Section V The Infernal Cycle
1. The First World War

To the fury aroused at the Vatican by the Franco-Russian alliance and shown so well in the Dreyfus Affair, to the anger which the Franco-Italian union incited, and to which the Loubet incident clearly testified, was added a bitter resentment caused by the Entente Cordiale with England. France had firmly decided not to stand alone opposite her ‘formidable neighbor’ and Austria-Hungary. Politics so “blind and ill-considered”, according to Monseigneur Cristiani, were looked upon most unfavourably by the Catholic Holy of Holies. For, besides jeopardizing the “thorough bleeding” godless France needed, these politics were a priceless support for schismatic Russia, this lost sheep whose return to the Roman Catholic fold had never ceased to be hoped for, though its accomplishment might mean a war. But for the time being the Orthodox Church stayed firmly implanted in the Balkans, especially in Serbia, where the treaty of Bucarest, ending the conflict of the Balkans, had made it a centre of attraction for the Slavs of the South and in particular for those under the yoke of Austria. The ambitious plans of the Vatican and the apostolic imperialism of the Hapsburgs were then in perfect accord, as in the past. To Rome and Vienna, the growing power of Serbia marked her out as the enemy to overthrow.

This is indeed established in a diplomatic document found in the Austrian- Hungarian archives; it reports, for the benefit of the Austrian minister Berchtold, on the talks Prince Schonburg had at the Vatican in October- November 1913:

“Amongst the subjects discussed first of all with the cardinal secretary of State (Merry del Val) last week, the question of Serbia came up, as anticipated. First of all, the cardinal expressed his joy at our firm and opportune attitude of recent months. During the audience I had that day with His Holiness, the Holy-Father, who started the conversation byTHE FIRST WORLD WAR mentioning our energetic steps taken in Belgrade, he made some characteristic remarks: “It would certainly have been better”, said his Holiness, “if Austria-Hungary had punished the Serbians for all the wrongs they had done”.(l)

So, the war-like sentiments of Pius X were clearly expressed in 1913 already. There is nothing surprising about this when we consider the inspirers of Roman politics.

“What were the Hapsburgs supposed to do? Chastise Serbia, an Orthodox nation. The prestige of Austria-Hungary, of these Hapsburgs who, with the Bourbons of Spain, were the last supporters of the Jesuits, and especially the prestige of the heir, Francois-Ferdinand, their man, would have been greatly increased. For Rome, the affair became one of almost religious importance; a victory of apostolic monarchy over Czarism could be considered as a victory of Rome over the schism of the East”.(2)

However, the affair dragged on in 1913. But, on the 28th of June 1914, the archduke Francois-Ferdinand was murdered at Sarajevo. The Serbian government had nothing to do with this crime committed by a Macedonian student, but it was the perfect excuse for the emporer Francois-Joseph to start hostilities.

“Count Sforza maintains that the main problem was to persuade Francois-Joseph that war was necessary. The advice of the pope and his minister was the one which could best influence him”.(3)

This advice was of course given to the emperor, and of the kind which could be expected from this pope and his minister, “favourite pupil of the Jesuits”. While Serbia was trying to maintain peace by giving in to all the wishes of the Austrian government which had sent a threatening note to Belgrade, Count Palffy, Austrian representative to the Vatican, gave to his minister Berchtold, on the 29th of July, a summary of the talks he had had on the 27th with the cardinal-secretary of State, Merry del Val; this conversation was about “the questions which are disturbing Europe at the moment”.

The diplomat scornfully denies the “fanciful” rumours about the supposed intervention of the pope who apparently “implored the emperor to spare the Christian nations the horrors of war”. Having dealt with these “absurd” suppositions, he expounds the “real opinion of the Curia”, as conveyed to him by the secretary of State:

(1) “Document” P.A. XI/291. (2) and (3) Pierre Dominique, op.cit., pp.245, 246, 250.

“It would have been impossible to detect any spirit of indulgence and conciliation in the words of His Eminence. It is true that he described the note to Serbia as very harsh, but he nevertheless approved of it entirely and, at the same time and indirectly, expressed the wish that the Monarchy would finish the job. Indeed, added the cardinal, it was a pity that Serbia had not been humiliated much earlier, as it could have been done, then, without such great risks attached. This declaration echoes the wishes of the pope who, over the past few years, often expressed regret that Austria-Hungary had neglected ‘chastising’ her dangerous neighbour on the Danube”.(4) This indeed is just the opposite to the “fanciful” rumours about a pontifical intervention in favour of peace.

In fact, the Austrian diplomat is not the only one who reports on the “real opinion” of the Roman pontiff and his minister.

The day before, on the 26th of July, Baron Ritter, Bavarian Charge d’Affaires to the Vatican, had written to his government:

“The pope agrees with Austria dealing severely with Serbia. He doesn’t think much of the Russian and French armies and is of the opinion that they could not do very much in a war against Germany. The cardinal-secretary of State doesn’t see when Austria could make war if she does not decide now”.(5)

(4) “Veroffentlichungen der (Commission fur Neuere Geschichte Osterreichs”, 26 Wien- Leipzig 1930, pp.893, 894. (5) This communication appears in”Bayerische Dokumentenzum Kriegssausbruch”, III , p 205.

So, the Holy See was fully conscious of the “great risks” represented by a conflict between Austria and Serbia, but, nevertheless, did all in its power to encourage it.

The Holy-Father and his Jesuit counsellors were not concerned about the sufferings of “Christian nations”! It was not the first time that these nations were used for the benefit of Roman politics. The opportunity wished for had come at last to use the Germanic secular arm against Orthodox Russia, “godless” France which needed a “thorough bleeding”, and, as a bonus, against “heretic” England. Everything seemed to promise a “lively and happy” war. Pius X did not see its unfolding and result, both contrary to his forecasts. He died at the beginning of the conflict, on the 20th of August 1914. But. forty years later, Pius XII canonised this august pontiff, and the “Precis d’Histoire Sainte” (Summary of Holy History), used for parochial catechism, dedicated to him these edifying words:

“Pius X did all he could to prevent the start of the 1914 war and he died of anguish when he foresaw the sufferings it would unleash”.

If this was satire, it could not be put in a better way!

A few years before 1914, M. Yves Guyot, a true prophet, said: “If war breaks out, listen, you men who think that the Roman Church is the symbol of order and peace, and do not search for blame outside of the Vatican: it will be the sly instigator, as in the war of 1870”.(6) Instigator of the slaughter, the Vatican was going to uphold no less craftily her Austro- German champions right through the war. The military excursion, in France, which the Kaiser boasted he was going to make, was stopped at the Marne and the aggressor brought back to the defensive after every one of his furious attacks. But, at least, pontifical diplomacy brought him all the help possible, and this is not surprising when we consider that Divine Providence seemed to delight in favouring the central empires.

Indeed, Cardinal Rampolla, considered to be pro-French—and for that reason kept away from the pontifical throne on a veto from Austria— wasn’t any more amongst those who could become pope as he had died a few months before Pius X, a death it seems very opportune. But this was not the whole of “God’s” intervention: As he had promised, even before voting took place, the new pope, Benedict XV appointed Cardinal Ferrata as secretary of State.

But the cardinal(7) did not even have the time to take up fully his new position. Having entered the secretary’s office at the end of September 1914, HE DIED SUDDENLY on the 20th of October, victim of a terrible indisposition after partaking of some “LIGHT REFRESHMENTS”.

“He was sitting at his desk when he suddenly became violently sick. He fell as if lightning had struck him. The servants hastened to come to his help. The doctor, who had been called immediately, realised straightaway the gravity of the situation and asked for a quick consultation. As for Ferrata, he had already understood and knew there was no hope… He pleaded that he should not be left to die at the Vatican… The medical consultation took place immediately at his hotel with six doctors… They refused to draw up a medical bulletin; the one published bore no signatures”.(8) He was not suffering from any kind of sickness or infirmity. “The scandal of this death was such that an inquest could not be avoided. The result of it was: a jar had been broken at the office. The presence of pounded glass in the sugar bowl used by the cardinal was explained quite simply in that way. Granulated sugar can be useful! The inquest was stopped there…”(9)

(6) Yves Guyot: “Bilan politique de l’Eglise”, p. 139.
(7) He was not very friendly towards the Jesuits.
(8) and (9) Abbe Daniel: “Le Bapteme de sang”, (Ed. de l’ldee Libre, Herblay 1935, pp.28-30).

The Abbe Daniel adds that the sudden departure, a few days later, of the servant of the deceased cardinal provoked quite a lot of remarks, especially as he had apparently been the servant of Monseigneur Von Gerlach before his master entered Holy Orders. This Germanic prelate, a notorius spy, was to flee from Rome in 1916: he was going to be arrested and charged with the sabotage of the Italian battleship “Leonard de Vinci” which blew up in the bay of Tarente, taking with it 21 officers and 221 seamen”. His trial was resumed in 1919. Von Gerlach did not appear and was condemned to twenty years hard labour”.(10)

Through the case of this “participating chamberlain”, editor of the “Osservatore Romano”, we get a clear idea of the state of mind in the Vatican’s high spheres.

It is again the Abbe Brugerette who describes the “entourage of the Holy See”: “Professors or ecclesiastics, they are not put off by any obstacles in their pursuit of impressing on the Italian clergy and the Catholic world in Rome respect and admiration for the Germanic army, contempt and hatred for France”.(11)

Ferrata, who favoured neutrality, had died just at the right time, and Cardinal Gasparri became secretary of State; in perfect agreement with Benedict XV, he did his best to serve the interests of the central empires “Considering all this, it is not surprising then that Pope Benedict XV, in the following months, worked hard to maintain Italy on the path of intervention which would best serve the Jesuits, friends of the Hapsburgs…”(12)

At the same time, the morale of the Allies was cunningly undermined. “On the 10th of January 1915, a decree signed by Cardinal Gasparn, secretary of State to Benedict XV, ordered that a day of prayer should be observed to hasten peace… One of the compulsory exercises of piety was the reciting of a prayer written by Benedict XV himself… The French government ordered that the pontifical document should be seized. This prayer for peace was considered to be a softening and destructive manifestation capable of slackening the efforts of our armies, at a time when the German hordes were feeling the irresistible pressure which would push them out of our territory, and when the Kaiser could see coming the terrible punishment his unpardonable crimes deserved… The pope, it was said, wanted peace come what may, at a time when it could only be in favour of the central empires. The pope does not like France; he is “German”.(13)

M. Charles Ledre, another Catholic writer, confirms: “On two occasions, mentioned in some famous articles of “La Revue de Paris”, the Holy See, by inviting Italy and later the United States to keep out of the war, did not merely wish for a quicker end of the conflict… According to the Abbe Brugerette, it served the interests of our enemies and worked against us”.(14) But the actions of the Jesuits, therefore the actions of the Vatican, were not only felt in Italy and the United States. Any means, every place, is good enough for them.

(10) (11) and (13) Abbe Brugerette, op.cit., III, pp.553, 528, 529. (12) Pierre Dominique, op.cit., p.252. (14) Charles Ledre, op.cit., p. 154.

“It is not surprising then to see pontifical diplomacy busy from the start at hindering our food supply; dissuading the neutrals from joining our side, in order to break the bond holding the ‘Entente’ together… Nothing was considered too insignificant if it could help this great task, and bring about peace by provoking some weakness amongst the Allies.

“There was worse: Solicitations for a separate peace. Between the 2nd and the 10th of January 1916, some German Catholics went to Belgium to preach, in the name of the pope they said, a separate peace. The Belgian bishops accused them of lying, but the nuncio and the pope remained silent… “Then, the Holy See thought of bringing together France and Austria, so hoping to make France sign a separate peace or demand that, with her allies, they should negotiate a general peace… A few weeks later, on the 31st of March 1917, Prince Sixte of Bourbon gave the famous letter of the emperor Charlesto the president of the Republic.

“As the manoeuvre had failed on this side of the Alps, it was bound to be tried again elsewhere, in England, in America, and especially in Italy… “Break up the temporal forces of the ‘Entente’ in order to stop its offensive attacks, ruin its moral prestige with the view to weaken its courage and bring it to terms… these two things make up the politics of Benedict XV and all the efforts of his impartiality always have been and are still aimed at hamstringing us”.(15)

This was written by a notorious Catholic, M. Louis Canet; and this is what the Abbe Brugerette wrote:

“We only learned four years later, through the declarations of M. Erzberger published in the “Germania” of the 22nd of April 1921, that the proposal of peace proclaimed by the Pope in August 1917 had been preceded by a secret accord between the Holy See and Germany”.(16) Another interesting point is that the ecclesiastical diplomat who negotiated this “secret accord” was the nuncio in Munich, Monseigneur Pacelli, future Pius XII.

One of his apologists, the R.P. Jesuit Fernesolle, wrote: “On the 28th of May (1917), Monseigneur Pacelli presented his letters of appointment to the king of Bavaria… He tried hard to enlist the co-operation of William II and the chancellor Bethmann-Holveg. On the 29th of June, Monseigneur Pacelli was solemnly received by the emperor William II at the headquarters of Kreuznach”.(17)

(15) Louis Canet: “Le Politique de Benoit XV”, (Revue de Paris, 15th of October and 1st of November 1918). (16) Abbe Brugerette, op.cit., III, p.543. (17 ) R.P. Fernesolle, S.J. “Pro pontifice”. Imprimatur 26th of June 1947,(Beauchesne, Paris 1947, p. 15.)

So, the future pope was starting his twelve years as nuncio in Munich, then in Berlin, in the way he meant to go on, for, during those years, he multiplied the intrigues to overthrow the German Republic established after the first world war and prepare the revenge of 1939 by bringing Hitler to power.

Yet, when the Allies signed the treaty of Versailles, in July 1919, they were so conscious of the part played by the Vatican in the conflict that it was carefully kept away from the conference table. And, even more surprising, it was the most Catholic State, Italy, which had insisted on its exclusion.

“Through art. XV of the pact of London (26th of April 1915), which defined Italy’s participation in the war, Baron Sonnino had obtained the promise from the other Allies that they would oppose any intervention of the papacy in the peace arrangements”. 18) This measure was wise but insufficient. Instead of applying the sanctions against the Holy See which it deserved for sparking off the first world war, the victors did nothing to prevent the further intrigues of the Jesuits and the Vatican; these eventually, 20 years later, led to a catastrophe even worse, maybe the worst the world has known.

(18) Charles Pichon: “Histoire du Vatican” (Sefi, Paris 1946, p. 143).123

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