This is from chapter XII of What The World Owes Luther by Junius Remensnyder which I found on The Lutheran Library.

Junius Benjamin Remensnyder (1843-1927) was a Lutheran pastor in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and served as the president of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church from 1911 to 1913.

America’s Debt to Luther

WHILE all civilized peoples share Luther’s heritage, yet especially here in America have we fallen heir to it. The principles of human freedom for which he battled have been embodied in our institutions as in no other country. This is particularly true as to the separation of Church and State. Luther found the State dominated by the Church. He showed that the sphere of the one was spiritual, and that of the other temporal, and that each was supreme in its own sphere alone. And that to preserve each from injury, neither should encroach upon the sphere of the other.

Writes Koestlin,¹ “ By Luther’s entire conception of the nature of the Church and ecclesiastical authority, every extension of that authority as divinely ordained, to the sphere of temporal, political, or civil life, was excluded.” So, conversely, he bluntly told the most powerful and arrogant civil rulers that they should keep their hands off the preparation of confessions and statements of religious doctrines, as being exclusively the business of the Church’s theologians.

¹ “Luther,” Vol, I, p. 308.

We can have no better illustration of the practical outcome of Luther’s principles respecting Church and State than the contrast between the colonists at Plymouth Rock and the Swedes, settled on the Delaware by the great Lutheran king, Gustavus Adolphus.

The former, although flying to escape religious intolerance, were soon persecuting Quakers and differing religionists as severely as they themselves had suffered. Contrariwise, the charter of King Adolphus’s American colony, confirmed by all the authorities of the kingdom, specially guaranteed freedom of worship for those of divergent confessions. In this Lutheran king’s scheme of colonization, all were invited to enjoy the blessings of a free state. Though a Lutheran colony, supported by a Lutheran government, the other colonists had peace and equal protection in it from the beginning, and when the Quakers came, they were at once and freely welcomed on the same free principles, as also were the representatives of the Church of England.

But chiefly does America owe to Luther her peerless prize of civil liberty.

When Luther made his famous stand at Worms for the rights of the individual, not alone liberty of conscience, but of the human reason, not alone the liberty of organized society, but personal liberty, the liberty of the individual, was on trial, and involved in his demand. What Luther there contended for was the right of a man, made in the image of God, to form and hold his own opinions; the divine prerogative of freedom of mind, thought and soul; that churches had their rights and sphere; that governments had their legitimate powers; but that the individual also had his rights, his sphere of independent action, his domain of liberty, and that within this sacred arcanum (hidden place) no scepter of pontiff, and no sword of monarch, dare enter on pain of the fiat (decree) of Almighty God.

America, then, in her separation of Church and State, and in her government by all the people, and for all the people—a true democracy—has profited far more largely by Luther than any modern nation. We are the heirs of his battles and victories and sacrifices, we share in the liberties he achieved, we illustrate in practice the thoughts he originated, as does no other people. America’s debt to Luther is one that every man, woman and child of her teeming millions should acknowledge—a debt that it would be as powerless to compute in dollars and cents as it would be to catch and number the drops of Niagara, as its mighty volume of waters plunges over the cataract. But a debt it is at least, that should never be forgotten, and for which we, and the generations that shall come after, and enjoy the blessings of this favored land, should not cease to be grateful.

This obligation has been expressed by Daniel Webster, America’s philosopher statesman, thus:

My friend Ron Bullock sent me books that contain insightful articles about Bible prophecy based on the Historical School of interpretation, also known as Historicism. The article I am posting, from one of the books I am reading today, defends the doctrine of Millennialism, the literal reign of Jesus Christ on earth as revealed in Revelation, chapter 20. I always liked that doctrine but started to have doubts about it after I left Futurism for Historicism. However, according to the author of this article, Millennialism was taught before Darby and Scofield’s futurism! This is very encouraging to me because I believe the prophecy in Isaiah chapter two is about Christ’s millennial reign on earth.

Ron compiled the articles in the booklet in 1987. I didn’t come out of Dispensationalism / Futurism until December of 2014. Debunking it is now one of the primary purposes of this website.

The following article is adapted from an address given by the author at a pastor’s conference on prophecy. Dr. Collins is Professor of Biblical Studies at Berkshire Christian College. He is a graduate of Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary and holds the M.A. and Ph.D. degree in Near Eastern and Judaic Studies from Brandeis University.

INTRODUCTION

The term “premillennialism” does not belong to the futurists. It has been used for centuries within the historicist school.

What is premillennial historicism? Historicism holds a principle that biblical prophecy is a forecast of redemptive history. As such, it is concerned with God’s covenant people and their redemption, their opposition to evil and their mission to the world. Historicists have understood that the Gentile church is “grafted in” to Israel and that prophecy includes both national and spiritual Israel, both Israelite-Jewish history and the history of the church. The so-called “church-age” is therefore in the mainline of biblical prophecy. Premillennial historicism sees in prophecy an intermediate, millennial kingdom during which Christ will reign visibly over the nations of the world after his second advent.

In our search for truth regarding prophetic interpretation, careful exegesis must be our final court of appeal. But we approach the Word with nineteen centuries of prior interpretation. We should give due consideration to the works of godly and learned men.

THE HISTORY OF THE PREMILLENNIAL HISTORICIST SCHOOL

1. First three centuries. Although futurists lay claim to much the same ground, the church of the first three centuries was both historical and premillennial. A fundamental aspect of historicist interpretation is the recognition that the church age is an integral part of prophecy. It is not a parenthesis. The seventieth week in Daniel is connected to the sixty-ninth; and the events prophesied in Revelation chapters four and following began in the days of the early church. This was affirmed with a nearly unanimous voice.¹

The early church was also premillennial until the eschatological shift which occurred with the Constantinian revolution.² Rome, formerly viewed as Antichrist, then became the protector of the church. With a state church arose a new allegorized millennialism which taught that Christ already reigned and Satan was already bound by the church and its spread of the gospel. Eventually in A.D.373 Pope Damasus I and the Council of Rome formally condemned premillennialism and put it under a ban, from which it appears not to have escaped until the Protestant Reformation (Taylor, p.115).

2. The Dark Ages. With the establishment of the state church, the persecution of “heretics” gradually developed and evangelical dissenters went underground. In the period of the Dark Ages which followed, it is very difficult to determine with certainty the extent of premillennial doctrine. We have reason to believe, however, that evangelical dissenters from the state church like the Paulicians, at least from the seventh century, were premillennialists. We know them only from the writings of their opponents, who chose to caricature their views rather than address the questions directly.³

With the growing assimilation into the church of such Pagan customs as the worship of saints and images, expositors pointed to Roman institutions and the rising papacy as Antichrist. They often identified the little horn of Daniel seven, the man of lawlessness of Second Thessalonians two, and the ten-horned beast of Revelation thirteen with the predicted Antichrist of John’s first epistle (2.18). The term antichrist came to be used in the dissenting churches in the specific sense of the Roman-papal ecclesiastical power. The papal antichrist doctrine was adopted by the Reformers and has characterized most of the historicist interpretation of the Protestant churches through the end of the nineteenth century. The Reformers saw in the Reformation movement the fall of the antichrist and therefore looked eagerly for the end of the age.

3. Post Reformation. In the post-Reformation reconstruction of the seventeenth century, historicist expositors began to produce commentaries on the book of Revelation. At this point the pendulum swung sharply back to the premillennial view. Of great importance to the prophetic exposition of subsequent centuries was the work of Joseph Mede, Clavis Apocalypticae, “The Key to the Apocalypse” published in Latin in 1627.”⁴

Of the 168 Protestant commentators cataloged by Leroy Froom, from the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, eleven were postmillennial, eight were amillennial, and 149 were premillennial. All in some way identified the Antichrist with Papal Rome.⁵ From the time that Joseph Mede published his commentary in 1627 until the turn of the 19th century, prophetic exposition was overwhelmingly premillennial historicist.

With the growth of the futurist movement, beginning to flourish near the end of the 19th century, and the preterist movement which rode the wake of higher criticism, the trend has shifted. Other factors were involved. No doubt the failure of several prophetic dates set with too much assurance by historicist interpreters turned some away from a literal approach to the more generalizing and spiritualizing methods of the preterists. Now, late in our century, a new amillennial historicism may be developing, borrowing elements from preterist and spiritualizing interpretations.

I believe, however, that literal interpretation and the Protestant premillennial-historicist consensus of nearly four centuries contributed substantially to the great movement of the post-Reformation and modern church to world evangelization, and to the resurgence of the Advent hope in the nineteenth century.

The renewed prophetic expectation of the restoration of Israel was foreseen in prophecy by leading premillennial historicists of the nineteenth century.⁶ They not only saw the return through a literal interpretation of prophecy, but some in high places who read these prophecies in this light used their influence politically to help secure a homeland for the restored Israel.⁷

THE PROGRESS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE PREMILLENNIAL HISTORICIST SCHOOL

1. The Medean Consensus. The concern for literal interpretation which produced the premillennial restoration of Mede (English scholar Joseph Mede (1586 – 1639)who wrote Clavis Apocalyptica Key of the Revelation Searched and Demonstrated) and his successors also resulted in a high degree of agreement within the school. The devout interpreter of prophecy should, I believe, always consider respectfully the deposit left to the church and offer reform or move in new directions only with godly reticence.

Limitations of time preclude our entering into a more detailed review, so I will make only a few more general observations. The first is that the outline of Mede’s analysis of the Apocalypse has been reflected in nearly all of subsequent interpretation within the school. Mede’s position can be summarized briefly:

1. The antichrist power of the Apocalypse is the papal ecclesiastical system wielding temporal power for 1260 years (the beast under its eighth head and the harlot Babylon. )

2. The seals forecast the progressive decay and fall of Roman paganism as a political system.

3. The trumpets forecast the downfall of the old Roman Empire under the assaults of the barbarians.

4. The bowls forecast assaults against the papacy and its eventual fall.

The downfalls of the Roman system reflected in the above outline are, of course, viewed by Mede and his successors as divine judgments.⁸

Mede saw the bowl judgments as being fulfilled in his time through the progress of the Reformation. With the change which occurred in Roman Europe through the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, the leading expositors came to see the resulting loss of Papal temporal power as the true fulfillment of the earlier bowl judgments. This realignment resulted in the continuous-historicist view, in which the seals, the trumpets, and the bowls are understood to represent a continuous chronology within the structure of the book of Revelation. In this view, the sixth bowl represents the fall of the Ottoman Turkish Empire and the seventh some final judgment at the end time.

2. Continuous-Historicism. The premillennial historicist interpretation came to its classic expression in the work of E.B. Elliott, Horae Apocalypticae (five editions, 1844-1862). Perhaps the greatest student and writer of the continuous historicist school was H. Grattan Guinness. He wrote nine major scholarly works on prophecy between 1878 and 1905, published in many editions in both Britain and America. The Approaching End of the Age passed through fourteen editions. Guinness was also a great preacher, a missionary to several countries, and a great missionary educator.⁹

Another outstanding British expositor was E.P. Cachemaille. He was also an educator and secretary of the South American Missionary Society. His commentary, The Visions of Daniel and the Revelation Explained, was published in several editions starting in 1911. These books have never been updated, and they are so much in demand that they seldom appear in the catalogs of the second-hand book trade.

THE BIBLICAL FOUNDATION OF THE PREMILLENNIAL HISTORICIST SCHOOL

The doctrine of the millennium is found principally in Revelation 20:1. The principal aspects of the millennial doctrine addressed in the above texts are: (1) the binding of Satan, (2) the promise of two resurrections, and (3) the concept of an intermediate, messianic kingdom between the present and the eternal age.

1. A literal hermeneutic. The determination of the question of the millennium, as also of the restoration of Israel, rests with the literal method of hermeneutics. If biblical language, when due allowance is made for apocalyptic symbolism and figures of speech, is understood in its ordinary and natural sense, premillennial doctrine will emerge. Contrariwise amillennialism and postmillennialism require unnatural allegorizing of certain texts. In our brief review of the question, I will illustrate and defend this judgment.

2. The binding of Satan. Our text begins with the prediction of the binding of Satan (Rev.20.3). The language is clearly that of apocalyptic symbolism. Some of the symbols are familiar to the reader from earlier chapters of the book (especially chs. 12,13). If the reader allows the normal sense of the language, several conclusions should follow.

First the binding of Satan reverses the role of Satan described earlier in the book. Satan is “bound to keep him from deceiving the nations any more” (vs.3). In the symbolic language of the book, “Israel” denotes the people of God (14:1-4) and “the nations,” Gentiles, are the unbelievers (see 13:3b,4,7,8,etc.). Deceiving the nations is precisely the role of Satan (the Dragon) in his war conducted through the Beast and the false prophet, “who had deluded those who had received the mark of the beast.” The Beast and the false prophet are destroyed (19:20) and the dragon, Satan, is bound “to keep him from deceiving the nations any more” (20:3).

The normal sense of language requires that Satan’s war of deception and his binding be consecutive events, not contemporaneous as Amillennialists affirm. This understanding is supported also by the imagery used to describe Satan’s imprisonment. He is bound with “a great chain” and “locked and sealed” in the abyss (20:2), language inappropriate to denote partial limitation. Moreover Satan is prevented from deceiving unbelievers (the “nations”), not the elect, as amillennialism requires.

The question is not whether Satan is in any sense bound during the present Gospel age. Jesus does indeed speak of a binding of “the strong man,” Satan, in connection with the work of the Spirit within chosen individuals in this age (Mt.13:29; Mk.3:27). Nevertheless, this use of the figure does not fit the language of Revelation 20:1-3.

3. Two literal resurrections. Revelation 20:4,5 speak of the millennial age as bounded by two resurrections: “They came to life and reigned with Christ a thousand years. (The rest of the dead did not come to life until the thousand years were ended.)” The second resurrection of “the rest of the dead” is referred to again in connection with the judgment in verse 13, where literal death and resurrection is required by the context. The question then must be asked whether the “first resurrection” may be figurative, as amillennialists and postmillennialists affirm.

The Bible does use the concept of resurrection figuratively of the regenerative work of the Spirit. Jesus speaks analogically of two resurrections, metaphorically of the spiritual resurrection of the believers in this present age and literally of all men in the last day. The question is not whether it is possible so to speak of two resurrections in the same context in which one is figurative and the other literal, but rather whether this is what the language says in Revelation 20. In the text in question there is no analogy between literal and figurative resurrection.

The expression, “the rest of the dead” (vs.5), of necessity implies that the first resurrection is partial and that it is completed by the second. If the “rest of the dead,” the second resurrection, are literally dead, grammatical exegesis requires a literal interpretation of the first resurrection.

The context also requires a literal first resurrection. The principal subjects of the first resurrection are “the souls of the martyrs and whoever had not worshipped the beast or his image nor received the mark on their forehead or their hand” (20:4, translation mine). The concept of martyrdom implies death resulting from their witness to Jesus, a concept inappropriate to describe those who might be spiritually dead, (i.e. unbelieving) and subject to spiritual resurrection. The same may be said with regard to their stated disassociation from the beast.

The literal approach to interpretation requires us to take such language in its normal sense. The significance of martyrdom and beast worship should then be seen from the preceding chapters in the book where during the Gospel age the Martyrs are the believers who have given their lives for their refusal to worship the beast (13:7,10,16; 14:4). With chapter 20, the beast is destroyed, Satan is bound, and the martyrs are raised to reign with Christ. The impossibility of the amillennial view can be seen in the supposed fact that the martyrs are “raised” in regeneration before their martyrdom.

The amillennial view of a resurrection of the righteous with the wicked must also adopt an unnatural view of other biblical texts which imply that the righteous will be raised separately from the wicked. Note Jesus’ statement that only some “are considered worthy of taking part. .. . in the resurrection from the dead” (Luke 20:25). The language necessarily implies a partial resurrection. Some will not take part in it. Moreover, the expression “from the dead” implies that some will not be raised, the full translation being not “from the state of death,” but “that which is out from among those who are dead.” The concept of partial resurrection was the common Jewish concept familiar to Jesus’ audience and the terminology was commonly used in that sense by the rabbis of his time.¹¹

The Apostle Paul in Philippians 3:10 states his purpose to know Christ and thereby “to attain to the resurrection from the dead.” His use of the Greek language is peculiarly constructed to emphasize the partial nature of the resurrection, that only of the righteous dead, and thereby to heighten the effect of his statement. He repeats the definite article with the partitive preposition, alluding to the “out of resurrection” ( exanastasin) as “out from among the dead”, (ek nekron). Only by abandoning literal interpretation can this be taken to refer to a general resurrection of all the dead.

Several other texts refer to the resurrection of the righteous as a distinct event (Dan.12:2; Lk.14:14; 1 Thess.4:16; 1 Cor.15:22,23). They serve further to support premillennial doctrine.

4. An intermediate kingdom. The third aspect of premillennial doctrine is the concept of an intermediate, messianic kingdom between the present and the eternal age. This kingdom is a limited time after the return of Christ when he rules over the nations of the world. The time may be a literal one thousand years or the number may be figurative. Is this concept foreign to the rest of Scripture as some opponents of the premillennial view suggest?

Many prophecies speak of a time when the nation of Israel will be glorified by the Lord among the nations of the world. Jerusalem will be exalted.

“I will bring health and healing to it; I will heal my people and let them enjoy abundant peace and security. I will bring Judah and Israel back from captivity and restore them as they were before. I will cleanse them from all the sins they have committed against me and will forgive all their sins of rebellion against me. Then this city will bring me reknown, joy, praise, and honor before all nations on earth that hear of all the good things I do for it.” (Jer. 33:6-9)

“Then the survivors from all the nations that have attacked Jerusalem will go up year after year to worship the king, the LORD Almighty, and to celebrate the Feast of Tabernacles. If any of the peoples of the earth do not go up to Jerusalem to worship the king, the LORD Almighty, they will have no rain.” (Zech. 14:16,17).

These and many other prophecies predict a time still future when the Messiah will reign from a restored Jerusalem and in the midst of a cleansed and reunited Israel over the nations of the world. The nations are viewed as recognizing Christ’s sovereignty while at the same time they are not beyond disobedience or rebellion (Is. 54:13-17; 60:10-12). Revelation 20:6 states that God’s covenant people “will be priests of God and of Christ.” This probably should be read as an allusion to Isaiah’s prophecy in 61:6:

You will be called priests of the LORD,
You will be named ministers of our God.
You will feed on the wealth of the nations,
And in their riches you will boast.

The millennial reign of Revelation 20 reflects the teaching of the Old Testament prophecies which hold up the glories and blessedness of the of the Messianic reign as the antidote to the suffering of God’s people. The prediction of tribulation and martyrdom in the church parallels the earlier sufferings of the faithful in Israel. The millennial prophecy reiterates in explicit messianic terms the biblical hope earlier proclaimed by the Old Testament prophets. At the same time it reaffirms the sovereignty of Christ in the temporal order of nations-“that all rulers will worship and obey him” (Dan. 7:28).

CONCLUSION

The premillennial historicist view is the alternative to a spiritualizing or allegorical approach; it preserves in a systematic manner the true and natural sense of prophecy. The preponderance of biblical interpreters from apostolic times in the early church and in Protestantism have been convinced that the premillennial historicist understanding of prophecy is not only supported by the last book of the Bible but results from the literal method of interpretation as applied systematically to the whole of biblical revelation.

** NOTES **

1. The exception seems to have been the African bishop, Hippolytus, who according to Jerome ended the 69th week with the birth of Christ and started the seventieth week at the time of the end of the world. E.B. Elliott, Horae Apocalypticae, 4th edition, IV, 284, n.2 London, 1851.

2. See Daniel T. Taylor, The Reign of Christ on Earth, (Boston: H.L Hastings, 1893), pp. 76-109.

3. See Elliott’s defense of the Paulicians as true evangelicals in Horae Apocalypticae, II, 240-258, 286-332, esp. pp. 311-314.

4. The Berkshire Christian College library has a 1677 edition. Also at hand from the library of my colleague, Professor Carl F. Ehle, is a rare copy of the English translation of R. Bransby Cooper (London: Rivington, 1833)

5. Leroy Edwin Froom, The Prophetic Faith of our Fathers, II (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 1948), 786-787; III (1946) 252-253; IV (1954), 400-401.

6. Note especially Elliott IV, 45, 46, 122, 123, 239, 240; H.G. Guinness, The Approaching End of the Age (New York: Armstrong,1884) pp. 435-436; History Unveiling Prophecy (New York: Revell, 1905) pp. 360-392.

7. See Carl F. Ehle, Jr., Prolegomena to Christian Zionism in America (Diss., New York University., 1977).

8. Joseph Mede, A Key to the Apocalypse, trans. R. Bransby Cooper (London: Rivington, 1833).

9. W.B. Owen, “Henry Grattan Guinness, “Dictionary of National Biography: Supplement (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1920), pp. 165-176.

10. The first edition appeared under the title XXVI Present Day Papers on Prophecy: An Explanation of the Visions of Daniel and of the Continuous-Historic System (London: Seeley, Service, 1911). The work was subsequently reissued by the same publisher as The Visions of Daniel and Revelation Explained. One chapter is “A Survey of Ezekiel XXXVI to XLVIII.”

11. Nathaniel West, The Thousand Years in Both Testaments (Chicago: Revell, 1888), pp. 349-378, especially p. 370; George Foot Moore, Judaism, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 1966), II, 297-298.

This is from chapter XI of What The World Owes Luther by Junius Remensnyder which I found on The Lutheran Library.

Junius Benjamin Remensnyder (1843-1927) was a Lutheran pastor in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and served as the president of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church from 1911 to 1913.

WHAT THE WORLD OWES LUTHER

TO realize what mankind owes to Luther for the work of the Reformation, we must look at what the world was when he threw down his challenge to the existing sacerdotal system, and compare it with the world as it has been and is, since.

Although the formula of Papal Infallibility was not officially declared until the Vatican Council in 1870, yet it was recognized as fully existent. This investiture gave the Pope the absolute right to interpret Holy Scripture. Once his decree had gone forth, the decision must be universally accepted as inerrant. This practically placed an embargo upon Scriptural exegesis. When the meaning of disputed passages was not to be decided by linguistic, historical and critical tests, what use for the study of Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and the investigation of manuscripts, and Scriptural learning? Consequently very little attention was given to searching out the true meaning, and opening up the fountains of Scriptural truth.

Moreover, as the right of “private judgment” was denied, and as all interpretation was in the hands of Pope and priests, the individual Christian felt that he was in danger of committing sacrilege if he went to the Word of God for himself. Under these conditions, it is not to be wondered at that the circulation of the Holy Scriptures was neither encouraged nor facilitated, so that practically the Bible was excluded from the possession of the people. There could be no stronger illustration of this than the surprise and joy of a brilliant student like Luther, when one day he found an entire copy of the Bible chained to a shelf in the university. And so, later, “the Bible in the hands of the laity” became his powerful slogan.

Now when we remember that “the entrance of Thy Word giveth light,” and compare the hundreds of languages into which the Bible is translated in our day, the circulation of copies by millions, as the leaves of the forests, the cheap editions which the poorest can purchase, and the free distribution, we see the change wrought by the Reformation, through Luther’s demand that every one’s right and duty were to read and interpret the sacred volume for himself. We cannot expect Christians to be such in deed and in truth unless they are informed and transformed by those Scripture truths which our Lord declares are “spirit and are life.” And this one fact explains the far greater Scriptural intelligence of Protestant Christians and the true spirituality which characterizes their piety.

But again the Romish Church had abused the claim to infallibility for ecumenical councils and popes, by the teaching of false doctrine, corrupting the pure gospel teaching. By this perversion of the truth, she clouded the minds of Christians and obstructed the way of life. These errors taught by the Church were partly the result of ignorance, and partly the lust for authority and power.

A primary one of these errors was that to the Church alone belonged the forgiveness of sins. The next step was that the Church could use this power over the souls and consciences of men to promote her own selfish and temporal interests. Thus came about what can truly be termed the infamous sale of indulgences. For money, then, sins great and small, sins past, present and even in the future [the bold purveyors of them often proclaimed], would be pardoned.

To strike at this pernicious traffic was Luther’s chief intent in nailing up his ninety-five theses, the twenty-first of which ran: “Therefore do the preachers of indulgences err when they say that by the papal indulgence a man is released and saved from all punishment.” And in the twenty seventh he delivers one of his cutting blows thus: “They preach human folly who pretend that as soon as the money cast into the chest clinks, the soul escapes.” And then Luther went on in these theses to declare that the Lord Jesus Christ had paid on the cross the full penalty of human sins, and that therefore any soul was freely justified. All that was needed was penitence and faith. Thus was opened up again the way of life which had been clogged and barred by penances and indulgences and ritualistic formalities and meaningless rites, until it was almost impossible to find it.

And the freedom, the simplicity, the confidence and the joy Christians now have in the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith alone, opening to them a new view and way of life, they owe to the blessed Reformation under Martin Luther.

The blessings of a free state, and of civil and religzous liberty, are another heritage the world owes to Luther, through the Reformation. In the Middle Ages the Church, through her claim to the spiritual primacy of St. Peter, asserted her right to dominate the State. No sovereign could ascend the throne without her investiture, and through her bull of excommunication she could, at pleasure, release his subjects from their allegiance. Thomas Aquinas sought to show that “submission to the Roman pontiff is necessary to every human being.”

And how this principle was reduced to practice is shown by Henry IV of Germany pleading, bareheaded and cold, for three days at the castle of Canossa for Pope Gregory VII to restore his forfeited crown. So King John of England, in 1213, after a losing struggle with Pope Innocent, laid his realm at the feet of the Pope’s legate, “to receive it back as a fief from Rome.” In his pledge he decrees “the concession of the kingdoms of England and Ireland with all their rights and appurtenances to our mother the Holy Roman Church, and to our Lord Pope Innocent and his Catholic successors, receiving and holding them as it were a vassal from God and the Roman Church, we swear fealty.” “The Political Theories of Martin Luther,” Waring, p. 17.

How fatal so preposterous a claim to freedom on the part of the State! How impossible under such a régime the development of mankind in the art of representative civil government! No wonder that under such a system there developed in Europe iron-clad autocracies in which the rights of the common people were utterly ignored. That all power, wealth, utilities and ownership of land, were held by a very few. That the princes, nobles and great families led lives of absolute ease, selfishness, indifference to the welfare of communities, and spent most of their time in revelry and vice. And that the masses of the peasants possessed no rights that their harsh lords were bound to respect, and were doomed to lives of hopeless poverty, ignorance and misery.

It was these wrongs and these unrighteous conditions that made the great heart of Luther bleed with sympathy, and that fired his courageous soul with hot indignation. In the boldest terms he challenges the claims of the Church to dominate the State, and proves from the Scriptures that her kingdom is not of this world, and that she must confine her sovereignty to the spiritual sphere. And in his “Address to the German Nobility,” he reproves the princes for their tyrannies and vices, and threatens them with an outbreak of divine vengeance, like one of the prophets of the Old Testament. At the same time he pleads the cause and rights of the peasantry in the strongest terms.

And it was only under the colossal and continuous blows of Luther that these unscriptural and destructive claims of the Church were relegated to the Dark Ages, and that there resulted the modern Free State. Hence the boon of civil liberty, the cause of human rights, the welfare and happiness of the masses, and the signs of the coming rule of Democracy everywhere, are our debt to Luther and his contemporaries alone.

And the same is true with respect to religious liberty. The pages of history are crimson with the blood that has been shed for conscience sake. The noblest saints, and those whose characters have shed the rarest luster upon our race, have suffered the severest persecutions, and been broken on the wheel, or burned at the stake, for the only reason that they “feared God rather than man.” The fires of martyrdom have lit up with a lurid glare the horizon from the days of the primitive Christian persecutions down to the sixteenth century. And even later, in France, England, Switzerland, etc., this spirit of intolerance led to barbarous executions.

And it was alone owing to the inflexible stand taken by the German princes whom Luther’s powerful personality had won to his support, that he himself escaped death. But from that era, religious liberty has prevailed in Germany, and thence has spread throughout all Protestantism.

No more burnings of a heroine saint, Joan of Arc, or of a preacher of the pure Gospel, John Hus, or of a noble Archbishop Cranmer, or exile of the Quakers from their native land, for conscientious religious convictions. Every man now can hold such religious belief as he pleases and worship God as he thinks right “sitting under his own vine and fig-tree, none daring to molest or make them afraid.”

And for this most inestimable prerogative of the human soul, that which affects more than every other his happiness and peace—religious liberty— enjoyed in these later ages, in all its fullness, we can thank none other than the indomitable hero of the Reformation.

A Scriptural conception of the Church was another rediscovery of Luther. His studies of the Post-Apostolic era and the primitive Church showed that its office had been perverted from its original purpose. The Church was designed to help, guide and strengthen the believer in the Christian life. But, under the prevalent conception of Luther’s time, it had taken the place of Christ, and stood between the believer and his Lord and Saviour.

The great theologian, Schieiermacher, thus defines the diverse theories held by Luther and his papal opponents:

When, through the Word, the believer has found Christ, then the Church tenderly nurtures within him the new spiritual life. Luther by no means depreciated the Church and her legitimate sphere and authority. Contrariwise, he laid great stress upon the importance of the Church with her Word and Sacraments as the means of grace. By this Scriptural, Protestant interpretation, the Church becomes, instead of an obstacle in the path of the seeker, a living shepherd to nurture and strengthen him in the way of salvation.

An important practical result of the Reformation is the change wrought in Public Worship. It had, with the predominance given to the priest, and with the abnormal authority lodged in him, been taken almost wholly from the congregation. The officiating clergy conducted the service mostly himself. And the part of the people consisted chiefly in routine formulas and inane repetitions. And, as the service was conducted in the Latin tongue, and not understood by the people, there was very little intelligent and real worship in it. Besides the sacraments, with their forgiveness and grace, being in the power of the priests, they reduced the preaching of the Word to a very secondary place.

But Luther changed all this. And, by having the service in the vernacular tongue, and setting aside many of the meaningless and burdensome repetitions, and encouraging the congregations to join in the popular hymns he wrote for them, the service was simplified, it was made natural instead of artificial, and inspired and enthused by Christian song, the worship of the sanctuary became free, spontaneous, joyous and helpful.

Then Luther brought into the forefront the prophetic office of the ministry. Preaching, from being almost neglected, was given the chief place in the service. The art of preaching was again studied, effective preachers and expounders of the Holy Scriptures were sought after, and the churches were filled with ardent listening congregations. The liturgies of the past, and the usages of the universal Church, freed from corruptions, were retained, and the Protestant form of worship became an ideal one. This distinction, and this superior simplicity, directness and popularity characterize, to a greater or less extent, all the branches of Protestantism.

The Worship of the Saints, which had become one of the greatest abuses and most universal practices of the Church, was rejected. Luther tells us that “it took him twenty years to emancipate himself from the delusion of the perfect holiness and power of the intercession of the saints,” so deeply had this fallacy been ingrained in him. Then he at last learned “to test even the holy fathers whom he so much revered, as Sts. Augustine, Jerome and Francis, by the Gospel of Christ, and he found them fallible men.”

Hence suppliants were taught that the worship of the saints was contrary to the teaching of Scripture and to the usage of the primitive Church, and was an act of sacrilege. And, instead of going to the saints, who themselves needed intercession, the petitioner was sent direct to Christ, who, possessed of all power in heaven and upon earth, and sitting at the right hand of the Father, Himself presents our prayers to the Almighty Throne.

Luther, moreover, gave us the true ideal of a Christian Home. He protested against the false notion that God could only be served by celibacy and retirement from the world into a cloister. He held matrimony to be God’s order and that of nature, and that therefore it was “a holy estate.” Hence he protested against the monks and nuns shutting themselves away from the active service of men and living at the expense of the community. And he held that it was desirable that the clergy should marry, and be familiar with the cares and duties, and also be recuperated by the pleasures of the domestic sphere. And Luther, himself, set the example of a charming and happy family life. Thus he glorified the Christian Home. And, in contending that the humblest peasant could serve God and the Church and society by fidelity in his lowly calling, as well as princes on their thrones, he upraised and sanctified the duties of common life.

Roman Catholics, intelligent and pious, will contest this picture of mankind’s debt to Luther and Protestantism. The author’s friend, the accomplished Dr. James J. Walsh, in his very able and fascinating volume, “The Thirteenth the Greatest of Centuries,” cites this eloquent description from the historian, Frederick Harrison:

This is a beautiful ideal, and such a universality and unity have a surpassing charm for all, especially for conservative minds and cultured tastes. But, unfortunately, it is an ideal that cannot be realized until humanity is much more highly developed than anything we can conceive of now. As mankind is constituted at present, such a harmony would be that of stagnation, such a unity can only be that of suppression, such a peace but that of death. It utterly lacks the breadth, the movement, the diversities, the activities and the inspirations of life.

That the gains of Protestantism have not been made without some regrettable losses cannot be denied. The unity of the Roman Catholic Church has many advantages over the divisions of Protestantism, but the price required to be paid for it far outweighs the gain. The right of private judgment and the individual freedom of the Christian often lead to a hurtful disregard of the necessity and proper authority of the Church.

It is a sad truth, exemplified a thousand times by history, that liberty is liable to abuse. The larger privileges men enjoy, to the greater dangers and fallacies are they exposed. A strong government prevents disorder, but it is also hostile to free growth. In Protestantism we do suffer from the vagaries Of individualism, and the large range accorded to congregations and pastors is sometimes taken advantage of by sensational methods and fanatical evangelists, by which means the Church is injured and the influence of religion weakened with intelligent and sensible people.

But these are disadvantages inseparable from the exercise of individual and ecclesiastical freedom. And they are not for a moment to be set over against the inestimable blessings of civil and religious liberty procured by the Reformation. Romanism has indeed the solid unity, the strength, the massiveness and the immobility of a mighty fortress, but Protestantism is rather a majestic tree, its springing branches swaying freely in the winds of heaven, instinct with energy, virility and growth —a Tree of Life.

Genius and the iron hand can no more harmonize than Napoleon and Madame de Staél could live within the boundaries of the same France. The spirit of man, to attain its loftiest flights, must have unclipped wings and unwalled skies. It is better to tolerate the vagaries of genius by giving it the open, than to stifle its powers within the bars of a prison. Besides, if great wrongs have been perpetrated, and dangerous heresies held in the name, and through the exercise of liberty, how multitudinous and woeful have been the tyrannies, the persecutions, the repressions, and the outrages committed by authority? The bloodiest chapters of the world’s history record its monstrous enormities. And the experience and wonderful progress of the past four centuries have given incontestable proof that it is only when the human mind is unfettered by ecclesiastical and civil tyranny that the race advances most rapidly upon the path of achievement, happiness and prosperity.

So it is to the work of Luther in the Reformation that we live in a new world. In passing from the Middle Ages to this modern period, mankind has left behind it darkness, and entered upon an era of light.

On every hand we see civilization taking greater strides. Absolute freedom of investigation has given an immense impulse to science. Schools and universities and specialized studies abound on an unprecedented scale. Government, not by and for the privileged few, but “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” is rapidly becoming universal. Religion, relieved of cramped uniformity, is more spiritual, vigorous, joyous and true. The missionary spirit is bearing abroad the Gospel to the nations, near and afar.

In short, no such a wondrous transformation in the condition of the race, no such a new epoch in civilization, no such a forward step in the march of the human mind, and no such a revolution in the destinies, uplift and happiness of mankind, have been introduced by any single personality in the world’s history as that by Luther in the work of the Reformation.

Yet Luther’s mighty task is far from being completed. Vast is the responsibility that rests upon the Christendom of the twentieth century to carry it forward. Luther has made a merely external Church and a merely formalistic religion forever impossible. But a spiritual religion, charged with living energy and power, propagated by a Church preaching the pure Gospel of Christ, and winning the world to God,—that is our ideal and our aim. And the larger the blessings of the Reformation, and the richer the possibilities in it for the uplift and happiness of the world, the greater should be our devotion, enthusiasm and sacrifice.

My wife Tess and I saw this together and we deem it quite enlightening and educational.

Transcription

The year is 1999. Pope John Paul II gently bows and presses his lips to the Quran, the holy book of Islam. Cameras flash. The world gasps. Is it a gesture of peace? Or is it a signal to insiders?

Now rewind 13 centuries. A man kneels inside a cave on the edge of the Arabian desert. He’s trembling. Voices whisper in the dark. His name? Muhammad, his comforter. A wealthy woman with Christian connections. Her cousin? A Catholic scholar of the Gospels.

In that moment a new religion is born. But was it truly born of the desert? Or conceived in the shadows of Rome? This is not just another story about Islam. This is a journey into the hidden architecture of power. A forgotten story that stretches from Mecca’s sacred black stone to the marble halls of the Vatican.

You’ve been told that these two world religions are rivals. But what if they were never truly enemies? What if Islam, far from being Rome’s greatest opponent, was actually one of its greatest creations? The symbols, the rituals, the alliances, all point to one chilling conclusion.

What began as a spiritual movement may have been, from the very start, part of a master plan. A plan hatched in the smoke of incense behind curtains of secrecy and sealed with blood. The truth is not what it seems. And what you’re about to discover may change how you see history and prophecy forever.

First let’s acknowledge something important. The sincere devotion of Muslim believers. I remember Muslim students who prayed faithfully, lived modestly, and stood firmly for what they believed was right. They were honest, principled, and loyal. Loyal like few others. In their daily prayers and strict lifestyles they seek to honor God wholeheartedly.

These qualities command respect. Such commitment reminds us of the biblical Daniel, unwavering in worship even in a foreign land. One cannot help but admire their dedication and moral clarity. And yet even the most devoted followers can be in the dark about unseen influences.

One might ask, is it possible to be completely sincere, yet sincerely wrong? The love and zeal of these believers make the hidden story all the more tragic and all the more urgent to reveal.

Throughout history religions have often had two sides. One for the masses and a secret side known only to a few. The medieval Knights Templar, for example, outwardly appeared as devout Catholic monks, but inwardly many indulged in occult rituals of Luciferianism. They presented one face to the world and another to their inner circle.

Could something similar be happening within Islam? Could there be an inner circle guiding Islam from behind the scenes, just as there was in medieval Catholicism? It sounds like the plot of a novel, but think about it. Both Catholicism and Islam have mysterious elite orders and historic secrets. The Bible itself hints at a hidden power behind earthly kingdoms, a beast power centered in Rome.

Prophecy identifies Rome as the seat of great deception and control in the last days. Islam, on the surface, didn’t arise from Rome at all. Or did it? What if a Roman hand has been steering the course of Islam from the shadows, right from the very start? The stage is set. Let’s turn back the pages of time and see how this saga began.

Our journey leads us to the birth of Islam and its prophet Muhammad. In AD 570, as a young trader, Muhammad married a wealthy widow named Khadija when he was 25 and she was 40. But Khadija was no ordinary Arabian woman. She was raised in a noble trading clan, had Christian connections, and held monotheistic beliefs. Her cousin Waraka was a devout Roman Catholic too, even a scholar of the Gospels.

This means Muhammad’s closest confidants in his early years were deeply connected to the Catholic faith. Picture the scene. An Arab seeker marries a cultured woman of wealth, education, and strong religious connections. She employs and mentors him, convinced he might be chosen by God. It was Khadija who encouraged Muhammad to trust the mysterious spirit that spoke to him in a cave. The voice he said was the angel Gabriel bringing revelations.

Was it truly an angel of God? Muhammad himself was terrified at first. But with Khadija’s comfort and Waraka’s counsel, he became convinced that he was a prophet. It’s as if Rome’s influence was whispering in his ear from the very start.

Is it a coincidence that the very founder of Islam had a direct connection to the Roman church? Or was a groundwork being laid for a grand plan? The pieces of the puzzle were just beginning to form.

With Khadija’s support, Muhammad soon began preaching a new faith, Islam. He taught that there is only one God, Allah, and that all idols must be destroyed. His message challenged the paganism of Arabia. Facing opposition, Muhammad fled Mecca to Medina in 622, the Hijra, year one of the Islamic calendar. There he gathered followers, gained strength, and eventually marched back to conquer Mecca in 630.

Within a mere 20 years, this once obscure merchant became the leader of a revolutionary religious movement. By the time of his death in 632, most of Arabia bowed to Islam.

The holy book of Islam, the Quran, was compiled soon after, by about 650, from Muhammad’s recited revelations. Muslims believe the Quran was dictated word for word by God, straight from heaven. Such a claim made the new scripture unquestionable and unchangeable. But one must wonder, if Catholic influences were present in Muhammad’s household, could they have helped shape those early revelations? History does record that Muhammad had scribes to write down his visions, and one of them could have been Waraqa or someone under Catholic guidance.

It’s a haunting thought. In the midst of genuine zeal, could elements of another agenda have crept into the foundations of Islam? As Islam spread its wings over the desert sands, the stage was being set for an even deeper connection with Rome’s legacy.

Look closely at the symbol of Islam, a crescent moon embracing a single star. You see it on mosques and flags from Turkey to Pakistan. But this symbol did not originate with Muhammad. Its roots reach far back into ancient pagan worship.

Long ago in Arabia, before Islam, the moon god and sun goddess were worshipped together as divine lovers. The moon god, known as Allah among certain tribes, was said to have three daughters, Allat, Alluza, and Manat, revered as goddesses. Even archaeological finds and old encyclopedias confirm that Allah was a pre-Islamic name, used for a pagan deity corresponding to the Babylonian god Baal.

In other words, the very name Allah was not new. It was borrowed from a pagan past. The crescent and star symbol itself is found on ancient carvings of Baal and Ishtar, or in Egyptian depictions of Isis and Horus.

The crescent, representing the moon goddess’s womb, and the star or sun, representing the sun god’s offspring together, signified a divine birth, the male and female cosmic powers uniting. How remarkable that a faith claiming pure devotion to one god carried forward the very icon of an age-old fertility cult.

This raises a troubling question. Were these symbols adopted by accident or were they a sign of something lurking beneath Islam’s new monotheistic veneer? The ancient mystery religion of Babylon seems to echo in Islam’s flag. But Islam was not alone in using this emblem.

Amazingly, the Roman Catholic Church also uses the very same pagan emblem of the crescent and star, though it’s hidden in plain sight. In Catholic worship, during the mass, the priest elevates a round wafer of bread, symbolizing the sun, and places it on a crescent shaped holder called a monstrance. This sacred display, a sun disc in a moon boat, is directly derived from ancient Baal worship. In some monstrances, you even see a star within the crescent, just like the Islamic symbol.

In Catholic art, Mary, the mother of Jesus, is often depicted standing on a crescent moon, crowned with stars. Even on the facade of Catholic churches, one can find the half-moon shape paired with a star or sunburst. It’s the same occult symbol, the union of divine male and female Baal and Ashtoreth in a new disguise.

Most worshipers have no idea of these meanings, they simply see a beautiful ritual or image of Mary. But here’s the startling reality, two great religions, Islam and Roman Catholicism, both prominently feature the ancient moon goddess icon in their worship. What are the odds of that? To a truth seeker, it’s a clue not to be ignored. It whispers that behind both faiths, a common influence may be at work, an influence tracing back to Babylon itself.

The Bible warns of a false system named Babylon the Great, the mother of harlots, the mother of false religions, Revelation 17:. Could it be that Islam, though outwardly rivaling Catholicism, drinks from the same ancient cup of Babylon? The matching symbols suggest a mystery in need of unraveling.

If Catholicism and Islam share secret symbols, might we find Islam signs inside Catholic settings? Incredibly, yes. In the city of New Orleans, a Catholic chapel called Our Lady of Guadalupe contains a peculiar window. High above the altar, in stained glass, shines the emblem of Islam, the crescent and star. To disguise it, a caption claims it’s merely the logo of the city police department. But why would a Catholic shrine display an Islamic emblem at all?

Inside the chapel, worshipers knelt before images of Mary praying with rosary beads. And above her shrine, the Islamic star and crescent cast a quiet glow over the scene. It was as if a message had been hidden in plain view, that these two systems are aligned in ways few suspect.

Elsewhere, Catholic churches quietly incorporate the crescent shape in architecture and art. Even the Vatican’s own courtyards and halls contain obelisks, domes with sunbursts and zodiac symbols, echoes of the same nature worship that inspired the crescent and star. Coincidence? Or a silent signal that the powers behind Catholicism and Islam are working together? Some might laugh at the idea, but the evidence keeps surfacing.

When one rotates the Islamic crescent and star symbol a certain way, it even forms the outline of a goat’s head, a known occult symbol of Satan. And incredibly, that goat head motif, the goat of Mendez, has appeared in some Catholic-associated art as well. It’s enough to make your heart tremble.

Two great religions, outwardly opposed, yet sharing signs that point to the same dark source. The faithful on both sides remain largely unaware, while a grand deception plays out above them.

To understand this strange alliance, we must go back before Islam, back to the early centuries after Christ. As Christianity spread in its pure form through the Middle East, North Africa and Asia, the forces of paganism didn’t just vanish. Occult knowledge from Babylon and Egypt found refuge in new quarters. History tells us that the city of Alexandria in Egypt became a center of secret learning. There, scholars like Origen and Gnostic bishops toyed with blending Christian ideas with pagan philosophy. At the same time in Rome, some within the church hung on to old Roman gods behind the scenes, even as they outwardly Christianized the empire. In those early centuries, Rome and Alexandria were like twin reservoirs, holding the mystery religion of ancient Babylon, keeping its embers alive.

When the Roman Empire supposedly converted to Christianity, many pagan beliefs simply put on Christian garments. The common people were taught a form of Christianity, but the initiates, the insiders, cultivated occult traditions quietly. By the time Islam emerged in the 7th century, the Babylonian mysticism was firmly entrenched in Rome’s bosom.

The Bible’s prophecy in 2 Thessalonians 2:7 warned that the mystery of iniquity, a secret power of lawlessness, was already at work even in Paul’s day, preparing for a great falling away. That hidden hand of Satan worked through Rome’s church as it gained political power. Thus, when Islam arrived on the scene, it was centuries behind the Roman church in age, essentially a younger sibling in the spiritual realm.

Like an elder mother, Rome already held the secrets of Babylon’s darkness. The question is, what did she do with them? Did Rome pass some of her dark knowledge to Islam? Did she help shape this new faith as another arm of her influence? The trail of clues suggests yes. Just as a mother might send her daughter on a mission, the Roman church may have set Islam on a course to serve a greater plan. Let’s explore what that plan might have been.

In the early Middle Ages, the Roman Catholic church had a serious problem. Scattered across North Africa and the Middle East were communities of true Bible-believing Christians outside Rome’s control. These were remnants of original apostolic faith that had not bowed to Rome’s authority. Groups like the Coptic Christians, the Nestorians, the Celtic Church, and others held doctrines that Rome called heresy but were closer to the pure gospel.

How could Rome extend its iron grip over these vibrant independent Christians? Open persecution by Rome was difficult in lands it did not rule. But what if another force could do the job? It’s speculated, and not without reason, that the Catholic power brokers conceived a diabolical plan. Use Islam as a weapon to wipe out the true believers.

Think of it. A fiery new religion believing it is fighting infidels could sweep through those regions and subdue them by force. The idea isn’t far-fetched. In fact, an ex-Jesuit priest by the name of Alberto Rivera later claimed that before Islam arose, Catholic agents were already at work preparing the way. He said the Vatican helped start Islam on purpose, to create an army of Arabs that would capture Jerusalem for the church and destroy Bible-believers who opposed Roman doctrines. While such claims are hard to prove definitively, think about the outcome.

Exactly as if fulfilling a mission, Islam exploded out of Arabia in the 7th century and devastated the old bastions of true Christianity. In those early Islamic conquests, countless Bible-reading Christians in Egypt, Syria, Persia, and beyond were either killed, driven into hiding, or forced to submit to Islam or flee. Churches that had stood for centuries were wiped out almost overnight.

Coincidence? Or the unseen hand of Rome using a new sword to slay its enemies? Revelation 17:5 calls Rome the mother of abominations. Could one of those abominations be a cleverly guided force that appears unrelated to Rome, yet does her bidding? Only God knows all the details, but the fruits of history speak volumes. Through Islam, the true followers of Christ in those regions were indeed largely crushed.

In the first century after Muhammad, Islam spread like wildfire. By AD 750, Muslim armies had conquered all of Arabia, the Middle East, Persia, North Africa, and even pushed into Spain and Europe. Much of what had been the Christian world of the first few centuries was now under the crescent banner.

In North Africa, the vibrant churches founded in apostolic times were obliterated. In Spain, the Visigothic kingdom, which had a form of Christianity independent of Rome, was overrun. The Visigoths and Vandals before them had held a simpler faith, some more aligned with scripture. Now, they were swept away by the sword of Islam. The timing is notable. Those tribes had been a thorn in Rome’s side.

The Vandals were literally Aryans who opposed certain Catholic doctrines, and Islam conveniently removed them from the scene. The Muslim warriors believed they were fighting for God, spreading the one true religion. Little did they know they might also have been serving the political interests of Rome.

Under the banner of Jihad, they accomplished what the papal crusaders could only dream of, the eradication of dissenting Christian groups across vast territories. Was this Rome’s plan all along? When I ponder the history, I can almost see an unseen puppeteer pulling the strings of war, using one group to punish another. The Bible says in Proverbs 16:4 that the Lord can even use the wicked for the day of doom, and indeed it seems God allowed the rise of Islam as a scourge against apostasy and to test his people.

But behind the curtain, another power, Satan himself, was orchestrating destruction, hoping to snuff out the light of the gospel. By AD 800, Islam had done its work. The Middle East and North Africa were largely void of vibrant Christianity. The true worshipers had either been martyred or fled to the mountains and remote places. Meanwhile, the papacy grew strong in Europe without competition in those regions. If indeed there was an unholy alliance, it had succeeded brilliantly. And yet, as with all such plots, alliances of convenience can turn into bitter rivalry.

History took an interesting turn. Having conquered Jerusalem and the Holy Land, the Islamic powers did not hand them over to the Catholic Church. Instead, they kept those territories and built their own shining shrines, like the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, on the very spot many Christians held dear. The Vatican must have been furious. Jerusalem was supposed to be theirs.

Thus began the era of the Crusades. From the late 11th century onward, wave after wave of European knights marched under the cross to reclaim the Holy Land from the infidels. What bloodshed and tragedy followed.

For nearly two centuries, crusaders and jihadists slaughtered each other in the name of the same God. Catholicism and Islam now openly clashed, but interestingly, only after those alternative Christian groups had been subdued. One cannot help but recall Psalm 2, verse 2, which says, The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together against the Lord and against his anointed.

The earthly powers raged against each other, yet behind it, the real war was against the truth of God. In Spain, after centuries of Muslim rule, the Catholics eventually pushed back. By 1492, the last Islamic kingdom in Spain fell. Islam retreated from Western Europe, and the papal church rejoiced. The heretics were gone, and now the Muslims were gone, too. Each side took turns being the scourge of the other, but who benefited in the end? The common people suffered, Jews were persecuted by both, and true biblical faith was almost extinguished in those regions.

From Rome’s perspective, her two biggest rivals, biblical Christians and the Islamic empire, weakened each other into exhaustion. By the 1500s, the papacy reigned supreme in the West, and the Ottoman Turks, the leading Islamic power, dominated the East with a natural buffer between them. It’s as if the world was neatly divided into two spheres of influence.

Yet, behind the scenes, were they truly separate? Or were clandestine ties still keeping them oddly synchronized? There is evidence that even as they fought openly, a secret coordination persisted, ensuring both sides ultimately served a larger scheme. To uncover that, we must look at the shadowy realms of secret societies and orders that transcended religious labels.

During the Crusades, a mysterious interaction took place between certain knightly orders of the Catholics and the secret sects within Islam. The Knights Templar, the warrior monks of the Pope, set up bases in the Middle East, and reportedly came into contact with a shadowy Islamic order known as the Assassins, or Hashashin. The Assassins were part of the Ismaili branch of Islam, and they had a bizarre reputation. They would murder targets without fear, often sacrificing their own lives in the process, all under the direction of their grandmaster, the old man of the mountain.

These men were fanatically devoted, thinking martyrdom would assure them paradise. Sound familiar? We see similar fanaticism in modern extremists who blow themselves up believing in God’s will. History repeats.

Now, the Assassins weren’t just zealots. They operated through degrees of initiation. New recruits were kept in strict Islamic devotion, but higher-ups were taught secret knowledge that nothing is true and all is allowed. In other words, at the top, they realized it was all about power and deception, not faith.

The Knights Templar, likewise, were said to have initiation rites and secret teachings beyond what the average crusader knew. It is rumored that the Templars and Assassins entered into covert alliances, trading knowledge, sharing occult rituals, perhaps conspiring to control events for mutual gain.

Both groups, interestingly, were accused of worshiping a bizarre idol called Baphomet, a demonic goat figure, and of spitting on the cross of Christ in secret ceremonies. These are historical accusations that led to the Templars’ downfall in 1307, but it makes one wonder. Were the Templars influenced by the Assassins’ philosophy, or were both simply drinking from the same satanic well of lies?

Consider this. The Templars, though officially serving the Pope, became astonishingly wealthy and powerful. Some say even more than kings. Could it be that these secret societies, one in Christian clothing and one in Muslim clothing, recognized each other as kindred spirits serving the same hidden master? Evidence of links between the Templars and Islamic mystic groups, like the Ismaili Druzes and Fatimids, has been noted by researchers. They all trace back to the mysteries, occult knowledge from Babylon.

It’s jaw-dropping to realize that while ordinary knights and soldiers on both sides fought and died for God and glory, a handful of initiated elites may have been colluding for wealth and domination. Truly, we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against spiritual wickedness in high places. Ephesians 6.12. Satan was playing a double game, setting up secret societies within both Christianity and Islam, forging them together at the top while they appeared to clash at the bottom.

Fast forward to the 16th century. The Knights Templar were gone, but a new Catholic order arose, the Jesuits, Society of Jesus. Don’t be fooled by their holy name. The Jesuits became the master strategists of the Catholic Church, experts in politics, education, and covert operations. They too have different layers, an appearance of piety and learning outwardly, but a reputation for cunning schemes behind closed doors.

History shows that the Jesuits were willing to do anything to advance the Pope’s power. They were even implicated in assassinations and plots against kings who opposed papal authority. One Jesuit motto is said to be, The end justifies the means. Does that sound like all is allowed? Indeed, it’s the same serpent’s tongue. The Jesuits became known for creating front organizations so the Vatican could deny involvement. For example, to influence politics and society covertly, Jesuits helped form the Freemasons, a secret fraternity that recruits influential men under the guise of enlightenment and philanthropy.

If a scheme was exposed, the Church could say, It wasn’t us. It was those Freemasons. Similarly, when something goes wrong in finance or media, how quick some are to blame the Jews or some other group, when often the real string puller stays hidden in Rome.

The pattern is clear. Deception by design. Could the entire rise of Islam have been one such masterstroke of Jesuit-like strategy before the Jesuits even existed? The timing doesn’t match the Jesuit order they came later, but the spirit of that strategy was at work long before. It was Satan’s strategy carried out through any willing agents. The Vatican of old likely didn’t call it Jesuit strategy, but the principle was the same. Create a movement that achieves your goals, but keep your own role concealed.

A modern example makes it plain. Remember the photograph of Pope John Paul II kissing the Quran in 1999? That single act spoke volumes. Here was the Catholic leader showing respect, even reverence, for the Islamic holy book. On the surface, a gesture of interfaith goodwill, but symbolically it hinted, we’re not so different. We accept you.

In truth, Catholicism has, from the start, controlled and guided Islam. Now in the open, now from the shadows, Rome’s fingers have been on Islam’s shoulders, steering it when useful, restraining it when necessary. The ultimate goal? To bring about a synthesis, a merging of faiths under Rome’s leadership. At the end of time, it’s a devilishly clever plan.

Use deception, flattery, and secret alliances to make the world think all religions are basically the same, so they can unite into one. But as Christians, we know there is one name above all others, the name of Jesus, by which we must be saved. Acts 4.12.

Any plan that sets that aside or hides it behind a cloak of common ground is a lie from the pit. The Jesuit agenda, and more broadly Satan’s agenda, is to replace Jesus Christ with a false system of salvation that appeals to everyone. What could be more appealing than a one-world religion that offends no one except those pesky true believers who insist Jesus is the only way? We are now seeing that push for a universal religion of peace, but over it will rule a puppet master, ultimately the devil, working through his agents on earth.

Today we hear terms like Abrahamic faiths and calls for unity between Jews, Christians, and Muslims. High-profile religious conferences bring imams, priests, and rabbis together to declare, we all worship the same God. Political and religious leaders speak of a coming global community of faith, a great family of religions.

It sounds lovely, doesn’t it? Peace, unity, understanding? Who wouldn’t want that? But let’s peel back the veneer. One prominent Christian leader, a man named Benjamin Chavez, shocked his colleagues by openly converting to Islam while claiming he still believes in Jesus. He said nothing really changed. Pouring water from one glass to another doesn’t change its nature. In his mind, Islam and Christianity were interchangeable. How can that be? Only if, at the core, the object of worship is the same false god wearing different masks.

As Chavez himself admitted, if you’re an insider, there won’t be a difference because you’re both worshiping at the same shrine. Did you catch that? Those deep on the inside know that a single entity is behind both religions. Ordinary believers pray differently and use different names for God, but the secretive elite know it’s ultimately one system.

This is exactly what prophecy warned, a beast with many faces, an image that all the world will be asked to worship. And who will lead this one world faith? The Bishop of Rome is vying for that role. Pope John Paul II’s Koran kiss was one step. Pope Francis inviting Islamic prayers in the Vatican gardens was another. Countless interfaith services continue to pave the road. The goal is to have over half the world’s population bowing to one leader, the Pope, as the infallible Holy Father.

In fact, a Vatican insider once wrote that John Paul II believed a second Fatima was coming, a miraculous event that would cause Muslims to acknowledge the Pope’s authority. Imagine that. An apparition or sign so stunning that Islam’s heart would melt toward Rome and they would join hands. It sounds far-fetched, but we are seeing early fruits. Middle Eastern Muslim leaders meeting the Pope, calling him a man of peace. The Pope praying in mosques and being received warmly. Even the chief Islamic shrine custodians have bowed before the Pope. Step by step, the world is being conditioned for a grand compromise.

But dear friends, any unity that comes at the expense of truth is a deadly trap. Revelation 13:3 forewarns that all the world wondered after the beast. We are on the verge of that reality. The stage lights are dimming, the actors are in place for the final act. But in this ecumenical pageant, Jesus Christ is pushed backstage. And that is something we cannot accept.

One figure has emerged as the key to this Catholic-Islamic convergence. Mary, the mother of Jesus. To devout Catholics, Mary is exalted as the queen of heaven, the sinless co-mediator, even assumed bodily into heaven. To Muslims, Mariam, as she is known in Arabic, is honored as the purest woman who miraculously gave birth to Jesus, Isa, while remaining a virgin. In fact, Mary is the only woman mentioned by name in the Quran, and even has a whole chapter named after her. In a startling way, Mary has become a bridge between the two faiths.

The Vatican has not missed this fact. Far from it. They have capitalized on it. In 1917, a radiant apparition claiming to be the Virgin Mary appeared to three children in Fatima, Portugal, a town notably named after Prophet Muhammad’s daughter, Fatima.

Many believe this is no accident. By choosing a village with that name, the apparition of Mary was making a special appeal to Muslims as well as Catholics. The messages of Fatima spoke of world peace and conversion of sinners.

Decades later, Pope John Paul II, intensely devoted to Mary, visited Fatima and credited Mary with saving his life from an assassin’s bullet. But here’s where it gets even more intriguing. High-ranking Catholic voices suggested that Mary’s appearance at Fatima was a sign that she would be the instrument to eventually reach Muslim hearts.

One Catholic bishop wrote that Muslims who already revere Mary will one day see her as the mother of God and, through her, come to accept the Pope’s authority. The plan goes something like this. Mary will supposedly unite her children, both the Christian and the Muslim, into one fold.

We see hints of this plan in Catholic media. The late Archbishop Fulton Sheen even wrote an article titled, Mary and the Muslims, noting that the Quran speaks highly of Mary’s purity and immaculate conception, and speculating that Mary will play a role in converting Muslims in the end times. Consider that, a prominent Catholic leader essentially saying, Mary is the key to winning Muslim allegiance.

And indeed, in some Muslim nations today, apparitions of a luminous lady, whom Christians call Mary, have been reported, drawing crowds of both Christians and Muslims. If another global Marian miracle were to happen, a second Fatima, as John Paul II anticipated, millions of Muslims could be swayed in an instant. They might say, if Mary calls us to recognize the Pope, who are we to resist the mother of our prophet Jesus? It would be the ultimate spiritual seduction.

But we must be clear, the real Mary of the Bible is resting in her grave, awaiting the resurrection. Any Mary appearing now is a deception, an evil angel of light, 2 Corinthians 11 14, masquerading as the blessed mother to achieve Satan’s ends.

The book of Revelation describes a pure woman, representing God’s true church, and a harlot woman, a false church, adorned with gold and holding a cup of abominations, Revelation 17:4 through 5. Which one do these global apparitions of Mary represent? When Mary brings messages that contradict scripture or exalt someone other than Jesus, it is not the Mary of Nazareth, but a demon in disguise.

Still, the strategy is fiendishly clever. Many sincere souls could be deceived by a maternal figure offering peace and unity. We should remember Jesus’ warning, take heed that no man deceive you, Matthew 24:4. Even if fire come down from heaven performing miracles, Revelation 13:13, we must test everything by the word of God.

Both Catholicism and Islam, interestingly, have versions of Mary that overshadow Jesus Christ. In Catholic teaching, Mary is called co-redemptrix, co-redeemer, and mediatrix of all graces, implying that all prayers and blessings must flow through her. Many Catholics pray far more to Mary or various saints than to Jesus.

In Islam, Jesus, Isa, is revered as a prophet, but not as the son of God or savior. Yet Mary is venerated in an almost exalted way. The Quran even teaches a kind of immaculate conception of Mary herself. It says Mary’s mother was barren and prayed, and Mary was born pure by God’s special intervention. This mirrors the Catholic dogma that Mary herself was conceived without original sin. The Quran also contains fanciful details about young Mary, clearly drawn from apocryphal gospels and legends, not from the Bible.

How did those details get into Islamic scripture? It appears Muhammad, or those advising him, borrowed from Catholic-influenced sources, stories circulating among unbiblical Christian traditions. This again hints at Catholic input in forming Islam’s doctrines. Now think about the implication.

Islam has a high doctrine of Mary’s greatness. Catholicism has elevated Mary to near-godlike status. Together, they set the stage for Mary to be a focus of devotion over Jesus.

What a bold affront to the gospel! The Bible says, For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; – I Timothy 2:5 But Satan’s counterfeit system installs Mary as an additional mediator, even a preferred one for many.

If millions are praying to Mary, who is answering those prayers? Not Mary, but fallen angels impersonating her, leading people away from the true mediator.

In some Catholic-Muslim gatherings, you’ll hear talk of Our Lady in terms that should be reserved for the Lord. It’s as if Mary has been crafted into a universal mother goddess, palatable to many cultures. A figure very similar to ancient pagan goddesses, Isis, Ishtar, Ashtoreth, who were called Queen of Heaven.

The prophet warned against the Israelites’ idolatry of the Queen of Heaven, Jeremiah 7:18. Sadly, history repeats itself. Today, a Queen of Heaven is again receiving incense and devotion, only now under the name Mary. And Islam, which prides itself on avoiding idolatry, is being drawn into this same snare by its deep respect for Mary and mystical encounters that seem to validate her power.

Ask yourself, who would benefit from diminishing Jesus and elevating someone, anyone, in his place? None other than the Antichrist power, which the Bible says seeks to usurp Christ’s position, 2 Thessalonians 2:4. By getting people to focus on Mary, or a church, or a prophet, or law-keeping, or anything, more than on Jesus’ sacrifice and lordship, the devil accomplishes a grand deception.

We must be very clear. Jesus Christ and he alone is the Savior of humanity. Only his death on the cross provides forgiveness of sins, 1 John 1:7. Only his life and intercession can reconcile us to God, Hebrews 7:25.

Any teaching that anyone else, Mary, Muhammad, a Pope, you name it, can save or intercede for us in the way Jesus does is a lie. It may be a beautiful-sounding, emotionally appealing lie, but it is deadly. Yet that lie is exactly what the Catholic-Islamic connection is setting up, a mutual theology where Mary and the Pope are exalted, and Jesus is left as a sideline figure.

How it must break our Lord’s heart. The very people he died to save are pointed to another for help. It’s like a sick patient turning away from the only doctor with the cure. This is the immaculate deception, a counterfeit grace that directs souls away from the true grace of God in Christ.

Step into a grand cathedral during high mass or observe the prayers in a massive mosque, and you will notice a common thread. Elaborate rituals, strict rules, and a sense of awe. In a Catholic basilica, incense rises, bells ring, and robed priests chant in Latin. The faithful kneel and stand in unison from pews reciting prayers by rote. In a mosque, rows of devout Muslims bow and prostrate on cue, touching foreheads to the ground, reciting Arabic verses they may not even fully understand.

Both environments are marked by deeply ingrained traditions. There is beauty in the devotion, but also a potential bondage. Jesus warned of those who draw near to me with their mouth and honor me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. Matthew 15 8.

In both Catholicism and Islam, many sincere people practice what they’ve been taught without ever experiencing a personal relationship with God. They fast, they repeat prayers, the rosary for Catholics, dhikr, and repeated surahs for Muslims. They adhere to dietary laws and holy days, yet often they lack the joy and assurance that comes from knowing Jesus as a friend and savior.

Both systems also have a history of forcing compliance. In Catholic history, failing to attend mass or accept church dogma could brand you a heretic. Punishment ranging from penance to execution.

In some Muslim contexts, failing to pray five times a day or defying Sharia law can make one an apostate. Punishment can be severe, even death in extreme cases. This is religion by compulsion, not by conviction of truth.

But the true God says, Come now, let us reason together. Isaiah 1 18. He appeals to us with love, not coercion.

Both faiths hold their followers with a certain fear. A Catholic might fear the flames of an ever-burning hell or the temporal pains of purgatory, driving them to buy indulgences or say endless prayers for relief. A Muslim might fear the torments of the grave or hellfire described in the Quran, driving them to scrupulously perform rituals and good works hoping to tip the scales toward paradise.

In both, there is an absence of assurance. A Muslim often says only Allah knows if I’ll be saved. And a devout Catholic might similarly say, I hope I don’t die in mortal sin. I hope I’ve done enough. How tragic, this is exactly what the enemy wants. Religious people busy with forms and never confident of God’s love.

Timothy 3.5 describes people having a form of godliness, but denying its power. The power of godliness is the gospel, the good news that Christ’s grace is sufficient and His righteousness covers us when we believe. That power is largely missing in these systems. Instead, millions shuffle through life burdened by guilt, fear, and an endless list of duties, hoping to appease God. In some places, people even harm themselves to prove devotion. Like Catholic flagellants whipping their backs or some Shia Muslims cutting themselves in mourning rituals.

These practices break the heart of the true God who says, I desire mercy and not sacrifice. Hosea 6:6. The tragedy is that the very rituals people trust in for salvation actually become a barrier to knowing God. They trust in a religion instead of a relationship. They may feel a solemn emotion during a mass or a prayer time, but never experience the new birth Jesus talked about. John 3:3.

And so, both Catholicism and Islam can create billions of followers who are religious but lost, ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. Satan doesn’t mind people being religious, so long as they don’t find the saving truth in Jesus. He will happily let them continue with rituals that look holy, but don’t transform the heart. Is it any wonder that he influenced the development of such ritualistic systems? He seeks to replace the Son of God with a system of works and both these faiths in different ways do exactly that. But into this dark labyrinth of human effort, a voice calls.

At the core of this cosmic drama is a single vital question. Who is God and what is he like? The answer given by Rome’s religious system and by Islam is very different from the answer given at the cross of Calvary. The God of the Bible proved his character of love in this. While we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Romans 5.8. The Son of God, equal with the Father, laid aside his glory and became a man, suffering and dying to save humanity. This is the profound heart of the Gospel.

For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son. John 3:16. Now, does the Catholic-Islamic amalgam confess this truth? Here is a dividing line. The Catholic Church, in theory, affirms Jesus died for our sins. Yet it complicates that simple faith with Mary’s merits, saints’ merits, indulgences, and repeated sacrifices of the Mass. It’s as if they say Jesus’ death wasn’t quite enough. You need the Church’s help and Mary’s help to be saved.

Islam outright denies that Jesus is the Son of God or that he truly died on the cross. Quran 4.15.7 declares Jesus was not crucified but it was made to appear so. Islam teaches that God has no Son and that it would be beneath him to die for humans. In fact, a Muslim is taught that Allah cannot have the kind of love that would sacrifice himself. Their God demands your sacrifice, even your life. But he doesn’t sacrifice himself.

Do you see the stark contrast? My heart swells with emotion at this realization. My God died for me. Theirs asks them to die for him. The God I serve, Jesus Christ, demonstrated ultimate humility and love. Whereas the gods of human invention, whether a distant Allah or an authoritarian Church hierarchy, exalt themselves and decree that followers must earn their favor.

As one former Muslim-turned-Christian remarked, the difference is, God so loved the world that he gave his only Son. That is the difference. Allah is a God of war and retribution, and Jesus Christ is a God of love who gives himself for us. How beautifully said!

The difference is Calvary. At Calvary, Jesus said, Father, forgive them, showing mercy to those who nailed him. In contrast, the spirit behind these false systems says, convert them or kill them, whether through crusade or jihad or inquisition. The God of the Bible weeps over lost souls and pleads, turn from your evil ways, for why should you die? Ezekiel 33.11. The counterfeit God, Satan, masquerading in various religious garbs, rages, submit or perish.

Look at the fruits. Jesus’ followers in the first centuries willingly died as martyrs, praying for their enemies. But later, under deception, so-called Christian and Muslim zealots killed others in God’s name.

Something changed, and that something was the loss of the true knowledge of God’s character. The character of God is the crux. The Bible says, God is love, 1 John 4:8. And greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends, John 15:13. Jesus exemplified that greater love by laying down his life not just for friends, but for sinners, for those who hated him.

Such love has power to melt the hardest heart. It draws us rather than forces us. In stark contrast, the spirit of Antichrist, working through both papal Rome and the false prophet Muhammad, denies the sacrificial love of God.

1 John 2.22 says, Who is a liar, but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ? He is Antichrist, that denieth the Father and the Son. Islam explicitly denies Father and Son. Catholicism functionally diminishes the Son by elevating others beside him.

Either way, the unique truth of God’s self-giving love is obscured. But let it be shouted from the rooftops, God loves you so much he chose the nails and thorns. He would rather die than live without you.

No imam or priest can compete with that kind of love. No ritual or law could ever do what that love did on the cross, break the chains of sin, and offer eternal life as a free gift. Hallelujah! What a Savior!

Once we see the true face of God and Jesus, the enchantment of oppressive religion is broken. Fear is cast out by perfect love. 1 John 4:8. We realize we don’t need to flagellate ourselves, or kiss relics, or bow toward a stone. We need to simply accept Jesus and love him back by obeying his loving commands.

If God so loved us, we also ought to love one another. 1 John 4:11. Not kill one another, or control one another. The true God wins our hearts not by threats, but by sacrificial love. This is the message that will expose the lie at the heart of both false systems.

Dear friend, we have traveled a long road uncovering the entwined roots of Catholicism and Islam. It’s a lot to take in. You might feel disillusioned, even angry, to learn that so much of what millions hold sacred is in fact a cleverly woven deception. Perhaps you are a Catholic whose heart burns hearing that your church could be involved in such intrigue, but deep down you may have noticed things in the church that don’t match the Bible.

Or perhaps you are a Muslim, shocked at the suggestion that Islam’s birth had hidden help from Rome. But in your soul, you might sense an emptiness that all the prostrations and fasting haven’t filled. Maybe you’re neither, just an observer marveling at this epic drama.

Whoever you are, know this. God loves the people in all religions. Jesus died for the Catholic monk pouring over his rosary in a monastery. He died for the Muslim mother striving to please Allah and raise her children right.

God commands all men everywhere to repent. Acts 17:30. Not because he hates them, but because he loves them and wants to save them from error and death.

In the book of Revelation, God sends a final urgent message. Babylon the great is fallen. Come out of her, my people, lest you share in her sins and lest you receive of her plagues. Revelation 18: 2-4.

Babylon is symbolic of the confused mixture of false religion. And yes, it encompasses the corruptions of papal Rome and all faiths that reject the pure truth of Jesus. Notice God calls people, my people who are still in Babylon.

That means he has sincere children inside the Catholic church, inside Islam, inside all denominations and faiths who are living up to what they know. But the time comes when truth is revealed and the choice must be made. Stay in the comfortable errors of Babylon or step out in faith to follow truth wherever it leads.

That time is now. The Holy Spirit is pleading with hearts around the world. Many Catholics are discovering the Bible for themselves and realizing they must follow sola scriptura, scripture alone, and leave traditions behind.

Many Muslims are receiving dreams of Jesus or finding a Bible and being captivated by Christ’s love. And secretly they become followers of Isa, Jesus. They risk much, but they gain eternity.

Will you be among those who come out? God is calling you. Yes, you who listen to or read these words. He’s saying, my child, come out of confusion. Come out of manmade requirements. Come away from the deception that mixes truth and lies. Come to me.

Jesus doesn’t say come to a church or come to a religion. He says, come to me. That is what matters. Find him and you will find peace. Friend, the Bible is your safe guide. Compare everything with scripture. Test these claims. God’s word will be a lamp to your feet. Psalm 119:105.

And pray. Ask God sincerely to show you the truth and he will. Seek and ye shall find. Matthew 7:7, Jesus promised. The Lord may lead you in steps, but follow each step. Find other truth seekers to fellowship with. There is a movement of people all over the world, leaving spiritual Babylon and coming together on the platform of Bible truth.

Above all, keep your eyes on Jesus. People may fail. Churches may disappoint, but Jesus never will. He says, I will never leave thee nor forsake thee. Hebrews 13:5.

In these last days, the devil’s deceptions are intense. He’s uniting the world in error and preparing to enforce false worship on everyone. Revelation chapters 13, 16 to 17. But those who know their God shall stand firm.

It may seem like we are a small minority, scattered and weak, yet we are strong in the Lord. And we know how the story ends. Jesus wins. The kingdoms of this world will become the kingdom of our Lord. Revelation 11:15. Every imposter religion will crumble when Christ returns in glory. The question is, on which side will we be on that day?

I pray you choose Jesus, no matter the cost.

Continued from Chapter XXIII. The Papal Theory of Government

A. BISHOP’S OATH.

THE following is the oath of allegiance to the pope, taken by every archbishop and bishop, and by all who are elevated to positions of official dignity by the pope. It is copied by Dr. Dowling from the treatise on the papal supremacy by Dr. Barrow (vol. i., p. 553), who copied it from “The Roman Pontificate, set out by order of Pope Clement VIII.,” Antwerp, 1626, p. 59, etc.

I, N., elect of the Church of N., from henceforward will be faithful and obedient to St. Peter the Apostle, and to the Holy Roman Church, and to our Lord, the Lord N., Pope N., and to his successors canonically entering. I will neither advise, consent, nor do anything that they may lose life or member, or that their persons may be seized, or hands in anywise laid upon them, or any injuries offered to them, under any pretense whatsoever. The counsel with which they shall entrust me by themselves, their messengers, or letters, I will not knowingly reveal to any to their prejudice. I will help them to defend and keep the Roman papacy, and THE ROYALTIES OF ST. PETER, saving my order, against all men. The legate of the Apostolic See, going and coming, I will honorably treat and help in his necessities. The rights, honors, privileges, and authority of the Holy Roman Church, of our Lord the Pope, and his aforesaid successors, I will endeavor to preserve, defend, increase, and advance. I will not be in any counsel, action, or treaty in which shall be plotted against our said Lord, and the said Roman Church, anything to the hurt or prejudice of their persons, right, honor, state, or power; and if I shall know any such thing to be treated or agitated by any whatsoever, I will hinder it to my utmost, and, as soon as I can, will signify it to our said Lord, or to some other, by whom it may come to his knowledge. The rules of the holy Fathers, the apostolic decrees, ordinances, or disposals, reservations, provisions, and mandates, I will observe with all my might, and cause to be observed by others.

Heretics, schismatics, and rebels to our said Lord, or his aforesaid successors, I will to my utmost persecute and oppose. [Hsereticos, schismaticos, et rebelles eidem Domino nostro vel successoribus proedictis pro posse persequar et oppugnabo.] I will come to a council when I am called, unless I be hindered by a canonical impediment. I will, by myself in person, visit the threshold of the Apostles every three years; and give an account to our Lord and his foresaid successors of all my pastoral office, and of all things anywise belonging to the state of my Church, to the discipline of my clergy and people, and lastly to the salvation of souls committed to my trust; and will in like manner humbly receive and diligently execute the apostolic commands. And if I be detained by a lawful impediment, I will perform all the things aforesaid by a certain messenger hereto specially empowered, a member of my chapter, or some other in ecclesiastical dignity, or else having a parsonage; or in default of those, by a priest of the diocese; or in default of one of the clergy of the diocese, by some other secular or regular priest of approved integrity and religion, fully instructed in all things above mentioned. And such impediment I will make out by lawful proofs to be transmitted by the foresaid messenger to the cardinal proponent of the Holy Roman Church in the Congregation of the Sacred Council. The possessions belonging to my table I will neither sell, nor give away, nor mortgage, nor grant anew in fee, nor anywise alienate, not even with the consent of the chapter of my Church, without consulting the Roman Pontiff. And if I shall make any alienation, I will thereby incur the penalties contained in a certain constitution put forth about this matter. So help me God and these Holy Gospels of God.—DOWLING’S History of Romanism, pp. 615, 616; Debate between Rev. Alexander Campbell and Archbishop Purcell, pp. 280—317.

B.

The pastoral letter of the Second National Council of Baltimore contained thirteen articles. The third concerns the “Relations of the Church to the State,” and is as follows:

The enemies of the Church fail not to represent her claims as incompatible with the independence of the civil power, and her action as impeding the exertions of the State to promote the well—being of society. So far from these charges being founded in fact, the authority and influence of the Church will be found to be the most efficacious support of the temporal authority by which society is governed. The Church, indeed, does not proclaim the absolute and entire independence of the civil power, because it teaches with the apostles that “all power is of God;” that the temporal magistrate is His minister; and that the power of the sword he wields is a delegated exercise of authority committed to him from on high. For the children of the Church, obedience to the civil power is not a submission to force which may not be resisted, nor merely the compliance with a condition for peace and security; but a religious duty founded on obedience to God, by whose authority the civil magistrate exercises his power. This power, however, as subordinate and delegated, must always be exercised agreeably to God’s law. In prescribing anything contrary to that law, the civil power transcends its authority, and has no claim on the obedience of the citizen. Never can it be lawful to disobey God, as the apostles Peter and John so explicitly declared before the tribunal which sat in judgment on them, “If it be just in the sight of God to hear you rather than God, judge ye.” This undeniable principle does not, however, entail the same consequences in the Catholic system as in those of the sects. In these the individual is the ultimate judge of what the law of God commands or forbids, and is consequently liable to claim the sanction of the higher law, for what, after all, may be, and often is, but the suggestions of an undisciplined mind or an overheated imagination. Nor can the civil government be expected to recognize an authority which has no warrant for its character as divine, and no limits in its application, without exposing the State to disorder and anarchy. The Catholic has a guide in the Church, as a divine institution, which enables him to discriminate between what the law of God forbids or allows; and this authority the State is bound to recognize as supreme in its sphere, of moral no less than dogmatic teaching. There may, indeed, be instances in which individual Catholics will make a misapplication of the principle; or in which, while the principle of obedience to civil authority is recognized as of divine obligation, the seat of that authority may be a matter of doubt, by reason of the clashing opinions that prevail in regard to this important fact. The Church does not assume to decide such matters in the temporal order, as she is not the judge of civil controversies, although she always, when invited to do so, has endeavored to remove the misconceptions from which disputes so often arise, and to consult for every interest while maintaining the peace of society and the rights of justice.

While cheerfully recognizing the fact, that hitherto the General and State Governments of our country, except in some brief intervals of excitement and delusion, have not interfered with our ecclesiastical organization or civil rights, we still have to lament that in many of the States we are not as yet permitted legally to make those arrangements for the security of church property which are in accordance with the canons and discipline of the Catholic Church. In some of the States we gratefully acknowledge that all is granted in this regard that we could reasonably ask for. The right of the Church to possess property, whether churches, residences for the clergy, cemeteries or school-houses, asylums, etc., cannot be denied without depriving her of a necessary means of promoting the end for which she has been established. We are aware of the alleged grounds for this refusal to recognize the Church in her corporate capacity, unless on the condition that in the matter of the tenure of ecclesiastical property she conform to the general laws providing for this object. These laws, however, are for the most part based on principles which she cannot accept without departing from her practice from the beginning, as soon as she was permitted to enjoy liberty of worship. They are the expression of a distrust of ecclesiastical power, as such; and are the fruit of the misrepresentations which have been made of the action of the Church in past ages. As well might the civil power prescribe to her the doctrines she is to teach, and the worship with which she is to honor God, as to impose on her a system of holding her temporalities which is alien to her principles, and which is borrowed from those who have rejected her authority. Instead of seeking to disprove the various reasons alleged for this denial of the Church’s rights in some of the States, we content ourselves with the formal protest we hereby enter against it; and briefly remark, that even in the supposition, which we by no means admit, that such denial was the result of legitimate motives, the denial itself is incompatible with the full measure of ecclesiastical or religious liberty which we are supposed to enjoy.

Nor is this an unimportant matter, or one which has not practical results of a most embarrassing character. Not only are we obliged to place church property in conditions of extreme hazard, because not permitted to manage our church temporalities on Catholic principles, but in at least one of these United States (Missouri) laws have been passed by which all church property, not held by corporations, is subjected to taxation; and the avowed object of this discriminating legislation is hostility to the Catholic Church. In concluding these remarks, we merely refer to the attempt made in that State to make the exercise of the ecclesiastical ministry depend on a condition laid down by the civil power.

The bishops of the council sent to the pope the following dispatch, through the Atlantic cable:

Seven archbishops and forty bishops, met in council, unanimously salute your holiness, wishing you long life, with the preservation of all the ancient and sacred rights of the Holy See.

To which the following answer was received:

Rome, from the Propaganda, October 24th, 1866.
To the Most Reverend MARTIN JOHN SPALDING, Archbishop of Baltimore:

The telegram which the bishops of the States of the American Union assembled in council had the happy thought to address to the Holy Father proved to be of great comfort and consolation to his holiness, and so highly did he appreciate its spirit that he ordered it to be immediately published in the official journals at Rome, for the edification of his Roman people and the faithful at large. His holiness looks with interest for the acts and decrees of the Plenary Council, which he expects to receive in due time, and from which he hopes a new impulse and continued increase to religion in the United States will result. He has, however, directed me to express directly to your amplitude, and through you to all your colleagues, his great pleasure, and to request you to thank them for the interest they have taken, and still take, in defending the Holy See and in vindicating its contested rights. Moreover, his holiness has learned with satisfaction that the papal loan is succeeding also, through the cooperation of the American episcopate. He thanks them particularly for this, and nourishes the hope that such cooperation will not cease, and that thence a prosperous result may be obtained. In the mean time, I pray the Lord that he long preserve and prosper you.
ALEXANDER CARDINAL BARNABO, Secretary.

C.
THE ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE PIUS IX.

To Our Venerable Brothers the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Universal Church having Grace and Communion of the Apostolic See.

Health and Apostolic Benediction.

It is well known unto all men, and especially to You, Venerable Brothers, with what great care and pastoral vigilance Our Predecessors, the Roman Pontiffs, have discharged the Office entrusted by Christ Our Lord to them in the person of the Most Blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and have unremittingly discharged the duty of feeding the lambs and sheep, and have diligently nourished the Lord’s entire flock with the words of faith, imbued it with salutary doctrine, and guarded it from poisoned pastures. And those Our Predecessors, who were the assertors and champions of the august Catholic Religion, truth, and justice, being, as they were, chiefly solicitous for the salvation of souls, held nothing to be of so great importance as the duty of exposing and condemning, in their most wise Letters and Constitutions, all heresies and errors which are hostile to moral honesty and to the eternal salvation of mankind, and which have frequently stirred up terrible commotions, and have damaged both the Christian and civil commonwealths in a disastrous manner.

Wherefore those Our Predecessors have with apostolic fortitude continually resisted the nefarious attempts of unjust men, of those who, like raging waves of the sea, foaming forth their own confusion and promising liberty whilst they are the slaves of corruption, endeavored by their false opinions and most pernicious writings to overthrow the foundations of the Catholic religion and of civil society, to abolish all virtue and justice, to deprave the souls and minds of all men, and—especially to pervert inexperienced youth from uprightness of morals, to corrupt them miserably, to lead them into snares of error, and finally to tear them from the bosom of the Catholic Church.

And now, Venerable Brothers, as is also very well known to you, scarcely had We (by the secret dispensation of Divine Providence, certainly by no merit of Our own) been called to this Chair of Peter when We, to the extreme grief of Our soul, beheld a horrible tempest stirred up by so many erroneous opinions, and the dreadful and never—enough—to—be—lamented mischiefs which redound to Christian people from such errors: and We then, in discharge of Our Apostolic Ministerial Office, imitating the example of Our illustrious Predecessors, raised Our voice, and in several published Encyclical Letters, and in Allocutions delivered in Consistory, and in other Apostolical Letters, We condemned the prominent, most grievous errors of the age, and We stirred up Your excellent episcopal vigilance, and again and again did We admonish and exhort all the sons of the Catholic Church, who are most dear to Us, that they should abhor and shun all the said errors as they would the contagion of a fatal pestilence. Especially in Our first Encyclical Letter, written to you on the 9th of November, anno 1846, and in two Allocutions, one of which was delivered by Us in Consistory on the 9th of December, anno 1854, and the other on the 9th of June, anno 1862, We condemned the monstrous and portentous opinions which prevail especially in the present age, to the very great loss of souls, and even to the detriment of civil society, and which are in the highest degree hostile not only to the Catholic Church, and to her salutary doctrine and venerable laws, but also to the everlasting law of nature engraven by God upon the hearts of all men, and to right reason; and out of which almost all other errors originate.

Now, although hitherto We have not omitted to denounce and reprove the chief errors of this kind, yet the cause of the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls committed to Us by God, and even the interests of human society absolutely demand, that once again We should stir up Your pastoral solicitude to drive away other erroneous opinions which flow from those errors above specified, as their source.

These false and perverse opinions are so much the more detestable by how much they have chiefly for their object to hinder and banish that salutary influence which the Catholic Church, by the institution and command of her Divine Author, ought freely to exercise, even to the consummation of the world, not only over individual men, but nations, peoples, and sovereigns—and to abolish that mutual co—operation and agreement of counsels between the Priesthood and Governments which has always been propitious and conducive to the welfare both of Church and State (Gregory XVI., Encyclical, 13th August, 1832). You are well aware that at this time there are not a few who apply to civil society the impious and absurd principle of naturalism, as they term it, and dare to teach that “the welfare of the State and political and social progress require that human society should be constituted and governed irrespective of religion, which is to be treated just as if it did not exist, or as if no real difference existed between true and false religions.”

Contrary to the teaching of the Holy Scriptures, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, these persons do not hesitate to assert that “the best condition of human society is that wherein no duty is recognized by the Government of correcting by enacted penalties the violators of the Catholic Religion, except when the maintenance of the public peace requires it.” From this totally false notion of social government they fear not to uphold that erroneous opinion most pernicious to the Catholic Church, and to the salvation of souls, which was called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI. [lately quoted], the insanity (Encycl., 13th August, 1832) [deliramentum], namely, that “liberty of conscience and of worship is the right of every man; and that this right ought, in every well-governed State, to be proclaimed and asserted by the law; and that the citizens possess the right of being unrestrained in the exercise of every kind of liberty, by any law, ecclesiastical or civil, so that they are authorized to publish and put forward openly all their ideas whatsoever, either by speaking, in print, or by any other method.” But whilst these men make these rash assertions, they do not reflect or consider that they preach the liberty of perdition (St. Augustine, epistle 105, al. 166), and that “if it is always free to human arguments to discuss, men will never be wanting who will dare to resist the truth, and to rely upon the loquacity of human wisdom, when we know from the command of our Lord Jesus Christ how faith and Christian wisdom ought to avoid this most mischievous vanity” (St. Leo, epistle 164, al. 133, sec. 2, Boll. ed.).

And since religion has been banished from civil government—since the teaching and authority of Divine revelation have been repudiated—the idea inseparable therefrom of justice and human right is obscured by darkness, and lost; and in place of true justice and legitimate right, material force is substituted; whence it appears why some, entirely neglecting and slighting the most certain principles of sound reason, dare to proclaim “that the will of the people, manifested by public opinion (as they call it), or by other means, constitutes a supreme law independent of all Divine and human right; and that, in the political order, accomplished facts, by the mere fact of their having been accomplished, have the force of right.” But who does not plainly see and understand that human society, released from the ties of religion and true justice, can have no other purpose than to compass its own ends, and to amass riches, and can follow no other law in its actions than the indomitable wickedness of a heart given up to the service of its selfish pleasures and interests?

For this reason also these same men persecute with such bitter hatred the Religious Orders who have deserved so well of religion, civil society, and letters; they loudly declare that the Orders have no right to exist, and, in so doing, make common cause with the falsehoods of the heretics. For, as was most wisely taught by Our Predecessor of illustrious memory, Pius VI., ” the abolition of Religious Orders injures the state of public profession of the Evangelical counsels; injures a mode of life recommended by the Church as in conformity with Apostolical doctrine; does wrong to the illustrious founders whom we venerate upon our altars, and who constituted these societies under the inspiration of God” (Epistle to Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld, March 10th, 1791). And these same persons also impiously pretend that citizens should be deprived of the liberty of publicly bestowing on the Church their alms for the sake of Christian charity, and that the law forbidding “servile labor on account of Divine worship” upon certain fixed days should be abolished, upon the most fallacious pretext that such liberty and such law are contrary to the principles of political economy. Not content with abolishing religion in public society, they desire, further, to banish it from families and private life. Teaching and professing those most fatal errors of Socialism and Communism, they declare that “domestic society, or the family, derives all its reason of existence solely from civil law, whence it is to be concluded that from civil law descend and depend all the rights of parents over their children, and, above all, the right of instructing and educating them.” By such impious opinions and machinations do these most false teachers endeavor to eliminate the salutary teaching and influence of the Catholic Church from the instruction and education of youth, and to miserably infect and deprave by every pernicious error and vice the tender and pliant minds of youth.

All those who endeavor to throw into confusion both religious and political affairs, to destroy the good order of society, and to annihilate all Divine and human rights, have always exerted all their criminal schemes, attention, and efforts upon the manner in which they might, above all, deprave and delude unthinking youth, as We have already shown: it is upon the corruption of youth that they place all their hopes. Thus, they never cease to attack by every method the Clergy, both secular and regular, from whom, as testify to us in so conspicuous a manner the most certain records of history, such considerable benefits have been bestowed in abundance upon Christian and Civil society, and upon the republic of letters; asserting of the clergy in general that they are the enemies of the useful sciences, of progress, and of civilization, and that they ought to be deprived of all participation in the work of teaching and training the young.

Others, reviving the depraving fictions of innovators, errors many times condemned, presume, with extraordinary impudence, to subordinate the authority of the Church and of this Apostolic See, conferred upon it by Christ Our Lord, to the judgment of civil authority, and to deny all the rights of this same Church and this See with regard to those things which appertain to the secular order. For these persons do not blush to affirm “that the laws of the Church do not bind the conscience if they are not promulgated by the civil power; that the acts and decrees of the Roman Pontiffs concerning religion and the Church require the sanction and approbation, or at least, the assent of the civil powers; and that the Apostolic Constitutions (Clement XII., Benedict XIV., Pills VII., Leo XII.) condemning secret societies, whether these exact or do not exact an oath of secrecy, and branding with anathema their followers and partisans, have no force in those countries of the world where such associations are tolerated by the civil government.”

It is likewise affirmed “that the excommunications launched by the Council of Trent and the Roman Pontiffs against those who invade and usurp the possessions of the Church and its rights, strive, by confounding the spiritual and temporal orders, to attain solely a mere earthly end; that the Church can decide nothing which may bind the consciences of the faithful in the temporal order of things; that the right of the Church is not competent to restrain with temporal penalties the violators of her laws; and that it is in accordance with the principles of theology and of public law for the Civil Government to appropriate property possessed by the churches, the Religions Orders, and other pious establishments. And they have no shame in avowing openly and publicly the heretical statement and principle from which has emanated so many errors and perverse opinions, that the ecclesiastical power is not by the law of God made distinct from, and independent of, civil power, and that no distinction, no independence of this kind, can be maintained without the Church invading and usurping the essential rights of the civil power.”

Neither can We pass over in silence the audacity of those who, not enduring sound doctrine, assert that “the judgments and decrees of the Holy See, the object of which is declared to concern the general welfare of the Church, its rights, and its discipline, do not claim acquiescence and obedience under pain of sin and loss of the Catholic profession, if they do not treat of the dogmas of faith and of morals.”

How contrary is this doctrine to the Catholic dogma of the plenary power divinely conferred on the Sovereign Pontiff by Our Lord Jesus Christ, to guide, to supervise, and govern the Universal Church, no one can fail to see and understand clearly and evidently.

Amid so great a perversity of depraved opinions, We, remembering Our Apostolic duty, and solicitous before all things for Our most holy religion, for sound doctrine, for the salvation of the souls confided to Us, and for the welfare of human society itself, have considered the moment opportune to raise anew Our Apostolic voice.

Therefore do We by Our Apostolic authority reprobate, denounce, and condemn generally and particularly all the evil opinions and doctrines specially mentioned in this Letter, and We wish that they may be held as reprobated, denounced, and condemned by all the children of the Catholic Church.

But You know further, Venerable Brothers, that in our time the haters of all truth and justice and violent enemies of our religion have spread abroad other impious doctrines by means of pestilent books, pamphlets, and journals, which, distributed over the surface of the earth, deceive the people and wickedly lie. You are not ignorant that in our day men are found who, animated and excited by the spirit of Satan, have arrived at that excess of impiety as not to fear to deny Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, and to attack His Divinity with scandalous persistence. And here We cannot abstain from awarding You well—merited praise, Venerable Brothers, for all the care and zeal with which You have raised Your episcopal voice against so great an impiety.

And therefore in this present letter, We speak to You with all affection; to You who, called to partake Our cares, are Our greatest support in the midst of Our very great grief, Our joy and Our consolation, by reason of the excellent piety of which You give proof in maintaining religion, and the marvelous love, faith, and discipline with which, united by the strongest and most affectionate ties to Us and this Apostolic See, You strive valiantly and accurately to fulfill Your most weighty episcopal ministry. We do, then, expect from Your excellent pastoral zeal that, taking the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God, and strengthened by the grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, You will watch with redoubled care, that the faithful committed to Your charge “abstain from evil pasturage,which Jesus Christ doth not till, because His Father hath not planted it” (St. Ignac. M. ad Philadelph. St. Leo, epist. 156, al. 125).

Never cease, then, to inculcate on the faithful that all true happiness for mankind proceeds from our august religion, from its doctrines and practice, and that that people is happy who have the Lord for their God (Psalm 143). Teach them “that kingdoms rest upon the foundation of the Catholic faith (St. Celest., epist. 22, ad Syn. Eph.), and that nothing is so deadly, nothing so certain to engender every ill, nothing so exposed to danger, as for men to believe that they stand in need of nothing else than the free—will which we received at birth, if we ask nothing further from the Lord—that is to say, if, forgetting our Author, we abjure his power to show that we are free.”

And do not omit to teach “that the Royal power has been established not only to exercise the government of the world, but, above all, for the protection of the Church (St. Leo, epist. 156, al. 125), and that there is nothing more profitable and more glorious for the Sovereigns of States and Kings than to leave the Catholic Church to exercise its laws, and not to permit any to curtail its liberty;” as Our most wise and courageous Predecessor, St.Felix, wrote to the Emperor Zeno. “It is certain that it is advantageous for Sovereigns, when the cause of God is in question, to submit their Royal will according to his ordinance to the Priests of Jesus Christ, and not to prefer it before them.” (Pius VII. Epist. Encycl. Diu satis, 15th May, 1800.)

And if always, so, especially at present, is it Our duty,Venerable Brothers, in the midst of the numerous calamities of the Church and of civil society, in view of the terrible conspiracy of our adversaries against the Catholic Church and this Apostolic See, and the great accumulation of errors, it is, before all things, necessary to go with faith to the Throne of Grace to obtain mercy and find grace in timely aid.

We have therefore judged it right to excite the piety of all the faithful in order that, with Us and with You all, they may pray without ceasing to the Father of lights and of mercies, supplicating and beseeching Him fervently and humbly, in order also in the plenitude of their faith they may seek refuge in Our Lord Jesus Christ, who has redeemed us to God with His blood, that by their earnest and continual prayers they may obtain from that most dear Heart, victim of burning charity for us, that it would draw all by the bonds of His love, and that all men being inflamed by His holy love may live according to His heart, pleasing God in all things, and being fruitful in all good works.

But, as there is no doubt that the prayers most agreeable to God are those of the men who approach Him with a heart pure from all stain, We have thought it good to open to Christians, with Apostolic liberality, the Heavenly treasures of the Church confided to Our dispensation, so that the faithful, more strongly drawn toward true piety and purified from the stain of their sins by the Sacrament of Penance, may more confidently offer up their prayers to God and obtain His mercy and grace.

By these Letters emanating from Our Apostolic authority, We grant to all and each of the faithful of both sexes throughout the Catholic world a Plenary Indulgence in the manner of a Jubilee during one month up to the end of the coming year, 1865, and not longer, to be carried into effect by You, Venerable Brethren, and the other legitimate local Ordinaries, in the form and manner laid down at the commencement of Our Sovereign Pontificate by Our Apostolical Letters, in form of a Brief, dated the 20th of November, anno 1846, and sent to the whole Episcopate of the world, commencing with the words “Arcano Divince Providentice consilio,” and with the faculties given by Us in those same Letters. We desire, however, that all the prescriptions of Our letters shall be observed, saving the exceptions We have declared are to be made. And We have granted this, notwithstanding all which might make to the contrary, even those worthy of special and individual mention and derogation; and in order that every doubt and difficulty may be removed, We have ordered that copies of those Letters should be again forwarded to You.

Let us implore, Venerable Brethren, from our inmost hearts, and with all our Souls, the mercy of God. He has encouraged us so to do, by saying, “I will not withdraw my mercy from them.” Let us ask, and we shall receive; and if there is slowness or delay in its reception, because we have grievously offended, let us knock, because to him that knocketh it shall be opened; if our prayers, groans, and tears, in which we must persist and be obstinate, knock at the door; and if our prayer be united, let each one pray to God, not for himself alone, but for all his brethren, as the “Lord hath taught us to pray ” (St. Cyprian, epistle ii.). But in order that God may accede more easily to Our and Your prayers, and to those of all His faithful servants, let us employ in all confidence as our Mediatrix with him the Virgin Mary, Mother of God, who “has destroyed all heresies throughout the world, and who, the most loving Mother of us all, is very gracious…… and full of mercy…… allows herself to be entreated by all, shows herself most clement toward all, and takes under her pitying care all our necessities with a most ample affection” (St. Bernard, Germ. de duodecim perogativis B. M. V. in verbis Apocalyp.), and who, “sitting as queen upon the right hand of her only begotten Son Our Lord Jesus Christ, in a golden vestment clothed around with various adornments,” there is nothing which she cannot obtain from Him. Let us implore also the intervention of the Blessed Peter, Chief of the Apostles, and of his co-Apostle Paul, and of all those Saints of Heaven, who, having already become the friends of God, have been admitted into the celestial kingdom, where they are crowned and bear palms, and who henceforth, certain of their own immortality, are solicitous for our salvation.

In conclusion, We ask of God, from Our inmost soul, the abundance of all his celestial benefits for You, and We bestow upon You,Venerable Brethren, and upon all faithful Clergy and Laity committed to Your care, Our Apostolic Benediction from the most loving depths of Our hearts, in token of Our charity toward You.
Pius PP. IX.

D. THE SYLLABUS OF THE PRINCIPAL ERRORS OF OUR TIME, WHICH ARE STIGMATIZED IN THE CONSISTORIAL ALLOCUTIONS, ENCYCLICAL, AND OTHER APOSTOLICAL LETTERS OF OUR MOST HOLY FATHER POPE PIUS IX.

I. Pantheism, Naturalism, and Absolute Rationalism.

1. There exists no Divine Power, Supreme Being, Wisdom, and Providence distinct from the universe, and God is none other than nature, and is therefore mutable. In effect, God is produced in man and in the world, and all things are God, and have the very substance of God. God is therefore one and the same thing with the world, and thence spirit is the same thing with matter, necessity with liberty, true with false, good with evil, justice with injustice. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

2. All action of God upon man and the world is to be denied. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

3. Human reason, without any regard to God, is the sole arbiter of truth and falsehood, of good and evil; it is its own law to itself, and suffices by its natural force to secure the welfare of men and of nations. (Allocution ” Maxima quidem, ” 9th June, 1862.)

4. All the truths of religion are derived from the native strength of human reason; whence reason is the master rule by which man can and ought to arrive at the knowledge of all truths of every kind. (Encyclical letters, “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846, “Singulari quidem,” 17th March, 1856, and the Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

5. Divine revelation is imperfect, and therefore subject to a continual and indefinite progress, which corresponds with the progress of human reason. (Encyclical “Qui plulibus,” 9th November, 1846, and the Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

6. Christian faith is in opposition to human reason, and divine revelation not only does not benefit, but even injures, the perfection of man. (Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846, and the Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

7. The prophecies and miracles, uttered and narrated in the Sacred Scriptures, are the fictions of poets; and the mysteries of the Christian faith, the result of philosophical investigations. In the books of the two Testaments there are contained mythical inventions, and Jesus Christ is Himself a mythical fiction. (Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846, and the Allocution “Maxima quidenm,” 9th June, 1862.)

II. Moderate Rationalism.

8. As human reason is placed on a level with Religion, so theological matters must be treated in the same manner as philosophical ones. (Allocution “Singulari quadam perfusi,” 9th December, 1854.)

9. All the dogmas of the Christian Religion are, without exception, the object of natural science or philosophy, and human reason, instructed solely by history, is able, by its own natural strength and principles, to arrive at the true knowledge of even the most abstruse dogmas: provided such dogmas be proposed as subject—matter for human reason. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, “Gravissimas,” 11th December, 1862; to the same, “Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

10. As the philosopher is one thing, and philosophy is another, so it is the right and duty of the philosopher to submit himself to the authority which he shall have recognized as true; but philosophy neither can nor ought to submit to any authority. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, “Gravissimas,” 11th December, 1862; to the same, “Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

11. The Church not only ought never to animadvert (to remark or comment critically, usually with strong disapproval or censure) upon philosophy, but ought to tolerate the errors of philosophy, leaving to philosophy the care of their correction. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, 11th December, 1862.)

12. The decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Congregation fetter the free progress of science. (Id. ibid.)

13. The method and principles by which the old scholastic Doctors cultivated theology are no longer suitable to the demands of the age and the progress of science. (Ib.” Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

14. Philosophy must be treated of without any account being taken of supernatural revelation. (Id. ibid.)

N.B.—To the rationalistic system belong, in great part, the errors of Anthony Gunther, condemned in the letter to the Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne, “Eximiam tuam,” 15th June, 1847; and in that to the Bishop of Breslau, “Dolore haud mediocri,” 30th April, 1860.

III. Indifferentism, Latitudinarianism (tolerance of other people’s religious views).

15. Every man is free to embrace and profess the religion he shall believe true, guided by the light of reason. (Apostolic Letters “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851; Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

16. Men may in any religion find the way of eternal salvation, and obtain eternal salvation. (Encyclical Letter “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; Allocution “Ubi primum,” 17th December, 1847; Encyclical Letter “Singulari quidem,” 17th March, 1856.)

17. We may entertain at least a well-founded hope for the eternal salvation of all those who are in no manner in the true Church of Christ. (Allocution “Singulari quadam,” 9th December, 1854; Encyclical Letter “Quanto conficiamur,” 17th August, 1863.)

18. Protestantism is nothing more than another form of the same true Christian Religion, in which it is possible to be equally pleasing to God as in the Catholic Church. (Encyclical Letter “Noscitis et Nobiscum,” 8th December, 1849.)

IV. Socialism, Communism, Secret Societies, Biblical Societies, Clerico—liberal Societies.

Pests of this description are frequently rebuked in the severest terms in the Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; Allocution “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849; Encyclical “Noscitis et Nobiscum,” 8th December, 1849; Allocution “Singulari quadam,” 9th December, 1854; Encyclical “QuLanto conficiamur marore,” 10th August, 1863.

V. Errors concerning the Church and her Rights.

19. The Church is not a true, and perfect, and entirely free society, nor does she enjoy peculiar and perpetual rights conferred upon her by her Divine Founder, but it appertains to the civil power to define what are the rights and limits with which the Church may exercise authority. (Allocution “Singulari quadam,” 9th December, 1854; “Multis gravibusque,” 17th December, 1860; “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

20. The ecclesiastical power must not exercise its authority without the permission and assent of the civil Government. (Allocution “Meminit unusquisque,” 30th September, 1861.)

21. The Church has not the power of defining dogmatically that the Religion of the Catholic Church is the only true religion. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

22. The obligation which binds Catholic teachers and authors applies only to those things which are proposed for universal belief as dogmas of the faith, by the infallible judgment of the Church. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, “Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

23. The Roman Pontiffs and Ecumenical Councils have exceeded the limits of their power, have usurped the rights of Princes, and have even committed errors in defining matters of faith and morals. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

24. The Church has not the power of availing herself of force or any direct or indirect temporal power. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolic,” 22d August, 1851.)

25. In addition to the authority inherent in the Episcopate, a further and temporal power is granted to it by the civil authority, either expressly or tacitly, which power is on that account also revocable by the civil authority whenever it pleases. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolica,” 22d August, 1851.)

26. The Church has not the innate and legitimate right of acquisition and possession. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856; Encyclical “Incredibili,” 17th September, 1863.)

27. The ministers of the Church and the Roman Pontiff ought to be absolutely excluded from all charge and dominion over temporal affairs. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

28. Bishops have not the right of promulgating even their Apostolic Letters without the permission of the Government. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

29. Dispensations granted by the Roman Pontiff must be considered null, unless they have been asked for by the civil Government. (Id. ibid.)

30. The immunity of the Church and of ecclesiastical persons derives its origin from civil law. (Letter Apostolic” Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

31. Ecclesiastical Courts for the temporal causes of the clergy, whether civil or criminal, ought by all means to be abolished, even without the concurrence and against the protest of the Holy See. (Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852; and “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

32. The personal immunity exonerating the clergy from military service may be abolished, without violation either of natural right or of equity. Its abolition is called for by civil progress, especially in a community constituted upon principles of Liberal Government. (Letter to the Archbishop of Montreal, “Singularis Nobisque,” 29th September, 1864.)

33. It does not appertain exclusively to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, by any right, proper and inherent, to direct the teaching of theological subjects. (Letter ad Archiep. Frising, ” Tuas libenter,” 21st December, 1863.)

34. The teaching of those who compare the Sovereign Pontiff to a free Sovereign acting in the Universal Church, is a doctrine which prevailed in the Middle Ages. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolieae,” 22d August, 1851.)

35. There would be no obstacle to the sentence of a General Council, or the act of all the universal peoples, transferring the Pontifical Sovereignty from the Bishop and city of Rome to some other bishopric and some other city. (Id. ibid.)

36. The definition of a National Council does not admit of any subsequent discussion, and the civil power can regard as settled an affair decided by such National Council. (Id. ibid.)

37. National Churches can be established after being withdrawn and plainly separated from the authority of the Roman Pontiff. (Allocution “Multis gravibusque,” 17th December, 1860; “Jamdudum cernimus,” 18th March, 1861.)

38. Roman Pontiffs have, by their too arbitrary conduct, contributed to the division of the Church into Eastern and Western. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851.)

VI. Errors about Civil Society considered both in itself and in its Relation to the Church.

39. The Republic is the origin and source of all rights, and possesses rights which are not circumscribed by any limits. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

40. The teaching of the Catholic Church is opposed to the well—being and interests of society. (Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; Allocution “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849.)

41. The civil power, even when exercised by an infidel Sovereign, possesses an indirect and negative power over religious affairs. It therefore possesses not only the right called that of exequatur, but that of the (so—called) apellatio ab abusu. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostoliae,” 22d August, 1861.)

42. In the case of conflicting laws between the two Powers, the civil law ought to prevail. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851.)

43. The civil power has a light to break, and to declare and render null the conventions (commonly called Concordats) concluded with the Apostolic See, relative to the use of rights appertaining to the ecclesiastical immunity, without the consent of the Holy See, and even contrary to its protest. (Allocution “In Consistoriali,” 1st November, 1850; “Multis gravibusque,” 17th December, 1860.)

44. The civil authority may interfere in matters relating to Religion, morality, and spiritual government. Hence it has control over the instructions for the guidance of consciences issued, conformably with their mission, by the pastors of the Church. Further, it possesses power to decree, in the matter of administering the Divine Sacraments, as to the dispositions necessary for their reception. (Allocution “In Consistoriali,” 1st November, 1850; A1locution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

45. The entire direction of public schools in which the youth of Christian States are educated, except (to a certain extent) in the case of Episcopal seminaries, may and must appertain to the civil power, and belong to it so far that no other authority whatsoever shall be recognized as having any right to interfere in the discipline of the schools, the arrangement of the studies, the taking of degrees, or the choice and approval of the teachers. (Allocution “In Consistoriali,” 1st November, 1850; Allocution “Quibus luctuosissimis, 5th September, 1851.)

46. Much more, even in Clerical Seminaries, the method of study to be adopted is subject to the civil authority. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

47. The best theory of civil society requires that popular schools, open to the children of all classes, and generally all public institutes intended for instruction in letters and philosophy, and for conducting the education of the young, should be freed from all ecclesiastical authority, government, and interference, and should be fully subjected the civil and political power, in conformity with the will of rulers and the prevalent opinions of the age. (Letter to the Archbishop of Fribourg, “Quum non Sine,” 14th July, 1864.)

48. This system of instructing youth, which consists in separating it from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and in teaching exclusively, or at least primarily, the knowledge of natural things, and the earthly ends of social life alone, may be approved by Catholics. (Id. ibid.)

49. The civil power has the right to prevent ministers of Religion and the faithful from communicating freely and mutually with each other, and with the Roman Pontiff. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

50. The secular authority possesses, as inherent in itself, the right of presenting Bishops, and may require of them that they take possession of their dioceses, before having received canonical institution and the Apostolic Letters from the Holy See. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

51. And, further, the Secular Government has the right of deposing Bishops from their Pastoral functions, and it is not bound to obey the Roman Pontiff in those things which relate to Episcopal Sees and the institution of Bishops. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852.)

52. The Government has of itself the right to alter the age prescribed by the Church for the religious profession both of men and women; and it may enjoin upon all religious establishments to admit no person to take solemn vows without its permission. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

53. The laws for the protection of religious establishments, and securing their rights and duties, ought to be abolished; nay, more, the civil government may lend its assistance to all who desire to quit the religious life they have undertaken, and break their vows. The government may also suppress Religious Orders, collegiate Churches, and simple Benefices, even those belonging to private patronage, and submit their goods and revenues to the administration and disposal of the civil power. (Allocution “Acerbissimumn,” 27th September, 1852; Allocution “Probe memineritis,”22d January, 1855; Allocution “Cum saepe,” 26th July, 1855.)

54. Kings and princes are not only exempt from the jurisdiction of the Church, but are superior to the Church, in litigated questions of jurisdiction. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

55. The Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church. (Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852.)

VII. Errors concerning Natural and Christian Ethics.

56. Moral laws do not stand in need of the divine sanction, and there is no necessity that human laws should be conformable to the law of nature, and receive their sanction from God. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

57. Knowledge of Philosophical things and morals, and also civil laws, may and must be independent of divine and ecclesiastical authority. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

58. No other forces are to be recognized than those which reside in matter; and all moral teaching and moral excellence ought to be made to consist in the accumulation and increase of riches by every possible means, and in the enjoyment of pleasure. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862; Encyclical “Quanto conficiamur,” 10th August, 1863.)

59. Right consists in the material fact, and all human duties are but vain words, and all human acts have the force of right. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

60. Authority is nothing else but the result of numerical superiority and material force. (Allocution “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.)

61. An unjust act, being successful, inflicts no injury upon the sanctity of right. (Allocution “Jamdudum cernimus,” 18th March, 1861.)

62. The principle of non—intervention, as it is called, ought to be proclaimed and adhered to. (Allocution “Novos et ante,” 28th September, 1860.)

63. It is allowable to refuse obedience to legitimate Princes; nay, more, to rise in insurrection against them. (Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; Allocution “Quisque vestrum,” 4th October, 1847; Encyclical “Noscitis et Nobiscum,” 8th December, 1849; Letter Apostolic “Quum Catholica,” 26th March, 1860.)

64. The violation of a solemn oath, even every wicked and flagitious action repugnant to the eternal law, is not only not blamable, but quite lawful, and worthy of the highest praise, when done for the love of country. (Allocution “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849.)

VIII. Errors concerning Christian Marriage.

65. It cannot be by any means tolerated, to maintain that Christ has raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851.)

66. The Sacrament of marriage is only an adjunct of the contract, and separable from it, and the sacrament itself consists in the nuptial benediction alone. (Id. ibid.)

67. By the law of nature, the marriage tie is not indissoluble, and in many cases divorce, properly so called, may be pronounced by the civil authority. (Id. ibid.; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1852.)

68. The Church has not the power of laying down what are diriment (absolute) impediments to marriage. The civil authority does possess such a power, and can do away with existing impediments to marriage. (Letter Apostolic “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

69. The Church only commenced in later ages to bring in diriment impediments, and then availing herself of a right not her own, but borrowed from the civil power. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851.)

70. The canons of the Council of Trent, which pronounce censure of anathema against those who deny to the Church the right of laying down what are diriment impediments, either are not dogmatic, or must be understood as referring only to such borrowed power. (Letter Apostolic, ibid.)

71. The form of solemnizing marriage prescribed by the said Council, under penalty of nullity, does not bind in cases where the civil law has appointed another form, and where it decrees that this new form shall effectuate a valid marriage. (Id. ibid.)

72. Boniface VIII. is the first who declared that the vow of chastity pronounced at Ordination annuls nuptials. (Id. ibid.)

73. A merely civil contract may among Christians constitute a true marriage; and it is false, either that the marriage contract between Christians is always a sacrament, or that the contract is null if the sacrament be excluded. (Id. ibid.; Letter to King of Sardinia, 9th Sept., 1852; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th Sept., 1852; “Multis gravibusque,” 17th Dec., 1860.)

74. Matrimonial causes and espousals belong by their very nature to civil jurisdiction. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851; Allocution “Acerbissimum,” 27th September, 1862.)

N.B.—Two other errors may tend in this direction: those upon the abolition of the celibacy of priests, and the preference due to the state of marriage over that of virginity. These have been proscribed; the first in the Encyclical “Qui pluribus,” 9th November, 1846; the second in the Apostolic Letter “Multiplices inter,” 10th June, 1851.)

IX. Errors regarding the Civil Power of the Sovereign Pontiff.

75. The children of the Christian and Catholic Church are not agreed upon the compatibility of the temporal with the spiritual power. (Letter Apostolic “Ad Apostolicae,” 22d August, 1851.)

76. The abolition of the temporal power, of which the Apostolic See is possessed, would contribute in the greatest degree to the liberty and prosperity of the Church. (Allocution “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849.)

N. B.—Besides these errors, explicitly noted, many others are impliedly rebuked by the proposed and asserted doctrine, which all Catholics are bound most firmly to hold, touching the temporal Sovereignty of the Roman Pontiff. These doctrines are clearly stated in the Allocutions “Quibus quantisque,” 20th April, 1849, and “Si semper antea,” 20th May, 1850; Apostolic Letter “Quum Catholica Ecclesia,” 26th March, 1860; Allocutions—”Novos,” 28th September, 1860; “Jamdudum,” 18th March, 1861; and “Maxima quidem,” 9th June, 1862.

X. Errors having Reference to Modern Liberalism.

77. In the present day, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic Religion shall be held as the only Religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other modes of Worship. (Allocution “Nemo vestrum,” 26th July, 1855.)

78. Whence it has been wisely provided by law, in some countries called Catholic, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own worship. (Allocution “Acerbissimum,”27th September, 1852.)

79. Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every mode of worship, and the full power given to all of overtly and publicly manifesting their opinions and their ideas, of all kinds whatsoever, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to the propagation of the pest of indifferentism. (Allocution “Nunquam fore,” 15th December, 1856.)

80. The Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, and civilization as lately introduced. (Allocution “Jamdudum ceruimus,” 18th March, 1861.)—Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Spalding, etc., etc.

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Continued from The Papacy And The Civil Power – Chapter XXII. The Papacy Always Exclusive.

The Papal Theory of Government.—The Kind of Christian State it requires.—The Laws of Theodosius and Justinian.—The Ordinances in France in the Times of her Kings most in Favor at Rome.—No Other Religion than the Roman Catholic allowed.—Heresy made a Crime against the State.—Modes of punishing Heretics.—These Laws required by the Church. The State Heretical without them.—The Protestant System.—Separates the Church and the State.—Is in Obedience to the Example of Christ and the Apostles.—The Harmony they established between the Spiritual and Temporal Powers disturbed by the Popes.—The Consequences of disturbing this Harmony.—Papal Doctrines in the United States.—They subject the State to the Government of the Pope.—How far they do this.—In All Temporals which concern the Faith or Morality.—The Government cannot stand if this Doctrine prevail.—The Extent to which it is carried. It is based upon the Bull Unam Sanctam of Boniface VIII.—” Temporal Monarchy” claimed as Necessary for the World.—Harmonious Condition of the First Christians.— Churches planted in Asia before those in Europe.—The Work well done by the Apostles.—Jerusalem the “Mother Church. “—No Necessity for Another at Rome.—The Consequences of Opposition to the Apostolic Plan.—They lead to the Reformation.—Effect of the Reformation.—Present Efforts of the Papacy to turn the World back.—The Contest in the United States.—Conclusion.

PROTESTANT no less than Roman Catholic Christians assign to the spiritual and temporal powers a common foundation in the order and appointment of God. But they differ with them essentially in the application of this general principle to the civil affairs of government.

The papal theory of government, taking this principle as the starting—point, reaches the following results: that the Church and the State, having this common origin, are bound to extend mutual aid to each other; that the Church, belonging to the spiritual or higher order, is bound to see that both the State and individuals conform, in their laws and conduct, to the law of God; and that, as the two powers are thus united in the common end of obtaining order and holding society together, they should also be so united in their action that the Church, as the superior, may always be in a condition to command obedience from the State, as the inferior. As it regards all those things which do not concern the law of God or the moral well-being of society, the State is left to deal with its citizens, collectively and individually, without any interference from the Church. This is its separate and independent sphere of action. But whenever questions arise which involve conformity to the law of God or of morality, then the Church is bound to interfere and prescribe the rule of conduct both to the State and the individual. This is called the separate and independent sphere of the Church. Correlative obligations arise out of these relations. The chiefest of these is, that when the Church commands what the law of God and morality require, the State is bound to obey, just as each individual is. And if it does not obey, it, like the individual, is subject to whatsoever penalty the Church may prescribe for disobedience. (*)

In looking through the history of such governments as have been constructed upon the papal plan, we find many illustrations of the manner in which these principles have been practically applied, especially in reference to the infliction of such penalties as the Church has from time to time imposed for the violation of its laws. The codes of the emperors Theodosius and Justinian contain many laws relating to religion, enacted only in obedience to the command of the Church; merely, says Domat, in his great work on the Civil Law, “to enforce the observance of the laws which the Church herself, and the spiritual powers to whom God has committed the care of her, have established, and to protect and maintain the execution of those laws.”

Referring further to these emperors, thus obedient to the Church, and to those kings of France under whose reigns ordinances on religious subjects were passed of the same nature, this same author says,

“They add to the authority of the laws of the Church that which God has put in their hands; enjoining, as to what concerns the articles of faith, their subjects to submit themselves to the doctrine of the Church, prohibiting all persons to preach or to teach anything contrary thereto, and enacting punishments against heretics.” (“The Civil Law,” etc., by Domat, London ed., 1737, vol. ii., p. 507. )

These are not called laws of the Church, and, strictly speaking, they are not, because they are not enacted by the spiritual, but by the temporal, authority. They are passed, however, because the Church obliges the State to enact them as a necessary protection to its religion and what it calls its “free exercise,” and holds the State to be heretical if it does not do so. If the laws are passed according to its dictation, then the civil power, being Christian, must be obeyed; but if they are not, then the Church releases all citizens from the obligation of obedience to it, because it is sinful to obey an heretical power. And this is called rendering “unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”

In France, when the papal power was sufficiently predominant to exact obedience to the laws of the Church, it caused the temporal power to be so employed in matters relating to the Church, that sundry laws were enacted which exhibit, in a strong light, the real spirit of the papal system of government. Domat, in defining the policy which prompted them, says it requires “that Catholic princes prohibit within their dominions divisions touching matters of religion, schisms, and the exercise of any other religion except the Catholic alone, and exclude all heretics from it, by inflicting penalties against them as there is occasion.” (Ibid., p. 515.)

Again, speaking of the obligation resting upon the civil magistrate, he says: “It is likewise his duty to employ his authority for enforcing the observance of the laws of the Church, in so far as they contain rules about manners which may regard the public order.” (“The Civil Law,” etc., by Domat, London ed., 1737, vol. ii., p. 516.)

And the same obligation is said to rest upon princes. (Ibid., p. 517.) And then, as a consequence necessarily resulting from this superiority of the Church and inferiority of the State, he says “that no person has a right to revenge the encroachments which the ministers of the Church may make on the rights of temporal princes;” (Ibid., p. 519.) thus exempting the pope, in administering the affairs of the papacy, from responsibility to any earthly power, and extending or limiting his jurisdiction only as his own discretion shall dictate.

One of these ordinances was in these words: “Heresy is a crime of high treason against the Divine Majesty, whereof one is guilty when he abandons the true Catholic faith, and obstinately maintains an error which the Universal Church hath condemned.” (Ibid., p. 524.)

And another: “They who will not hearken to the Church, which is the pillar of truth, and against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, ought to be treated as heathens and publicans.” (Ibid., p. 625.)

The following modes whereby the progress of heresy was required to be hindered are particularly pointed out: take from heretics the places where they assemble for worship; forbid them from assembling in private houses; remove their ministers into distant parts; “take care that the children of heretics be educated in the schools of the orthodox;” prevent heretics from holding any public office or any honorable employment, or from exercising reputable professions, such as advocates, physicians, or professors in colleges; subject them to corporal punishment; and, finally, put them to death. (Ibid., pp. 625, 626.)

And those guilty of blasphemy were thus dealt with: they were fined for the first offense, but, in the event of frequent relapses,” their lips are pierced with a hot iron, their tongue is cut out, and they are condemned to the pillory, to banishment, or to the galleys,” and, at last, ” even to death itself.” (Ibid., p. 627.)

These ordinances were enacted in France during the reigns of those kings who are held in the highest estimation by the papacy, as the most beloved and honored sons of the Church, on account of their obedience to its commands and their devotion to the cause of religion. By means of them, and others of like nature, they caused themselves to be esteemed in Rome as foremost among Christian princes, and placed France in the very front rank of Christian states.

The nation presented to the world a model form of government, according to the papal plan. If it had not passed these laws in obedience to the dictation of the Church, it would have been heretical, and not Christian. And if those who exercised the temporal power had not caused them to be vigorously executed, they would have subjected themselves to the anathemas of the Church. Thus we see the nature and character of the civil institutions for which we are now asked to exchange our own—in other words, what the papacy and its defenders mean by a Christian state!

Why are Roman Catholic states required to exhibit their obedience to the Church by enacting such laws as these? Manifestly, because they concern the faith, and the principles involved in them are considered necessary to be believed as a part of it. They are laws for the advancement and protection of religion—rules prescribed by the Church to the State, whereby the State and its citizens are to be held in the line of religious duty, and thus maintain their Christian character. The obligation of obedience on the part of both is the same—the measure of punishment differing from necessity. As the above-named ordinances cannot reach the State, which has no corporeal body to be punished or soul to be damned, it becomes equally heretical with the individual by its act of disobedience, and thereby forfeits its right to exist as a state—because the Church considers it as much a violation of the laws of God for a state to commit heresy, as it does for an individual to commit it. And those who administer its affairs forfeit their right to do so, because they are guilty of treason against God. Consequently, the Church—that is, the pope—releases the citizens of the heretical State from any further obligation to obey its laws or its heretical governors, and supplies it with such other laws and governors as shall put it back again upon the Christian path!

The Protestant system of government draws a marked and palpable line of distinction between religion and civil policy—between the Church and the State; and while recognizing also their common foundation in the order and appointment of God, it so separates them in their respective spheres of action that neither shall trench upon the jurisdiction of the other, and therefore leaves no question of submission by the temporal to the spiritual authority, and, consequently, none about punishment of the State for disobedience to the laws of the Church. It leaves religion to its influence upon the hearts of individuals, so as to form good dispositions within each one, in order that society may be influenced by the love of justice and right, and the government be enabled, under these influences, to secure the public tranquility.

In this it follows, with strict exactitude, the example of Christ Himself. Before His appearing, the Jewish commonwealth consisted in a union of Church and State the subjection of the temporal to the spiritual power. But He came upon earth to undo this old order of things, and to establish His spiritual kingdom. In order to do this so that it should stand out prominently before the world as something distinct from what had ever existed before, He expressly abstained from exercising His own spiritual power over temporal things, or over any of the affairs of existing governments. So far from doing so, whatever He did was directly opposite to the grandeur and power of a temporal kingdom—of such a kingdom as the papacy afterward built up at Rome. He did not take a single mark of temporal power. He exercised no single function of it. On the contrary, when appealed to by one brother to cause another to divide the inheritance with him, He refused to act the part of judge. (Luke xii., 13, 14.)

To show that it was necessary to His spiritual kingdom that it should exist apart from the temporal power—be separated entirely from it—He left the temporal princes to exercise the latter, and He himself paid strict obedience to them. As God, He caused his earthly parents, Joseph and Mary, to go up to Bethlehem, to be taxed, under a decree from Caesar Augustus; (Luke ii., 1—5.) thereby making even His birth to depend on His obedience to a law of a heathen prince. In order to demonstrate the absolute necessity of disuniting His own spiritual kingdom from the temporal kingdoms of princes, He taught his disciples to render unto the temporal power what belonged to it; and exhibited the manner of doing this by requiring Peter to pay tribute—money at Capernaum, when none was due, and by working a miracle for that purpose. (Matthew xvii., 24—27.) He pointed out the distinction between his spiritual kingdom and the temporal power of princes, by declaring, “My kingdom is not of this world.” (John xviii., 36.)

When He was delivered up to be crucified, He told Pilate that He could have had no temporal power at all against Him, except it were given him from God,(John xix., 11.) and yet did not employ His own supernatural power to release Himself from His enemies and persecutors. When He made His disciples the ministers of His spiritual kingdom, He prescribed to them rules for the government of their conduct, and defined the boundaries of the power He entrusted to them, He did not give them a single iota of power over temporal affairs. And they, obedient to His commands, neither claimed nor exercised any temporal power. On the contrary, they obeyed it, as He had done.

And although the temporal princes opposed them in their ministry, and persecuted them under temporal laws, they practiced obedience themselves and taught it to their followers, performing all the duties of their sacred ministry, without attempting, in any single instance, to break down the authority of the temporal power or to subject it to the spiritual power which Christ had given them. “Taken from among men,” and “ordained for men in things pertaining to God,” (Hebrews v., 1.) they exercised their ministry in spiritual things, without intruding themselves upon temporals, inculcating at the same time, on the part of those who exercised the temporal power, the necessity of their not encroaching upon spirituals. And thus, while they recognized both powers as established by the hand of God, the harmony between them consisted in the performance by each of its own distinctive functions; the spiritual purifying the heart of man and fitting him for all the duties of life, and the temporal conforming to his wants and necessities arising out of the discharge of those duties.

There would have been no disturbance of this harmony but for the establishment and introduction of the canon law of Rome. Nor would even this have done it, had its operations been confined to the temporal things within the territories known as “the States of the Church” of Rome. When, however, the provisions of this law were carried beyond these territories by those kings who held their crowns from the popes and their governments to be “fiefs of the See of Rome,” collisions between the two powers immediately began, and did not end until ignorance and superstition became almost universal, as in the Middle Ages, and the temporal power was subjugated by the spiritual. The same spirit of ambition which incited these popes to stretch out their arms beyond the limits of their Italian possessions influenced them to the effort of making the world a grand “Holy Empire,” with themselves its rulers; and when they so far succeeded as to cause governments to be framed according to the papal (or what they called the Christian) plan, mankind became subject to such laws as we have seen embodied in the ordinances of France, when, under their dictation, that Government was held up as a model for all Christian states!

Thus we see the radical and irreconcilable difference between these two opposing systems of government—the Protestant and the papal. And it is impossible to escape the conviction that the substitution of the former for the latter was not only accordant to the principles recognized by Christ and the apostles, but absolutely necessary to elevate and improve the condition of mankind. So long as but one form of religious faith was tolerated, and all else was regarded as treason against God, popes and princes kept mankind in degrading servitude, by the infliction of the most terrible punishments. Charity, love, and the mild Christian virtues, so beautifully exemplified in the lives of Christ and the apostles, were dethroned by hatred and revenge.

And now, when the established, fully developed, and tolerant Protestantism of the United States has carried us forward to the very front rank of the nations, we have those among us who impudently tell us that every step of our prosperity is marked by treason to God, and that they are the chosen and selected vicegerents of the Almighty to bring us back to the obligations of Christian duty. If we rebuke them ever so mildly for their insolence, and protest against their destroying the work of our fathers, they call it persecution, because it denies to them the liberty of striking down whatsoever the pope shall command to be destroyed. If we insist that they shall obey our Constitution in consideration of the protection they receive from it, they tell us that the pope is, to them, a domestic prince, who steps in between them and it, bids defiance to its injunctions, and sets aside its obligations whensoever he shall deem it necessary to the ends and aims of the papacy to do so.

Even if there were no principle in the Constitution the pope might desire to set aside, the assertion of the right and power to do so should command our most serious attention. But when he fixes his pontifical curse upon the very fundamentals of our Government, and marshals his forces to assail them, it is as much our duty to resist him as it is to defend our lives.

We have sufficiently indicated, in the previous chapters, wherein he has done so, and there is no authority in the Church—whether hierarchical or lay—entitled to gainsay what he has declared. There is no single man in the United States, no matter how high his position in the Church, who has authority to define the principles or declare the purposes of the papacy. He may avow what would seem best to him, under any given state of circumstances; but in doing so he speaks for himself alone. Whenever he speaks for the Church, his individual opinions are of no value, since by the dogma of the pope’s infallibility he is required to surrender his will and conscience into the keeping of the pope. The pope is the sole exponent and interpreter of the law of the Church, which he may abrogate or change at his pleasure; and however much he may tolerate, for a time and from prudential motives, the expression of individual opinions contrary to those set forth in the Encyclical and Syllabus of 1864, and other pontifical briefs, from these alone can we derive a just and accurate understanding of the faith and doctrines of the Church. Let us take a single illustration out of the many which are exhibited almost every day.

A late number of The Catholic World contains an eloquent article on “Religion and State in our Republic,” evidently from the pen of the learned and distinguished editor. Referring to the time when, by possibility, the Roman Catholic population of the United States may “become an overwhelming majority,” and endeavoring to remove any cause of alarm among Protestants on that account, he says, “They will never seek to tyrannize over their fellow—citizens, to establish their religion by force, or to compel any one to do those things which are required only by the Catholic conscience.” (The Catholic World, February, 1875, vol. xx., pp. 624, 625.)

Such assertions as these are not worth the value of a rush—light in showing what the pope would require to be done in the United States if he had an obedient majority to control the Government. Whatever the author of them may think for himself, and however hearty the response they may meet in the minds of intelligent laymen, they utterly fail of any other effect than to delude those laymen and such Protestants as accept them. Measured by the papal standard, they are heretical. By the constitutions of popes, the decrees of councils, the repeated action of Roman Catholic governments, and by the avowals of the present pope, the law of the Church is held to enjoin upon its authorities the duty to extirpate heresy, to destroy every other form of religion than the Roman Catholic, to compel obedience to it, in faith and morals, and to do all this by force, by uniting the Church and the State together, and requiring the State, as in the case of France under her obedient kings, to pass such statutes as shall bring these results about. And it can only mislead the incautious and unwary to pretend that different results would be sought after in this country, if the policy of the Government were directed by the pope. The form of Government which the papacy dictated when it had the power to enforce obedience, and none other, would, if it had that power in the United States, spring up upon the ruins of our Protestant institutions. What was a Christian government in France, acceptable to popes, would furnish the model for the construction of the new government here.

And this writer, perhaps unwittingly, concedes as much in the very next sentence, when he says that “the difficulty lies chiefly in respect to those laws which forbid certain things as contrary to the divine law.” (The Catholic World, February, 1875, vol. xx., p. 625.)

Certainly, the difficulty lies just there; because out of it grows the whole controversy about the spiritual and the temporal powers. At that point exists the radical disagreement between the Protestant and the papal systems of government; between the United States Government and that of France when it was a Christian state after the papal model. This difference has been pointed out sufficiently to show wherein the principles of our Government are “contrary to the divine law,” as the pope interprets it; and he must be exceedingly ignorant who does not see that if these were destroyed the Government would fall. All the talk about the necessity of giving to the law an ethical standard is a mere pretext for keeping governments as well as individuals within the circle of moral duty which the pope may choose, from time to time, to mark out.

When he shall prescribe that duty in anything, whether it concerns civil policy or the intercourse of individuals with each other, whatsoever is done to the contrary, by the Government or the individual, becomes heretical, and therefore sinful. In such a case, to which command—that of the Government or the pope—does the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility require the papist to render obedience? This writer in The Catholic World answers just as all other ultramontanes do. Setting aside, with entire frankness, all mere “private versions or modifications of Catholicity” as counting for nothing, and going directly to the pope as the fountain—head of all authority in the Church, he says:

“For ourselves, we are purely and simply Catholic, and profess an unreserved allegiance to the Church which takes precedence of, and gives the rule to, our allegiance to the State. If allegiance to the Church demanded of us opposition to political principles adopted by our civil government, or disobedience to any laws which were impious and immoral, we should not hesitate to obey the Church and God. We should either keep silence and avoid all discussion of the subject, or else speak out frankly in condemnation of our laws and institutions, if we believed them to be anti—Christian, or, which is the same thing, anti—Catholic, in their principles.” (The Catholic World, February, 1875, vol. xx., p. 621.)

The reader need not be again reminded of the many important principles of our Government, already pointed out, whereby our civil institutions have become, in the view of the papacy, “anti—Christian” and “anti—Catholic.” The avowal here is distinct and emphatic, that to none of these does the papist owe allegiance. If he acquiesces in them for the time being, it is only that strength enough may be acquired, by prudential and cautious movements, to aim effective blows at them when the open battle shall begin.

Dr. Brownson again brings his powerful pen to the support of this theory, and expresses himself with his accustomed boldness and indifference to consequences. Binding us all to an acceptance of the law of God, as the infallible pope shall announce it, he says:

“Under this supreme law the State holds, and this law is the ground and limit of this authority, or of its rights and its obligations. This law is, therefore, the ground and limit of civil allegiance. The civil power holds all its authority from this supreme law, and, consequently, it has no authority to do or command anything that it forbids, or that is contrary to it. Hence it follows that, if the civil power commands anything contrary to the law of God, its commands do not bind the subject or citizen, and are not only not obligatory, but are to be treated as null and void from the beginning, simply because the civil power has no right to issue them, and the law of God forbids them. Here is the limit of civil obedience, or my allegiance to the civil powers.” (*)

There is abundant evidence to show, besides what has been embodied in the preceding chapters, that these are the doctrines of religious faith set forth by the recognized authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, both in the United States and in Europe. A single additional reference, however, must now suffice, leaving the inquiring reader to search out others, if he desires them, for himself.

A work, considered exhaustive, has recently appeared in reply to “Janus;” the main object of which is to support and justify the claim of the present pope of power over the government of civil society. He quotes from a letter of Pius IX. to show that the Church “requires of those clothed with political power that they should conform to those laws [of morality], and, indeed, such as she proclaims them. Were she to abandon this postulate, she would then renounce her very mission.” (“Anti-Janus,” by Hergenrother, p. 37.)

He justifies the doctrines set forth by the Syllabus of 1864, in a whole chapter; and thus denounces that principle of our Government which treats all churches with an equal degree of respect: “To prescribe an equal respect for another religious community [not, observe, for the persons of its members] is to require that the doctrines of the true Church should be placed on the same level with the opinions of other religious bodies.” (Ibid., pp. 39, 40.) He says, “The pope can do nothing against the divine law.” (Ibid., p. 42.) He insists upon a union of Church and State. (Ibid., p.44.) He admits that the powers of the pope have heretofore been enlarged by “forgeries,” and yet asserts them to exist to the same extent as those forgeries were designed to stretch them. (“Anti-Janus,” by Hergenrother, ch. iv., p. 144. ) But these are comparatively immaterial by the side of his justification of the bull Unam Sanctam of Boniface VIII., the doctrines of which have been already shown to be the necessary consequence of papal supremacy.

The distinctive principles proclaimed by this bull, and now a part of the canon law of the Church, he sets down as follows: first, “it is necessary to salvation that every man should submit to the Roman pontiff;” second, “this is a necessary consequence of the dogma of the papal supremacy;” third, “it condemns the assertion by the State of any power over ‘church property;'” fourth, “the temporal power of Christian princes does not exempt them from obedience to the head of the Church;” fifth, “the material sword is drawn for the Church, the spiritual by the Church;” sixth, “the material sword must co—operate with the spiritual and assist it;” seventh, “the secular power should be guided by the spiritual as the higher’;” eighth, “the spiritual has the preeminence over the material;” ninth, “the temporal power is subordinated to the ecclesiastical, as to the higher;” tenth, “the temporal power, if it is not good, is judged by the spiritual;” eleventh, ” to the ecclesiastical authority” (that is, to the pope and his hierarchy) “the words of the prophet Jeremiah apply, ‘Lo! I have set thee this day over the nations and over kingdoms to root up, and to pull down, and to waste, and to destroy, and to build, and to plant;'” twelfth, when “the temporal power goes astray, it is judged by the spiritual;” thirteenth, “for obtaining eternal happiness, each one is required to submit to the pope;” fourteenth, “the supremacy of the pope, even in temporal things;” and, fifteenth, the popes “recognize human authorities in their proper place, till they lift up their will against God.” (Ibid., pp. 203—209.)

This book has upon it the imprint of “The Catholic Publishing Society,” of New York, and is extensively circulated in the United States, for the enlightenment and instruction of the faithful. Its general character is recommended by an “Introduction,” wherein it is said that “the spiritual royalty of Christ’s vicar will ultimately tend to consolidate anew temporal monarchy, and all its concomitant institutions.” (“Anti-Janus,” by Hergenrother, Introduction, p. xl.) And the preference entertained by papists for a monarchical over a popular or democratic form of government is thus unequivocally avowed, “The Church, it is truly said, needs not kings and emperors; but civil society in great states needs them; and this is especially true under the Christian dispensation, which, by the abolition of slavery, has indefinitely multiplied popular suffrages, and therefore aggravated the difficulties of popular government.” (*)

We have here the deliberate sentiments and purposes of the papacy, that is, of the only legitimate authority of the Church. No individual opinions weigh a feather’s weight in the scale against them, although uttered by one or a thousand prelates or laymen. Every man who has any connection whatever with the Church must accept them without change or modification as a necessary part of the faith. If he shall accept them, and is intelligent enough to understand them, he must be regarded as prepared to take all the consequences which must necessarily follow if they are pressed, as now seems inevitable, to their legitimate results. But if, like the “Old Catholics” of Europe, the Roman Catholic population of the United States shall sternly and manfully rebuke these politico—religious teachings of the papacy, they will yet retain the power to save their honored and venerable Church from open antagonism with the Government which shields them so effectually from harm, and carry her back to those smooth and pleasant paths of peace and quiet and Christian concord, where she once stood so proudly, and where they, side by side with other Christians, may dispense the cheerful and benignant influences of pure, tolerant, and apostolic Christianity.

How beautifully and harmoniously were unity and diversity blended in the churches of the early Christians—diversity in discipline and economy—unity centering in Christ as the rock upon which it was built. Then, the bishops of Jerusalem, of Antioch, of Alexandria, of Corinth, of Rome, and elsewhere, presided over the clergy and people of their respective churches and provinces, with the internal policy and economy of each so conducted as should best promote the advancement of Christianity, leaving its external policy under the superintendence of the whole Church, not as it concerned discipline and government, but only the prime and essential part of religion, the preservation of the Christian faith. (“Antiquities of the Christian Church,”by Bingham, vol. i., bk. ii., ch. v., p. 33.)

Neither Christ nor his apostles made provision for any form of church imperialism. He did all things perfectly. He established this simple plan of a perfect Church, leaving the apostles to rear the superstructure. They, with inspired wisdom, built the churches at Jerusalem and Antioch, and other cities of Asia, before a Christian was ever known to be at Rome, and their work was also well and perfectly done, so well and perfectly that it was scarcely needed to be repeated at Rome in order to establish the true Church of Christ.

There was everything to recommend this plan of the Master and the apostles. The city of Jerusalem, in the midst of the fallen columns of “the temple of God,” and near Calvary and Gethsemane and Bethlehem, and where Christ had first disputed with the learned doctors of the Jewish law, and whose streets had been trodden by his feet; this “Holy City” was a far more fitting place for planting the first Christian Church than the old pagan and imperial city of the Caesars, where God’s providence had been defied for centuries; where the name of Christ was cast out with derision and reproach; where Christianity was held to be a pernicious and dangerous superstition; (Tacitus, bk. xv., xliv. “Exitiabilis superstitio” are the words of Tacitus.) where the demon of persecution first held his bloody orgies; and where vice and corruption were consuming all its pagan glories, and leaving it, wrapped in clouds of life—consuming miasmna (toxic air), to become the place where the curse of God would surely rest, as it had once rested upon the old Babylon of the Euphrates.

As the first churches of Asia were established, under the express commission of Christ before the Church of Rome, it was manifestly against the divine plan for the latter Church to set up the false claim that she was the “mother and mistress” of all the churches. Besides the presumption and vanity of the assumption, it was untrue in point of fact—for the Church at Jerusalem is conceded on all hands to have been the “mother Church.” On this account the apostles assembled there to settle the differences which had arisen among the Christians at Antioch. (*)

The Roman Church was, therefore, the daughter of the older Asiatic churches—not the mother. They preceded her in the order of time so far that Christianity was planted by means of them, before she had a beginning—or before it had reached any part of Europe. These Asiatic churches possessed, undoubtedly, all the external authority which Christ designed should be conferred upon his Church; for, being presided over by the apostles and specially cared for by them, it is an impeachment of them to say that, in this or in any other respect, they failed in obeying the divine injunction to establish the Church rightfully. While the system they organized continued, everything worked well and harmoniously. If there were differences, they were adjusted by conference, as at Jerusalem; and nothing occurred to plant discord among them until the Church at Rome endeavored to bring them all to her feet.

At every step she took in that direction, she struck fatal blows at this original system of church organization, and never rested from her work of demolition until the columns of all the ancient churches had fallen to the ground. To add to the efficacy of her measures, she snatched from the State the imperialism of temporal power, which she employed as the means of achieving her universal dominion; and thus, by uniting Church and State, she has afflicted both herself and the world with incalculable calamities. As usurpation and imposture have their reward, as well as virtue, these have been visited upon her in terrible abundance, since she sought to place the triple crown upon the brows of her bishops, and to gild her papal palaces with gold.

Ever since the time of Constantine and the Nicene Council, she has been dealing in various modes of compulsion, with multitudes of her rebellious and heretical children—born within her fold and nurtured upon her bosom. The most formidable resistance she has encountered has been invited by the vacillations of her faith, or has been produced by the tyranny and persecutions of the papacy. The hardest blows under which she has reeled and staggered—and under which she is now reeling and staggering—have been struck by those who have been compelled to strike them, in order to assert and vindicate their manhood by breaking the fetters with which she had manacled their limbs.

Before the Reformation, the Roman Church had some good popes, many bad ones, and some who were almost monsters of impiety and vice. The seventy years of papal residence in France had created a rivalry in crime and prostitution between the two pontifical cities, Rome and Avignon; and whenever the one excelled the other, it was only because of the larger number of cardinals and priests, and of the courtesans who followed them. Of course, reformers grew up in formidable numbers—for there were many good men in the Church, belonging to every class—but anti—reformers existed in greater force, composed of those who held the chief authority in the Church. Of the first, there were those who believed, in all Christian sincerity, that the Church could be reformed within herself, and thus her life and purity be preserved. Of the latter, there were those who either supposed that corruption had done its work so thoroughly that the disease was beyond the reach of remedy, or preferred the wealth and power which her vast revenues produced, and the ambition it gratified, to the preservation of her purity.

And when the great Council of Trent placed the Church in a condition to become an engine of mischievous power and bad ambition in the hands of the Jesuits, it made Protestantism an absolute necessity for the world—because, without it, the terrible pressure under which both Church and State were rapidly sinking into a common grave could never have been removed. Protestantism, therefore, finds both its truth and its philosophy in the history of those times. God was its author. He did not design it to exterminate, but to preserve; to support the cause of truth, and to resist error. There was yet good enough in the Roman Catholic Church to have secured the complete triumph of divine truth, but for the perverseness of those who seemed to defy all the providences of God. It needed only the winnowing process of reform to separate the good from the bad—the genuine grain from the chaff—so that this venerable Church could drift back again into the calm and placid current along which it had moved so beautifully and majestically in the days of her primitive purity.

The Reformation was not the result of impulse and passion. Preceding events had convinced the leading nations of the necessity of taking care of their own affairs, which it was evident they could not do without resisting the aggressions of the papacy. These aggressions had become so repeated and flagrant that some of the governments were entirely subordinated to Rome. With the imperialism of princes and of popes, the people were almost crushed, as it were, between the upper and the nether millstone. The necessity of self—protection and self—existence compelled them to seek out other paths.

France was the foremost in the movement of resistance (“History of the Popes,” by Ranke, Introduction, p. xxvi.)—as we have seen how soon as a Christian nation, according to the papal standard, her very life would have been crushed out. Germany followed, and then England; and finally the United States rose up in the New World, clothed in fresh robes, to prove how benignant are the influences which spring from popular government and Protestant toleration. These influences are now reacting upon the older nations, and one by one they are moving into the same paths. As the light from each increases more and more—just as it is almost ready to break out in meridian brightness—the papal sword is unsheathed, and they are commanded, under the impious pretense that God has spoken through the voice of an infallible pope, to turn back into darkness and slavery and imbecility again.

There are many Roman Catholic laymen in the United States, who, if they could be prevailed upon to investigate these matters for themselves, and to abate somewhat their unbounded confidence in their ecclesiastical superiors, would see—as many of their brethren in Europe have done—that there is a broad and manifest distinction between their Church as it existed in its original purity in the days of the early fathers, and that enormous papal structure into which ambitious and designing men have since converted it, with power to domineer over princes and tyrannize over peoples. It would be impossible for them not to know that, in order to restore and maintain the pretensions now set up in behalf of the papacy, its emissaries would be guilty of infractions upon the rights of all existing governments, especially those where the people are the rulers; and that their own continued acquiescence in these excessive demands of the pope and his priesthood must, in the end, lead them into opposition to the most essential principles of our own Government, and especially to that which makes the people themselves included—the true and legitimate source of all civil authority. It is impossible to suppose that they desire to forget the sacrifices many of them have made for the cause of popular government, or that they can become willingly insensible to the precious interests they have wrapped up in its continuance.

Whatsoever they may decide, however—whether they shall resolve to become the guardians of their own civil rights, or leave them to the guardianship of an army of papal hierarchs, irresponsible to all human authority and above all human laws—the American people, as a whole, will not be likely to remain passive and unresisting under these continued threatenings. And when they shall be brought to realize—a point they are rapidly reaching—that their popular form of government is actually and insolently threatened; that opposition to some of the most highly prized features of their civil institutions is already inaugurated, with the view of substituting the power of the papacy for their own constitutional authority, and of subordinating their fundamental laws to the decrees of the pope, as a foreign king and despot—when the great body of the American people shall become fully apprised of all these things, they will then understand what remedy to apply, and how to apply it.

They will not find this remedy in the violation of any of the cherished principles of their Government; by the abandonment of its liberal or tolerant spirit; or by any act unworthy a Protestant nation pledged to maintain free thought, free speech, and a free press. They will not find it in any form of wrong or oppression; either by withdrawing from the Roman Catholic religion any part of that protection they give to Protestantism, or by excluding any who think proper to profess that religion from the shelter of their civil institutions. They will not find it by imitating the example set them by those Roman Catholic governments that have allowed coercive measures to be employed to prohibit every form of religion but that of Rome. But they will find it by maintaining at every hazard, and in the face of all consequences, their right to enact their own laws, to preserve their own constitutions, and to regulate their own affairs according to their own sovereign will, and without foreign dictation; by perpetuating their popular form of government as the rightful inheritance of their children; by resisting to the last the “divine right” of kings or popes to rule over them; by firmly refusing to permit the canon laws of the Roman Catholic, or of any other church, to take the place of those of their own enacting; and by teaching the Roman hierarchy and all others who shall willingly become subservient to the schemes of the pope, that, while citizens of the United States, they can enjoy unimpaired all the rights of citizenship secured to themselves; but that, in order to this, they must render the same obedience to all existing laws which others are required to render; and that they call enjoy no exclusive privileges, whether civil or ecclesiastical, which shall put it in their power to violate the principles of American liberty—to impose unwilling restraint upon a single conscience—or to endanger the existence of a single fundamental principle upon which they have erected their civil and religious freedom.

Continued in Appendix

Continued from Chapter XXI. Disputes About Papal Authority.

The Laity and the Church.—They once aid in Election of Popes.—Gregory VII. takes away this Power, and vests it in the College of Cardinals.—His Object is Universal Dominion.—The Papacy necessarily Intolerant.—Never satisfied with Freedom of Conscience.—Condemned in Syllabus of Pius IX.—Denounced when introduced in Austria.—He excommunicates all Heretics.—Magna Carta.—Religious Toleration in Maryland.—The Colony Part of Virginia.—English Supremacy established by Law in Virginia.—The Law extended over Maryland.—Lord Baltimore in Virginia.—He cannot take the Oath as a Roman Catholic.—Obtains Grant from Charles I.—It provides for Religious Toleration in the New Colony.—This is a Necessity to Lord Baltimore.—He cannot settle a Roman Catholic Colony without it.—Charles I. favors the Papists.—Roman Catholic Emigrants to Maryland.—Make War on Virginians found there.—They suppress the Protestants.—Efforts to establish the Royal Authority of Lord Baltimore.—Oath of Allegiance to him.—Offices filled by Roman Catholics.—All Writs run in his Name.—Those who refuse Fidelity to him forfeit their Property.—Their Lands to be seized.—Colonists under Control of Jesuit Priests.—Their Claim of Church Immunities.—Opposition to English Law.—Jesuits never in Favor of Religious Toleration.—The Condition of the Papacy at that Time.—Completely allied with the Jesuits.—Gregory XV.—His Persecutions.—His Influence over Louis XIII. of France.—Urban VIII.—Terrible Persecutions under his Reign.— Cardinal Richelieu and Olivarez.—Persecution of Galileo.—Bank Debt collected by Bull of the Pope.—All the Teachings of the Church opposed to Religious Toleration.—The Legislation in Maryland is only in Obedience to the Charter.—May have had the Assent of Laymen, but not of the Priests or the Church.—Could not have the Assent of Pope Pius IX. now.

IT has abundantly appeared in the preceding chapters that the theory upon which the papal system has been constructed requires all Roman Catholics to be exclusive, intolerant, and aggressive. To say that they are not all so, is only to say what everybody knows; but it is no answer to the allegation against the system itself. Those who constitute these commendable and praiseworthy examples are mostly single individuals; but sometimes communities as is frequently found to be the case in the United States. They are, however, generally influenced by their special surroundings, and have never acquired sufficient prominence to impress their sentiments upon those who mold the principles and direct the course of the papacy. The popes have never been influenced by them in any degree since the papal power reached its culmination; but, on the contrary have simply borne with them on account of their general acceptance of the fundamentals of the Roman Catholic faith, and their habit of nonresistance.

For a number of centuries the laity had a voice in the election of the popes,(“Antiquities of the Christian Church,” by Bingham, vol. i., p. 132.) which, of course, made those elected, or desiring to be elected, somewhat circumspect in their conduct toward them. This did not give the people any direct influence over the faith, but rather indirect, by means of that representative feature in the Church constitution which provided for general councils. There was no change in this mode of procedure until the emperors and kings of France, Spain, and Germany, from political motives only, arrogantly asserted the imperial right to select popes obedient to themselves, and to dispossess such as were not so. And when, after severe and long—continued struggles, the popes were enabled to wrench this usurped power from the hands of royalty, they felt themselves under no obligation to restore the ancient authority of the people; because, by that time they had become so inoculated with the sentiments of imperialism themselves, that they did not consider the people as having any rights whatever in matters of so much importance. Insisting that the episcopal order was established by direct appointment of Christ, they claimed for it the power of self—perpetuation; and therefore it became an established principle of the papacy that, even when the people aided in the election of a pope, they had no right to assume that he derived any authority from them. (“Universal Church History,” by Alzog, pp. 396, 397, 659, etc.)

From this principle it was easy for so ambitious and talented a man as Gregory VII., surrounded by the prevailing superstition of the eleventh century, to deduce others which have since become necessary to the life of the papacy. Engaged as he was in consolidating a vast spiritual despotism, he was sagacious enough to know that his success would be in proportion to the removal of its power and authority from the people. Therefore, he employed his vigorous mind, not only while the confidential adviser of four popes, but more especially after he became pope himself, “to render all authority, civil and religious, dependent on the fiat of the Holy See; to place thrones and miters alike at the papal disposal; and to realize what had long floated dimly before the eyes of preceding pontiffs, an object of desire rather than of hope, the scepter of the universe swayed by the successor of St. Peter as vicegerent of the Almighty.” (“Church History,” by Baxter, p. 211.)

Chiefest among the means of consummating this object was the removal of all popular influences from the election of the pope, so that the ecclesiastical constitution should provide for a pure theocracy, with imperial powers. This he accomplished by vesting it exclusively in the college of cardinals, designated and appointed by the pope; by compelling all prelates and laymen to bind themselves, under the most solemn obligations, to the See of Rome; and visiting them with curses, anathemas, and excommunications in the event of their disobedience. So powerful was the influence he exercised upon his age, and so indelibly did he impress his principles upon the constitution of the papacy, that those of his successors who have imitated his usurpations have sheltered themselves behind his great name. And this has been done so frequently, with the apparent acquiescence of the laity, that at last what was originally the conception of overweening ambition has come to be considered as the infallible teaching of God—as an essential part of his eternal truth.

If some of these successors did impair the strength of the system he had constructed by vices which outraged the Christian sentiment of the world, the present pope (Pius IX.), by his exemplary life and piety, has been enabled, in some measure, to will back their losses. He has, at least, done so to the extent of being enabled to turn all his papal artillery upon the liberalizing and tolerant opinions of the nineteenth century, and of finding multitudes of followers who agree with him in the pretense that Hildebrand, no less than himself, was the infallible representative of Christ on earth.

We must no longer look, then, to the laity of the Roman Church for its faith or discipline. They have nothing to do with either, except to obey whatsoever is prescribed to them. And this obedience is required to be so comprehensive and unlimited as to include all that has been in the past, now is in the present, and may hereafter be in the future. Their whole duty is involved in the simple act of submission. Consequently, if there are here and there some of them, or even many, who are liberal and tolerant, and therefore not aggressive, they either hush up these sentiments in their own breasts, or, if they express them, have not authority sufficient to make them felt, if even known, at Rome. The papacy is reached only through the hierarchy, and they are sworn to obey the pope implicitly, and to preserve and extend his royalties. He imparts a portion of his infallibility to them in the execution of their theocratic functions, and through them to the laity in the single act of obedience. The strength of the papacy is by these means left unimpaired, and, in so far as the claim of universal supremacy is concerned, it is set forth as boldly and defiantly as when Gregory VII. hurled his thunders of excommunication and anathema at the head of the German emperor.

What government has ever existed which has recognized freedom of religious belief and worship while submissive to the authority of the papacy? In all history there is no account of any such. Wheresoever it has been done, the popes have considered it an act of disobedience to them, and dealt with it accordingly. In all the forms of bulls and briefs they have condemned and denounced it as heresy. Pius IX. has done so in his Syllabus and other official papers. When the Austrian Government, in 1855, abolished the Concordat, allowing liberty for all opinions—liberty of the press, of faith, and of instruction in the schools—he characterized the act as inimical to the Church, as “in flagrant contradiction with the doctrines of the Catholic religion;” and, by virtue of power which he claimed to have derived directly from Christ, he declared all the acts and decrees in that respect “null and powerless in themselves and in their effect, both as regards the present and the future.” And he threatened all engaged in their execution with the censures of the Church and with excommunication. (*)

These threats have been executed by the proclamation of excommunication, in 1869, of all heretics, “whatever their name, and to what sect soever belonging, and those who believe in them, and their receivers, promoters, and defenders;” (Ibid., for 1869, p. 619.) so that the pontifical curse is now resting upon all the institutions of Protestantism, and upon all liberal and tolerant opinions, wheresoever they are to be found in the world.

When, therefore, we talk about what the Church of Rome teaches and allows in reference to freedom of religion, of the press, and of speech, such as is secured by the Constitution of the United States, we must look, not to what is done and said by exceptional individuals, or even by communities of liberal tendencies, but to the pope alone. He is the Church, and absorbs in himself whatsoever power it possesses, in all its height, depth, length, And breadth. The pen of inspiration has instructed us that “God is not a man,” but the pope tells us that he, of all the earth, possesses the attributes of God, and must, therefore, prescribe the faith, reward the faithful, and punish the disobedient.

There are two memorable events in history which are sometimes referred to by defenders of the papacy to show that such accusations as the foregoing are unjust and unmerited: the granting of Magna Carta; and the introduction of religious liberty into the Colony of Maryland. If this defense were designed only to show that there had been, and yet existed, numbers of Roman Catholics who approved the principles involved in these great measures, it would be perfectly legitimate, and nobody could object, for that is an undoubted fact. But it is not so limited. On the other hand, it is placed to the credit of the papacy, which is not in any sense entitled to it.

As to Magna Carta, we have seen that the barons of England incurred the displeasure of Pope Innocent III. for extorting it from King John, and that he excommunicated them for doing so; and that he released the king from his sworn obligation to observe it, as he also did several of his successors. We have seen, too, the direct conflict between the principles it expressed and those which pertain to the papal system. The other inquiry—whether the papacy is entitled to any credit for religious toleration in Maryland—comes more directly home to the people of the United States; which makes the investigation of it of more immediate concern to us.

The Colony of Virginia was settled under several royal charters. That which erected it into “a corporation and body politic” was dated May 23d, 1609, and was granted by James I. The district of country included within the colonial limits extended “from sea to sea, west and northwest,” and included all of what afterward became the Colony, and is now the State, of Maryland. One of the purposes expressed in this charter was “the conversion and reduction of the people in those parts unto the true worship of God and Christian religion.” And inasmuch as the true worship was at that time in England considered to be that provided by the Established Church, in opposition to that of Rome, King James further said,

“We should be loath that any person should be permitted to pass that we suspected to affect the superstitions of the Church of Rome.”

It required also that the English oath of supremacy should be taken by all the colonists. By these provisions of the charter, therefore, Roman Catholics were positively prohibited from settling in any part of the colony. Other and subsequent provisions were designed to enforce this exclusion. By royal instructions issued to the governor in 1621, the colony was required “to keep up the religion of the Church of England as near as may be.” In obedience to these instructions, the General Assembly of Virginia—the first that ever met in the United States—enacted a law providing

“that there be uniformity in our church as neere as may be to the canons in England, both in substance and circumstance; and that all persons yield readie obedience unto them under paine of censure.” (Old spelling of some words.)

This was also repeated in 1629 and 1631, before the charter to colonize Maryland had been granted to Lord Baltimore. (“Henning’s [Virginia] Statutes at Large,” vol. i., pp. 97, 98, 114, 123, 149,155.)

The condition of things existing in the Colony of Virginia was not at all satisfactory to the king. The first legislative assembly had met at Jamestown in 1619, each borough sending a representative. The impulse given to popular freedom by this means excited his apprehension that the monarchical principles he desired to plant in the New World might be endangered. He manifestly feared that if the right of representation in the Colonial Legislature were granted to the people, it would, in the end, result in organizing a formidable opposition to his own authority. And being a monarchist in the strictest sense, he therefore resolved at once to bring the colonists into complete subjugation. For this purpose he resorted to several wrongful and oppressive measures. He commanded that a number of felons, unfit to remain in England, should be transported to the colony; and also made the most grinding exactions upon the people in order to draw off their wealth, and thereby to supply his own treasury. This injustice, which violated the chartered rights of the colonists, they could not endure without remonstrance; and when they did undertake to set forth their grievances, and to appeal to the settled principles of the law of England for protection, they were regarded as seditious.

This furnished a pretext, in 1622, for an attempt to destroy the charter. The first step to this end was to establish in England the entire governing power of the colony, and thus deprive the people of all agency in making their own laws and managing their own affairs, which was secured to them in the charter as pertaining to “the privileges, franchises, liberties, and immunities” which belonged to all Englishmen. This scheme of government, as a substitute for the charter, was laid before the colonists, who were told that if they did not accept it, they would be crushed by the power of the king. Not at all intimidated by this threat, they rejected the proposition with indignation, being resolved to cling to their chartered rights. The king, therefore, found it necessary to resort to a more direct measure. He caused a writ of quo warranto (Latin meaning, “by what warrant?”) to be issued from the Court of King’s Bench in England to declare the charter forfeited. The colonists could not, of course, make any successful defense to this, for the king could easily find the means, in those days, to bring the judges over to the royal side if they were otherwise inclined.

The English law gave the court no jurisdiction over the whole body of colonists, and they rightfully decided to treat whatever judgment should be pronounced against them as null and void. The judgment of forfeiture was arbitrarily rendered in 1625, just before the death of King James, but no steps were taken toward its execution before that event. Charles I., who succeeded him, took up the matter where his father had left it, and in one of his proclamations assigned all the misfortunes in the colony to what he called “corporate democracy.” His principal effort, therefore, was to destroy entirely the representative form of government inaugurated in 1619. To this end he appointed a governor and council with powers as royal as he himself possessed. But the people were determined not to give up their General Assembly, and it continued to meet at regular periods, passing such laws as we have seen, in strict conformity to those of England. They cherished the rights of Englishmen too fervently to surrender them at the mere dictation of the royal power, or in obedience to the illegal judgment of a court subservient to it.

In 1628, Lord Baltimore visited Virginia. This nobleman was a monarchist both from inclination and education. He was so devoted to the interests of the king as to have become a special favorite of both James I. and Charles I. He had many excellent and ennobling qualities, which made him exceedingly popular. In 1624—only four years before—he had become a Roman Catholic. When he reached Virginia he found the English Episcopal Church established by law, and also a legal requirement that, in becoming a citizen, he should take the English oath of supremacy. This he could not do consistently with his new religious convictions. He was willing, as all the papists in England were, to take the oath of allegiance, which involved merely the support of the kingly prerogative, but not that of supremacy, which denied the authority of the pope. Consequently he did not unite himself with the colonists. But being delighted with the climate, soil, and scenery about the Chesapeake Bay and Potomac River, he formed the design of obtaining a charter from King Charles authorizing him to make a settlement there, in entire disregard of the rights of the Virginia colony. Upon that question, being a monarchist, he, of course, took sides with the king—both having an equal disregard for the rights of the people when they came in conflict with the prerogatives of royalty. He relied manifestly upon his well-known devotion to these principles for his success with the king. And in this he was not disappointed; for Charles was not only disposed to oblige him personally, but was resolved upon punishing the seditious colonists of Virginia, notwithstanding they rigidly maintained the religious worship established by the laws of England.

The charter to Lord Baltimore was granted in 1632; but in consequence of his death it was transferred to his son, who took his title. It granted the tract of country lying on both sides of the Chesapeake Bay and north of the Potomac, up to the fortieth parallel of latitude—the whole of which was within the limits of the Virginia colony. (*)

This charter contained the celebrated provision that while Christianity was made the law of the colony, yet no preference should be given “to any sect,” but “equality in religious rights, not less than in civil freedom,” was secured. (Bancroft, p. 243.) This constitutes the groundwork of the Roman Catholic claim of toleration in the United States. A critical examination of it will demonstrate not only that this claim is groundless, but also what was understood by Charles I. and the elder Lord Baltimore by giving security to civil freedom in Maryland—in other words, by granting the right of legislation to those Roman Catholics who should emigrate to the colony.

The English oath of supremacy had been established one hundred years before the date of this charter. This oath required that every subject should recognize the king as the supreme head of the Church of England; that the Pope of Rome had no more jurisdiction than any other bishop; and that obedience to him should be renounced. (“History of England,” by Rapin, vol. vii., p. 480.) This was not only the law in England, but it was also the law in the Colony of Virginia. It was because of this that Lord Baltimore could not become a citizen of the latter colony. Now when this, and the further fact that the territory granted to him was within the limits of the Virginia colony, are observed, it will be seen that he could have accomplished no possible object designed by him without a provision for religious toleration in his charter. He was about to undertake a settlement in a region of the New World where there was an existing form of religion established by law, which, in his conscience, he entirely repudiated—which he had renounced only four years before as contrary to the law of God, and which, if he remained true to his religious convictions and papal obedience, he would feel it his duty not merely to oppose, but to exterminate. Like other papists of that day, and the advocates of the pope’s infallibility now, he favored religious toleration in a Protestant country that is, such toleration as would enable him to maintain the cause of the papacy in the midst of Protestantism as the means of rooting out the Protestant religion, and securing the establishment of the Roman Catholic by law. His only means of getting rid of the oath of supremacy in the Colony of Virginia was to get the king so far to set it aside, without authority of law and by his royal will alone, as to allow him to colonize part of the territory with Roman Catholics—this being, at that time, the only possible means of introducing that class of population into the colonies. Hence, the provision for religious toleration was a matter of necessity, not choice, with Lord Baltimore.

On the part of the king there was one principal object to be attained by the establishment of the new colony. As Lord Baltimore was a thorough monarchist, it was expected of him that he would check the tendency among the Virginia colonists toward popular liberty, and so employ the right of legislation granted to the Maryland colonists as to preserve the monarchical principle; which Charles well understood to be an established feature of the papal system. This object was so near the heart of Charles that he was quite willing that the established religion should be sacrificed, if it could be done in no other way. Although he had no power by the law of England to set aside the oath of supremacy, yet he could even venture to defy the authority of Parliament in order to punish the Virginia colonists for daring to assert their just rights as Englishmen.

He may, indeed, have had, and possibly did have, another motive beyond this: the subversion of the English Church in the colonies and the establishment of the Roman Catholic by law. It is very well known to the readers of English history that both Charles I. and his father, James I., while professedly Protestants, were inclined to favor the papists as far as they dared to go. During the reign of Charles the laws were not executed against them, and they were allowed to go unpunished for refusing to take the oath of supremacy, whenever they consented to swear allegiance to him. (Rapin, vol. xi., p. 89.) By this latter oath they assured themselves of his royal favor to such an extent that they contributed greatly toward the general policy of his administration. They were allowed publicly to celebrate mass at Somerset- house, especially under the royal protection.

A papal nuncio resided in London, and his house was their general rendezvous. The queen was an acknowledged and fanatical papist. It is, therefore, quite certain that they materially aided the convocation and Archbishop Laud in implanting in the mind of Charles an intense hatred of the Presbyterians and Puritans. (*)

And as the influence of the latter was beginning, about that time, to create a sentiment in the Plymouth colony, like that in Virginia, in favor of the principles of popular government, it was probably an easy matter for Lord Baltimore to obtain from Charles the charter of 1632. Both of them thought alike upon the political questions likely to be involved in the settlement of the new colony; and these were considered by—Charles as of more consequence than the religious worship established by the English law.

Thus, when all these facts are taken into account, the conclusion is a natural if not unavoidable one—that the insertion of the provision in favor of religious toleration in the Maryland charter was alone for the objects and purposes already suggested. So far as Lord Baltimore himself was concerned, it was undoubtedly a necessity with him. He did not take it in that form because he favored religious toleration in a broad and liberal sense, even if he did so favor it, but because it was the only mode by which he could maintain Roman Catholicism in opposition to the existing law of the Virginia colony. By precisely the same process of reasoning as may have influenced him, Pope Pius IX. is in favor of religious toleration in the United States, but not at Rome; and so with his hierarchy all over the world.

The second Lord Baltimore did not accompany his colonists to America. They were placed under the care of Leonard Calvert, his brother, who arrived in Virginia with two hundred Roman Catholics in 1634. They visited Jamestown, where they were notified by the governor and council that their grant was considered as an encroachment upon the rights of Virginia. (Howison, vol. i., p. 270.) They then sailed up the Chesapeake, and established a colony which they called Maryland, in honor of Henrietta Maria, the Roman Catholic queen of Charles I. Upon Kent’s Island, near the present city of Annapolis, they found a settlement of Virginians, already made under the authority of the Virginia charter. They demanded of these that their jurisdiction and authority at Kent’s Island should be immediately recognized. The Virginians not consenting to this, which they considered an invasion of their colonial rights, hostilities were commenced. Their leader was seized by Calvert and his party, tried, and convicted of sedition and other crimes, and would doubtless have been executed if he had not succeeded in making his escape to Jamestown, where he demanded the protection of the governor, who was then Sir John Harvey. No effective steps were taken by him; and he was suspected of favoring the views of the king, and of Calvert also. On this account he became so odious to the Virginia colonists that he was removed by the General Assembly, and sent back to England. But he was restored by the king, who was not disposed to listen to any popular complaints, or to do anything to protect the Virginians. (Howison, vol. i., p. 273.)

The facts thus far stated may be found in the general histories of those times; but any careful student of them will readily perceive that many things are omitted which are necessary to a perfect understanding of the early history of the Maryland colony, especially in so far as religious toleration was concerned. One reason for this is found in the fact that hitherto it has been deemed expedient by Protestants to permit the claim of Roman Catholic toleration to go unchallenged, as there was nothing to be gained by controverting it, and its evident tendency was to keep alive that sentiment in the minds of the multitude of Roman Catholic laymen to whom it is most acceptable. But now, when this claim is set up with such apparent candor, and so much is demanded on account of it, it has become necessary that it shall be more particularly examined and accurately understood. And it is fortunate that we are not entirely without the means of doing so.

In 1655, soon after these events occurred, there was published in Westminster Hall, London, an account of the settlement of the Maryland colony, wherein it was shown, by facts and arguments which could not be easily overthrown, that the patent of Lord Baltimore was illegal, and that under it the younger Lord Baltimore had usurped royal jurisdiction and prerogatives in violation of the laws and liberties of the English nation, and of the just rights of the Virginia colonists. In order to demonstrate this, a relation was given of the leading incidents connected with the rebellion of the Roman Catholic colonists against the existing government organized under the Virginia charter. Some years ago, this account, along with many others connected with our colonial history, was put in an accessible form by a gentleman who, during his life, was greatly esteemed for his erudition as well as for his painstaking in collecting together the materials of our early history. From this source the facts now to be related have been obtained. (*)

After speaking of the seizure and confiscation of vessels belonging to the Virginians who had been trading with the natives of Maryland for a number of years, under proper and legal authority derived from their Colonial Government, and the invalidity of the Maryland charter, which it was alleged Lord Baltimore had obtained by falsely representing the country as unsettled, it thus speaks of the Roman Catholic colonists:

“And professing an establishment of the Romish religion only, they suppressed the poor Protestants among them, and carried on the whole frame of their Government in the Lord Proprietaries name; all their Proceedings, Judicature, Trials, and Warrants, in his name, Power and Dignity, and from him only; not the least mention of the Sovereign Authority of England in all their Government; to that purpose, forceably imposing Oaths (judged illegal in a Report made by a Committee of the Council of State, 1652), to maintain his royal Jurisdictions, Prerogatives, and Dominions, as absolute Lord and Proprietary, to protect chiefly the Roman Catholic religion in the free exercise thereof; and all done by yearly Instructions from him out of England, as if he had been absolute Prince and King.” ( Ibid., p. 5.)

There is no difficulty in seeing the object and precise nature of the oaths prescribed by Lord Baltimore for all officers and citizens, when it is considered that both by the laws of England and those existing in the colony at the time of his settlement, the English Episcopal was the established Church. And while the practice of religious toleration was compulsory, being provided for in the charter, it is undoubtedly true that these oaths were specially designed to give undue preference to the Roman Catholic colonists—a preference destructive of the equality which the charter was designed to establish. This is one of the requirements:

“And I do further swear I will not by myself, nor any other person directly, trouble, molest, or discountenance any person whatsoever in the said province professing to believe in Jesus Christ, and in particular no Roman Catholic, for or in respect of his or her Religion, nor his or her free exercise thereof within the said province, so as they be not unfaithful to his said Lordship or molest or conspire against the civil Government established under him.” (“Historical Tracts,” collected and printed by Peter Force, Washington City, 1838, pp. 23, 24, 26.)

We must necessarily look to the character of the civil government established by Lord Baltimore, in order to as certain the obligations imposed by this oath. The oath of fidelity to him required that he should be acknowledged “to be the true and absolute Lord and Proprietary” of the colony; that “true faith” should be rendered to him and his heirs, and that his and their “Right, Title, Interest, Privileges, Royal Jurisdiction, Prerogative, Propriety and Dominion over” the colony should be maintained. (Ibid., p. 25.)

Here was a manifest attempt to substitute his own royal power for that of the king,, to whom all the original colonists were ready and willing to pay obedience. But the same is further shown by the commissions, writs, and processes that were issued. The law of England required all these to issue in the name of the “Keepers of the Liberty of England;” but, in disobedience of this requirement, they were issued in his name—a clear usurpation of royal jurisdiction and dominion. (Ibid., p. 10.)

The plan of government constructed by means of these usurped powers and prerogatives became such that the Protestant inhabitants of the colony who were loyal to England could not conscientiously take this oath, because it imposed the obligation of violating the law of the mother country. Whether that law was right or wrong is not now necessary to be inquired into; it was in accordance with the spirit of that, though not of the present age. It prescribed the line of duty for all English citizens, whether at home or in the colonies, and these Maryland colonists by violating it would have been subjected to prosecutions for sedition and treason. All this Lord Baltimore knew perfectly well, and therefore he prescribed an oath of fidelity to himself of such a nature that a loyal Protestant could not take it, being well assured, at the same time, that the Roman Catholics would all do so. And to show the little favor he was disposed to exhibit toward those who should refuse—if, indeed, he did not design to drive out the Protestants entirely—he caused a proclamation to be issued to the effect “that all such persons so refusing shall be forever debarred from any Right or claim to the Lands they now enjoy and live on;” that is, their property should be confiscated; and “his Lordship’s Governor” was instructed “to cause the said lands to be entered, and seized upon to his Lordship’s use.” (“Historical Tracts,” collected and printed by Peter Force, Washington City, 1838, p. 35.)

As might well be supposed, the results were just what Lord Baltimore designed they should be, and are fully set forth in this tract. “Papists and Priests and Jesuits” flocked into the colony. “Papist Governors and Counselors, dedicated to St. Ignatius,” filled the offices. The Protestants were “miserably disturbed in the Exercise of their Religion.” A number of “illegal Executions and Murders” occurred. There were “Imprisonments, Confiscations of many men’s Estates, and of widows’ and orphans’, to the destruction of many Families.” Those who would not take the oath were disarmed and plundered. “Popish Officers” were appointed, “outing those” who were previously in office. “Lands and Plantations” were seized and confiscated. And it cannot fail to arrest attention that all these persecutions were visited upon Protestants, while not one Roman Catholic suffered from them! (Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 16, 30, 31. ) As for these, they were so favored that if one of them was called “Papish Priest, Jesuit, Jesuited Papist,” etc., the offender forfeited a penalty of “ten pounds!” (Ibid., p. 27.)

The inferior position occupied by laymen in those days should relieve them from any responsibility for these measures. The civil authority of the colony was entirely in the hands of those appointed by Lord Baltimore, who, as it appears, selected Roman Catholic agents exclusively. At that time, in England, the papists were chiefly under the influence of the Jesuits, whose vigilance was too sleepless to permit this opportunity of planting their society in the New World to escape them. How far they had the sympathy and support of Lord Baltimore is, of course, not known; but it is undoubtedly true that they were the authors of all these measures in the Maryland Colony, and that they had pretty much their own way there. This appears from a narrative preserved in the Jesuit college at Rome, which is also found among the “Historical Tracts” above referred to. It was prepared by the Jesuit fathers appointed by the superior general of the order at Rome, to superintend the first emigration of Roman Catholic colonists who left England in the fall of 1633.

They went, as it is declared, to “carry the light of the Gospel and of truth where it has been found out that hitherto no knowledge of the true God has shone “—that is, where neither the pope nor popery had been heard of. History has amply shown the kind of light they throw upon the pathway of nations as well as individuals, and the events in the Maryland Colony show that they acted there, as everywhere else, under instructions from Rome. “Bulls, letters, etc., from the pope and Rome “—that is, from the pope and the general of the Jesuits— became familiar to the colonists. (Historical Tracts,” collected and printed by Peter Force, Washington City, 1838, p. 12.)

By means of these the Jesuits became omnipotent in the colony; and in the tract last named they show how successfully they exercised their power. Then, as now, the first object of the order was the acquisition of wealth, with the right to govern and control their property without any reference or obedience to the laws of the country in which they reside. On this subject Father White, one of these Jesuits, reports that when they set tip this claim in Maryland, they were met by those who insisted that the laws of England, which bound the colony, forbade it; and he speaks of them as those “who, too intent upon their own affairs, have not feared to violate the immunities of the Church by using their endeavors that laws of this kind formerly passed in England, and unjustly observed there, may obtain like force here, to wit: that it shall not be lawful for any person or community, even ecclesiastical, in any wise, even by gift, to acquire or possess any land unless the permission of the civil magistrate first be obtained.

Which thing, when our people declared it to be repugnant to the laws of the Church, two priests were sent from England who might teach the contrary.” And then, in order to show his superior what admirable success he had in resisting this unjust English law, and how all—powerful the order had already become in America, he continues:

“But the reverse of what was expected happened; for our reasons being heard, and the thing itself being more clearly understood, they easily fell in with our opinion, and the laity in like manner generally.” (*)

And thus the Jesuits won their first triumph in the United States. The two priests sent over from England to demonstrate the necessity of obeying the English law were easily converted; the laity were unresisting; the law was trampled under their feet; and they were allowed to acquire, hold, and govern their own property with impunity, and without any responsibility to the civil power. This is precisely the claim now set up by the American hierarchy at the Second National Council at Baltimore, who have again revived, and upon the same soil, the old Jesuit demand of nearly two centuries and a half ago.

If the simple narration of the foregoing facts were not sufficient of itself to prove that the Jesuits in Maryland were only in favor of religious toleration as a means of extirpating Protestantism—which is acknowledged to have been the chief object of their organization— the game they were then playing throughout Europe sufficiently removes all doubt upon the subject.

Those were the days of Popes Gregory XV. and Urban VIII., both of whom strove hard to establish papal omnipotence. Gregory XV. canonized Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits. He organized missions to every country in the world. He founded the society of the Propaganda. He formed an alliance with Roman Catholic sovereigns for the extirpation of the Lutherans and Calvinists. He sent into Bohemia “cohorts of Dominicans, Augustines, Franciscans, Carmelites, and Jesuits,” under Cardinal Caraffa, with a subsidy of two hundred thousand crowns, who attacked and murdered Protestants wherever they found them; who “burned the farm—houses, murdered the farmers, violated girls, polluted young children, sparing those only who called themselves Catholics.

“He sent Cardinal Stein to Moravia, with like cruel and rapacious soldiers, who drove fifteen thousand Moravian brothers from their homes. His Jesuit missionaries, in Bavaria and Saxony, terrified twenty thousand people with the axe of the executioner, until they renounced Protestantism. He prohibited Protestant worship in the Palatinate, and forced the inhabitants to submit to the Church of Rome. His emissaries penetrated to Upper Baden, to Bamberg, Fulda, Eichsfeld, Paderborn, Halberstadt, Magdeburg, Altona, and threatened Denmark and Norway. He made Duke Maximilian of Bavaria Elector of the Palatine, as a reward for his heartless persecutions, which, he said, filled his heart “with a torrent of delight,” because it gave him assurance that “soon will all the enemies of the throne of the apostle be reduced to dust.”He stimulated Louis XIII. of France to make war upon the Huguenots. Everywhere they went, his legions of Jesuits, Franciscans, and Capuchins preached the extinction of heresy. With the heartlessness of a fiend he wrote thus to Louis XIII., on account of his cruelties to the Calvinists:

“My dear son, the ornament of the universe, the glory of our age, march on steadily in your holy path; cause the power of your arm to be felt by those who know not God; be pitiless toward the heretics; and merit to be seated one day on the right hand of Christ, by offering to him as a holocaust all the children of perdition who infest your kingdom.”

He wrote to the King of Spain “to have no pity on the heretics; to order his governors to establish the Catholic religion by force in the provinces dependent on his crown; to light up the stake; and to leave the Calvinists no alternative but the mass or death.”

Dreading the power of the English people, he changed his tactics in that country, and sought to win James I. by flattery, and by favoring the marriage of his son Charles to the daughter of the King of Spain. He conceived the idea of bringing the whole world into dependence upon Rome by the instruments he was then employing, and of sending these desolating missionaries to the Indies, China, Japan, all Asia, and Africa. It was his fertile and inventive brain which first conceived the thought, just before the Maryland charter was granted to Lord Baltimore, of planting Roman Catholicism in North America by means of Jesuit missionaries. (Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 295, 297.) And to notify the world how it would be governed if he had the power, this infallible pope issued a bull, Contra Haereticos in locis Italioe, whereby he ordained that no heretic, under any pretense whatever, should reside in Italy, or the islands adjacent. (“Religion and Policy,” by Clarendon, Vol. ii., p. 530.)

Urban VIII. was a fit successor to Gregory XV. in some respects, while in others he was not. The condition into which Europe was thrown by the violent measures and remorseless persecutions of Gregory was one of convulsion and uncertainty. The Protestants were everywhere seeking places of refuge; and the princes who were obedient to Rome were emulous (ambitious to equal or surpass) of each other in the adoption of measures to extirpate them.

There was no valley in the Alps or the Pyrenees so remote as to furnish them a hiding—place. Spain had almost worn out its strength during the forty odd years of the tyranny of Philip II. by the expulsion of more than a million and a half of Jews and Moors, and the murder of untold numbers of Protestants. Ferdinand II. of Germany had swept over the Protestant settlements of Bohemia as with a besom of destruction. The bloody and unrelenting Alva had desolated the Netherlands. The fires of the Thirty Years’ War were blazing all over Germany. Lutheranism was forbidden in Austria. Hungary was subdued, impoverished, and paralyzed. The indomitable but treacherous Wallenstein was crushing out the spirit of civil and religious liberty with his mighty army. The tramp of soldiery was heard everywhere. James I. and Charles I. were concerting plans, under the dictation of Buckingham and Laud, to turn over England to the papacy. The minor princes everywhere were intimidated.

Nowhere, in all Europe, was there to be found a single conspicuous Roman Catholic, except the great Richelieu, who dared to defy the thunders of Rome; and even he was so impressed with the teachings of the queen-mother, Mary of Medici, that he was as remorseless as his royal master, Louis XIII., could desire, in spreading consternation and dismay throughout the ranks of the Protestants. He used their swords to further his ambition, but punished them for their heresy. He added them to his armies in order to strike terror into the mind of Urban VIII., and then struck them down to keep within the pale of the Church. He would brook no rival to the king in) France, and with his strong arm snapped every cord with which the infallible pope tried to bind him. Olivarez of Spain was a puppet in his hands. He played with kings as with toys. As there was no check to his ambition, so there was no limit to his power. His mighty genius displayed itself in the grandest measures of state policy; and finding that the greatness and glory of France lay through fields of blood, his cardinal robes were not sacred enough in his eyes to cause him an instant’s pause in the task of achieving them.

Surrounded by men and events like these, Urban VIII. would have had an insignificant existence had he not possessed the papacy. This position required him, not alone to carry on the persecutions against the Protestants, but to mix himself up with the contests of the princes. Spain was trying to hold Portugal with one hand, and to keep France in check with the other. Urban, afraid to offend either, courted both. He dreaded the perfidy of Olivarez as much as he did the power of Richelieu. Necessity, therefore, not choice, kept him from reaching out the papal arm over the nations as boldly as his immediate predecessor had done; but, nevertheless, he quietly left at work, whenever he was not prevented, all the instruments of papal vengeance which Gregory XV. had sent out. Italy was the only place where his infallibility was recognized, and there it was conceded only from dread of his power. It having been charged against him that he reached the pontificate only by causing some of the cardinals who had opposed him to be poisoned, (Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 299.) and by intimidating others, the Italians were kept in silence by fears of his cruelty.

Hence, in this limited field of ecclesiastical jurisdiction—where his mastery was undisputed, he felt authorized to show, to the fullest extent, what an infallible pope could do when undisturbed in the exercise of his power. The first measure by which he distinguished his pontificate was to set aside a bull of Sixtus V. by inaugurating a shameless system of nepotism, in making cardinals of his brother and two of his nephews, and in rewarding his own family with gifts of money and power. He caused Galileo to be thrown into prison and persecuted because he violated the faith of the Church in teaching the earth’s revolution, according to the theory of the heretic Copernicus. He disgracefully converted the papal power into an instrument for extorting money from an orthodox prince, to oblige his nephew, Cardinal Francisco.

The Duke of Parma was largely indebted to the Monte, or Bank, of Rome, as security for which the revenues of the Duchy of Castro were pledged. Cardinal Francisco, desiring to obtain possession of Castro, prevailed upon the pope to summon the duke before him and command the payment of the debt to the bank. The duke was notified that if he did not appear within a fixed time, he would be excommunicated, and the revenues of Castro be sequestered for that purpose. The notice was disregarded, and the duke, knowing the character of Cardinal Francisco and his great influence over the pope, commenced the erection of fortifications to defend his territory in the event of forcible invasion. This the pope held to be an offense amounting to “crimen laese majestatis,” because it was done without his consent, and he proceeded to pronounce a solemn judgment against the duke. This consisted in fulminating a formal bull, excommunicating him, forfeiting all his dominions, and absolving all his subjects from their oaths of fidelity. (“Religion and Policy,” by Clarendon, vol. ii., pp. 548-550.)

In this act Urban VIII. went a bow-shot beyond any of his predecessors. With them the practice of excommunicating heretics, releasing their subjects, and taking away their dominions was familiar enough as the exercise of their divine power; but Urban was the first pontiff who employed this extraordinary power to compel an orthodox prince, as faithful to the Church as himself, to pay a debt to a banking corporation! What other than an infallible genius could have originated the idea of converting an ecclesiastical bull of excommunication into a capias ad satisfaciendum?

When forced, at last, to experience the mortification of defeat in consummating this nefarious scheme, in consequence of the combination of princes to protect the Duke of Parma, he gnashed his teeth in anger, like a madman, and died a miserable and ignominious death; “blaspheming the name of God, and confounding in the same curses the Doge of Venice, the Dukes of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, the French and Spaniards, Protestants and Catholics.” (Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 317.)

The events heretofore related, immediately preceding and connected with the colonization of Maryland, occurred during the pontificates of these two popes; and there is nothing more certain than that neither of them did anything up to that time to counteract the influence of the Jesuits, or to check their career of conquest. Suarez, and Sanchez, and Emanuel Sa, and Bellarmin, and other fathers, had just died, leaving immense volumes of defense as a legacy to the order. Neither the “Augustinius” of Jansen nor the “Provincial Letters” of Pascal had yet been published. The heavy artillery of Port-Royal had not yet been opened upon them. They were holding “high carnival” among the nations; crowding around the courts of kings to subjugate them by their intrigues, bending popes to their will through such generals as Acquaviva, and lighting the torch wheresoever there were victims to be found.

But a few years before, the accursed and infernal Inquisition had been declared “holy” and “universal” by Pope Sixtus V., and no monarch had yet been powerful enough to succeed in mitigating its cruelties. John IV. of Portugal was the only one among the Roman Catholic sovereigns who, at that time, dared to incur the pontifical displeasure by denouncing its ferocities and seeking to destroy it.

Under all these circumstances, it is absurd—the very height of absurdity—to suppose that these Jesuit fathers, White, and Altham, and Brock, and others, who accompanied the first Roman Catholic colonists to Maryland, came over with the purpose in their minds to plant religious toleration and freedom of conscience in the New World. The idea is preposterous; and he who is credulous enough to believe it, is also ready to believe that Gregory VII., and Adrian IV., and Alexander III., and Innocent III., and Boniface VIII., made the service of God the sole motive of their lives, and undertook no efforts to seize upon the temporal scepters of kings.

Whatsoever, then, was done in the Colony of Maryland in favor of religious toleration was done only in obedience to the charter, and against the known and steady policy both of the Church of Rome and the Jesuits. Nobody can justify the intolerance of the Episcopalians of Virginia or the Puritans of New England; and while we may now congratulate ourselves that counteracting influences were planted in Maryland, it should not be forgotten that those who brought them accepted toleration from compulsion, and employed all the arts and cunning of Jesuitism to get rid of it.

Intolerance, it is true, accorded with the spirit of that age, and some allowance—but no apology—is to be made for it on that account. But the first influences that set in against it were Protestant exclusively, not Roman Catholic. Nowhere in the Roman Catholic world could religious toleration obtain a foot—hold. Although great men and laymen of the Church gave it their support, Rome would not permit it, and her fiat was the law of the Church: “when Rome has spoken,” said Augustine,” that is the end of the matter.”

The first legislation in Maryland in favor of freedom of conscience was in 1649, fifteen years after the colony had been planted. Earlier assemblies had enacted laws, but they were not approved by Lord Baltimore, and were, therefore, lost. It was necessary in passing all these that the colonists, while preserving the legal rights of the Proprietary, should, at the same time, be careful to express their allegiance to the English monarch. They had the example of Virginia before them to teach them how necessary it was that their legislation should conform to their charter, in order to avoid a forfeiture. This conformity to the charter was the expression of their allegiance. Without it Lord Baltimore could not legally have approved of their legislation, and the displeasure of the king would have been incurred.

In any aspect of the question, then, the legislation of 1649 was a necessary duty imposed by their fundamental law, and was almost in the language of the charter. It was an act of legal obedience, nothing more. If, apart from this, it had the hearty assent of the Roman Catholic laymen of the colony, that only goes to show, what has often appeared elsewhere, that liberal-minded men of that Church have had courage enough to defy the papacy, in their advocacy of the inalienable natural rights of mankind. To these, if such were the fact, all possible honor is due, and we should not be slow to render it. And even now, in the present aspect of affairs, it may well be left unchallenged; for neither then nor now could religious toleration obtain the sanction and approval of the papacy. It could not have done so then, because Innocent X. was pope, and he, in a pontifical bull, ex catthedra, denounced the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War by restoring peace to Germany, and placed every religious sect on an equal footing; declaring it to be “prejudicial to the Catholic religion, to divine worship, to the safety of souls, to the Apostolic See,” and “null, vain, iniquitous.” (“History of Germany,” by Menzel, vol. ii., p. 395; Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 321.)

It could not be done now, because Pius IX. has announced, in his Syllabus of 1864 and elsewhere, that it is in violation of God’s law and the faith of the Church; that Innocent X. and all other intolerant popes were infallible; and that unqualified and unresisting obedience is due both to the doctrines set forth by them, as well as to those which have been set forth by him.

If the Roman Catholic laymen of Maryland, in 1649, were so far removed from the immediate influence of Innocent X. that they dared to give expression to their honest sentiments in favor of toleration, let us cherish their memory with affection. But the immediate question which concerns us now, and which is practical in all its bearings, is this: Are the Roman Catholic laymen of the United States at this time sufficiently removed from the immediate influence of Pius IX. to stand firmly by the honest sentiments of their own hearts, and defend religious toleration at the hazard of incurring excommunication and anathema? If they are—if our free institutions have given growth and strength to their natural love of liberty, and they cherish the hope that they may be preserved as an asylum where Protestants and Roman Catholics may mingle together in harmony, and enjoy whatsoever forms of religious belief their consciences shall approve, then to them also should appropriate honors be given.

And this is the great question to which all our inquiries tend. How it is to be decided, and what shall be the character of the struggle through which a decision shall be reached, is known only to the Searcher of all hearts. The head of the pope no longer wears a crown, but he will tolerate no subjects whose submissive obedience is not the same as if he did. With him there can be no religion without this obedience; there can be no service of God without serving him. If this is to be the religion of the Roman Catholic population of the United States, then the obligation of self-protection will require measures of defense against it. What these shall be it would be premature to discuss until this preliminary question shall have been decided. And this cannot be put off much longer. It is crowding upon us every day, and each demand from Rome increases its proportions.

Continued in Chapter XXIII. The Papal Theory of Government

Continued from Chapter XX. Papal Infallibility

The Condition of the Church at the Time of the Councils of Basel and Florence.—Council at Pavia fixed by that of Florence.—Approved by Martin V.—Transferred to Basel.—Meets there, and is presided over by Legate of Eugenius IV.—It is Ecumenical—Agrees with that of Constance about its Power over the Pope.—Eugenius IV. endeavors to defeat It.—His Proceedings against It.—Organizes a Factious Assembly at Ferrara.—Proceedings of the Council against Him.—He pretends to yield, and approves its Decrees.—He violates his Pledge.—He draws the Greeks to Florence, and calls the Meeting there a Council.—It is not Ecumenical; the Council at Basel is at first, when its Decree against the Pope’s Infallibility is passed.—It represents a Majority of Christians.—The Council at Florence is mainly Italian.—The Pope’s Agreement with the Greeks about his Primacy.—Limited by Decrees of Councils and Canons of the Church.—The Greeks reject the Agreement, and it falls.—This is called a Decree.—Its Terms.—Misrepresentation of Them.—Do not make the Pope Infallible.—Give Him the Primacy conferred by Decrees and Canons.—Primacy of Honor, not Jurisdiction.—The Fifteenth Century, after the Council of Florence. —The French Church.—Charles VII.—Council at Bourges.—Pragmatic Sanction.—Opposition of the Popes to it. Revoked by Louis XI.—Parliament resisted.—Council of Pisa.—The Fifth Lateran Council in Opposition to it.— The Former renews the Decrees of Constance and Basel—The Latter factious at Beginning.—Afterward assents to.—Concordat of Bologna agreed to by Francis I. and Pope Julius It.—Rejected by France.—French Bishops do not attend the Council.—It is not Ecumenical.—No Deliberation in it.—Submissive to Leo X.—Council of Trent.— Does not assert the Pope’s Infallibility.—Does not deny the Validity of the Decree of Council of Constance.—Concedes merely Power of Pope to interpret the Canons, not to set them aside.—Pius IV. does this only in his Profession of Faith.

IT is so positively and dogmatically asserted that the pope’s infallibility was recognized by the Council of Florence, that, in order to know whether it is to be accepted as a fact or rejected, we must understand the character of that council, the circumstances which led to it, and the nature of its decrees.

The Church at the time of the two Councils of Basel and Florence was fearfully rent by a most disgraceful schism. The Council of Constance, only a few years before, had appointed a council to meet at Pavia, which had the sanction and approval of Martin V. This fixed its ecumenical character; and when it did afterward meet, in 1423, and was attended by five legates of the pope, and by deputies from France, Germany, and England, it, of course, retained this character. It was, therefore, an ecumenical council at the beginning, according to the principles then and now universally recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It was subsequently transferred to Basel, where it was presided over by a legate of Pope Eugenius IV.—his immediate predecessor, Martin V., having, in the mean time, died.

One of the first questions that came before it was that which had been decided by the Council of Constance, involving the relative powers of popes and councils. It became apparent, at once, to the pope that the council would decide, as that at Constance had done, in favor of its own and against his authority; in other words, that it possessed the rightful power to settle and prescribe the faith, independently of the pope, and that the pope had no such power without its consent, because it alone represented the Universal Church. To prevent this, Pope Eugenius IV. immediately began a most disreputable war against the council, intending, if possible, at whatever cost or injury to the Church, to defeat this action. He did not hesitate to inaugurate a war between the Church and the papacy; the former represented by a regularly organized ecumenical council, and the latter by the pope alone. He undoubtedly supposed that the times were favorable to the recognition of the claim of papal supremacy and infallibility; a supposition well warranted by the condition of affairs then existing.

The long residence of the popes at Avignon had corrupted the highest authorities of the Church to so fearful an extent, and the disgraceful schisms existing but a little while before had so rent the Church into factions, that it only required a bold and courageous pope to bring the bishops into obedience, especially when they were assured that they would be the sharers with him of whatsoever power he should acquire over the lay members of the Church. Therefore, Eugenius IV., in the very first step taken by him, exhibited a determination to take advantage of the times, and bring the whole Church to his feet at a single blow. He was determined to lose nothing by equivocation, and, accordingly, as if he were already dictator, commanded his legate to transfer the council to Bologna, where he could preside over it in person, and thus direct and control its action.

Acting under the protection of the Emperor Sigismund, the legate refused to obey this insolent command; whereupon the pope, greatly incensed, published a bull dissolving the council—a course of proceeding both factious and disorganizing. In the mean time, and before this bull was issued, the council had passed a decree to the effect that “every person, of whatsoever state or dignity, even the pope himself, is bound to obey it in what concerns the faith,” and another denying the right of the pope to dissolve it. The issue was thus distinctly made—the pope on one side, representing himself alone; the council on the other, representing the whole Church. One or the other had to recede, or divide the Church—separate its body from its head!

The council, backed by the emperor, sent a deputation to the pope earnestly desiring him to recall his bull for its dissolution. He refused. Whereupon the council renewed their former decrees, and declared that, as they were abandoned by the pope, it was their duty to provide for the necessities of the Church, “as the Holy Spirit should dictate to them.” They summoned the pope to attend in person. This he also refused, and was declared contumacious. He was then notified that unless he appeared at a fixed time he would be proceeded against. The council declared, also, that no prelates should attend a council at any other place, under the penalty of excommunication. It manifestly did not desire to press matters to an extremity with the pope, unless, by his conduct, he rendered it impossible for them to do otherwise. They accordingly deferred any final action several times, to give him every possible opportunity of seeing that the welfare of the Church required the restoration of the pacific relations between them. The pope, however, when he found the council resolved to treat him as contumacious, and to deal with him accordingly, solicited ten more days of delay, which were readily granted him. He thus acknowledged the jurisdiction of the council over him, and again asked for additional delay of ninety days, which was also granted.

During the third year of the council, the pope sent to it his pontifical bull, wherein he declared that the council was lawful; that it ought to continue, without dissolution; that he annulled and revoked his bulls dissolving it; that he approved it, and would do nothing prejudicial to it. Earnestly desiring conciliation, it accepted this bull as satisfactory; and admitted the pope’s legates, upon their taking an oath to approve the decrees of the Council of Constance. And thus peace was seemingly restored upon the basis of the superiority of a council over a pope—the pope having, by his last bull, proposed and agreed to this as the basis of an adjustment.

But it was only seemingly restored. The pope soon made up his mind to falsify his own promise, and to get rid of the troublesome fathers of Basel in some way, it mattered little to him how. He was playing the game for empire, and, like other pretentious potentates, considered himself entitled to do with impunity what the universal law of ethics forbids without dishonor. Accordingly, while the fathers were engaged in faithful exertions to bring about a union with the Greek Christians, he, by his emissaries, was constantly engaged in plotting against them.

He issued a bull to transfer the council, this time to Florence. Baffled again in this, he issued another transferring it to Ferrara. Here, at last, “some Italian bishops,” with a single cardinal, met and organized a rival council, which immediately proceeded to enact that the council at Basel was illegal, and its acts void. It will be seen at once that such a council as this was schismatical, unless the whole power of the Church were taken away from its legitimate and only representative body, and transferred to the pope. Two councils could not lawfully sit at the same time; and as that at Basel had been legally called and organized, this assemblage at Ferrara was manifestly irregular and factious. In so far as the pope himself was concerned, it was fraudulent; for in the act of convening it he violated the promise made in his bull sent to the Council of Basel. But the two councils did sit at the same time, each having its own representative character: that at Basel representing the Church; that at Ferrara, the pope. The former remained almost entirely unreduced in numbers, being deserted only by the pope’s legate and four prelates. These followed their master and the few other Italian prelates to Ferrara; while all the other prelates, with the ambassadors of princes, remained at Basel, representing nearly the entire Church.

The Council of Basel, driven at last to extremities by the factious and malignant conduct of the pope, proceeded with his trial. He was accused by it, among other things,, of simony and breaking his oath; and, being found guilty, a decree was adopted which “declared Eugenius suspended from all kind of administration of the papal power, as well in spirituals as temporals, which had now devolved on the council; decreed that all he did should be null; and forbade all sorts of persons to obey him, under pain of excommunication.”

Measures of resistance were adopted by the pope, who caused the prelates at Ferrara to declare all these proceedings void. And he issued another bull to that effect, commanding those at Basel to come to Ferrara, and pronouncing excommunication against those who did not. He enjoined the magistrates and inhabitants of Basel “to force them away under pain of excommunication, and an interdict; and in case they should not do it, he forbade all persons to enter within the city, under the same pains, and enjoined all merchants to withdraw from it.”

What a mild and Christian temper did this infallible pontiff display! In dealing with the Baselian fathers, who represented the Church, he exhibited that malignity which bad men always show when balked in the pursuit of unworthy enterprises. But the council at Basel was not intimidated, and retaliated by decreeing that that at Ferrara was illegal, and all its proceedings null. There seemed to be no oil of Christian charity to pour upon the troubled waters. Everything was cursing and anathema.

In the mean time, the Greeks, who had been invited by the Council of Basel to attend it, were on their way to the West, and the pope inaugurated measures to draw them away from Basel to Ferrara, upon the pretext that the prelates at Basel were schismatics because they had opposed him. In this he succeeded, and negotiations were commenced for settling the terms of union between the Greek and Latin Christians. These lasted for some time. The pope insisted that the primacy denied him at Basel should be recognized, but the Greeks refused. The controversy was attended with a great deal of violence, but no compromise was agreed upon at Ferrara.

The pope issued another bull transferring his council from there to Florence, where it could be more directly surrounded by Italian influences, and, consequently, more subject to his dictation. After it reached Florence, much time was consumed in discussions about the procession of the Holy Ghost, and the phraseology to be used in expressing the nature and extent of the pope’s power. He desired an unqualified expression of his primacy over both spirituals and temporals—the very opposite of what had been declared at Constance and Basel. His object was to have it so broadly set forth as to show that his power was plenary over everything, including councils, and even the canons of the Church. To this the Greeks were unwilling, because such a concession by them would admit the inferiority of the Church at Constantinople to that at Rome; whereas they had always maintained that each of them possessed equal authority within its own jurisdiction. They would not consent to go farther than the First Council of Constantinople had gone, more than a thousand years before, which was to concede to Rome the first rank of honor, on account of its having been the old imperial city. This they insisted would be sufficiently indicated by a decree which should provide for the primacy of the pope, within the limitations fixed by the decrees of the ecumenical councils and the canon law—that is, that in the exercise of his primacy he should obey these.

The issue was a very plain one, and required the employment of an unusual degree of diplomatic skin on the part of the pope and his adherents. He was dealing exclusively with those who had been cut off from the Roman or Latin Church by the sword of excommunication, and were therefore heretics; and his manifest object was to entrap them into an agreement as to the extent of his power, which he could fling into the faces of the Latin Christians. These latter were then regularly assembled in the council at Basel, from which he had been able to draw off only the Italian prelates and a few others, leaving the great bulk of the Church still faithful to the decrees of the Council of Constance. And the pope understood perfectly well that, if the sentiment of the Latin Christians were honestly expressed, it would remain thus faithful. Therefore he employed the utmost skill and assiduity in procuring such an act of assent from the Greek heretics as would enable him to set up some claim of right to resist this sentiment, and to disregard the decrees of Constance and Basel. In other words, he desired to employ the Greeks only for the purpose of subverting one of the fundamental principles of faith in the Latin Church, that he might be enabled thereby to bring the whole Church to his feet, and make the pope alone, as its infallible head, the sole custodian of all its authority, the sole guardian of all its rights, and the sole dictator of its faith. How far this papal artifice succeeded will appear in the sequel.

As furnishing one of the best modes of interpreting the result, it is necessary to observe that the chief action of this Council of Florence was in the nature of a treaty between the pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople, and their followers, with reference alone to a union between the Latin and Greek Christians, and not for the settlement of questions of faith. Certainly, it cannot be pretended by anybody that the Greeks had any authority whatever to decide upon matters of faith, so as to bind the Latin Christians, until they had first made such atonement as would remove the sentence of excommunication, and restore them to Christian fellowship. Their visit to the West, and all these negotiations, had this principal object; and therefore what they did or assented to cannot, in any just sense, be considered as a part of the faith, unless also assented to by such regularly constituted authorities of the Church as were then recognized as having the right to bind the Church.

The parties had no special difficulty in agreeing to such general terms as would express the primacy of the pope, and his headship over the Universal Church. They, however, understood these terms differently. The pope considered them as a concession of his infallibility, along with that degree of spiritual power which included jurisdiction over temporals; while the patriarch and the Greek Christians understood them as conferring the utmost degree of honor, but no such authority as should justify the pope in invading their local jurisdiction.

The Greeks not being disposed to make the concession in the former sense, it became necessary to insert some terms of limitation or qualification which should serve to interpret the meaning of the treaty, in order to obtain their assent. The pope proposed to insert, after the words declaring his primacy, and power to feed, rule, and govern the Church, these words, “According to Scripture and the writings of the saints.” (“Latin Christianity,” by Milman, vol. viii., p. 46 (note).) But to this the Greeks could not, of course, consent without surrendering everything. They could easily see that the proposition had the stamp of trickery about it.

Finally, however, a treaty was agreed to wherein the words proposed by the pope were so changed as to express the idea that the pope had the power, as the head of the Church, to govern it, according to the acts of ecumenical councils and the canons of the Church. To this we must refer presently, in order to see what its precise meaning is, since it is the basis of the papal claim of infallibility; but, whatever its meaning is, it was the best the pope could do. It may be fairly supposed that he was only reconciled to it in that form, because he saw the possibility of so perverting its terms as to base the claim of infallibility upon it and his own superiority to councils; especially if the Greeks should withdraw from it, and he should be left alone as the only contracting party authorized to interpret its meaning. At all events, he soon found himself in this position; for the Greek Christians at Constantinople, when they learned what had been done, disagreed to and repudiated the treaty of settlement, and thus the effort at union proved abortive, and the compact made at Florence fell to the ground. This left it, of course, entirely worthless for all practical purposes, unless the pope could secure influence enough to gather up its repudiated provisions and impose them upon the Latin Christians as the law of the Church, in opposition to the decrees of Constance and Basel; in other words, unless he could reduce the Latin Christians to such a degree of submission and obedience as to compel them to accept their faith, not from their own legally constituted and assembled councils, but from the heretical Greeks, merely because, by all sorts of art and intrigue, they had been enticed into an agreement which, if it did elevate the pope, most certainly humiliated the Latin Church.

There is nothing to justify the assertion that the Latin Christians assented to these proceedings at Florence. Those of them who attended the council held there under the auspices of the pope, were only such as he had succeeded in drawing away from Basel. The agreement made there took the form of a consular decree only because it was signed by those who followed the pope. Of the Latins, these were, besides the pope, only eight cardinals, two patriarchs (of Jerusalem and Grado), two bishops, ambassadors of the Duke of Burgundy, eight archbishops, forty—seven bishops, four heads of orders, forty—one abbots, and the Archdeacon of Troyes,(“Latin Christianity,” by Milman, vol. viii., p. 47.) only one hundred and thirteen in all; while the council at Basel was attended by the recognized representatives of all the remainder of the Latin Christians, and had the sanction and approval of the Roman Catholic princes.

Consequently, when the Greek Christians refused to be bound by the treaty, the only support it had left, in all Christendom, was this schismatical faction of the pope. The Council of Basel still represented the Church, and continued its sessions. It reaffirmed its previous decree, and that of Constance, wherein it was declared that a council was superior to the pope, and more formally than before deposed Eugenius IV. When this formal act of deposition was passed, there were thirty—nine prelates and nearly three hundred ecclesiastics present about three times as many as signed the decree at Florence! They declared him “disobedient to the commands of the universal Church; one that persists in his rebellion, a violator and contemnner of the Holy Synodical canons; a disturber of the peace and unity; one that gives open scandal to the whole Church—simoniacal, perjured, incorrigible, schismatical, heretical, etc.” This was, undoubtedly, the act of a large majority—in fact, of nearly the whole—of the Latin Christians, speaking in the only mode then known to their Church organization.

Du Pin says that at that time “some prelates” were with the pope at Florence, and we have seen that their number was insignificant compared with that of those who remained at Basel. Consequently, the Baselian fathers, after having deposed Eugenius IV., were compelled to elect a successor to him. They did elect Felix V. The combat now thickened, and bulls and other papal weapons were hurled, from side to side, with no less fierceness than velocity. Pope Eugenius flung his bull at the head of Pope Felix, declaring him heretical and schismatical, and excommunicating all his supporters—that is, condemning to eternal perdition all the Baselian fathers and the bulk of the Christian world—for daring to deny to him the right to clothe himself in the robes of deity. The Council of Basel retaliated by declaring the bull null, and signified their contempt of it by consecrating Felix as pope.

The struggle waxed warmer and warmer. Deputies from each party were dispatched to secure the approbation of the princes. The Kings of France and England hesitated, and desired a compromise. Arragon, Hungary, Bavaria, Poland, and Austria took the side of Felix and the Baselian prelates. The universities of Paris, Germany, and Cracow wrote theses acknowledging Felix, and maintaining the authority of councils above popes. Another general council was suggested, but neither party would agree to it. And the consequence was that the schism thus created by Eugenius in attempting to force the recognition of his infallibility upon the Church, and to destroy a legally convened ecumenical council, lasted until his death, which occurred after the councils of Basel and Florence had both terminated their sessions.

Nicholas V. was elected pope by those who espoused the cause of Eugenius. Being of a meek and peaceful temper, he agreed to the suggestions of the princes with a view to compromise. The final result was such an accommodation of the difficulty upon the conditions that Felix should resign and be made chief cardinal, that all the excommunications and censures on both sides should be revoked, and that “also the decrees, dispositions, and regulations they had made should be confirmed.” This arrangement was carried into effect, and Nicholas V. issued a bull accordingly, approving the decrees of both the Council of Florence and that of Basel!

What there was, in all these proceedings, indicating the presence and special direction of the Holy Spirit, it would be hard to find. The conduct of Pope Eugenius was characterized by violence, passion, malevolence, and perfidy—an entire absence of Christian charity and love. If he had lived, the schism would, in all probability, have inflicted still greater injury upon the Church. But it was healed, for the time being, by the pacific temper of Nicholas V., and comparative quiet was restored. (*)

The Roman Catholic Church rejects the Council of Basel, and accepts that of Florence as ecumenical. The latter, manifestly, has no just claim to that character; or certainly less claim to it than the former, which undoubtedly represented a majority of the Latin Christians. It has been suffered to acquire this character, however, because the popes and those passively obedient to them have been permitted to make up the history of the Church; and they, favoring their own infallibility, and desirous of the power it gives them, have rejected the Council of Basel, which really represented the Universal Church, and the sentiments of the Christian world, far more than did the papal faction at Ferrara and Florence. The assembly at Florence can not be called ecumenical in any proper sense, because there is nothing to show that it represented the Universal Church.

That at Basel was ecumenical for a time, at all events, even according to the papal rule. When Eugenius solicited delay in its proceedings, and agreed, in consideration of its being granted, that he would sustain its action and approve its decrees, he knew that the decree declaring the council above the pope had been passed. He must be understood, therefore, as having by this act made that decree a part of the law of the Church, according to the recognized forms of procedure. True, he supposed he could change it, and resorted to falsehood and intrigue to do so. But having failed in this, the only course left him was to assemble a seceding faction of his own, entice the Greeks to join it, cause it to enact a new decree, and then employ all the authority of the papacy to bring the Church to accept it as an ecumenical council. Even this, however, does not help the supporters of the pope’s infallibility out of the difficulty—for Pope Nicholas V. afterward approved the decrees of the Council of Basel, which, according to their theory, makes them a necessary part of the faith, whether the council enacting them was ecumenical or not. But he also approved those of Florence, which, of course, had been also approved previously by Eugenius.

What then? There is but one common—sense view of it: if Florence decreed in favor of the pope’s infallibility and Eugenius approved it, Basel decreed against it and Nicholas approved that! Were they both infallible? If so, then the act of one was what the lawyers would call a set-off against that of the other. If neither was infallible, then the act of Nicholas, being the last in point of time, must be held to be of more weight than that of Eugenius; or else Nicholas must be put in the singular attitude of having approved two decrees directly in conflict with each other! This would certainly require infallibility— though the integrity of such an act might well be questioned.

But if it be conceded that the Council of Florence was ecumenical, and that it did regularly enact a decree in reference to the primacy of the pope, as the advocates of papal infallibility now insist, we are brought to the point of inquiring what that decree in point of fact was—whether it went to the extent asserted, or stopped short of it.

If the reader will keep in mind the circumstances already detailed explaining the difficulty the pope encountered in bringing the Greeks to enter into the treaty in reference to his primacy, it will materially aid him in satisfactorily interpreting what follows.

The Jesuits regard what they call the decree of the Council of Florence as furnishing one of the strongest arguments in favor of their theory of infallibility; and Weninger, true to their cause, gives the whole of it in these words:

“We define that the Apostolic See, that is, the Roman pontiff, has the right of primacy over all the churches of the world; that the Roman pontiff is the successor of St. Peter; that he is the very vicar of Christ, the head of the whole Church, the father and teacher of all the faithful; that in the person of Peter he was entrusted by our Lord with full power to feed, direct, and govern the whole flock of Christ. Such is manifestly the doctrine taught by the acts of the general councils, as well as by the sacred canons.” (*)

Weninger’s book is so full of errors and misquotations as to excite suspicion against the integrity of much that he has said; and where we find him differing with such an author as Du Pin, if the question rested alone between them, the preference should be given to the latter. There is no difficulty about that part of the decree which precedes the power to feed, etc. Du Pin makes it confer the primacy, with “power to feed, to rule and govern the Catholic Church, as it is explained in the acts of ecumenical councils, and in the holy canons;” thus confining it within the limitations prescribed by the latter. But Weninger goes further, and represents the decree as conceding the primacy as an independent and substantive power, with no limitations whatever upon it; and then, beginning with a new sentence, makes it declare that “such is manifestly the doctrine taught by the acts of the general councils, as well as by the sacred canons.”

This rendering of the decree is false at the very point upon which its whole meaning turns. The decree is in a single sentence, as the Latin in the last note will show. To be understood correctly, all its parts must be taken together, not detached. But Weninger very deliberately divides it into two sentences. He takes out the comma after the words “traditam esse,” in the original, and substitutes a period for it—thus closing the sentence. And then he translates the remainder (“quemadmodum etiam,” etc.), so as to make it mean, independently of what had preceded, that the same degree of primacy which the first sentence conceded was conferred by the councils and the canons. A school—boy ought to detect this false translation, as almost any one would with the original before him. The words “quemnadmodum etiam” mean “as also,” and cannot be tortured into such a meaning as Weninger has given them.

Retaining the comma, then, in its proper place, and leaving the decree one continuous sentence, as it is in fact, the last clause should be rendered, “as also is contained in the acts of the ecumenical councils and the sacred canons;” making the two clauses dependent upon each other, and the last referring to and qualifying what precedes it. This meaning is equivalent to that given by Du Pin, “as it is explained in the acts of the ecumenical councils and in the holy canons;” and substantially like that given by Milman, “according to the canons of the Church.” (Milman, vol. viii., ch. xiv., p. 46.)

The true meaning undoubtedly is this: that the power and primacy of the pope exist just in that degree which is expressed by the councils and in the canons. To have declared the pope infallible, and to have followed it up with the assertion that he was also so declared by the councils and in the canons, would have been false in point of fact—for the very last preceding ecumenical council had decreed precisely the reverse, and there was no existing canon to that effect outside the “constitutions” of the popes themselves. And, besides, the Greeks, who were jealous of Rome, would manifestly not have agreed to a treaty of union with the Latin Church if it—had been understood that they thereby surrendered their independence within their accustomed jurisdiction, and subjected themselves entirely to the dominion of an infallible pope at Rome.

Construing the treaty in the light of the actual relations then existing between the two churches, it must be understood that the Greeks intended to concede nothing more than they had conceded at the first Council of Constantinople; that is, that the Roman Church had the primacy of honor, and nothing more, except such authority as had been from time to time granted by the councils and the canons. (*)

During the remainder of the fifteenth century, after the proceedings at Florence had ended, the popes were undisturbed both in the claim and exercise of authority, except as they brought themselves in contact with princes. But their efforts to have it accepted as universal were in no manner slackened. Under the influences exercised by them the discipline of the Church had become so relaxed that, in 1512, the Fifth Lateran Council was convened by Pope Julius II. to provide, in some effective mode, for its re-establishment. And this brings us to the inquiry whether or not papal infallibility was so decreed by this council as to make it binding upon the whole Church. This cannot be decided satisfactorily without understanding also the true character of that council, and the circumstances which led to it.

At the time of the Council of Basel the French Church occupied an anomalous position toward the papacy. Realizing that the popes were endeavoring to encroach upon its ancient liberties, and that to concede to them superiority over general councils would enable them to do so, it moved with as much caution as possible, consistently with the preservation of its boasted independence. Therefore, the King of France, Charles VII., instead of giving an open adhesion to the Baselian decrees, favored a compromise of the disagreement between the two councils— Basel and Florence rather than an open rupture. At the same time, he was unwilling to concede to the pope his asserted supremacy. Finding, however, that both parties were driven to extremities—each anathematizing the other as schismatical and heretical—no other course remained to him but independent action. Accordingly, he assembled a national council at Bourges, in 1438, by which was promulgated the “Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges,” which not only asserted the right of councils to legislate for the Church and to control the pope by its canons, but went even further, and insisted upon the authority of a national council of France to legislate for the French Church. Thus, upon the vital question out of which the issue between the two rival councils had arisen, the French Christians took the side of the Baselian fathers, maintaining the decrees of the Council of Constance; but from motives of expediency merely they refused to recognize the—deposition of Eugenius, and rejected the claims of Felix V.

These contradictory movements had their origin in state policy far more than in the necessities and interests of Christianity. These latter were of secondary consideration both with the pope and the king—the principal motive with each being the acquisition of temporal power. The pope, of course, was deadly hostile to the “Pragmatic Sanction,” while the king was determined to maintain it. The former and his adherents insisted that, by virtue of his supremacy, he had the power to revoke the authority of the Council of Basel, and that, although it was ecumenical at the beginning, all its decrees passed subsequent to his act of revocation were void. On the other hand, the king claimed that the pope’s approval of its de crees previous to the calling of the council at Ferrara made valid that which asserted the superiority of councils; and that as the council was assembled with the assent of the pope, his sanction related to all the decrees passed by it during its entire session. And hence, as the “Pragmatic Sanction” was but a re—affirmance of the decree passed at Basel, therefore it also had the implied, if not express, sanction of the pope. (Jervis, vol. i., pp. 97-99.)

The “Pragmatic Sanction” became the statute—law of France by enactment of Parliament. It was fiercely denounced by several popes in the language of denunciation so familiar to them. But all their efforts to get it out of the way were unsuccessful during the reign of Charles VII. Under that of Louis XI. they were attended with better results so far as the papacy was concerned. This arbitrary monarch, influenced by both papal flattery and threats, revoked the sanction by an imperial decree, utterly disregarding the will of the French Christians and the dignity of France.

Upon the question of his authority to do this, he and the pope were fully agreed—each maintaining the “divine right” of kings and princes to rule without regard to the wishes of the people. But they disagreed upon another point: Louis supposed that the rescission of the Sanction would give him the whole power, as king, to control the Church in France; whereas, as soon as the act was consummated, the pope claimed all this power for himself, and so exercised it as to sow the seeds of corruption broadcast all over France, and to cause both him and the king to be held in contempt by the French Christians. Parliament now interfered, and declared the king’s act of revocation illegal, which left the principles of the “Pragmatic Sanction” in force.

Yet the restoration of the papal authority consequent upon the conduct of the king had produced such results that the French Church became paralyzed by the blow. This paralysis continued until the reign of Louis XII., who formally re—established the Sanction. Julius II. was then pope, and immediately assumed a hostile attitude toward the king. This led to remonstrances on the part of the French clergy, who insisted upon a general council to settle over again the points of disagreement. To this Pope Julius would not consent, fearing a repetition of the decrees of Constance and Basel. His refusal induced the King of France and the Emperor of Germany to take steps on their own responsibility to have a council convened.

Having obtained the acquiescence of nine cardinals, these latter called a council to meet at Pisa in 1511. The pope now became both embarrassed and incensed, and, like his predecessor, Eugenius IV., immediately inaugurated measures to prevent, if possible, the re-enactment of the decrees of Constance and Basel the question what was, or was not, the true faith being of far less concern to him than the gratification of his ambition. For this purpose he called a council at Rome, which would be more under his control than that at Pisa, and summoned the prelates who had appointed the latter council to attend his, at his Palace of the Lateran, in 1512. He threatened to degrade them of their dignity, and deprive them of their benefices, if they did not attend. Disregarding both his summons and threat, they opened the council at Pisa, asserting their right to do it, under the protection of the princes at whose instance they had acted, independently of the pope. It was attended by four cardinals in person, the procurators of three others, two archbishops, thirteen bishops, five abbots, several doctors of law and divinity, and the deputies of the universities of France. This council renewed the decrees of the councils of Constance and Basel, concerning the authority of councils over the pope, and adjourned to meet at Milan, where they endeavored to have the pope to meet with them, in order to decide upon the necessary measures of reform. This he refused, and they at last proceeded to declare him contumacious and schismatic, and to suspend him from the administration of the papacy.

The Council of Pisa then came to an end. And although it had not at any time any authority as an ecumenical council, and only serves to show how large a portion of the Christians of Europe refused to admit the supremacy claimed by the pope, yet its decree suspending the pope was accepted in France, where the king, Louis XII., forbade his subjects any longer to regard Julius II. as pope, or to pay any attention to his bulls. The pope replied by excommunicating the king, putting France under an interdict, and releasing his subjects from their oath of allegiance. And thus the contest between these royal representatives of the “divine right” waxed to an exceeding degree of warmth. (Du Pin, vol. xiii., pp. 17-19; Jervis, vol. i., pp. 100-103; Fleury, livre cxxii., 115—117; apud Jervis. )

The council called by Julius II.—the Fifth Lateran—met in Rome in 1512. It was certainly not ecumenical at the beginning, having no juster claim to be so considered than the assemblage at Pisa, unless the pope’s claim of supremacy is primarily conceded. The word “ecumenical” has but one meaning—that of universal. Ecumenical councils are designed to give expression to the universal faith, and, therefore, in all the early ages of the Church, they constituted “the highest courts of judicature in all dogmatic discussions.” (Alzog, p. 677.) But they obtained that character only by virtue of the fact that they represented the entire Church; that is, included all the episcopate. If they did not do this, they had no just jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the Universal Church; or, in other words, could not decide questions of faith.

Measured by this rule, the Fifth Council of Lateran was certainly not ecumenical at its commencement, because the whole Church was not represented there. There were no prelates from England, France, Germany, Spain, Austria, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, or any other part of the Christian world outside of Italy; and only those who lived alone upon the favor and patronage of the pope. Du Pin says they were “all Italians,” except some abbots. Thus far, then, it was entirely factious, like that at Ferrara; both factions having their origin in precisely the same motive. Did it afterward become ecumenical? Its original character was not changed during the life of Julius II., although, with it that time, it had declared annulled all the proceedings at Pisa, confirmed the bull against the King of France, and fiercely attacked the Pragmatic Sanction. It had also summoned all its supporters to appear and show cause why it should not be revoked.

At this point, the death of Julius II. occurred, and Leo X. became pope. Being of the princely family De’ Medici, of Florence, he entertained more enlarged views than Julius II., and the King of France was encouraged by hopes of a satisfactory reconciliation with him. Accordingly, he sent his ambassadors to the council, and renounced the proceedings at Pisa. The King of Spain and the Emperor of Germany did the same; and the prelates who had assembled at Pisa also attended the council. The French bishops had not yet done so. The king stipulated that they should, but the time was postponed tin the latter part of the year 1516, when the council was to hold its eleventh session. Before that time arrived, Louis XII. died, and Francis I. became King of France. With him and the pope the question now became one of diplomacy, the interests of the Church still remaining secondary.

A diplomatic ambassador was sent to Rome, and finally came to a compromise with Leo X., by abrogating the Pragmatic Sanction and substituting the celebrated Concordat of Bologna in its place. Each of the parties to this arrangement supposed himself the gainer—the king by being made the head of the Church in France, and the pope by being enabled to collect annats or imposts in France, which had been denied by the Pragmatic Sanction. The pope exchanged a share of the spiritual right claimed by his predecessors for this temporal advantage.

But France was not as easily reconciled as the king. The Parliament resisted the Concordat, and adhered to the Pragmatics Sanction. The University of Paris did the same. An appeal to a general council was insisted on—that at Rome not being so considered. The king, becoming incensed at this resistance to his royal will, denounced these proceedings as seditious, and undertook to enforce the Concordat by despotic power.

In the meantime the period fixed for the eleventh session of the Lateran Council had arrived, and the session was held without the attendance of any of the French clergy. Nothing had transpired to give it universality, inasmuch as many parts of the Christian world yet remained unrepresented in it. It still retained its original Italian character, and was, to all intents and purposes, the pope’s council, and not that of the Church. And yet it was at this eleventh session of the council that a decree was passed which, it is now claim ed, recognizes the pope’s infallibility. The foregoing facts show, if such a decree was passed, that it was not binding on the Church as a part of its faith; and the fact that it was not so considered by the Church is fully established by subsequent events.

But no such decree was, in point of fact, passed by the Fifth Lateran Council. The facts are these: the pope issued a bull abrogating the Pragmatic Sanction, affirming the Concordat, and declaring that he had authority above councils, and full power to call, remove, or dissolve them at will. He also renewed the bull of Boniface VIII called Unam Sanctam, which asserted the supremacy of the pope over the world, both in spirituals and temporals. When this bull was read in the council, it was “approved by all the bishops” except one, says Du Pin. (Du Pin, vol. xiii., pp. 22-25; Jervis, vol. i., pp. 107, 108; Maclaine’s “Mosheim’s Chutirch History,” vol. ii., p. 9.)

There was no freedom either of discussion or of will. It was simply a strong man, as Leo X. was, commanding and exacting obedience by the superiority of his own will. There was no decree about it—nothing but the simple approval of the pope’s bull. And, consequently, this is to be taken merely as the assent to it by those prelates who were present; which was in no way binding upon those who were not present. The Church, as such, was not represented in the council, and consequently did not assent to its action, whatever it may have been. The French Christians resisted the whole thing, continued to adhere to the Pragmatic Sanction, and to resist the Concordat. And therefore the defenders of the pope’s infallibility can not, with any propriety whatever, insist that the Fifth Lateran Council made it a part of the law of the Church. What was done by the Ecumenical Council of Trent upon this subject is more readily disposed of; although this was the most important of all the councils, and its various sessions were held from 1545 to 1563. In its decree for general reformation it is provided that “they will be obedient to the constitutions of the pope, and of councils, determining that all constitutions of general councils, and of the Apostolic See, in favor of ecclesiastical persons and liberty, shall be observed by all.”

In another decree, which was held back until the final session, and was “never mentioned in any congregation,” it was provided that in all the decrees of reformation made in the council, under the three previous popes, “the authority of the Apostolic See is excepted and preserved.” (“History of the Council of Trent,” by Sarpi, pp. 756, 757.) That this council intended to enlarge the power of the papacy to the utmost extent there is no sort of doubt.

Its final action was mainly controlled by Italian bishops from Rome—the tools of the pope; and they would listen to nothing that limited his power. The French ambassador present, writing to the king, said, “They will give ear to nothing that may hinder the profit and authority of the Court of Rome. Besides, the pope is so much master of this council, that his pensioners, whatsoever the emperor’s ambassadors or we do remonstrate unto them, will do but what they list.” (Ibid., p. 783.)

But it will be observed that neither of these decrees asserts the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility. The most they do is to assert that the Church is to be governed by the constitutions of the popes and the canons of councils. They do not decide, nor did the Council of Trent at any other time decide, which of the two should prevail when the constitutions of the popes and the canons of councils came in conflict. The general terms employed embrace all the councils. And as one canon of the Council of Constance declared that the pope was inferior to a council, and no ecumenical council, as we have seen, has repealed that canon, therefore it is included in the decree of the Council of Trent. Besides, it is said that the faith never changes—that it never can change. This being true, the canon of Constance was a part of the faith after that council had adjourned; and must have continued so up to the Council of Trent, and could not be changed by it. Therefore, the Council of Trent, while it went as far as it dared to go to give supremacy to the pope, must be considered as denying his infallibility, because they did not affirm it. If they had intended to affirm it, they would have required obedience to him alone, as the late Lateran Council has done, and not to him and the canons of councils conjointly. Requiring the faithful to look to the constitutions of popes and the canon sof councils is almost an express denial of the pope’s infallibility.

Yet it is true that the Council of Trent did not expressly place any limitation upon the power of the pope. It left it as it found it, but somewhat augmented in strength by the failure to place a curb upon it. While it conceded to the pope the power to interpret its canons, and thereby gave him great control over the faith, yet it did not give him the power to set aside existing canons, or to make new ones. Therefore it stopped short of declaring him infallible. And so Pius IV. understood it when, in 1564, he promulgated the creed, founded upon existing canons, which has been since re-proclaimed by Pius IX. and remained as the faith of the Church up to the late Lateran Council.

That creed requires that interpretation of the Scriptures to be accepted which has “the unanimous consent of the fathers;” and, while it enjoins “true obedience to the Roman pontiff,” it does not concede to him the power to set aside this “unanimous consent” and substitute his own interpretation for it. That remained for the late council, which has so changed the creed as to require it now to mean that the “true obedience to the Roman pontiff” which is now enjoined is to accept that interpretation of Scripture which he, and not the fathers, shall give! Does not this change the old faith, and substitute a new one for it?

Now, it is undoubtedly true that those who, by this change of faith, have elevated the pope above the fathers and all the great councils of the Church, by assigning to him equality with God on earth, have done so because they hope thereby to be able to bring the world back again into that condition in which it was when the popes did exercise the utmost plenitude of power by usurpations they were strong enough to maintain. Every intelligent reader knows what that condition was; but it is nowhere more graphically portrayed, in so far as the popes were concerned, than by the greatest of Italian historians, who was a personal observer of the passing events just preceding the Council of Trent. After enumerating some of the usurpations by which the popes had obtained their ascendancy over princes and peoples, he says:

“Being raised by these steps unto earthly power, they laid aside by little and little the care of souls and of divine precepts: so that setting their affections wholly upon earthly greatness, and using their spiritual authority only as an instrument of their temporal, they seemed rather to be secular princes than priests. After this their care and business was no more sanctity of life, increase of religion, love, and charity toward their neighbor, but armies, and wars against Christians, handling the sacrifices even with bloody hands; but heaping up wealth; but new laws, new arts, new snares to scrape money from all parts. For this end they used their spiritual weapons without respect, and sold things, both sacred and profane, without any shame at all. The popes and the court thus abounding with wealth, there followed pomp, riot, dishonesty, lust, and abominable pleasures: no care of posterity, no thought of maintaining the perpetual dignity of the papacy; but in place hereof succeeded ambitious and pestiferous desires to exalt their sons, nephews, and kindred, not only to immoderate riches, but to principalities and to kingdoms; bestowing their dignities and benefices not upon virtuous and well—deserving men, but either selling them to those who would give most, or misplacing them upon ambitious, covetous, and impudently voluptuous persons.” (Francis Guicciardini, from the fourth book of his “History;” apud Sarpi, pp. 781, 782.)

Continued in Chapter XXII. The Papacy Always Exclusive

Continued from Chapter XIX. The Claimed Rights of the Papacy Over Governments.

Infallibility formerly in General Councils and the Popes conjointly.—Efforts made to prove this in England and the United States.—Books published on the Subject in both Countries.—Extracts from Several of Them. Doctrine of French Christians on that Subject.—They deny the Infallibility of the Pope.—Proceedings in England to obtain Catholic Emancipation.—The Doctrine denied both in England and Ireland.—The Pope’s Infallibility a new Doctrine.—Denied in the Catechism.—Distinction between the Church and the Papacy.—Infallibility in the Church during the Early Times.—The Greeks never admitted the Infallibility of the Pope. The First Seven Councils mainly Greek.—They concede Primacy of Honor, not Jurisdiction, to the Pope.—The Council of Nice.—The First Council of Constantinople.—The Council of Ephesus.—The Council of Chalcedon.—The Second Council of Constantinople.—The Third Council of Constantinople.—The Second Council of Nice.—The Fourth Council of Constantinople.—Subsequent Councils held by the Latins.—The First Lateran Council.—The Second Lateran Council.—The Third Lateran Council.—The Introduction of Papal Constitutions.—Adding them to Decrees of Councils.—More Effort to make Law for the Church by the Force of Precedent.—The Fourth Lateran Council.— Blindly obedient to Innocent III.—The Primacy of the Church, not of the Pope, established. Constitutions of Heretical Princes not Binding.—Part of the Canon Law.—The First Council of Lyons.—The Second Council of Lyons.—The Council of Vienne.—None of these Councils declare the Pope Infallible.

IT ought not to be considered as asking too much of those who support the absolutism of the papacy, when we insist that they shall address themselves to our consciences in furnishing a solution of the problem involved in the claim of the pope’s infallibility. It concerns the present age of the world too much, to let it rest upon the mere assertion that because it has been dogmatically avowed by a number of popes, therefore it is true. Such persons as have been trained in the school of submission, and accept whatsoever is told them by their superiors, may be satisfied with this; but to those who recognize no obligation of this nature, something more is due if they are expected to acquiesce in it. “No man,” said Archbishop Tillotson, “can be under an obligation to believe anything who hath not sufficient means whereby he may be assured that such a thing is true.”

Yet, when the objection is urged that this dogma places the papacy in direct antagonism to the domestic policy of the progressive nations, we are told—as if it were a complete answer—that there is nothing new in this; that it is a part of the ancient faith, descending from Peter, and which has known no variation from the beginning. Thus the whole question is rested; and we are required to give our assent, or remain under the pontifical curse if we do not. (*)

It has been elsewhere asserted that before the late council the infallibility of the Church was generally recognized by its lay members, especially in the United States, as lodged in the whole body of the Church, acting, according to the unvarying custom, through general councils and the popes conjointly. Even if the hierarchy thought otherwise, they studiously avoided any open declaration to that effect, leaving those to whom it was their duty to teach the whole truth in ignorance and delusion. There were even some of them who were not only guilty of this unpardonable sin of omission, but actually misled their flocks into the acceptance of a fatal error. And others, who did not go so far, silently acquiesced in the imposture.

About twenty years ago there was published and extensively circulated in the United States a work devoted to the discussion of the question of “Church authority”—the precise question involved in the dogma of papal infallibility. It was written by a former clergyman of the English Church, who had gone over to the Roman, as an explanation of his reasons for so doing. Starting out by defining the word ecclesia to mean any combination of men, he insists that in that sense the Church was established by Christ with the office of deciding what is human and what divine, and of interpreting the system of which it is the depository. (*)

He then proceeds to instruct us what the Church is, where it is that the Holy Ghost is always present, and where this power of interpretation is lodged. He proves by Ireneus, Origen, and other fathers that “the divine spirit” which directs the Church “has its dwelling in the collective body,” which “is our sole guide in the things of God.” (“Principles of Church Authority,” by Wilberforce, pp. 27, 47, 61, 65.) He defines “the collective episcopate” to be “the medium of Church authority,” and insists that Christ provided for the Church,” as the law of its organization, that the same persons [the bishops] who were individually the dispensers of grace should collectively be the witnesses to doctrine.” (“Principles of Church Authority,” by Wilberforce, pp. 77, 84, 89, 92, 98.)

And then, in flat denial of papal infallibility, if not of the primacy of Peter, he declares that this principle of.Church organization “proceeds on the supposition that the gift bestowed upon the apostles, and which had been inherited by their successors, had been given to them as a body; that no bishop or bishops could possess it apart from the communion of the whole; that as grace and truth lay in Christ our Lord, and afterward in the college of apostles, so it had been inherited by the whole episcopate as a trust, in which they had a common share.” (Ibid., p. 103.)

That this principle has received the approbation of all the ages since Christ, he considers “manifest from the weight attached to general councils.” He quotes this language from Cyprian:

“The episcopate is a single trust administered collectively by many individuals.” And this from the Apostolic Constitutions: “For the confirmation of you who are put in trust with the universal episcopate.” This episcopate he calls by the equivalent names of the “one Church” of Christ, “the federal union,” and “the sacerdotal college.” And then, summing up, he says:….these principles evidently imply that the interpretation of doctrine was lodged as a perpetual trust in the episcopate, but the exercise of this function implied the co-operation of all bishops as a collective whole.” (Ibid., pp. 103, 104, 107, 108.)

It would be hard to find language more directly condemnatory of the doctrine of papal infallibility than this. Not only does it show that no such doctrine prevailed in the early ages of the Church, but that it is in express conflict with “the law of its organization” as ordained by Christ. The writer was highly complimented for the manner in which he performed his task, and for the learning he displayed. He was considered as a valuable acquisition to the Church, and, doubtless, one object in circulating his book was to influence hesitating Protestants, if they could be found, by his argument.

Another object undoubtedly was to disprove what many Protestants considered the tendency toward papal infallibility in the Church. And still another, to quiet any apprehension that might exist among the lay men of the Church in regard to the threatened concentration of all the power of the Church in the hands of the pope. It may be readily called to mind, by almost anybody, how flatly, and even spitefully, it was denied that any such concentration was designed; as it may now be realized how this denial served to mislead many who find themselves deluded. This book was only one of the many instrumental ties employed to carry on this work. Having performed its task, it is now consigned to obscure places where the dust and cobweb may settle on it; while the faithful are instructed that the very doctrine it denied and condemned has always been the doctrine of the Church!

Another book was published a few years ago, written by a priest, designed to show that “the father of lies” had circulated misrepresentations and calumnies against the Church in this country. In reference to “new additions” to the faith, he says, it would be “damnable” to believe otherwise than as Christ teaches, although it “should be defined and commanded to be believed by ten thousand councils.” And, answering the accusation that the pastors and prelates are held to be infallible, he classes it along with other “misrepresentations” of which “the father of lies” is the author, and says: “The papist, truly represented, believes that the pastors and prelates of his Church are fallible; that there is none of them but what may fall into error and heresies, and consequently liable to be deceived.” And he assigns infallibility only to “the whole Church.” (“A Papist Misrepresented and Represented,” by Rev. John Gother, pp. 44—46.)

Coming at last to the pope, he says that it is an exhibition of the “black art” which the devil practiced in paradise, to charge the papist with believing that he has taken the place of Christ, “and that whatsoever he orders, decrees, or commands is to be received by his flock with the same respect, submission, and awe as if Christ had spoken it by his own mouth,” or that he is “no longer liable to error, but is infallible.”He indignantly repels the insulting and impious falsehood, as the devil’s work, and declares that the pope is the head of the Church only as “every father of a family owns himself to be master of it under Christ;” and that, while God assists the popes in the administration of their office, no man is” obliged to believe them infallible,” because no such doctrine has ever been defined by the Church. (“A Papist Misrepresented and Represented,” by Rev. John Gother, pp. 49—51.)

There was yet another book of this same kind, published with the official endorsement of Bishop Fitzpatrick, of Boston, who certainly was fully instructed in the doctrines of his Church. The author of this book meets the question of papal infallibility squarely, and disposes of it without equivocation; manifestly intending to put it at rest, so that his adversary should have no excuse for again referring to it. That there may be no misconception of his meaning, the whole of what he said is given as follows:

“I shall therefore tell the gentleman, once for all, and in the clearest terms I am able to express myself, that when you speak of the Roman Catholic Church, and maintain it to be that infallible Church which Christ has established upon earth, and to which all his promises of perpetual assistance were made, we mean not the particular Church or diocese of Rome, which, as a diocese has its jurisdiction limited, and is no more the Universal Church than the diocese of Paris or Toledo—because a part is not the whole; but we mean the whole body of Roman Catholics, whatsoever country or diocese they belong to, professing the same faith, and living in communion with the Bishop of Rome, whom they acknowledge to be their supreme pastor, or head of their Church on earth. This is plain English; and, if the gentleman will not understand it, but persists in his real or pretended ignorance, and to impose upon his reader with a manifest equivocation, I can say no more to render him sensible of his mistake.

“I observe, fourthly, that the gentleman has sometimes a great itching to shift the state of the question from the infallibility of the Church to that of the pope. Nay, he tells his lordship in plain terms that not to place the infallibility in the pope is giving up our whole foundation.’ I am sorry he understands the doctrine of our Church no better, which he ought to have done before he wrote against it. For, as a controvertist, he ought only to dispute against articles of our faith fairly stated, and not against private opinions. Now, the infallibility of the pope is one of these. Some Catholic divines write for it, and many against it, without any breach of communion with the See of Rome. And therefore the gentleman shall have the liberty of talking by himself upon that subject as much as he pleases; for I am not bound to answer anything wherein the article of faith which I pretend to maintain is not concerned.” (“The Shortest Way to end Disputes about Religion,” by the Rev. Robert Manning, Boston, 1855, pp. 189, 190.)

Language more expressive could scarcely have been found. It will be observed that he not only lodges infallibility in the whole body of the Church, but denies flatly the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility. Some divines favor it, he says, but many oppose it; clearly signifying that the latter constitute the majority. When it is considered that all this was specially approved by a distinguished prelate of the Church, it may be regarded as a sufficient set—off against the contrary assertions now so frequently and dogmatically made.

But there is abundant evidence, equally conclusive and satisfactory, to show that this question was met and dealt with in Europe in the same way, from the very earliest efforts of the Jesuits to keep the popes on their side by its persistent and pertinacious advocacy. A thesis was published in Paris, in the seventeenth century, wherein it was claimed that Christ had communicated his own infallibility to the pope, both in questions of right and of fact. This thesis was immediately laid before all the bishops of France; it being well understood that it came from the college of the Jesuits. Another soon after appeared from the same source, not merely affirming what the first contained, but insisting that the system of Copernicus, as defended by Galileo, should be considered as battered down, because “the Vatican has also thundered against it, and the sentence delivered by the congregation of the Cardinals of the Inquisition has overthrown by its just censure the hypothesis, or rather the thesis, of Copernicus in the person of Galileo.” The avowed purpose was to carry the doctrine of the pope’s infallibility to the extent of requiring “some mathematicians, more bold than religious,” who accepted the Copernican theory and the teachings of Galileo, to “submit to the authority of this censure.” This thesis was submitted to the learned Faculty of Divinity of Paris. The Parliament of Paris also took the matter into consideration. It was thus brought directly before the whole country, and presented in such form as to invoke all the best intellects of France in its consideration. The result was a strong and decided affirmance of the doctrines set forth in the ancient decrees of the Faculty of Divinity, which were embodied in six distinct propositions.

1. It is denied that the pope has any indirect power or authority over the temporalities of the king.
2. That the king has no other superior in temporals than God alone.
3. That subjects owe such allegiance to the king that it cannot be dispensed with upon any pretense whatsoever.
4. That the pope cannot depose bishops against the rules of the canons.
5. That the pope is not above a general
council.
6. That the pope is not infallible, when he has not the concurring consent of the Church. (*)

The opinion of these leading minds of France, so clearly and strongly expressed, shows, beyond all controversy, what was the opinion of the Gallican Christians on this subject. The Jesuits were not able to drive them from their position, and, therefore, when Bossuet, the great Bishop of Meaux, who stood at their head, undertook to define the relation between sovereigns and the popes, he said “that kings and princes are not subject in the temporal order to any ecclesiastical power by the order of God; that they cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by virtue of the keys of the Church; finally, that by virtue of that power, their subjects cannot be absolved from their fidelity, obedience, and oath of allegiance which bind them to their prince.” (“Defense of the Declaration, ” by Bossuet, lib. i., s. i., ch. xvi., pp. 272, 273. Apud Gosselin, vol. ii., pp. 299, 300.)

The oath of supremacy and allegiance which the English law, during the reign of James I., required Roman Catholics to take, made it necessary they should swear that, in their opinion, the pope had no power to depose the king, or to dispose of the kingdom, or to authorize its invasion, or to discharge the citizens from their allegiance. With them it became a question whether, in view of their obligations to the pope, they could lawfully take this oath. They were not left in doubt long, in so far as the pope, Paul V., was concerned; for he addressed to them a brief which condemned “the oath as unlawful, and containing many things manifestly contrary to faith and to salvation.”

He addressed them also a second brief of the same tenor; and Innocent X., after the death of Paul, condemned the oath anew. In this perplexed condition, arising out of their divided loyalty, they consulted the Faculty of Divinity of Paris whether they could, in their opinion, take the oath without prejudice to the faith, and this after two infallible popes had declared solemnly and officially, ex cathedra, that they could not. The sixty doctors of the Faculty declared, against these popes, that they could take the oath without prejudice to the faith; and they did take it.

The Jesuits, of course, were not satisfied at this direct and powerful opposition to their favorite theory of the pope’s infallibility; and they had no difficulty in having this opinion of the French doctors placed upon the Index at Rome, so as to stamp it with pontifical condemnation and censure. (Gosselin, vol. ii., pp. 252, 253 (note).)

The same question arose afterward in England, at a period nearer our own times. When, toward the close of the last century, the question of Catholic emancipation was pending before the British Parliament, it was doubted by many whether it would be safe to confer full political privileges upon Roman Catholics because of the doctrines of the papacy in regard to their allegiance. Strong efforts were made to remove this doubt, and, as the most efficient means of doing so, the opinions of learned divines and foreign universities were solicited directly upon the questions of the power of the pope to depose monarchs, and to release their subjects from allegiance, and the obligation of papists to keep faith with heretics.

Three questions, embracing these points, were sent to the universities of Louvain, Donay, and Paris, in France; and Alcala, Valladolid, and Salamanca, in Spain. The answers were all condemnatory of the doctrine of papal infallibility. In that from Douay, taken as a specimen, it is said: “That no power whatsoever, in civil or temporal concerns, was given by the Almighty either to the pope, the cardinals, or the Church herself; and consequently that kings and sovereigns are not, in temporal concerns, subject by the ordination of God to any ecclesiastical power whatsoever; neither can their subjects, by any authority granted to the pope or the Church from above, be freed from their obedience or absolved from their oath of allegiance.” And they declared that they were bound to keep all oaths, whether pledged to “Catholic, heretic, or infidel.”

These doctrines were also asserted, in 1792, by a Roman Catholic committee in Ireland, acting for and in the name of all their countrymen of that faith. And when, long afterward, in 1826, the three Irish bishops, Murray, Doyle, and Kelley, were examined before the British House of Commons on this same subject, they also unanimously affirmed the doctrines set forth by the universities. (*)

If the question then to be decided had been, whether or not the popes themselves had claimed and asserted their own infallibility, these inquiries would have been entirely useless. That a very large number of them had done so, directly and most explicitly, was well understood. The object of the inquiries, however, was to ascertain whether or, not the claim they set up was recognized by the Church as a part of its faith—whether or not their frequent repetition of the claim gave it the binding force of law to the whole Church. Like all other aspiring and ambitious rulers, they endeavored, at all times, to extend their power, and omitted no argument necessary to maintain it. Nor were they ever known to abate their pretensions. On the other hand, by including the deposing power in the spiritual, they had enlarged the limits of their jurisdiction so as to embrace the world. Hence, it became necessary to know to what extent the faith of the Church had been influenced by these exorbitant demands; for the plain reason that if the assertion of this enormous power, frequently repeated, by any number of popes, had ingrafted the doctrine of papal infallibility upon the canons of the Church, so that the whole membership were bound to accept it as a necessary part of the faith, then it was undoubted that the obligation of allegiance to the pope was higher and more binding than that to any nation on earth. Therefore it was necessary to ascertain whether the Roman Catholics of England and Ireland adopted or repudiated this kind of faith, so that Parliament could decide advisedly whether they should or should not be allowed to share in the management of public affairs.

It would be unjust, in the absence of all evidence to that effect, to say that they acted with duplicity by concealing their real belief. However this may have been, the answers were satisfactory, and the bill for Catholic emancipation ultimately became a law. The object they desired was accomplished. (Any body who will examine the doctrines of the Gallican Church in France will see that the opinions here expressed agree precisely with them.)

If we are to decide upon the existence of facts not within our personal knowledge, by the settled and common—sense rules of evidence, it must be accepted as established, beyond contradiction, that, at the times referred to, the Roman Catholics of the United States, France, England, and Ireland not only did not accept papal infallibility as a part of their religious faith, but positively denied it. They constituted a very large portion of the Roman Catholic world; so large a portion that it would be absolute folly to talk about the universality of any dogma of faith which was rejected by them.

In France especially, notwithstanding Protestantism was tolerated, the Government was Roman Catholic; and to say that it could remain so, and reject so important a dogma as this, would amount to the impeachment of the integrity of the pope for not condemning it, and of the intelligence and piety of those who did so.

And in Ireland, as is well known, there has been, for several centuries, such devotion to the true faith, that no shadow of doubt has ever rested upon the loyalty of its Roman Catholic people to Rome. Shall we not accept all these people, then, as denying the pope’s infallibility? If they truthfully declared the doctrine of the Church on this subject, has not the dogma of the late Council prescribed a new article of faith?

Manifestly, it has declared that to be the faith which, before its passage, was not the faith. Then it was not heresy to deny it; now it is. Then a Roman Catholic could believe it or not, as seemed fit to him; now he is anathematized if he does not believe it. It has changed his relations to the Church, and to the country in which he resides. It superadds to his obligation of allegiance to his country the obligation of a higher allegiance to the pope. It subordinates his national citizenship to his citizenship of a great ecclesiastical empire. It changes the orthodox faith into heresy. It takes away the right of individual opinion upon the very question involved, and denies any further exercise of reason. And carrying along with it all the consequences which the popes have claimed as involved in their infallibility, it requires the Church to accept, for the first time, as an absolutely necessary part of its faith, the equality of the pope with God in the government of all human affairs, within the extensive domain of faith and morals.

Is not all this new? We may readily agree that it is not so to the popes, who, like other ambitious men, are ever ready to assert doctrines designed to increase and consolidate their power. That is not the question, any more than it is now a question to decide whether kings, by the persistent assertion of the “divine light” to govern, have established a principle of law by which all mankind are to be, now and forever, held in subjugation by them. The question is, whether it is not new as the doctrine of the Church. How can it be otherwise, when the Universal Church never assented to it—when no council ever declared it as it is now declared—and when at least one ecumenical council has expressly asserted precisely the reverse? The claim is not new, for the popes and the Jesuits have repeatedly asserted it— but the doctrine is; and it is only as doctrine that it becomes part of the faith. If, then, it is faith for the first time, it is new faith, necessarily.

But is it faith for the first time? The catechisms of the Church answer this. Previous to the late Lateran Council, there was an authorized version of catechism circulated in England which had the sanction of the highest authorities of the Church, including Dr. Manning, the great Archbishop of Westminster, wherein the following question and answer are found:

“Q. Are not Catholics bound to believe the pope in himself to be infallible?”

“A. This is a Protestant invention, and is no article of the Catholic faith.” (Apud Bishop Coxe, of Western New York, in his pamphlet entitled “Catholics and Old Catholics,” p. 15.)

And confirmatory of the fact that it was not an article of faith before the enactment of the dogma to that effect, it is well understood that a considerable number of the bishops petitioned the pope not to submit to the council his infallibility as a dogma of faith. Of these there were five archbishops and twenty—two bishops from America. (*)

We shall fail to reach correct conclusions upon this subject, unless by observing the true distinction between the Church, as such, and the papacy. The former conveys the idea of universality, and includes the whole body of membership—the pope, cardinals, all the hierarchy and laymen. The latter excludes laymen from any participation in the management of Church affairs; and, if the pope’s infallibility be conceded, places the entire power and authority of the Church in his hands without any responsibility either to the Church as an organization, or to the lay members.

In the former sense, the Church has held nineteen ecumenical councils before that recently held at Rome; and from the opening of that at Nice down to the last—a period of over fifteen hundred years—it was universally understood, except by the popes themselves who succeeded Gregory VII., that whatever of infallibility it possessed was lodged in the whole body, acting through the episcopate assembled in general council, or through them and the pope acting conjointly. There is nothing in the early history of the Church contrary to this, but everything to confirm it. All the dogmas of faith express this idea in one or the other of these forms.

The seven first councils were almost entirely composed of Greeks, and were assembled by the Eastern emperors—not by the bishops of Rome. The aggregate number of bishops attending them at their different sessions was 1486, and only twenty—six of all these were Romans. There were only three Roman bishops in the Council of Nice; only one in each of the first of Constantinople and Ephesus; only three at Chalcedon; only six at the second of Constantinople; only five at the third of Constantinople; and only seven at the second of Nice. (Debate between Campbell and Purcell,” p. 45.)

The Greeks never admitted the primacy of the Bishop of Rome over the Patriarch of Constantinople. The most they ever agreed to was to concede to him primacy of honor, but not jurisdiction. This was a point of perpetual controversy and disagreement, which continued up to the final schism. And therefore it falsifies all history to say that any of these early councils established or recognized the infallibility of the Pope of Rome. The pretense has no shadow of foundation. The Council of Nice did not even consider the assent of the pope as necessary to the infallibility of its action, and therefore did not submit its decrees to him for approval. They were communicated to him and the other absent bishops by Constantine, the emperor, “by a letter in his own handwriting.” Constantine tells him that he is to receive them as a “divine injunction,” because “whatever is determined in the holy assembly of the bishops is to be regarded as indicative of the Divine will.” And Eusebius, in explanation of the universal Christian sentiment of the fourth century, says that the decrees of the council were confirmed and sanctioned by the emperor. (*)

He does not mention the Bishop of Rome as having anything to do with them, except that, like all the other bishops, he was required to accept them as the infallible action of the council.

The First Council of Constantinople conceded to the Bishop of Rome the “place of honor” in the council, on account of the superiority of Rome over Constantinople; but did not extend his jurisdiction or concede to him any power not equally possessed by other bishops. It defined the jurisdiction of each bishop with great particularity, confining each one to his own diocese. The Bishop of Alexandria was to govern Egypt only; the bishops of the East were to govern the East, saving the ancient privileges and prerogatives of the Church at Antioch; those of Asia, their own dioceses; those of Thrace, the churches of Thrace; and those of Pontus, the churches of Pontus. Each one was expressly forbidden to interfere with the affairs of another diocese. Each province was to regulate what concerned itself. And when a bishop was accused, the accusation had to be carried to the bishops of his own province. If they could not decide, the case was to be taken to the synod of the diocese. No appeal to the Bishop of Rome is spoken of; there is not a word on the subject. (“Eccl. Hist.,” by Du Pin, vol. ii., p. 273.) If there had existed any such idea as that he had supreme jurisdiction over all the churches and was infallible, these provisions would have been perfectly idle and useless.

Nothing can be inferred in favor of the pope’s infallibility from the proceedings of the Council of Ephesus; but directly the contrary. That council was called by the Emperor Theodosius, without any conference with Pope Celestine I. The object of it was to deal with the heresy of Nestorius, Bishop of Constantinople. This prelate and some of his priests had insisted that the Virgin Mary ought not to be called the Mother of God; and the heresy having reached the Egyptian churches, Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria, called a council of the bishops of his province to condemn it. After this was done the Church became much agitated, and both Nestorius and Cyril corresponded with the Bishop of Rome upon the subject. His opinion was solicited, more as an arbitrator than anything else; certainly not as a final judge. He decided against Nestorius, who appealed to a general council, which was called by the emperor. The council affirmed the decision of Celestine I. and deposed Nestorius. In this there was not a single element of infallibility recognized as being possessed by the pope. Nor was his primacy recognized. If he had possessed either, his judgment would have been executed without a general council. But it had no validity until ratified by a council, which he did not call, and over which he did not preside, either in person or by his legates, and which his legates did not attend until after Nestorius had been tried and deposed. This council reaffirmed what the first of Constantinople had done in reference to jurisdiction, by confining the bishops to their own provinces. (Du Pin, vol. iv., pp. 191-217.)

The Council of Chalcedon gives no more support to papal infallibility than any of the three preceding. Eutyches, a priest, and abbot of the monastery of Constantinople, was found guilty of heresy by a provincial council assembled in that city, and excommunicated. He appealed to a general council, and wrote to Pope Leo I. asking him not to decide the question in dispute between him and his diocesan bishop, but to give his judgment about the point of doctrine alleged to be heretical. Nor did he ask Leo to summon the council: this he solicited of the Emperor Theodosius. It was done by the emperor, who caused all the bishops, including the pope, to attend. The pope did not know of it until after it was summoned, but sent his legates. It was presided over by Dioscorus of Alexandria, by order of the emperor—the chief legate of the pope having the second place.

Its decision corresponded with that of Pope Leo in reference to the heresy of Eutyches, who had denied the two distinct natures, human and divine, in Christ; and its final result was the enactment of thirty canons. By none of these is any jurisdiction conferred upon the pope which had not already been conferred by the former councils. On the contrary, by one of them, the twenty—eighth, there were expressly conferred upon the Church of Constantinople “the same privileges with old Rome,” and jurisdiction given to it over the dioceses of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace, and the churches “out of the bounds of the emperor,” together with “the right to ordain metropolitans in the provinces of these dioceses.” (Ibid., vol. iv., pp. 218—242.)

Here, it will be observed, there is no recognition of the primacy of the Bishop of Rome over the other churches. The First Council of Constantinople had conferred upon him only “the place of honor,” without interfering with the jurisdiction of any of the bishops, except to define it. This council leaves that honorary distinction undisturbed; but, when it comes to speak of “privileges” and “jurisdiction,” places Rome and Constantinople upon a footing of perfect equality; thus absolutely repudiating the idea of the pope’s infallibility or supremacy.

The Second Council of Constantinople was called by the Emperor Justinian, to settle the controversy about “the three chapters.” Pope Vigilius exhibited some inconsistencies during its proceedings, not being inclined to go to the whole extent of condemnation demanded by the emperor, but he finally yielded his assent to what was done. It included, however, nothing concerning his jurisdiction; for, although he was present in Constantinople during the session of the council, its proceedings were directed almost entirely by the emperor. (Du Pin, vol. v., pp. 131—146.)

The Third Council of Constantinople grew out of the controversy about the two wills of Christ, and was called by the emperor, Constantinus Pogonatus, with a view to reconciling the disagreement between the Eastern and Western Christians. The emperor himself presided, although the pope had three legates present. The heresy condemned by the council had been professed over forty years before by Pope Honorius I., and, consequently, in finding Sergius, Theodorus, and others guilty of it, they included Pope Honorius by name. Its decrees were approved by Pope Agatho, who has been made a saint by the Church. So that the proceedings of this council have always been wonderfully perplexing to the advocates of papal infallibility, instead of being available to them in support of that doctrine.

How Honorius could have been infallible and yet a heretic, at the same time, is not a little puzzling. Baronius, the annalist, brought all his learning and ingenuity to bear on the question, but, as Du Pin says, his “fancy must pass for a matchless piece of rashness.” (Ibid., vol. vi., pp. 66—74.)

While the Jesuits have been taxing their ingenuity to escape the effect of this decree of a general council that Pope Honorius was a heretic, and its approval by Pope Agatho, the common sense of mankind has long since settled the difficulty by deciding that neither of these popes was infallible. Manifestly, the Third Council of Constantinople thought so.

Constantine Copronymus, the emperor, called a council at Constantinople to settle the dispute about the worship of images. It was afterward removed, and became the Second Council of Nice. The pope, Adrian I., sent his legates, to whom he entrusted a letter setting forth the necessity and orthodoxy of image—worship, which he traced back, of course, to Peter. The letter was addressed to the emperor, in the nature of a petition; and, among other things, entreated the emperor “to cause St. Peter’s patrimony to be restored to him,” and “to maintain the Church of Rome’s supremacy.”He exhibited the accustomed papal presumption in asserting his superiority. But, unfortunately for the cause of papal infallibility, his legates did not venture to lay this insolent demand before the council. Referring to these propositions, Du Pin says, “The pope’s legates durst not, perhaps, present them to the synod in which Tarasius [Patriarch of Constantinople] presided.” The council passed twenty—two canons, but none of them interfered with the jurisdiction of the churches, as previously fixed. (Du Pin, vol. vi., pp. 131—148.)

The Fourth Council of Constantinople, during the pontificate of Adrian II., was called by Basilius, the emperor, in consequence of the controversy between Ignatius and Photius, after the deposition of the former and the appointment of the latter as Patriarch of Constantinople. The pope took the side of Ignatius, and his decision was affirmed by the council. Twenty—seven canons were enacted, but one of them, however, having any bearing on the question of the pope’s supremacy. This, the twenty—first, provided, “That the pope of old Rome ought to be honored and respected in the first place, and next to him the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.”

It provides that no obloquy should be cast “against St. Peter’s Holy See, the prince of the apostles,” and that whosoever shall do so shall be condemned for heresy. Also, that he shall not be deposed by princes. And then it also provides as follows: “But if a general council being met, there happens any difference with the Bishop of Rome, he ought to be conferred with about the matter, and his answers be had, to make the best of it on either side, and no rash judgment to be passed against the supreme bishop.” (Du Pin, vol. vii., pp. 92—98.)

Careful observation of this language will show its whole import. In the first place, following the First Council of Constantinople, it assigns the chief place of honor merely to the pope; and then, in the second place, gives as the reason for it that this precedence of honor was conferred upon Peter when he was made “prince of the apostles.” But all this falls very far short of infallibility, which, besides honor, includes power and jurisdiction. And the council did not pretend, either that Peter had any superior power and jurisdiction beyond that conferred upon the other apostles, or that the pope had them in any greater degree than the other bishops. On the other hand, they, in the final clause of the canon, exclude any such idea by providing that differences existing between the pope and others may be settled by general councils, both parties being heard.

How could there be any such differences, or how could a council have jurisdiction over them if the pope was infallible? And this council, it should be observed, met in 869, long after the temporal power of the popes had begun to grow under the patronage of Pepin and Charlemagne, and just after the pontificate of Nicholas I., who had augmented the power of the papacy by means of the False Decretals. Even then the council was unwilling to surrender its supreme jurisdiction over the pope.

After the close of this council no other general one was held for nearly two hundred and fifty years. In the mean time, events of the greatest importance, bearing upon the increase of the papal power, had transpired. By the agency of Pepin and Charlemagne the popes had severed their allegiance from the emperors, and had become the acknowledged head of the Western or Latin Church, as distinct and separate from the Eastern or Greek Church. They had also succeeded in building up an immense fabric of papal power by means of false and forged decretals, which were manufactured as occasion required, to suit each exigency as it arose. And being thus separated from and independent of the Greeks, the remaining councils, covering the whole period of the Middle Ages, were held by the Latin Church, and under the immediate auspices of the popes.

True to the purpose of acquiring every possible degree of power, and of establishing their supremacy over the world, they began these Western councils at Rome, where the pope, by means of Italian influence, could generally have his own way. We shall see, however, that, with all these advantages, slow progress was made toward papal infallibility. It took all the time from 869 to 1870—a thousand years—to find a general council with so little self—respect as to place the whole power of the Church in the hands of the pope.

The First Council of Lateran, called the Ninth Ecumenical, met during the pontificate of Calixtus II., but made no enactment in reference to the power and jurisdiction of the pope. It passed twenty—two canons, having reference to other matters. (Du Pin, vol. x., pp. 33, 34.)

The Second Council of Lateran, under Innocent II., confined itself mainly to the regulation of discipline. There seems to have been, by this time, a necessity for providing, as it did, that priests who kept concubines should not hear mass. But it also secured to them immunity from public censure by subjecting to anathema those who should abuse a clergyman. (Ibid., p. 206.)

The Third Council of Lateran, under Alexander III., was professedly a reform council, designed “to reform a great number of abuses that had crept into the Church,” and also to condemn heresies. By this time the power of the papacy had nearly reached its culmination, and Alexander III. was not the kind of pope to permit any abatement of it. Not one of the twelve popes between him and Gregory VII. equaled him in ambition or strength of will; and not one among all his predecessors was more fitted than he to prepare the way for those events which were soon to transpire under Innocent III.

While this council asserted nothing in reference to the pope’s supremacy, it enacted twenty-seven disciplinary canons, some of which were pointed at existing abuses. It went somewhat farther than that immediately preceding, in the recognition of principles asserted in the False Decretals. It anathematized those laymen “who exact duties and lay taxes on the churches, and on ecclesiastical persons;” and those who should dare to “summon clergymen before their judges” in the secular courts. It relaxed nothing whatever in the work of establishing, papal supremacy, while it omitted any avowal of it. (Du Pin, vol. x., pp. 207—209.)

The practice of publishing what are called “papal constitutions” along with the proceedings of councils, seems, how ever, to have been then introduced. These consist of the briefs, bulls, and encyclical letters of the popes, wherein they asserted their own supremacy, and occasionally their infallibility. They were designed, of course, to maintain “the immunities of the Church,” by making the power of the popes, in its government, superior to all other.

The object to be accomplished by their publication in this form was, manifestly, to give to them a sort of consular sanction, in order that the Church might, in the end, be brought to the point of accepting them as of equal obligation with the canons of councils. The process was simple, and the argument plain. The False Decretals had furnished the claims of authority set up by the popes from Clement to Siricius, and these “constitutions” were such as the popes had made since then; and as they all claimed supremacy and infallibility, therefore they were supreme and infallible! Hence we find annexed to the proceedings of this council “a large collection of divers constitutions of Alexander III. and of the popes who preceded,” and, subsequently, of those also who “succeeded him,” which are published “as a sequel to this council.” (Ibid., p. 209.)

The proceedings of the Fourth Lateran Council exhibit the unbounded ambition of Innocent III., under whose pontificate it was held. There we find the celebrated third canon, which makes the persecution and extirpation of heretics a religious duty, which yet remains the law of the papacy. By this time the claim of supremacy made, and so frequently repeated by the popes, was considered to have the sanction of the Church, because there was no formidable resistance to it. Acquiescence was inferred from silence.

Innocent III. availed himself of this, in order that the practice of asserting this claim in papal “constitutions” should become ripened into the force of law. He, accordingly, is the first pope who boldly and openly struck at the independence of a general council; and he was not accustomed to aim his blows ineffectually. Seventy canons were passed without debate, which “were already drawn up” by him when the council assembled in Rome. There was no deliberation or debate about them. They were laid before the council by the pope, who “ordered them to be read;” but they were not acted on. But because the prelates did not openly resist and denounce them, “their silence was taken for an approbation;” a rule of procedure yet adhered to.

Among these canons we find it avowed, for the first time in the proceedings of a general council, that “the Church of Rome” has “the primacy over all other churches according to the appointment of our Saviour;” that they all owe “obedience to the Holy See;” and that the pall received from Rome is “the ensign of the plenitude of the pastoral power.” This bold avowal was not made, therefore, till the thirteenth century; but even then, when the world was enveloped in the thick mist of the Middle Ages, it stopped somewhat short of the claim of the pope’s personal infallibility. Innocent III. was undoubtedly ready to carry it to that extent, but, with all his daring, he was not prepared to ask of a general council a direct decree to that effect.

It will be perceived that the primacy asserted was alleged to be in “the Church of Rome,” not in the pope. It manifestly designed to consider the Church to be, according to the invariable custom, the whole body of Christians, as represented by the universal episcopate in general council; and that the pope, in asserting this primacy, should act within the limitations fixed by the Church. Otherwise, many of the canons would have been useless—especially the forty—fourth. This canon solemnly declares, “That the constitutions of princes which are prejudicial to the rights of the Church shall not be observed, whether they be for the alienation of fiefs, or for the encroaching on the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, or for any other goods.”

If the council had intended to change the deposit of infallibility from themselves, as representing the Church, to the pope alone; or if the pope had thought it expedient to have his personal infallibility distinct from that of the council openly acknowledged, there would have been no necessity for this canon. The principle asserted in the canon was considered necessary to the Church, and as requiring the stamp of infallibility upon it, in order that it should stand throughout all time. To give it this, the consent of the council was necessary; and that not having been withheld, this canon is one of those which the present pope is desirous of enforcing, and with reference to which the late council must be considered to have acted. (Du Pin, vol. xi., pp. 95—103.)

The principal object of the First Council of Lyons, under Innocent IV., was to decree a general crusade. And although much may be inferred from its silence, under the then existing state of affairs, yet it made no decree about primacy, supremacy, or infallibility. It, however, gave its sanction to the bull of the pope which deposed the Emperor Frederick and released his subjects from their allegiance; from which it is fair to suppose that both the pope and the council considered this sanction as necessary to give that act the ratification of the Church. Be this as it may, the stamp of infallibility was also given in this mode to the right of deposing monarchs and releasing their subjects from their allegiance, and that principle, with the approbation of this council, took its place among the canons of the Church, where it has ever since remained. (Ibid., pp. 6—8, 114, 115.).

The Second Council of Lyons, under Gregory X., was called with reference chiefly to a reunion with the Greek Church; which fact will sufficiently account for its silence in reference to papal infallibility, primacy, etc. Its doctrinal decrees had reference to the procession of the Holy Spirit, though it passed a number of a disciplinary character and upon general subjects. (Ibid., pp. 123,124.)

The Council of Vienne was assembled under Clement V. This pope had reached the pontificate by a corrupt bargain with Philip, King of France, by which he solemnly pledged himself that, if elected, he would cause Pope Boniface VIII. to be declared infamous. He was one of those who held the corrupt papal court at Avignon, in France, and who contributed his full share toward causing it to be esteemed the most prostituted place in Europe; so much so that Bishop Durandi said of it that it was “the retreat of dragons, the place of resort of satyrs, and the kingdom of demons.”

Clement V. called this council to avoid, if possible, the fulfillment of his promise to Philip, as he hoped to find shelter behind its unwillingness to defame a former pope. He succeeded so far as to pacify the king by issuing a bull to the effect that all the former bulls of Boniface against him should be held void. The council did nothing but pass some canons concerning the faith, and others condemning and anathematizing some heretics. With its proceedings, however, there were published a number of ” papal constitutions,” after the practice introduced by other popes, all tending to increase the power of the papacy. Some of these by Clement V. himself only go to show how entirely impossible it was for such a man to be infallible: it is scarcely possible they could ever have been accepted by the Church, or that any general council would have allowed them a moment's consideration.

Among those given by Du Pin are such as these: that as man may reach perfection in this life, when he has done so, he “may freely allow his body what he pleases;” that he is not then “obliged to obey, or tied to practice, the principles of the Church;” “that to kiss a woman is a mortal sin, but the carnal knowledge of her is no sin,” etc., etc. This latter papal precept was probably designed as a shield for his intercourse with the beautiful Countess de Foix. (*)

This Council of Vienne was the fifteenth recognized as ecumenical, and the last which preceded that at Constance. Neither by any of its decrees, nor by any of those assembled before it, was there any direct averment to the effect that the pope was infallible. With all of them infallibility was lodged in the collective Church, and nowhere else. But so frequently had some of the most ambitious and pretentious popes endeavored to assert it for themselves independently of the Church, acting as an organized body, and by this means to enlarge the circle of their admitted spiritual primacy so as to make it broad enough to include jurisdiction over temporals, that it became absolutely necessary to the peace and welfare of the Church, that the Council of Constance should grapple directly with the question and put it at rest.

It did endeavor to do so, as we have already seen, by deposing one pope and declaring the superiority of a general council over all of them. This was undoubtedly the voice of the Church, declared in the only recognized mode, and was accepted as such by all but the popes themselves, and their special adherents in Italy, where their power was omnipotent. They were not disposed to rest long under this direct censure of a general council; for even Martin V., who accepted from it the place of the deposed pope, so soon as he could get away from its immediate influence, commenced a series of measures designed expressly to reverse its decisions and bring it into disrepute. In this he was sympathized with by Eugenius IV., his immediate successor, under whose pontificate the Council of Florence was held, only seventeen years after the Council of Constance.

To this council we are now referred by all the defenders of papal infallibility, in proof that this doctrine has always been recognized by the Church as a part of its faith. From that time they trace it down to the present, through the councils of the Fifth Lateran and of Trent, to show that the late council—the Sixth Lateran—did not introduce any new dogma, but only gave expression to the faith which had always and everywhere existed. This pretense requires a minute examination, somewhat more in detail; but in order to see that it is a pretense, and nothing more, it is only necessary to observe the manner in which the Jesuit writers dispose of the Council of Constance. Whether in doing this, mendacity or ingenuity prevails the most, the reader must judge for himself.

Passing by the equivocations of Weninger—from whose book repeated quotations have already been made—and his flagrant suppression of important facts necessary to a correct understanding of the Council of Constance, let us come directly to the important points of his explanation. He says that in condemning the heresy of the Wycliffites, the council “did not pronounce new ecclesiastical censures against them, but contented themselves with reminding the faithful that the sect and its infamous doctrines had been previously condemned by the decisions of the Holy See. These decisions are irrefragable, remarks the council, because it is impossible that the Apostolic See—that is to say, the pope—should err.” (“Apostolical and Infallible Authority of the Pope,” by Weninger, pp. 145, 146.)

It requires but a moment’s thought to see that it was impossible, in the very nature of things, for the fathers of Constance to have stultified themselves by any such declaration as this. It would have been as diametrically opposed to what they actually did, as darkness is to light. They had tried, condemned, and deposed John XXIII., a lawful pope, for innumerable crimes, including heresy; and to have followed such an act with the assertion that it was impossible that “the pope should err” would have made them the laughing—stock of all Europe.

But it is not necessary to argue upon general principles to show how entirely this assertion of Weninger is without any fact to support it. Du Pin says, the decree of the Council of Constance “concerning the authority of the council above the pope did plainly decide the question, and subjected the pope, as well as to faith as manners, to the judgment of a general council;” which applied not only to times of schism, or where there were rival popes,” but generally in all other cases.”And he gives the reason for this decision: “Because they deduce the authority of the council above the pope from its representation of the Church, and from its infallibility.”

And when speaking of the bull of Martin V. against the errors of the Wycliffites, he says also, that, in the forty—first decree, “the authority of the Universal Church is distinguished from that of the pope; and there it is ordained that the Universal Church, or the General Council, have a sovereign authority indefinitely; whereas ’tis only said of the pope that he hath a primacy over other particular churches, which amounts to the same thing with the decision of the council.” (Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 15.)

This same author asserts, moreover, that, after Martin V. had been elected by the Council of Constance, and while it was yet in session, he issued a bull prohibiting all appeals from the pope to any other tribunal, and that it was approved by the council. The words of this bull given by him are these:

“It is not lawful for any person to appeal from the Roman pontiff, who is the supreme judge and the Vicar of Christ on earth, or by subterfuge to elude his judgment in matters of faith.” (Weninger, p. 147.)

This statement is untrue, or else Du Pin did not understand, or has perverted the facts—neither of which is probable. When the Council was nearly drawn to a close, a question arose about which there was so much disagreement that the ambassadors of Poland talked about appealing to a future council—a remedy in entire accord with the common sentiment of the time. Martin V., like some of his predecessors, was disposed to avail himself of every opportunity to resist this idea, so as to concentrate all the power of the Church in his own hands, and accordingly issued the bull alluded to, notwithstanding, as was then declared, it was directly contradictory of what the council had decreed. But it did not receive the sanction of the council, as Weninger asserts. On the other hand, if the council had acted upon it, there can be no reasonable doubt that it would have been not merely rejected, but sternly condemned. Du Pin says: “However, the bull of Martin V. containing the prohibition of appealing to the council was not read, nor approved, in this session of the council, but published in a private assembly of the cardinals;” (Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 24.) that is, sent out as the popes have generally promulgated their “constitutions,” with the hope that, in the course of time, their custom of asserting universality of power would ripen into the force of law. They understood full well the nature and import of that principle of their Church organization which construes silence into acquiescence—as do also the hierarchy of the present day. And they acted upon this principle, if not with impunity, at least with courage, until at last it has come to be a part of the settled faith of the Church that no layman has any right to inquire by what authority a papal decree has been issued, or to what extent it goes, or what it commands to be believed or done, but is bound to accept it as true and obey it accordingly, without any regard to whatsoever human power and authority it may defy.

Notwithstanding the contrary assertion of Weninger and other Jesuits, no man can study the history of the Council of Constance without seeing that the infallibility of the pope was directly contradicted by it—not merely by the act of deposing an obnoxious and heretical pope, and electing another in his place, but by the enactment of a decree to that effect, which was approved by Martin V. And if it be true, as alleged, that Martin V., after approving this decree, endeavored to counteract its effect by a papal bull—of which there seems to be no doubt—he is presented to all impartial minds in the attitude of having played a double part—of having misled the council by the pretense of approving what it did, while, at the same time, he cherished the purpose of resisting it at the earliest opportunity.

But this is nothing new in the conduct of the popes, who, in building up the wonderful system of the papacy, have taken care to reserve to themselves the right of doing whatsoever they may suppose the interest of the Church requires, without any regard whatever to what they themselves or any others may have done or said. Martin V. found ample justification for his duplicity in the example of many of his predecessors, and only increased the number of those popes whose conduct has since added to the significance of the precedent.

Continued in Chapter XXI. Disputes About Papal Authority

Continued from Chapter XVIII. Resistance to Civil Power.

The Rights of the Papacy not lost by Revolution.—No Legitimate Right acquired by it.—Revolutions always Iniquitous.—Christopher Columbus.—He takes Possession of the New World in the Name of the Church of Rome.—He thereby expands its Domain.—The Popes claim Jurisdiction in Consequence.—Illegitimate Power obtained by Revolution cannot destroy this Right of Jurisdiction.—Exercise of the Power in England by Alexander II., and in Germany by Gregory VII.—Defense of Gregory VII.—Direct and Indirect Power.—Doctrine asserted by Peter Dens. Bellarmine the Author of the Theory of Indirect Power.—Doctrine of St. Thomas.—That of Cardinal D’Ostia.—Infidels can have no Just Title to Governments.—The Pope may dispose of Them.—Gregory III., Stephen II., and Leo III. all justified.—Also Gregory VII., Innocent III., Adrian IV., and Boniface VIII.—The Late Lateran Council makes them all In fallible.—They claim the Direct Power.—The Doctrine of Indirect Power an After—thought in Answer to the Objection of Protestants.—The Papal Jurisdiction in America the Same under Either.—Alexander VI. divides America between Spain and Portugal.—Resumption of this Authority defended by Jesuits.—Obedience to Governments de facto not enjoined by the Church of Rome.—Effect of this Doctrine upon the Oath of Allegiance.—Doctrine of “Mental Restrictions,” and “Ambiguity and Equivocation” in Oaths.—Jesuit Teachings on this Subject.—The Object of the Second Council of Baltimore to introduce the Canon Law.—What it is.—Its Effect if introduced in the United States.—Punishment of Heretics.—Extirpation of Infidelity.—Heretics rightfully punished with Death.—All Baptized Protestants are Subjects of the Pope.—May all be rightfully punished for Disobedience.

THE author of “Protestantism and Catholicity Compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe” must be followed still further, in order that the full import of his teachings may be understood. His eminent ability, and his distinction as an expositor of the true faith in so far as it involves the dealings of the papacy with the nations, give an unusual degree of prominence and importance to what he says.

Assuming, as his premise, that the “American possessions” of Spain were separated from the mother country by “usurpation,” and that thereby illegitimate was substituted for legitimate authority, he reaches the next step in his argument, as a logical conclusion: that the new government thus formed can impose no absolute obligation of allegiance—it may be submitted to as a measure of prudence, but not obeyed on the ground of right. Manifestly he had a twofold meaning: first, to assert the existing right of Spain to retake possession of such portions of America as she had lost by revolution; and, second, the right of the papacy, also subsisting, to re-assert and maintain the spiritual jurisdiction and authority it once exercised in America. The application of this doctrine designed by him is readily seen.

Mexico sundered her allegiance from Spain, as the United States did theirs from Great Britain. In both cases new governments were established and became “consummated facts”—so recognized by other governments. But, in his view, these new governments became “usurpations” by the fact that they were the result of illegitimate, or revolutionary, resistance to legitimate authority. To such governments he does not consider any obedience due, as of right; because, says he, a government which has “abolished legitimate rights cannot justify its acts by the simple fact of its having sufficient strength to execute these iniquities.” (Balmes, p. 334.)

Therefore, according to the “Catholic doctrines” as announced by him, the rights of Spain and Great Britain in America are in no way legitimately impaired by consummated acts of revolutionary resistance; but remain intact—as complete and perfect as they were before the revolutions began. Therefore, also, Mexico belongs, rightfully and legitimately, to the old Spanish monarchy, under its old de jure form of government, and the United States to Great Britain; subject, of course, in both cases, to the papal claim of primacy and superior right, recognized by both countries when they had the legitimate right to do so. Neither Mexico nor the United States has acquired any legitimate and valid right, as against the legitimate authority they defied, or as against the papacy, rightfully acknowledged by that authority, by reason of the mere fact of having had “sufficient strength to execute” the iniquitous purpose of establishing revolutionary governments. Hence, he reasons that, as the original obligation of obedience to the old monarchies—the only form of government which he considers as known to the divine law—has not been impaired by “these iniquities” or “consummated facts,” and cannot be impaired by the substitution of new and illegitimate allegiance for it, the papacy, as the representative and divinely appointed guardian of the monarchical power, has the legitimate right to sweep out of existence, whenever it shall become prudent to attempt it, everything that shall stand in the way of this original and primary obedience. And hence, also, the oath of allegiance to the United States, with those who accept thy doctrine of papal in fallibility, has no other than a temporary binding force, because, being illegitimate and unjust, it is perjury, and no oath at all!

Thus always reasons the papal monarchist, who invariably argues so as to make everything center in the proposition that the bulk of mankind are fit only to be governed—not to govern. He and the political monarchist start from this same stand-point. They do not differ in their process of reasoning, except in this: that the former never fails to concentrate everything in the papacy as the legitimate source of all power, because it is the only authorized interpreter of the divine law, to which all mankind must become subject; and is sufficiently comprehensive to include the temporal or civil power, as the greater includes the lesser.

Those who defend the claim of papal supremacy in this sense see, or pretend to see, in the discovery of America by Columbus, the act of God consummated only through the instrumentality of the Roman Church, specially chosen for that purpose. They have always considered this fact as having conferred jurisdiction upon the pope to govern the new continent in whatsoever concerns the faith and the divine law including, necessarily, in their view such direction of temporal affairs as is required to make them conform to that law. These ideas, somewhat remitted heretofore from necessity and prudence, have acquired additional strength from the dogma of papal infallibility. They are now avowed with great emphasis and vehemence by the ultramontane authorities at Rome, who are, seemingly, the more pertinacious in their advocacy in proportion to the resistance of them by the progressive nations.

A new life of Columbus has lately appeared. It was written in French by De Lorgues, but has been translated, and published in this country. Anyone who will carefully read this book will see that one design of it is the inculcation of the idea of papal supremacy in America. Speaking of the preparation of Columbus for his work of discovery, by penance, prayer, and the meditation of divine things, the author says:

“His expedition takes the religious character of its origin and object: he gives the name of the Blessed Virgin to his ship, and hoists the cross in her; he departs on a Friday, and commands the sails to be unfurled in the name of Jesus Christ.

“It is in the name of Jesus Christ that he takes possession of the lands he discovers. It is to honor the Redeemer that he erects crosses everywhere he lands.” (“Life of Christopher Columbus,” translated by Dr. Barry, p. 570.)

He is described, not only as the first who carried the cross to the New World, but as “the herald of Catholicity, and the tacit mandatory of the papacy.” (Ibid., p. 571.) It is said that “he presents the Holy See with an opportunity, or occasion, of showing the spirit of infallible sagacity that perpetually inspires the Church, etc.” (Ibid.) Events are recited to establish for him “the character of apostolic legate, with which he showed himself invested in his acts and by his intentions.” (Ibid., p. 573.) It is declared that “evidently God chose Christopher Columbus as a messenger of salvation.” (Ibid.)

And treating the discovery of America as a fact accomplished in accordance with the divine decree, it is said that by means of it he “enlarges the known surface of the earth, brings nations, as it were, nearer each other, and expands the domain of the Catholic Church.” (Ibid., p. 590.) He is called a saint, even without canonization, because, as “a hero of the Gospel” and “a great servant of the Church,” the “messenger of the cross is found, as regards history,” in him. (“Life of Christopher Columbus,” translated by Dr. Barry, p. 596.) And, finally, in assigning the discovery to “the infallible wisdom of the Church,” he sums up by saying that “the history of Columbus contains the glorification of the Catholic Church; it shows the spirit of light which always guides the papacy in the government of intelligence;” (Ibid., p. 616.) which assigns all the honor and glory of the discovery to the papacy alone, and treats the agency of Ferdinand and Isabella as merely secondary to it.

The papist who by this process of reasoning argues himself into the belief that this enlargement of “the domain of the Catholic Church” conferred higher jurisdiction upon the papacy than that acquired by Ferdinand and Isabella by virtue of the right of discovery and the law of nations, because the papal rights were divine, and the royal rights human only, has no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the pope obtained by means of it a degree of authority within the new “domain” which cannot be impaired by the employment of illegitimate power, or a resort to revolution and usurpation, which with him are convertible terms. Undoubtedly, the popes have thus reasoned in reference to the jurisdiction they acquired over all nations once submitting to their authority; and when this jurisdiction has been suspended or disturbed for a time by forces they could not resist, they have not hesitated to re-assert it when occasion offered, and to insist upon resuming it when these forces were overcome or withdrawn. They have maintained that neither time nor circumstances, of whatsoever nature, could operate in bar or limitation of their right, for the reason that it is derived from God; and that, therefore, everything in conflict with it is wrong and usurpation. They have never been known to abandon any jurisdiction, and the rights arising out of it, exercised by them over any nation, however remote may have been the period of its exercise.

In the case of Great Britain, for example, their theory supports, and in their view justifies, the claim that as Gregory I. introduced the Roman faith there, and the early Saxon kings became converts to it and submitted to the jurisdiction of the pope, and other kings did the same thing, especially John, who consented to hold the crown and country as a fief of the pope, therefore they acquired a spiritual supremacy there, which, whatsoever “consummated facts” may have since transpired, has lost none of its original validity or legitimacy. They do not acknowledge that the statute of limitations or any analogous principle of the law of nations can run against the papal rights over either nations or individuals, because they have the stamp of the divine sanction. Their reasoning is based upon the ideas that Christ entrusted to them the keys, giving to them thereby the power to bind and loose in heaven and upon earth; that this power is necessarily plenary, and confers upon them the right of spiritual government over all nations and peoples brought under the influence of Christianity.

The extraordinary nature of this claim is not more startling than the manner of its exercise, whenever there have not been sufficient means of repelling it. Examples already referred to in a different connection, as illustrating other aspects of the papal question, bear directly on this point.

It was by virtue of this jurisdiction that Alexander II. blessed the banner of William the Conqueror, and gave him pontifical permission to dispossess Harold, the legitimate King of Great Britain, and occupy the country in the name of the papacy. In support of it, he and his successors sent an army of legates and Italian monks into the country, in order to extend the pontifical dominion, and, according to the historian, “they carved and clipped ecclesiastical matters as they pleased.” (Rapin.)

It was under the same claim of authority that Gregory VII. pronounced his anathemas against the Emperor Henry IV., and stirred up against him an insurrection in favor of Rudolph, without any regard to the wishes or desires of the German people. And the papists, not being disposed to attempt a direct justification of his enormous pretensions, in an age of so much enlightenment as the present, have resorted to various subterfuges to escape the consequences of his bold and defiant demands.

An effort has been made by a learned papal writer—which has the merit of great ability—to show that Gregory VII. “did not pretend to ground himself merely on the divine power of binding and loosing, but on the laws both of God and man.” ( “The Power of the Pope in the Middle Ages,” by Gosselin, vol. ii., p. 106. ) He does not by any means make this clear. On the contrary, his shifting of position merely suggests the impossibility of drawing the line, in ascertaining the extent of papal power, between the laws of God and those of man; for if the power is divine in any sense, it must be plenary, and not dependent upon human consent.

Bellarmnine, with more ability, called it indirect power—distinguishing it from direct; the ground also taken by Cardinal Antonelli in his letter to the French ambassador, heretofore alluded to. (Ante.) What is meant by this, however, is that in the Papal States the power of the pope is direct, whereas outside their limits, and elsewhere throughout the world, it is indirect. But there is no difference in degree, it being the same wherever it exists. Thus we find it laid down by Peter Dens in these words:

“Bellarmine, Sylvius, and others say that the pope has not by divine right direct power over temporal kingdoms, but indirect; that is, when the spiritual power cannot be freely exercised, nor his object be attained by spiritual, then he may have resource to temporal means, according to St. Thomas, 22, q. 10, a. 12, et q. 12, a. 2, who teaches that princes may sometimes be deprived of their rule, and their subjects be liberated from the oath of fidelity; and thus it has been done by pontiffs more than once.” (*)

The Jesuit Bellarmine is supposed to be the author of this doctrine; but as he lived in the sixteenth century—five hundred years after Gregory VII.—the latter, of course, had no idea of any other than the direct power, and being an infallible pope, the opinions of a mere cardinal, however distinguished, cannot be set up against his. Nor do they avail much against the opinions of St. Thomas, who is regarded as one of the foremost of the fathers. As represented by Dens, St. Thomas merely refers to the exercise, but not to the origin, of the power. When, however, he does refer to the origin of it, he says, “that according to the institution of God himself, the King of kings, the pope possesses the highest degree of both powers, the spiritual and the temporal.” (Gosselin, vol. ii., p. 365, and note.)

And Cardinal D’ Ostia makes a more practical application of the doctrine when he asserts that “since the coming of Jesus Christ all the dominion of infidel princes was transferred to the Church, and is vested in the pope as the vicar of Jesus Christ, the King of kings; whence he infers that the pope can, by his own authority, grant the kingdoms of infidel princes to any of the faithful whom he may think proper to select.” (Ibid., p. 362.)

But although St. Thomas sustains the direct and Bellarmine the indirect power, they agree in its application according to the principle laid down by D’ Ostia. In justifying Popes Gregory III., Stephen III., and Leo III. in seizing upon a number of Italian provinces after the emperors of the East had separated from the Roman Church and united with the Eastern Christians—thus becoming heretics—they both “maintain that the Church and the pope could have declared the pagan emperors of Rome, and especially Julian, deposed from the empire, and their subjects absolved from all obligation toward them, if such a declaration had been consistent with prudence.” (Ibid., p. 367.)

The fact is, this theory of indirect power is an after-thought. It had no existence in the minds of the ambitious popes who laid the foundation of papal power, and under whose administrations that power was made to overshadow the world. With them—Gregory VII., Innocent III., Adrian IV., Boniface VIII., and all the rest—the pontifical power was direct, full, plenary, omnipotent, derived immediately from God. They denied that it was in any sense indebted to human grants or concessions, or that it could be enlarged or diminished by them.

When, however, Protestantism began its work, and the papacy reeled and tottered under the blows of the great Reformers, it required the genius and ability of Bellarmine to conceive and promulgate the idea of indirect power, so that the assailants of the direct power might be answered with an argument that was at least plausible. It is said that he was “driven to the theory of the indirect power by the desire of vindicating the popes and clergy of the Middle Ages against the attacks of Protestants and of the more ancient heretics,” and that he “believed that he struck the middle and proper course, between the excesses of heresy and the opinion of the direct power, which he considered to be manifestly extravagant.” (Gosselin, vol. ii., p. 368 (note).)

If the great popes who originated, maintained, and acted upon the doctrine of the direct power were infallible—and the dogma of the late Lateran Council makes them so—then this doctrine became an essential part of the faith of the Church, which it would now be heresy to deny or change. It is a vain pretense, therefore, to talk about the indirect power, as Cardinal Antonelli does, it being merely the ingenious argument of a Jesuit of the sixteenth century, not promulgated by authority as a part of the faith, but as a mere shelter for the enormities practiced under the claim of direct power. If it be that the faith of the Church is immutable, and the popes all infallible and incapable of error, then the doctrine of the indirect power is heresy. Or, if the promulgation of it from the Vatican, under the official auspices of the present pope, makes it a necessary part of the faith at this time, then the popes who maintained the direct power were heretics. Let the papist take either horn of the dilemma, and his theory falls to the ground as utterly untenable, alike opposed to the divine and human law and the best interests of mankind.

It is apparent, therefore, that Gregory VII. did not pretend to shelter himself behind any indirection, and that in asserting his primacy and supremacy he required it to be recognized as a part of the faith, that the power of the pope over both spirituals and temporals was derived directly from God, and was not susceptible of any human limitation.

This is the fair and only import of his language, previously quoted, (Ante, ch. iii.) and of all his official acts when dealing with the European kings. Even in dealing with Philip, King of France—the favorite “Son of the Church “—he forbade him lay investiture, and addressed a letter to the French bishops, declaring that if they did not obey him, and not the king, to whom by the law of France they owed allegiance, “he would, with God’s help, use every means to wrest the kingdom of France from his hands.” (Reichel, p.205.) And his labored exertions to establish a holy empire or ecclesiastical state, in the form of a revived Jewish theocracy, indicates how completely, if he had succeeded, he would have absorbed all the spiritual and political power of the world. (Ibid., p.282.)

Nor did Adrian IV., Innocent III., or Boniface VIII., up to the beginning of the fourteenth century, pretend to rest this supremacy upon any other ground than that asserted by Gregory VII. The blight of the Middle Ages was resting upon the world during their pontificates, and there was no necessity for moderation or disguise. Reason was not then free to expose or combat their errors or usurpations. There was no free thought or free press in those days. Protestantism was not then born. The iron weight of the papacy rested upon all the nations, and even kings so crouched at the feet of these great pontiffs as to cause Dante to exclaim,

“How many now hold themselves mighty kings,
Who here like swine shall wallow in the mire,
Leaving behind them horrible dispraise!”

When Adrian IV. granted Ireland to King Henry II. and authorized him to subjugate the Irish people, he did so expressly upon the ground that it “belonged to the Holy See” by a divine right, and that he could dispose of it as seemed right to him; asserting, at the same time, the right in all the popes to dispose of every country where Christianity had been received. Innocent III. declared that his power came directly from Heaven, and was based “on a divine ordinance;” and that the authority of princes was derived from him; wherefore he gave away crowns, disposed of governments, and transferred peoples from one allegiance to an other, in the name of God and the Church. And Boniface VIII., in his bull Unam Sanctam— which remains a part of the canon law—set forth the doctrine that temporal governments should be conducted “for the Church,” and that “for every human being subjection to the pope was necessary for salvation;” deriving the tremendous power he asserted directly from God alone.

All the popes who at various times before the sixteenth century claimed this supremacy asserted the direct power over all nations. They universally regarded it as an attribute attached to the papacy by Christ, descending to them from the apostle Peter, and reaching out to the utmost bounds of the earth, in order that all mankind may in the end be saved. Whatever may have been said by others for them since then is no part of the original argument by which the power was sustained, but merely the invention of such limitations upon it as prudence and expediency have dictated. The original argument remains the same. If it does not, the power does. Its comprehensiveness is in no way lessened by shifting the method and grounds of its defense.

While, since Bellarmine, a vast amount of ingenuity has been displayed in the discovery of various arguments, often conflicting, to reconcile the world to its exercise, the popes themselves, even when it has been held in abeyance, have treated it as a part of the faith—unalterable and forever the same. And Pope Pius IX. is not behind any of them in asserting it to be all—absorbing, and in denouncing and anathematizing everything which stands in its way. His infallibility being now established, the Church has assigned to him the incapacity to err, and the same incapacity to all his predecessors. Hence it binds itself, and requires all its members to recognize the doctrines and principles advanced by any and all of them as the true “Catholic doctrines.” And these doctrines being true, the inevitable and logical result, from which no ingenuity can contrive a loop—hole of escape, is that the divine and legitimate authority which the pope has at any time acquired over any government or country by virtue of discovery, conquest, or compact, cannot be displaced by any act considered as usurpation, or by any illegitimate act, no matter in what way it may have been consummated.

As “the domain of the Catholic Church” was extended by the discovery of America by Columbus, acting for and in the name of the reigning pope, Alexander VI.,(*) and spiritual jurisdiction was thereby acquired over this continent in obedience to the providence of God, that jurisdiction, though disturbed for a time by revolution and usurpation, exists yet in all its original vigor! As temporal jurisdiction necessarily follows the spiritual, that also exists in a like degree, to be resumed whensoever by possibility it may be done, and it shall become prudent to attempt its recovery! The resumption of both these jurisdictions is commanded by Almighty God in order to secure the universality of the only true Church, against which “the gates of hell shall not prevail!”

Thus has the Jesuit reasoned ever since the wonderful system of Loyola was contrived in aid of the papacy; and thus must necessarily reason all who accept the dogma of papal infallibility. The author of “Protestantism and Catholicity Compared,” etc., understood all this when he wrote his book, as also did his American publishers when they recommended it as “peculiarly adapted” to the wants of this age, because it sets forth “the glorious character of the faith;” and he and they manifestly contemplated the occurrence of such events as would bring the world into a condition for the practical application of these doctrines.

At all events, he felt it to be the duty of the papacy, in whose behalf he wrote, to keep them fresh in the minds of its devotees, so as to hold them in readiness for such a time, whensoever it should arrive. And, consequently, his work would have been left in complete if he had failed to point out the ultimate results to be expected from these “Catholic doctrines;” that is, if he had not indicated “how the civil power may be lawfully resisted.” To this special subject, therefore, he has devoted a chapter, which begins thus:

“From what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it follows that it is allowable to resist illegitimate power by force. The Catholic religion does not enjoin obedience to governments existing merely de facto; for morality does not admit a mere fact unsupported by right and justice.” (Balmes, ch. lvi., p. 336.)

And then, referring to the teachings of St. Thomas, which we have already seen, in support of his proposition that “an equality of social and political rights “is impossible, he passes on to define what is meant by papal interference in the affairs of governments, and to show that it is nothing less than the direct interposition of God himself! He says:

“For many centuries there has been inculcated in Europe a doctrine much criticized by those who do not understand it, the intervention of the pontifical authority between the people and their sovereigns. This doctrine was nothing less than Heaven descending as an arbiter and judge, to put an end to the dispute of the earth.” (Ibid., p. 340.)

And this remarkable chapter is wound up by pointing to the times when the tempest of revolution has burst upon the world, and thrones have been overturned, and royal heads cut off “in the name of liberty;” to all of which he declares the Church says “this is no liberty, but a succession of crimes; the fraternity and equality which I have taught were never your orgies and guillotines” (Ibid., p. 343.)—thus placing all political revolutions along-side of each other, and seeming not to know that it was only that of Roman Catholic France where “orgies and guillotines” were substituted for law and order.

What man is so ignorant as not to understand all this? “The Catholic religion does not enjoin obedience to governments existing de facto!” that is, governments not founded on the law of God. No such thing as “an equality of social and political rights” is possible! “The intervention of the pontifical authority between the people and the sovereigns,” or between them and their governments, is only “Heaven descending as an arbiter and judge,” in the person of the pope, to hold them to the line of duty! The liberty which allows thrones to be overturned and kings to be dispensed with, “is no liberty, but a succession of crimes!” (*)

This author was not disposed to shield the papacy behind any disguise whatever, but marched bravely up to the work he had in hand. He felt himself too secure in Spain to practice any deception upon a point of doctrine so absolutely essential to the maintenance of the ultramontane party, of which he was a distinguished member. He was too truthful for subterfuge. And, therefore, he could do no less than declare that the power of the pope over both spirituals and temporals is derived directly from God, and that its exercise over the world is the act of God himself!

We all concede that whatever is derived from God must be just and right: he is infallible. Whosoever shall be persuaded to believe that these doctrines are according to his teachings, to him they necessarily become just and right. No defender of papal infallibility is permitted to deny them— excommunication and anathema have already been decreed against him if he does. With all such, then, their duty to the Church is higher and more obligatory than any duty they can owe to human governments, either in the United States or elsewhere. And if the pope shall tell them, in an official bull or brief, that there are principles of government prevailing here which are condemned by the law of God; that this country belongs of right to “the domain of the Catholic Church” by virtue of the discovery by Columbus; that this right, being divine, can never be destroyed or impaired by revolution; that the papal jurisdiction has been wrongfully and criminally displaced by lawless usurpation; that the Government existing here is de facto, and not de jure, because it is merely human, and not such as God’s law requires; that it does not recognize the temporal power as subordinate to the spiritual, which God commands, but the spiritual, in its exterior organization, as subordinate to the temporal, which God forbids; that it has disunited the State and the Church, and tolerates different forms of religion, which is heresy; that all such institutions as ours, being Protestant, are infidel, because they deny to the papacy the right to measure our laws by the papal standard—if he shall tell them any or all of these things, and enjoin upon them that, in view of all this wrong, injustice, and crime, it is a duty which the papacy owes to God to re-assert its jurisdiction here, to restore again the true apostolic Christianity, to banish all this heresy, and to build up a lawful government constructed according to the divine plan; with all these and other kindred propositions before their minds, pressed and urged upon them by cunning and adroit priests, trained for the purpose in Jesuit schools, what will those who believe that the pope is infallible do and say? Win they obey or disobey the pope?

That is the question which no ingenuity can evade. He who accepts papal infallibility, and with it the ultramontane interpretation of the power of the pope over the world, and thinks that by offending the pope he offends God, will obey passively, unresistingly, uninquiringly. Such a man, whether priest or layman, high or low, is necessarily inimical to the Government and political institutions of the United States. With him his oath of allegiance would be worth no more than the paper upon which it is written. It would not stand a single moment before the all-absorbing absolutism of the pope, whose commands are equivalent with him to those of God. Or if, for a moment, he should stop to consider the extent of its possible obligation, the pope would be ready to assure him that, as it required him to do what the welfare of his Church and the will of God forbade him to do, it was null and void from the beginning. Or if still there should be some little unrest in his conscience, some slight misgivings as to the true line of his duty, the power of dispensation would be ready at hand to release him from the obligation of his sworn allegiance, and snap the cords that bind him to the Government, as the same kind of cords have been snapped by other popes and in other countries. To this end do the papal teachings inevitably lead: it is their natural and logical result.

The law of the Church is in its canons. These are made by the decrees of popes and councils. One of the greatest of the popes, Innocent III., asserted for himself such plenitude of power as gave him the right to dispense with any law. The Fourth General Lateran Council, with the approval of this same pope, enacted a canon wherein it is declared that constitutions which are prejudicial to the rights of the Church shall not be observed; thus, by the use of imperative language, making the non—observance of them obligatory. The Decretals, which are the body of the canon law, contain provisions to the same effect. The Third General Lateran Council, with the approval of Alexander III., decreed that an oath in opposition to the welfare of the Church and the enactments of the holy fathers is not to be called an oath at all, but rather perjury. Peter Dens, the great commentator on the laws and moral theology of the Church, lays it down as the law of the Church that the right of the pope, as the ultimate superior and sovereign, is reserved in every oath; which, of course, includes the oath of allegiance. He also instructs the faithful that the pope has the power of withdrawing or prohibiting what is included in an oath, and that when he does so it is no longer included. And Bishop England, driven to the wall by an ingenious and learned adversary, from the point of whose lance he could not escape, was compelled to admit the law of the Church yet to be as it was established by the Third Lateran Council.

Under such a law the papacy has but to demonstrate to its followers that a constitution or law of the State is opposed to the welfare of the Church, when it becomes their religious duty to treat the oath to obey such constitution or law as no oath at all, but rather perjury. And if this provision were not so plain and emphatic as to be insusceptible of misunderstanding, the papacy, ever on the alert, has provided its doctrines of “mental restrictions” and “ambiguity and equivocation,” as the final means of escape from almost every imaginable promise or oath, except where the party is bound to the papacy itself.

Its adroit training of its subjects in the school of dissimulation shows how completely the practice of falsehood may be systematized into a science. Of course, the abstract proposition that it is unlawful to he in any event is laid down in general terms; but in each special case as it arises rules are furnished by which to decide what is and what is not a lie.

“Mental restrictions” are of two kinds: purely mental and real. In the first, falsehood is not excused, because there is no external sign to signify that which is restricted in the mind. In the second, there is no falsehood, because the external circumstances signify that something is secretly understood. Thus, as to real restriction, it is said: “Real restriction occurs when the declaration is false, if we regard the words alone; but circumstances concur which signify that something is to be secretly understood, which the speaker keeps in his mind, and which, being secretly understood, the declaration is true.” (*)

This rule had the sanction of one of the infallible popes, Innocent XI., which, of course, adds greatly to its influence. In a proposition laid down by him, he said:

“If any, either alone or before others, whether asked or of his own accord, or for the purpose of sport, or for any other object, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, by understanding within himself something else which he has not done, or a different way from that in which he has done it, or any other truth that is added, he does not really lie, nor is he perjured.” (*)

It will be readily observed how wide these rules open the door for falsehood and perjury—how completely they tend to destroy all confidence between men, and all faith and integrity. But as if this abominable doctrine of “mental restriction” were not sufficient to enable the order of Jesuits to triumph over the world by the system of fraud which it is designed to legitimate, that of “ambiguity and equivocation” is superadded to give it both efficiency and completeness. It amounts to this: that if a proposition is susceptible of two meanings, one may be expressed when it is not meant, and the other, which is meant, may be reserved in the mind. Hence it is said:

“An equivocation of this kind does not contain a lie, in whatever sense it may be received; because the external words truly signify that sense which the speaker has in his mind, and thus differs from a purely mental reservation, in which the external words do not contain the mental sense.” (*)

That these rules are part of the Jesuit system of “mental reservations,” is undoubted. Sanchez, one of the fathers, says: “A man may swear that he never did such a thing (though he actually did it), meaning within himself that he did not do so on a certain day, or before he was born, or understanding any other such circumstance, while the words which he employs have no such sense as would discover his meaning.” (“The Provincial Letters,” by Pascal, letter ix., p. 277.)

The reason given by him and Filiutius, another father, is that “it is the intention that determines the quality of the action.” (Ibid.) And they give a surer method of avoiding falsehood: “After saying aloud, I swear that I have not done that, to add in a low voice, today; or after saying aloud, I swear, to interpose in a whisper, that I say, and then continue aloud, that I have done that.” (Ibid.)

The same rule is also expressed in these words: “No more is required of them to avoid lying than simply to say that they have not done what they have done, provided ‘they have in general the intention of giving to their language the sense which an able man would give to it.'” (Ibid.)

And Escobar, another and greater of the Jesuit fathers, lays down the following lax and demoralizing rule in reference to promises not confirmed by an oath: “Promises are not binding when the person in making them had no intention to bind himself.” (*)

Now, with the believer in the ultramontane doctrines which prevail at Rome, and which, since the decree of papal infallibility, have become the only doctrines which the pope will allow to be accepted as true, it is quite certain that the oath of allegiance will not stand, for a single moment, in the way of his obedience to any command of the pope for the promotion of the welfare and interest of the Church. In taking the oath, how easy was it for him to have renounced his allegiance to some civil monarch; yet, at the same time, to have reserved in his mind his allegiance to the pope, not as a civil monarch in the same sense, but as the spiritual head of the Church, whose power, divinely granted, included authority over all temporal affairs within its jurisdiction!

But if he did not have this reservation, the other modes of escape are equally effective. Possibly, there are not very many who have made this reservation, but these will labor assiduously to increase their number. The Jesuits, and those upon whose minds they have impressed their teachings, understand it perfectly well; and their struggles to obtain the mastery over the world are unremitting. They have the unabating ardor of an army held together and in spirited by the promise and expectation of victory.

It is fair to assume that a majority of those Roman Catholics who have taken the oath of allegiance had no such mental reservation. But these well— meaning and good citizens are relied on to acquiesce, by their silence, in what may be done by such as had. These seem to have no conception of the extent to which this passive submission may carry them. They may well pause at this point for reflection and self-examination, while they are protected by institutions which allow this to them. If they shall do so, they may readily see how completely they have become entangled in the meshes of the Jesuit net, and realize the nature of the efforts their hierarchy are now making to bring them under the government of the canon laws of Rome, whensoever the existing laws of the United States shall conflict with them. Perhaps not one in a thousand is aware of these efforts.

The proceedings of “the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore” were referred to in the second chapter, to show the preference of the American hierarchy for the Catholic over the Protestant system of government, and their opposition to certain laws of the United States. From what was there said it would appear, very satisfactorily, that their purpose was to bring about that condition of things which shall result in governing this country by the canon law of Rome—some of the principles of which, as they affect the obligation of allegiance, have been explained. If there was left any doubt upon that subject, it may be easily removed. Since that chapter was written, a work has appeared entitled “Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore.” The preface thus begins:

“The desire of gradually introducing in this country, as far as practicable, the ecclesiastical discipline prevalent throughout almost the entire Church, was strongly and repeatedly expressed by the fathers of the late National Council of Baltimore. Its decrees tend both avowedly and implicitly to promote the accomplishment of this object.” (“Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore,” by Smith, Preface, p. iii.)

The author professes to propound the Decrees of Baltimore, because they are designed to establish “the same hierarchy, and, in consequence, substantially the same relations between bishops, priests, and laity,” as exist elsewhere in the same Church. (Ibid., Preface, p. vii.)

In defining the canon law, he calls the Church a perfect and sovereign society, which possesses “a three-fold power—legislative, judicial, and coercive or executive,” and which cannot be subordinate to any other society. (36) There are but two perfect societies—the Church and the State; the Church is “absolutely supreme;” the State “but relatively supreme.” The State, when emancipated from the Church, “stands in open revolt against God himself;” there should, therefore, be such “close union” between them that they should “assist each other.” (Ibid., p. 7.) He calls the canon law the “common law” of the Church, which “is obligatory on all the faithful spread throughout the world;” and makes it comprise, in so far as it is written, “The Constitutions and Decretal Epistles of the Sovereign Pontiffs,” and the ” Decrees of Ecumenical Councils.” (Ibid., pp. 8, 9.) He then defines the principles of the common law, among which are those which follow:

The pope can dispense with any law. (Ibid., p. 17.) The constitutions and decrees of the popes are explanations of the divine law, and are, therefore, binding as soon as known. (Ibid., p. 21.) The Church does not recognize the right in any government to say whether or not the pontifical decrees shall be enforced: “She is supreme and independent, and therefore can admit of no intermeddling with her authority.” (Ibid., p. 27.)

The Isidorian Decretals, although now known to be spurious and false, were looked upon as genuine for seven hundred years, or until their fraudulent character was discovered by Protestants in the sixteenth century; (Ibid., p. 32.) yet they aided materially in building up the papal system, and there is no pretense that the popes have abandoned such provisions of them as increase their power. The pope alone is the interpreter of the divine law, and his temporal power is necessary to the free exercise of his spiritual authority. (“Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore,” by Smith, p. 47.) He derives his jurisdiction immediately from God, and imparts a share of the plenitude of his power to his bishops. (Ibid., pp. 77, 78.) Ecclesiastical property must be governed by the laws of the Church. (Ibid., p. 144.) The State ought to recognize and carry into effect the laws of the Church. (Ibid., p. 149.) By these laws, laymen have no right of property in the Church, and it is against the law of God that they should dispose of its revenues. (Ibid., p. 150.) Where the mother of a child is a Catholic, and the father a heretic, or Protestant, the child may be baptized at the request of the mother, and against the wishes and consent of the father. (Ibid., p. 178.) Children of heretics may be baptized against the will of both their parents; because all heretics are “per se subject to the laws of the Church.” (Ibid., pp. 178,179.) Religious books, including Bibles, shall not be printed without the consent of the priesthood; and all such as have not their approbation are forbidden to be read. (Ibid., pp. 354, 361, 362.) The coercive power of the Church includes the power “to punish the insubordinate and repress the lawless;” which extends to any punishment short of shedding blood, such as imprisonment in monasteries, and other chastisements. (Ibid., p. 372.)

These provisions fall very far short of the whole body of the canon law, which is set forth in the papal and consular decrees, many of which have been noticed; but they distinctly show the purpose of the hierarchy to be the introduction of the whole into this country, gradually, but as rapidly as they can, either by the exercise of direct power, or because of the inattention and toleration of the American people. All the power they can now control is directed to, and concentrated in, this object. It will be observed that one reason assigned for the jurisdiction they seek to establish over this country, is that all heretics are “subject to the laws of the Church.” And inasmuch as infidels, who have always denied the faith, are included among the heretics along with Jews and pagans, this jurisdiction is made so complete and broad as to include the entire population of the country. Not only, therefore, do these hierarchs consider themselves entitled to possess the country and govern it, in the name and by virtue of the divine right of the pope, but to act as the masters and superiors of all classes of the people—only awaiting, prudentially, the opportunity to assert and exercise this high ecclesiastical prerogative.

In the mean time, while this tremendous authority is held in abeyance by our civil institutions, the papacy stands ready with its armory full of ecclesiastical weapons prepared for use. If these are somewhat dulled by the length of time they have lain idle, the dogma of infallibility has created a necessity for resharpening and burnishing them up again. Therefore, we find the faithful instructed in the law of the papacy as to the manner in which it would deal with the host of its enemies and persecutors. Thus, it is said, infidels “are not to be tolerated; because they are so bad that no truth or advantage for the good of the Church can be thence derived.” (*)

And they are to be dealt with without trial or proof, on the ground of being incorrigible and rebellious from the beginning. Infidelity “is not to be tried or proved, but extirpated,” subject only to this condition—that this extirpation may be suspended where “there may be reasons which may render it advisable that it should be tolerated;” for example, where the power to extirpate is not possessed. (*)

Heretics as such are to be dealt with under special provisions of the law, made to fit their case on account of their crime and impiety practiced in the act of setting up a false faith in opposition to that of Rome. Baptized heretics are to be visited with the greater excommunication by the pope, as in the case of the bull of Pius IX., a few years ago, excommunicating all Protestants. They are to be considered as infamous; and their temporal goods are to be confiscated. (“Bona eorum temporalia sunt ipso jure confiscata.”—DENS, vol. ii., No. 56, p. 88.)

They are to be subjected to corporal punishment, to exile, and imprisonment. (” Denique aliis paenis etiam corporalibus, ut exilio, carcere, etc., merito afficitintur.”—Ibid., p. 89.)

And then, to complete the work, in case they shall remain obstinate, and not heed the warnings of the Church, they are to be dealt with as John Huss and Jerome were under a decree of the Council of Constance—that is, they shall suffer death.

Let not the Protestant reader be alarmed; this is only the law of the papacy, which the infallible pope with his hierarchical auxiliaries is trying to enforce here, and which they would enforce if the world could be carried back by them into the gloom and superstition of the Middle Ages. See, however, the emphatic and plain language in which this death penalty is recorded in question and answer:

“Are heretics rightly punished with death? St. Thomas answers, Yes, because forgers of money, or other disturbers of the State, are justly punished with death; therefore also heretics, who are forgers of the faith, and experience being the witness, grievously disturb the State.” (*)

It must not be supposed that the baptized heretics who are thus to be dealt with are only those who have been baptized into the Roman Catholic Church. The class is much larger, and includes all baptized Protestants as well, provided the ceremony has been performed with reference to the ordinary essentials. These are not required to be re-baptized upon reception into the Roman Church; and are, therefore, proper subjects of excommunication and punishment. Since the time of St. Augustine, more than fourteen centuries ago, the doctrine on this subject has been as laid down by him, as follows: “For in all points in which they [heretics] think with us [Catholics] they are also in communion with us—are severed from us only in those points in which they dissent from us. What they have retained of the teaching of the Church, they do not lose by severance from her; hence, the power of conferring baptism may be found outside the Church. Moreover, it is Christ himself who baptizes. The grace of the Sacrament is wholly independent of the qualification of him who administers it.” (Alzog, p. 424.)

Thus it is manifest that all Protestants who have been baptized are held to be in “communion” with the Roman Church for the purpose of punishment for the crime of heresy, and, consequently, they are now, in the papal view, under sentence of death—the executioner merely waiting for sufficient power to enforce the decree, which has stood unrevoked and unchanged since the Lateran Council of Innocent III. provided for the extermination of the Albigenses.

Founded upon this enlarged and extraordinary jurisdiction and the subtle reasoning employed to maintain it, the law of the Church distinctly lays down the power of the pope to compel obedience from us all, from the millions of Protestant people in the United States who have vainly supposed themselves to be outside of his jurisdiction. It says: “Baptized infidels, such as heretics and apostates usually are, also baptized schismatics, may be compelled, even by corporal punishment, to return to the Catholic faith and the unity of the Church. The reason is, because these by baptism have become subject to the Church; and therefore the Church has jurisdiction over them, and the power of compelling them through appointed means to obedience, and to fulfill the obligations contracted in baptism.” (*)

It is easy now to understand what the pope, in his Syllabus, and Archbishop Manning, in his pastoral, mean by the right of the Roman Church to employ force to coerce obedience to its decrees. With them the jurisdiction of the papacy is limited only by the boundaries of the world, and professing Christians of every creed are brought within the sweep of the pontifical saber, by a system of ecclesiastical law and ethics, which, built up in ages of superstition and ignorance, they are now seeking to revive. They admit no compromise and practice no moderation. Whatsoever stands in the way of their success is visited with the pontifical wrath; and anathemas and curses, in the name of God, are scattered broadcast over the world, as if God did not delight to exhibit himself more in the sunshine than in the lightning and the storm.

How many of the multitude of criminals upon whom the sentence of condemnation has been already pronounced are destined to pay the penalty of their disobedience, and how many shall escape, are matters concealed in the womb of the future. It is no trifling and idle thing for nations and peoples to find themselves thus plotted against. Nor is it a trifling and idle thing for the people of the United States to find such an enemy, with drilled and disciplined troops, in the very midst of their peaceful institutions. Heretofore they have not failed to meet the necessities of every crisis to which this country has been subjected, and it seems impossible that they can remain listless and indifferent with so formidable and dangerous an adversary at their very doors.

Continued in Chapter XX. Papal Infallibility

Continued from Chapter XVII. Coercive Power of the Church.

Adrian IV and the grant of Ireland to England.—Ireland brought within the jurisdiction of Rome in the twelfth century.—Enlargement of the papal power.—Secular power administered by commission from the Pope.—Gregory VII and Innocent III.—The Fourth Lateran Council establishes the faith that institutions prejudicial to the Church should not be observed.—Papal doctrine in regard to oaths. Urban VI, Eugenius IV, and Innocent III.—Nature of the oath exacted by Innocent III from King John.—Subjects all governments to the Pope.—Effect in the United States.—Constitutional oath of allegiance.—Its obligation.—The papal theory on that subject.—Oaths opposed to the welfare of the Church not binding.—Unlawful oaths not binding.—What are lawful, and what are unlawful.—The papal principle applied to the government of the United States.—The papal argument by Balmes. Resistance to civil power usurped.—When it is usurped.—When legal, and when illegal.—Governments de jure and de facto.—Obedience to the last not obligatory.—May be recognized from prudential motives.—Government of the United States is de facto.—The monarchies of Europe, when obedient to the Pope, are de jure.—The doctrine of consummated facts denied.—Illegitimate authority cannot become legitimate by time.—Rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s only requires obedience to legitimate governments.—Legitimate governments are only such as are based on the law of God.—That of the United States is not legitimate.

The dignity and power acquired by the Roman Church by means of the exercise of its spiritual jurisdiction, however great, was not sufficient to answer the ends and gratify the ambition of the medieval popes. The frequent efforts of the Italian people to establish republican institutions, which were often attended with the expulsion of the popes from Rome, were not intended as a denial of that jurisdiction, in the proper sense, but as the means of limiting it to its own ecclesiastical sphere.

But the popes were not satisfied with this. With them, republicanism was synonymous with heresy, which they resolved to uproot with all the power necessary to that end. They denied, totally, the right of any people to make the laws or mold the institutions under which they were to live. Therefore, when Arnold of Brescia preached at Rome against their temporal power, and in favor of a republican form of government, the people were so incensed against Adrian IV that they drove him out of the city. And when he was afterward restored to his see by the army of Frederick Barbarossa—who delivered Arnold to him, in consideration of his coronation as emperor—he consigned his patriotic victim to death at the stake and held the Roman people in subjugation by force.(*)

Thus, also, we find this same pope authorizing the like subjugation of Ireland by the English king, and consigning its peaceful and Christian people to the merciless cruelties of Henry II., upon the ground that it was a portion of “the patrimony of St. Peter and the Holy Roman Church;” and this, too, notwithstanding the Irish Church had grown up independently of Rome; had derived its faith from the canons of St. Patrick, and not from those of the Roman Church; had appointed and consecrated its own bishops and priests; had held its own synods; and had received the pallium from the pope only three years before the commencement of Adrian’s pontificate. (*)

The pallium is an ecclesiastical vestment in the Catholic Church, originally peculiar to the pope, but for many centuries bestowed by the Holy See upon metropolitans and primates as a symbol of their conferred jurisdictional authorities, and still remains a papal emblem. – From Wikipedia

Pallium

The idea that all this enormous and comprehensive power was derived from the pretended donation of Constantine was fast becoming obsolete, for the reason that if that were its only foundation, it would be circumscribed within too narrow limits. To enlarge rather than curtail it was what the popes of that age specially sought for. Hence they maintained the more steadily the idea of their own personal infallibility, in order by means of it to engraft upon the faith of the Church the doctrine that their temporal power was derived from Christ through Peter; and therefore, having that origin, was not confined to the Papal States, but extended to the entire world, and subjected all nations and peoples to their dominion, within the domain of morals no less than that of faith. This domain was considered as almost without limitation, or, at all events, as broad enough to include, not only the entire conduct of individuals in their public and private intercourse, but all such secular action of nations as involved questions of public or private morality. Thus, monarchs were to hold their crowns and exercise their royalty at the will of the reigning pope; nations were to execute only such laws as he considered in conformity to the divine law, and to abrogate those which were not so; and he was to intervene between them and their citizens at his own discretion, and release them from their allegiance, and turn over their territorial possessions to the dominion of those who would obey his commands and execute his will. “Secular power was only to be tolerated, as secular princes avowedly exercised it, by commission from the pope.” (Legge, p. 50.)

This doctrine had continued to grow and strengthen from the time when Gregory VII., the great Hildebrand, had excommunicated and deposed Henry IV., Emperor of Germany, and released all his subjects from their allegiance to him. Each of the succeeding pontiffs of the eleventh and twelfth centuries had avowed it whenever they could safely venture to do so. But it remained for Innocent III., one of the leading and ruling spirits of the age, to make it a part of religious faith, by ingrafting it, by virtue of his infallibility, upon the dogmas of the Church. His towering and unsatisfied ambition stimulated him to use it as the means of making himself “the general arbiter of differences and conservator of the peace throughout Christendom.” (“Middle Ages,” by Hallam, Harper & Brothers’ ed., chli. vii., p. 287.)

His proud spirit chafed at the thought that any earthly potentate should equal him either in greatness or authority. Therefore he required that “all disputes between princes” should be referred to him; and if either party should refuse “to obey the sentence of Rome, he was to be excommunicated and deposed,” and a like penalty was to be visited upon those who refused to attack whatsoever “refractory delinquent” he should point out. (Ibid.)

Forfeitures, interdicts, excommunications, and every other form of ecclesiastical censure and punishment, were of almost daily occurrence. Even such monarchs as Philip Augustus and Henry IV. quailed before him, and Peter II. of Arragon and John of England—as we have seen—ignominiously consented to convert their kingdoms into spiritual fiefs, and to hold them in subordination to him, upon the condition of paying an annual tribute. By virtue of the claim of infallibility, the power of arbitrary papal dispensation was carried to its extremest limit, even to the assertion and exercise of the right to infringe the canons of the Church. “Innocent III. laid down as a maxim, that out of the plenitude of his power he might lawfully dispense with the law;” (Ibid., p. 293.) and caused the Fourth General Lateran Council to insert among its canons one which provided “that the constitutions of princes which are prejudicial to the rights of the Church shall not be observed;” (*)—thus establishing this as a fixed principle of the canon law, and, consequently, as a part of the religious faith of the Church.

It did not take long to carry this doctrine of dispensation to the extent of applying it to the observance of oaths, and to find in the Decretals this provision: “That an oath disadvantageous to the Church is not binding; and that one extorted by force was of slight obligation, and might be annulled by ecclesiastical authority.” (*)

Instances are numerous to show the effect of these teachings upon the lives and conduct of the popes, and Mr. Hallam gives two memorable ones by way of illustration—that of Urban VI., who promulgated a solemn and general declaration against keeping faith with heretics; and that of Eugenius IV., who, acting upon this principle, annulled compacts with the Hussites by releasing those who had sworn to them, and made the King of Hungary break his treaty with Amurath II., absolving him from his promise “on the express ground that a treaty disadvantageous to the Church ought not to be kept.” (Hallam, p. 293 (note), citing Sismondi, t. ix., p. 196, and Rymer, t. vii., p. 352.)

These instances are dwarfed before the more flagrant exercise of the same power by Innocent III. in the advancement of his schemes of temporal policy. At the very beginning of his pontificate he required the Roman prefect to take the oath of allegiance to himself, when it was his duty to take it to the emperor, from the obligation of which duty he released him. He asserted the right to punish offenses against the civil law, and “to interpose with his judgment and annul the decisions of the civil tribunal.” He reminded the inhabitants of the Tuscan States, who owed allegiance to the emperor, “that there were two great lights in the social heaven, having their seat in Italy, the lesser of which, the imperial authority, received its light from the greater, the Papal See.”

He fulminated against Otho, Emperor of Germany, a bull of excommunication; released his subjects from their allegiance to him, and stirred up a rebellion against him and in favor of Frederick, the youthful son of Henry VI.

As we have seen at another place, he released King John from the oath he had taken before the barons at Runnymede, to observe and enforce the salutary provisions of Magna Carta; and, concentrating, as it were, all his enormous claim of power in a single expressive thought, he proudly announced the maxim, that “the pope, in virtue of the plenitude of his power, might dispense even with rights.” (Legge, pp. 53—56.)

The very nature of the oath exacted by Innocent III. of King John shows the inordinate ambition of the one and the pusillanimity of the other. Lingard says, “He swore that he would be faithful to God, to the blessed Peter, to the Roman Church, to Pope Innocent, and to Innocent’s rightful successors.” (Lingard, vol. ii., p. 165.) This oath was extorted by the papal interdict, which closed all the churches in England and left the dead to go unburied, and by the terrible thunder of excommunication. It placed the English king at the feet of the pope, and the entire destiny of the English people in his hands, to be disposed of, not as their wants and interests demanded, but as the wants and interests of the papacy and the welfare of the Roman Church required. What wonder, then, that, at the very beginning of the Reformation in England, an earnest protest was made against this absorption by the pope of all the civil power of the Government, and this plotting to destroy the last vestige of popular authority. This protest might have been heard in the mutterings of discontent among the body of the people; but it was unavailing, except as the measures already narrated grew gradually out of it.

Wycliffe, a hundred years after the papal conquest of England, and two hundred years before Luther, maintained, in the face of all the powerful and persecuting prelates in the kingdom, that the nation had forfeited her dearest rights by so long consenting that the crown should be held as a fief of the See of Rome; and that the king could properly and rightfully administer the government, even though, at the same time, he refused any tribute to the Pope of Rome. Pointing out the life and example of Christ, who was “unwilling to become a ruler in civil matters,” and did not teach his disciples to seek after civil dominion—he declared, “Therefore it behooves us to require that the pope should be observant of his religious obligations after this pattern. It is clear,” said he, “that we are bound to resist him in the exaction of a condition which call not be proper to him, as being purely civil.” (“Day of Rest,” London, vol iii., part v., p. 238.)

Wherein does the difference consist between the claim of papal power and prerogatives in the time of Wycliffe and the present? The infallibility of the pope means now just what it did then, with whatsoever has been done and said by all the popes and in all the centuries since superadded, as the means of overcoming the increased power of resistance among the people of the advancing and progressive nations. The doctrine runs back to the remotest times so as to include every assertion of pontifical power made by any of the popes from the beginning, and concentrates it all in the present. If any single pope, by virtue of “the primacy of St. Peter,” struck nations out of existence, dethroned monarchs, released subjects from their oaths of allegiance, appointed rulers for the people without their consent, extirpated heretics by fire and sword, dispensed the obligation of the most solemn oaths on the part of others, and violated their own, then may the present or any future pope do any or all of these things infallibly, whensoever it shall seem to him that the interests of the Roman Church require it. There is no word in any language more comprehensive than the word infallibility. It embraces everything in the past, the present, and the future. Even while its earthly possessor remains in the world, it elevates him above the world, and makes him a co-partner with God in the exercise of divine power.

Keeping these things in mind, we shall be the better enabled to apply the doctrines of the papacy to the condition of things in our own country, and to understand what the present pope expects and requires of those citizens who recognize him as a “domestic prince” within the territorial limits of the United States. We have nothing to do, now, with the question how far and how many of these citizens will render obedience to any demands he shall make: it is but just to assume that multitudes of them will not, when they may be pressed to the extremity of impairing any of the fundamental principles of the Government. But we have directly and immediately to do with the papal doctrines he is now so assiduously laboring to re-establish, so that we may fully comprehend them, in all their length and breadth, and understand wherein, if successfully established, they will assail the integrity of our institutions.

The people of the United States, appreciating the advantages and distinctive features of their Government, have wisely and unselfishly provided a mode by which those born in other countries may enjoy, to a like extent with themselves, all these advantages. They have provided by their naturalization laws that an alien may become a citizen; and, in return for this valuable privilege, have required of him only that he shall take an oath of allegiance to the Government, whereby he shall swear that he “doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever.” Such an invitation to citizenship in a free government, extended to those who have felt the burden and pressure of absolutism, commends itself to the admiration of mankind. It stamped our Government, from the beginning, with a degree of liberality hitherto unknown among the nations.

That oaths of allegiance are sometimes taken by those who regard them as mere form, and as having no binding obligation upon their consciences, is unquestionably true. There are very few who have not realized the truth of this, in their own experience and observation. But it is equally true that a large majority of those who become naturalized citizens of the United States become so with a full and proper appreciation of the binding nature of the allegiance they assume, and with the determination to discharge, faithfully and honestly, all the obligations which attach to their new relations. Innumerable considerations combine thus to influence them, apart from the mere integrity of personal motive and conduct. Chief among these is the fact that, by coming here, they have sought to escape the consequences of monarchical rule, and to better their condition by enjoying the protection of civil institutions which recognize the people, and not a monarch, as the authors of the law; and where they, by also becoming law—makers, may increase the sense of their own personal dignity and importance in society, and thus elevate themselves and their posterity. It is altogether natural that, after obtaining privileges of so much personal and social importance, they should be unwilling to forfeit or lose them by any act of their own.

But, while this is readily and cheerfully conceded to the bulk of our naturalized citizens, the fact cannot and should not be disguised that there are some among them whose minds are impressed, or liable to be impressed, with the belief that, although they have improved their condition by coming to this country, it may be yet further improved by the establishment of an independent ecclesiastical hierarchy, with authority to subordinate the Government to such laws and regulations as they, under the direction and dictation of the pope, shall consider necessary to bring the people under subjection to the Roman Catholic Church. Their liability to this impression is the result of their education, which is called religious, because it is received alone from priests, acting as officers of their Church. One of the first principles taught them is the belief that as the laws of God are higher than the laws of man, and the eternal welfare of their souls of more importance than all secular and temporal things, therefore the State must obey the Church, and not be permitted to enact or enforce any law which the Roman Catholic Church, or the pope, as its infallible head, shall consider inconsistent with the divine law, the faith of the Church, or good morals.

Under the influence of this teaching, it is difficult for them to realize the wisdom and virtues exhibited by our fathers in resorting to revolution to throw off the authority of the British crown, and substituting for it the authority of the people. They have a sort of undefined idea that the people should be permitted to make the laws by which they are to be governed; and this idea, which arises naturally in all minds, might be developed into positive belief in theirs, and probably would be, if it were not that the faith and teachings of their Church, as interpreted and explained to them by their priests, forbid it. For fear that they may be influenced by it, they are held under the strictest surveillance by these priests, who employ every opportunity to remind them that they owe higher allegiance and duty to the Church than to the State, and must obey the pope at every and any cost, even though, by doing so, all human governments and laws should be destroyed. They are required to believe that this obedience to the pope is obedience to God, because God has placed the pope above all human governments and laws, with power, as his only infallible representative on earth, to require and command obedience to all his decrees upon matters of faith and morals. And the utmost precaution is observed by the papal hierarchy to exclude such impressions as would naturally arise in their minds from the contemplation and enjoyment of our liberal institutions, and especially from their participation in the management of public affairs.

In this their vigilance is extreme, and exhibits itself most strikingly in prohibiting them from permitting their children to mingle with ours in our common schools, because they are provided by the State; and because, in order that they may comprehend and understand the structure of the Government, the pupils are taught that the people are the primary source of all our laws, and not the pope or the Church, and that every citizen of the United States is bound to pay obedience to them; the pope, the Church, and all the kings and princes of the earth to the contrary notwithstanding.

Few things are so wonderful as the readiness with which many of the Roman Catholic part of our population, especially among those who are naturalized, accept these teachings and act upon them; while, at the same time, they are unwilling to admit, or are too ignorant to realize, their inevitable tendency—which is, that they are training and educating their children in the belief that our Government is altogether wrong in separating Church and State; that our fathers were wrong in resorting to revolution to get rid of monarchy; that it is wrong for the people to make their own laws; and that the only form of government upon which the blessing of God can rest is that wherein the Church shall govern the State, and the pope the Church. They fail to see that, by these means, they are aiding in the erection of a “State within the State,” whose authority will be sufficient, if its exercise be permitted, to regulate the Government and society by its laws, and to compel obedience to them by force, whenever it shall become necessary to resort to it. They fail also to see that this state of things cannot exist so long as our form of government shall stand, and that those who require them to aid in producing it would not hesitate to sacrifice the Government itself if by that means they could establish their hierarchical system.

And, since such is the position in which many of our Roman Catholic population stand, it is in every possible sense important that the country should realize to what point their present subserviency to the papal hierarchy may by possibility lead them, unless something be done to counteract its influence. In order to do this intelligently, it is necessary to understand how far their oath of allegiance is considered by the Roman Catholic hierarchy as standing in the way of their complete obedience and submission to the pope, whenever he shall consider that the interest of the Church requires any change in our plan of government, or disobedience to any of our laws.

The obligation of an oath is understood to arise out of the law authorizing it. Although it binds the conscience, in a moral sense, in whatever form it may be taken, yet if not taken pursuant to law its violation does not amount to perjury. An invalid law is universally held as no law at all, although it may possess the ordinary forms. Hence, if an oath is required by a law which is null and void, on account of its violation of constitutional or fundamental principles, no legal consequences attach to its violation—the violator being left to settle the matter with his own conscience. Hence, also, if our naturalization laws require allegiance to institutions which oppose the fundamental principles of Christianity as maintained by the papacy, and are therefore, in the opinion of the pope, invalid, the papal hierarchy readily infer that the violation of this allegiance would involve no crime whatever, but, on the contrary, would arise out of the obligation of duty to God and the Church. And hence, again, if this violation be merely a matter of conscience, and the pope possesses the power—as standing in the place of God—to dispense with all merely conscientious obligations, then a dispensation from him would place all Roman Catholic violators of the oath of allegiance right before God and the Church. To comprehend properly the results which might ensue from this mode of reasoning, it is necessary to inquire into the doctrines and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church in relation to oaths—their nature and obligation.

The reader will remember the reference heretofore to a controversy carried on, some years ago, between the Right Rev. John England, Roman Catholic Bishop of Charleston, South Carolina, and the Rev. Richard Fuller, a Baptist minister of Beaufort, in the same State. (*) Being afterward published in book form, under the auspices of Bishop England, it is proper to assume that what he has there said is a just and fair exposition of the doctrines of his Church.

Among other accusations made against this Church by Mr. Fuller, this was a prominent one, which could not fail to arrest public attention and excite inquiry: that the Third Lateran Council, held in 1179, made not only falsehood, but perjury, a virtue when practiced in behalf of the Church. So grave a charge as this greatly excited Bishop England, and drove him, after some ingenious equivocation, to an explanation of the doctrines which had been established by his Church. He endeavored at first to parry, with true hierarchical adroitness, the home-thrusts of Mr. Fuller; but the latter was too able and learned a disputant to allow this, and the bishop was at last driven to a degree of particularity which, in all probability, he did not contemplate at the beginning of the controversy. His language should command the most serious attention. He said:

“Among Catholics, sir, perjury is the violation of a lawful oath, or the taking of an unlawful one. Thus, if we swear to declare the truth, and do not declare it, it would be perjury; and should a man attempt to bind me by the form of an oath to declare a falsehood, I would be guilty of perjury, in going through the form to tell a lie, but I am obliged to go against the words by which I appeared to be bound, because it is no oath, but a perjury. An oath cannot be a bond of iniquity. A conspirator who has sworn with his fellows to commit robbery or murder is not bound by his oath. In fact, it is no oath; to be an oath it must have three qualities, viz., truth, judgment, and justice: the defect of either renders it no oath.” (“Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery,” p. 157.)

Here the distinctive principle is announced that an unlawful oath cannot be taken without perjury; but if taken, he who takes it must go against it, because it is no oath in the opinion of the Roman Catholic Church. With this as his postulate, Bishop England proceeds to explain what the direct action of this Church has been upon this important subject. He quotes Canon XVI. of the Third Lateran Council, which he calls “the legislature of the Church,” wherein this sentence is found:

“For they are not to be called oaths, but rather perjuries, which are in opposition to the welfare of the Church and the enactments of the holy fathers.” (*)

Then, addressing himself directly to Mr. Fuller, the bishop defends these principles as follows:

“I need not inform you that the first obligation of every citizen is the law of God; the second is the constitution of his State; and as no form of oath could bind him to the violation of the divine law, so, except the constitution of his State should conflict with the divine law, no form of oath could bind him to violate that constitution; and should there be such a conflict, he is bound to the State in every other point save that in which the conflict exists: and his exemption in this instance arises from that sound maxim of legal interpretation that where two laws are in irreconcilable conflict, that of the first or highest authority must prevail. These are the principles which I have been taught from Roman Catholic authors, by Roman Catholic professors; they are the principles which I find recognized in all enactments and interpretations of councils in the Roman Catholic Church, from the council at Jerusalem, held by the apostles, down to the present day.” (“Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery,” pp. 162, 163.)

To make the matter so clear that no room for misapprehension should exist, he quotes from chapter xix. of the Roman Catholic catechism the following questions and answers:

“Q. What else is commanded by the second commandment?

“A. To keep our lawful oaths and vows.

“Q. What is forbidden by this commandment?

“A. All false, rash, unjust, and unnecessary oaths; also cursing, swearing, blaspheming, and profane words (Matt. v., 34; James v., 12).

“Q. Is it ever lawful to swear?

“A. It is: when God’s honor, our own or our neighbor’s good, or necessary defense, requires it.

“Q. What do you mean by an unjust oath?

“A. An oath injurious to God, to ourselves, or to our neighbor.

“Q. Is a person obliged to keep an unjust oath?

“A. No; he sinned in taking it, and would sin also in keeping it.

“Q. Is a person obliged to keep a lawful oath?

“A. Yes; and it would be perjury to break it.

“Q. What is perjury?

“A. The breaking of a lawful oath, or the taking of an unlawful one.

“Q. Is perjury a great crime?

“A. It is a most grievous one.” (“Letters Concerning the Roman Chancery,” pp. 190, 191.)

And then, summing up his argument and putting the doctrine in the most compact form, he says:

“My argument, sir, would have been more fairly put in this way: Man’s first duty is to observe the divine law; but the divine law requires that an oath shall bind when it is taken in truth, in judgment, and in justice, and that it shall not bind when either of these conditions is wanted. The divine law is paramount to every other law, constitution, tribunal, or authority. Therefore, no law, constitution, tribunal, or authority can allow a man to swear falsely, to swear in support of injustice, or to swear rashly, or injudiciously, or profanely. No tribunal, civil or ecclesiastical, can do what God himself could not do!—he cannot do what is incompatible with his divine attributes: the sanctioning of perjury would be incompatible therewith, and therefore no tribunal could sanction it.” (*)

The language here employed by this distinguished prelate has the merit of simplicity and frankness, and it requires no critical analysis to understand its meaning. It lays down the following propositions as settled and established by the Roman Catholic Church:

1. An unlawful oath cannot be taken without perjury.

2. He who takes an unlawful oath is not obliged to observe it, but should go against it.

3. An oath cannot be a bond of iniquity; that is, in opposition to the divine law.

4. To be a binding oath it must have the three qualities of truth, judgment, and justice; the absence of either renders it no oath.

5. They are not oaths, but perjuries, which are in opposition to the welfare of the Church, and the enactments of the holy fathers.

6. The first obligation of every citizen is the law of God; the second is the Constitution of his State.

7. The obligation of a citizen to the constitution of his State is only binding when it does not conflict with the divine law.

8. The obligation of a citizen to the constitution of his state is not binding when it does conflict with the divine law.

9. The divine law is of higher authority than the law of the State, and must always prevail when they come in conflict.

10. A person is not obliged to keep an unjust oath; he sinned in taking it, and would sin also in keeping it.

11. An oath is not binding when it lacks the element of either justice, judgment, or truth.

12. No law, constitution, tribunal, or authority can bind a man to act unjustly; God cannot even do it.

From this recapitulation it will be seen that in order to determine upon the binding obligation of an oath, it is necessary, in any given case, to understand its character. If it is unlawful, it is not binding. To this, as an abstract proposition, there may be no special objection; but the difficulty lies in agreeing upon what is lawful and what unlawful. Let us give the doctrine a practical application as it is understood by those whose minds are trained in papal polemics.

Having separated the Church from the State, and made the latter entirely independent of the former, we have provided in our National Constitution that it and all the laws passed pursuant to it are “the supreme law of the land,” binding alike upon all citizens. In order, therefore, to decide whether the oath of naturalization is or is not lawful, we look to the Constitution and the powers it confers upon Congress as the legislative department of the Government. By that instrument it is provided that Congress shall have power “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization “—thus leaving, in the legal or common mind, no sort of doubt about the legality of the oath of naturalization under our laws. Hence, in view of our Constitution and laws, such an oath is both lawful and of binding obligation. But, according to Bishop England, the Roman Catholic Church does not reason in this way. It goes behind the Constitution in order to inquire whether it violates the divine law or not; whether it is just or unjust; whether or not it is in opposition to the welfare of the Church and the enactments of the holy fathers; whether it is consistent, or inconsistent, with truth; and if it finds the Constitution lacking in any of these essential elements, whatever oath it shall authorize, looking to any of these ends, or in any way bearing upon them, is unlawful, and not binding. Recognizing no other form of government as consistent with the divine law, except that which keeps the State and the Church united, it, of course, measures all laws by the standard of the divine law, and regards as invalid and not binding all such as do not come up to that standard. It receives the divine law from itself—that is, from the pope as God’s only infallible representative upon earth; and whatsoever constitution or law shall be found opposed to its welfare is unlawful, and must not be obeyed. It searches the enactments of the holy fathers for precedents by which to decide upon the character of all existing institutions; and whatsoever they shall not sanction and approve must fall before its supreme authority. Let us apply these principles and rules more particularly to the subject in hand—our naturalization laws.

The oath of allegiance implies, necessarily, the obligation to support the Government and maintain its principles. In direct and express terms, it requires the support of the Constitution as the fundamental law; and the oath, in this form, is taken by every naturalized citizen. How does the Roman Catholic Church, with the pope as its expounder of the divine law, look at this oath? Taking up the Constitution, it finds the following principles of government distinctly and emphatically set forth: the separation of Church and State, and the Church subordinated to the State, and required to obey its laws; the people made the source of all laws and of all political authority; the prohibition of any law respecting an establishment of religion, or interfering with the free exercise thereof; and the freedom of speech and of the press fully secured. How does it regard these provisions? In every form in which it can authoritatively speak, and especially through the mouths of a multitude of its most illustrious popes, it has declared that the divine law requires the Church and the State to be united, and the State to be subordinated to the Church, being required to obey its commands as the only mode of obeying God; that the people are incapable of self—government, and that it must declare what laws they shall, and what they shall not, obey; that the law of God commands “an establishment of religion,” with the pope at its head, with sufficient power and authority to govern the world; that Christ established the Roman Catholic Church, and founded it upon the apostle Peter, making all other forms of religious belief heretical and sinful; and, therefore, that the “free exercise” of religious belief is violative of the divine law; and that the freedom of speech and of the press are “in opposition to the welfare of the Church,” and tend to irreligion and infidelity, by giving license to free discussion, by inviting the exercise of individual reason and judgment in the formation of religious faith, and by stimulating the people to revolution, which is against the law of God, because violative of the “divine right of kings” to govern mankind. Looking upon the foregoing provisions of the Constitution of the United States in the light of these authoritative teachings, the Roman Catholic Church must, of necessity, regard each one of them as opposed to the divine law, the welfare of the Church, and the teachings of the holy fathers: such is the logical result of its mode of reasoning.

Hence, the Constitution of the United States, in so far as these principles are involved, is not binding upon the conscience of any who adhere to those doctrines of that Church which are dictated by the papacy. Hence, also, an oath to support these principles of the Constitution is perjury, and no oath at all, because it enjoins disobedience to the divine law. Hence, again, our naturalization oath is not binding upon the supporter of papal infallibility, because it obliges him to support principles which are opposed to the teachings of the pope and the Church, and which he is commanded to resist as the only mode of securing the favor of God. And, still further, it is the inevitable consequence of these papal doctrines—as announced by Bishop England, and involved in the recent dogma of papal infallibility—that not only these principles of our Constitution, but all other constitutions and laws which the pope shall declare to be in opposition to the law of God, “the welfare of the Church, and the enactments of the holy fathers,” must be resisted by all who hope for the approbation of the Church, and expect salvation in the world to come; thus making all human institutions dependent upon the will of a single man—upon whomsoever shall, for the time being, be the “King of Rome!”

It is altogether probable that Bishop England did not foresee the ultimate tendency of the doctrine he defended with so much learning and ability; for at the time of his controversy with Mr. Fuller, the doctrine of papal infallibility was not recognized as a part of the faith of the Roman Catholic Church, and its hierarchy in the United States had not become sufficiently bold to avow their support of it, or openly to assume, as they now do, a defense of the principles and enormities of the Jesuits or ultramontaies of Europe. They were “biding their time “—waiting for the accumulation of such strength as would afford some promise of ultimate victory, and therefore spoke upon all the delicate subjects touching the papal power and prerogatives with suppressed voice and “bated breath.”

But there were observant eyes in Europe constantly watching the progress of events in the United States; for it has become almost a proverb that Jesuitism never sleeps. Those who possessed a vision keen enough to see that the American hierarchy were well versed in the law of obedience, served a valuable purpose to the pope by influencing him to advance his claims and pretensions, so as to educate the whole Roman Catholic world up to the position it now occupies.

Books setting forth these claims and pretensions, some covertly, others openly, multiplied in every direction. Among the authors of these none won more distinction than the Rev. J. Balmez, a Roman Catholic priest of Spain, who was the author of a work which exhibits great power, learning, and erudition, by which he designed to show that the world is far more indebted to “Catholicity,” as he calls it, than to Protestantism for its present advanced civilization. This work, originally in Spanish, was soon translated into French, and then into English, so that a large circulation should be secured for it. It was published in the United States by the Roman Catholic publishing houses, and was commended in the highest terms by the authorities of the Church. In the preface to the American edition the author is spoken of as one who “has supplied the age with a work which is peculiarly adapted to its wants, and which must command a general attention in the United States.” The Roman Catholic is especially referred to it as furnishing reasons why he should “admire still more the glorious character of the faith which he professes;” and the Protestant is kindly informed that it “will open his eyes to the incompatibility of his principles with the happiness of mankind.” (*)

This book was written in order to counteract the “pernicious influence exerted among his countrymen by Guizot’s lectures on European civilization.” (Ibid., p. ix.) But there were special objects designed to be accomplished by it, which were very distinctly and emphatically avowed. It is said, for example, that the pope “is the best guide of men in the path of liberty and progress,” and that the present pontiff, Pius IX., “shows a profound knowledge of the evils which afflict society.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, p. xi.) It was manifestly intended to aid in laying the groundwork upon which the structure of papal infallibility was to be erected.

In a work so highly commended as this is to American readers, one would scarcely expect to find a labored effort to prove that the oath of allegiance to our Government, taken by a Roman Catholic, amounts to nothing, and has no binding obligation, when the welfare of the Roman Catholic Church requires it to be disregarded. But those who prepared it for publication here understood perfectly well the character of the persons into whose hands it would mostly fall, and that their minds were easily impressed by anything, however extravagant or preposterous, put forth authoritatively in behalf of their Church. And they did not miscalculate, as we may infer from the fact that in the United States the dogma of infallibility has been accepted with greater unanimity and more readily than in any other country in the world—a fact which renders an exposition of the teachings of this book, and others like it, not only interesting and instructive, but of more than ordinary importance, as well as significance.

This author has a chapter upon “Resistance to the Civil Power,” in which, after the necessary preliminary discussion, he begs his readers to “bear in mind the general principles at all times inculcated by Catholicity, viz., the obligation of obeying legitimate authority.” (Ibid., ch. liv., p. 325. ) In order to make the desired application of this principle, and to explain what he means by legitimate authority, he puts and answers a most pertinent question, as follows: “In the first place, Are we to obey the civil power when it commands something that is evil in itself? No, we are not; for the simple reason that what is evil in itself is forbidden by God: now, we must obey God rather than man.” (Ibid., p. 326.)

He does not stop here to explain what is and what is not evil, but proceeds as follows: “In the second place, Are we to obey the civil power when it interferes in matters not included in the circle of its faculties? No; for with regard to these matters it is not a power.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. liv., p. 326.)

In order that there may be no misapprehension of his meaning, he then points out the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual power, and insists upon the independence of the latter with respect to the former. In his view, the Church must be left by the State perfectly free to act for itself, in all matters within the spiritual jurisdiction. It must in no sense be subject to the laws of the State, because that would impair its freedom. And whenever the State undertakes to subject the Church to its laws, it passes beyond “the circle of its faculties.”He then continues:

“Ever since the foundation of the Church, this principle of the independence of the spiritual power has at all times served, by the mere fact of its existence, to remind men that the rights of the civil power are limited; that there are things beyond its province—cases in which a man may say, and ought to say, I will not obey.” (Ibid.)

Satisfied with his argument to maintain and enforce these propositions—and it undoubtedly displays great ingenuity and ability—he reverts to his original question, and repeats what he had already said, but in more expressive terms, thus: “It remains, then, established that we are to be subject to the civil power so long as it does not go beyond its proper limits; but that the Catholic doctrine never enjoins obedience when the civil power oversteps the limits of its faculties. ” (Ibid., p. 328.)

He adopts the general and commonly accepted definition of unjust laws, such as are against the common welfare, public policy, etc., in regard to which nobody would enter into controversy with him. But he goes beyond this, and finds other laws equally unjust, because of their opposition to the divine law. He says: “Laws may also be unjust in another point of view, when they are contrary to the will of God; as the laws of tyrants enforcing idolatry, or anything else contrary to the divine law. With respect to such laws, it is not allowable under ally circumstances to obey them; for, as it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, ‘We must obey God rather than man.'” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. liv., p. 328.)

Having thus established his premises, he lays down, as the logical result of the doctrines maintained by the Roman Catholic Church, these rules: “1. We cannot, under any circumstances, obey the civil power when its commands are opposed to the divine law. 2. When laws are unjust, they are not binding in conscience. 3. It may become necessary to obey these laws from motives of prudence, that is, in order to avoid scandal and commotions.” (Ibid.)

These are the principles upon which he is rejoiced to know that “the admirable institution of European monarchy was founded;” principles which he thinks it the duty of the Roman Catholic Church to maintain throughout the world, because, as he says, they constitute “the moral defenses by which that monarchy is surrounded.”He thinks the minds of men are already sufficiently “wearied with foolish declamations against the tyranny of kings,” and would bring back to these salutary principles all such governments as have departed from them. (Ibid., p. 330.)

These principles are the same, substantially, with those laid down by Bishop England, and, if applied in this country, would test all our civil institutions by their conformity to the divine law. We have established our Government upon the theory that God recognizes the personality of each individual, and will deal with him accordingly. Therefore the conscience of every man is left free, that he may maintain whatsoever religious belief it shall approve. Necessarily, in order to establish and preserve this great principle, every individual and all Church organizations are required to obey the laws of the State. The spiritual power is not made independent of the temporal, but, in so far as the authority to enact the necessary laws for the public good is concerned, the temporal power is made independent of the spiritual. In all else the spiritual power is left unimpaired; that is, it is left independent within its proper spiritual sphere.

But according to the papal doctrine, as announced by this distinguished author, this places our Government in the condition of having transcended the proper “limits of its faculties,” of having violated the divine law, and of requiring certain obligations of obedience from every citizen which cannot be yielded by those who obey the papacy without disobedience of the fundamental principles of their Church organization. He insists that the Government shall be arraigned at the bar of the papacy, where it shall be judged by the divine law; that the pope alone, as God’s vicegerent, is the only proper and infallible interpreter of that law, and that whatsoever principle of the Government he shall declare to be unjust or heretical shall have no binding obligation upon the conscience of any Roman Catholic.

Already the present pope has declared that, in order that a government shall conform to the divine law, the State and the Church must be so united that the State shall obey the Church; that the ecclesiastical or hierarchical body must govern itself by its own laws, and not be governed by, or answerable to, the laws of the State, even for crime; that there must be but one form of religion, and that the religion of Rome; that all other forms of religion except that of Rome, including the Protestantism of the United States, are heretical, and ought to be annihilated; that freedom of speech and of the press and of conscience are all inconsistent with the “divine right of kings” to govern, and, therefore, should not be tolerated or allowed; that the present “progress” of the nations, which we attribute greatly to the influence of our example, must be arrested, and the world turned back to the medieval times; that he must be recognized as the only just and infallible expounder of the Word of God, and as incapable of error in all matters of faith and morals; that all mankind must obey him, in faith and morals, because he stands upon earth in the place of God; and that the Church, whose tremendous power is concentrated in his hands, may employ force whenever he shall deem it necessary to exact obedience as the means of reaching these results.

All these things are openly and distinctly avowed in his Encyclical and Syllabus; are set forth in books, pamphlets, newspapers, and tracts of immense circulation; and are foreshadowed by the persistent movements of the Roman Catholic hierarchy all over the world. And it requires but an ordinary amount of intelligence to see that if the time should ever come when these principles shall obtain the ascendancy in the United States, it must be, necessarily, at the expense of the fundamental and most cherished principles of our Government, the very principles whose protection the Roman Catholic emigrants from Europe professedly desired to secure when they abandoned their citizenship among the effete monarchies of the Old World and hopefully acquired it in the New.

But, in order to demonstrate the legitimate use of the right of resistance to civil authority, this Jesuit author explains the “Catholic doctrines” in relation to de facto governments, that is, governments existing by what he calls a “consummated act,” whether of revolution or otherwise, and in the actual possession of all necessary power. That these doctrines may be comprehended, it is necessary to keep in mind that, according to the teachings of Rome, governments de facto are those which have been established by the people upon the overthrow of the kingly authority—which is considered the only legitimate authority. Governments de jure are such as are based upon the law of God, with kings at their head, who shall obey the pope as the highest authority upon earth. In this view, all Roman Catholic monarchies are governments de jure, and therefore legitimate; while all popular republics are governments de facto, and therefore illegitimate. Kings must always rule; the people, never.

Hence, the old Roman Catholic monarchy of Spain, overthrown a few years ago, was a government de jure, to which implicit and passive obedience was due. Hence, also, the Government of the United States is a government de facto, because it was the offspring of revolution, and was substituted in place of a monarchy. And hence, again, the latter is an illegitimate government, borne with by the papal hierarchy for a while, only “from motives of prudence,” but subject to resistance and overthrow, to make room for a government de jure, or a legitimate government, whenever the interest and welfare of the papacy shall require it, and the result can be made certain. It is wonderful how surely all Roman Catholic authors and publicists who adopt the Jesuit or ultramontane views argue within such circles as bring them inevitably to these conclusions. This author shows that they are the only logical deductions from their mode of reasoning.

Asking the question, How far do “Catholic doctrines” extend on the subject of resistance to the civil power “by physical force?” he proceeds at once to combat and deny the proposition that “obedience is due to a government from the very fact of its existence.” This he calls unsound doctrine, “which is contrary to right reason, and has never been taught by Catholicity.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. lv., p. 330.)

Whenever, according to him, the Roman Catholic Church speaks of obedience “to the powers that be,” it has reference to “powers that have a legitimate existence.” Why? Because, says he, “the absurdity that a simple fact can create right can never become a dogma of Catholicity;” (Ibid.) that is, the papacy asserts the right to go behind the fact that a government exists, and inquire whether it is or is not legitimate; whether, in other words, it is de facto (existing in actuality, especially when contrary to or not established by law. ) or de jure; (according to law) and if it is found to be de facto merely, it may be resisted, because otherwise it would be the concession to an illegitimate government of “a right to command,” which would be to legitimatize usurpation. (Ibid.) Therefore he argues “that no reasonable man can seriously accept” such a doctrine as that “of consummated facts” as applied to governments. Yet, remembering what he had just said about not resisting existing governments “from motives of prudence,” he continues:

“I do not deny that there are cases in which obedience, even to an illegitimate government, is to be recommended; when, for instance, we foresee that resistance would be useless, that it would only lead to new disorders, and to a greater effusion of blood: but in recommending prudence to the people, let us not disguise it under false doctrines—let us beware of calming the exasperation of misfortune by circulating errors subversive of all governments, of all society.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on tile Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. lv., p. 331.)

It is a favorite idea with all the supporters of the papacy—most persistently maintained—that whenever society gets from under the influence and control of the Roman Catholic Church, it necessarily runs into heresy, infidelity, anarchy, and all that sort of thing. They repudiate everything like middle or conservative ground, and seem to be utterly unconscious of their intolerant and partisan excesses, as well as of the fact that it is only the progressive influence of Protestantism which has lifted the nations out of the darkness and superstition into which they were sunk during the Middle Ages. We ought not to be surprised, therefore, at finding this recognized and authoritative propagator of “Catholic doctrines” falling into this error, and talking about the subversion of all governments and of all society, whenever they refuse obedience to the pope and his hierarchy.

The standard he sets up recognizes only Roman Catholic governments and society!—for from them alone does he suppose all human advancement and prosperity to spring. All else is evil—and that continually. Yet he prudently recommends that this evil, terrible as it is in its consequences both in this life and that which is to come, be endured, wherever “resistance would be useless,” because such resistance would be but “the exasperation of misfortune.” Still, however, this “prudence” must not be practiced at the expense of truth—it must not be disguised “under false doctrines”—but the true “Catholic doctrines” should be proclaimed, so that the power shall be preserved by the papacy to upturn and destroy all illegitimate governments whenever resistance can be successfully resorted to, and establish legitimate governments in their places! This was the real design of the publication of this book in Europe in two languages; a design manifestly sympathized with, if not openly avowed, by its American publishers, when they professed to regard it as having “supplied the age with a work which is peculiarly adapted to its wants.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, Preface to American edition, p. v. )

He finds no difficulty in arguing out of the way the Scriptural teaching that the civil authority must be obeyed: this merely furnishing him a field for the display of Jesuit ingenuity. “Illegitimate authority,” says he, “is no authority at all;” because “power involves the idea of right,” and where no right exists, there is only force. Therefore, he argues, “when the Scriptures prescribe obedience to the authorities, it is the lawful authorities that are implied.” (Ibid., ch. lv., p. 332.)

Again, the kind of civil power to which the Scriptures enjoin obedience upon us is that “ordained by God himself,” that which “is the minister of God himself,” which a usurped and illegitimate government can never be, and which none but a Roman Catholic government can be! And, again, the obedience to the civil power prescribed by the Scriptures is the same as that prescribed “to the slave in relation to his master;” it exists only where there is a “legitimate dominion.” If the slave is unjustly held in servitude, he may rebel against the authority of his master; but if justly held, he may not. So, if the civil authorities be not lawful—that is,” ordained by God himself”—as the pope shall declare his law—no obedience to them is required, except that “which prudence would dictate;” and they must, therefore, be endured as a “misfortune” until resistance can be made successful! Whatever process of reasoning he adopts, he reaches always the same conclusion. He keeps always within his prescribed circle; but, whether it be large or small, he never fails to terminate at the point most prominently before him, and most indelibly fixed upon his mind—the illegitimacy of all governments not based upon the divine law—meaning, of course, the divine law as the infallible pope shall declare it!

Conscious of the opposition to these “Catholic doctrines” of the practice of the early Christians, who always submitted to the ruling authority of the Government without concerning themselves about the temporal power, he endeavors to point out the “futility” of their position, by insisting upon a distinction between the state of things existing then and that existing in our day. In these early centuries, according to him, “all that upright men could do was quietly to resign themselves to the calamitous circumstances of the times, and by fervent prayer to implore the Almighty to take compassion on mankind.” (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. lv., p. 332.)

But now, since the number of Christians has increased so that they have become a controlling power in the world; since they have, in many instances, overturned governments, and may do so again whenever circumstances make it prudent to attempt it, he admonishes the faithful adherents of the papal cause to husband their resources, and submit prudently, for a while, to illegitimate rule; but, in the mean time, to prepare to strike when the proper hour shall arrive! He cautions them, first, to be sure that the government at which they strike is illegitimate—a question which now, since the dogma of infallibility, belongs to the pope alone to decide. Then, second, they should have in view the substitution of a lawful power, which, of course, the pope also decides. And, third, they “should count besides on the probability of the success of their enterprise;” a matter which involves prudential considerations alone. In the absence of “these conditions,” there would be “no object” accomplished; it would be “a mere fruitless attempt, an impotent revenge;” it would only cause “bloodshed,” only incense and “irritate the power attacked,” and have no other result than “to increase oppression and tyranny.” (Ibid., ch. lv., p. 332.)

An Archbishop of Palmyra had published a work upon the Church Militant, in which he maintained that when Christ commanded his followers to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,” he meant “that the mere fact of a government’s existence is sufficient for enforcing the obedience of the subjects to it;” that is, he established the doctrine “of consummated facts.” But this he calls a “fallacy,” and declares that this work of the archbishop “was forbidden at Rome” by the “Sacred Congregation!” a decree, he says, in which “every man who is jealous of his rights”—that is, all the defenders of papal infallibility—will acquiesce. (“Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe,” by Balmes, ch. lv., p. 333.)

Keeping in mind his prudential argument, and suggesting that “the interference of Christians in political disputes” would only bring their holy religion into disrepute, in the event that they should fail of success, he surmounts the difficulty arising out of “consummated facts” by repeating his argument that they must be legally consummated before the obligation of obedience can arise out of them. And then, by way of a practical application of these “Catholic doctrines,” he continues:

“Hence, in a political and social sense, we designate consummated facts a usurpation, completely overthrowing the legitimate power, and by means of which the usurper is already substituted in its place; a measure executed in all its points. Such is the suppression of the regular clergy in Spain, and the confiscation of their property to the treasury; a revolution which has been triumphant, and which has entirely disposed of a country, as was the case with our American possessions.” (Ibid., ch. lv., p. 334.)

This is the culmination of this distinguished author’s theory—of the “Catholic doctrines” of which he is the able and eloquent expounder. It reaches the point to which everything is now pressed by the defenders of papal infallibility—that is, to the point of revolution. Recognizing no other form of government except the monarchical as consistent with the divine law, Pope Pius IX. and his hierarchy do not hesitate to declare, in the face of the world’s progress, that every other form of government is revolutionary and usurpation. Therefore these “Catholic doctrines” are put forth by one of the most eloquent men in the Church, to show that all revolutionary governments are unlawful, and that although prudence may dictate obedience to them for a season, yet that, as they confer no right whatever, they may be destroyed, and lawful governments erected in their places whenever it can be done without the infliction of too much harm upon the attacking party! And therefore, in order that the prudential submission to a revolutionary government for the present may not be disguised “under false doctrines,” the teachings of this author are translated into English, published in the United States, and circulated among our Roman Catholic population, avowedly upon the ground that they are “peculiarly adapted” to the wants of the present age!

The Government of the United States had its origin in revolution. Our fathers cut with the sword the cord which had bound the American colonies to one of the monarchies of Europe. Believing their cause to be just, they appealed to God for the protection of his providence, and we believe that they won their success under that protection. They snatched liberty—civil and religious—from those princes of the Old World who had managed to keep their feet upon the necks of all who desired to enjoy it, and thus elevated the inhabitants of this country to a condition of prosperity and happiness which has no parallel in all the ages of the past. They built up a government which secures, in a higher degree than any other government on earth, all the rights and immunities of citizenship. They recognized the common brotherhood of man, and opened their arms to the oppressed, persecuted, and down-trodden of the world, inviting them to come and share with them the blessings of free and popular institutions. Millions of them, who were the slaves of political and ecclesiastical tyranny in the countries of their birth, are now in this country, and have already experienced the improvement of their condition—have acquired a new and more invigorating manhood. Of these there are thousands who love our Government with fervid intensity—who have defended its honor and its flag when they have been attacked, and are ready to do so again, to the very death, if necessary.

But there are others—no matter whether they may be counted by hundreds or thousands—who accept, with seeming acquiescence, the idea that they shall subordinate their patriotism to the Government to their devotion to the papacy; and who appear content to be recognized as maintaining, with their hierarchy, that the Church is higher and more potent than the State—even within the constitutional domain of the State. They are invited, by the most earnest and pathetic appeals, to love the Church first, the State second, and then only as the Church shall decree; and to merge their responsibility to the laws in their responsibility to the pope.

The laws of this country do not interfere with the religion of any of these; nor can they do so. They leave each individual conscience free, so that the citizen shall act upon his own responsibility to God. All our Protestant institutions assume that each of us may enjoy a pure Christian faith without ingrafting upon it any of the principles of civil polity which are confided to the State. They will not allow the State to invade the rightful jurisdiction of the Church, and declare what the faith shall be; nor will they submit to any impairment of the legitimate functions of the State by the Church. The line which separates these jurisdictions cannot be obliterated without marring the beauty of the one and assailing the integrity of the other. The Church and State must be kept apart—each in its own proper sphere.

Therefore, our Roman Catholic fellow—citizens, for themselves as well as Protestants, have the deepest interest in having these questions properly and satisfactorily solved: What is the design of those hierarchs who claim to be their sole and exclusive teachers, no less in the domain of social and political morality than in that of religious faith? Are they endeavoring to extend their spiritual jurisdiction beyond the limits fixed by our laws, and to trench upon the civil jurisdiction as marked out and defined? Does the pope claim for himself a jurisdiction over them, as citizens, superior to and above that of the State? Does he or not recognize as a legitimate fact our separation of Church and State? Does he expect of them to resist those principles of our Government which he shall declare to be contrary to God’s law, or against the welfare and interest of the Church? Does he demand of them, by virtue of his asserted infallibility, to enlarge the circle of their religious faith, so as to include within it any of the essential principles of our civil polity? Does he require them, as any part of their religion, to test their obedience to our laws by their conformity to the Constitution, or to his will? Which does he command them to obey, the civil laws of the State or the canon laws of the Church, in case of conflict between them? Which allegiance does he consider the highest, that which they owe to the Government of the United States, or that which they owe to the ecclesiastical government constructed by the Roman pontiffs?

In so far as the pope is concerned, every intelligent man who has taken the trouble to investigate understands the answers to all these questions. In so far as they are concerned, the time has come when they can no longer defer to answer them for themselves.

Continued in Chapter XIX. The Claimed Rights of the Papacy Over Governments

Kevin Annett’s bio.. In this interview with YouTube Shaun Attwood, Mr. Annett says he is “launching a criminal lawsuit against ‘Pope’ Leo XIV/Robert Prevost, charging him with complicity in murder, criminal conspiracy, and crimes against humanity.”

Transcription

Shaun Attwood: Good evening, everybody. I’m hugely excited to have Kevin back. He has an amazingly viral series exposing the horrors of the Vatican, the Pope and the Catholic Church.

But tonight he’s got an absolutely huge announcement that he has saved for this channel to let everybody know this news because you guys have really given him so much positive feedback, comments, support. People have bought his book and you can find the link for the books in the description. So Kevin’s really appreciative of all the support and interest that has been generated on this channel. It’s become one of the stories that has got the most interest of everything that we’re doing and we appreciate Kevin coming back so soon again and announcing this huge news. All of Kevin’s links are in the description box. And if you’ve got any questions for Kevin, please keep them within the remit of what we’re talking about. Put them in the chat. And when Kevin has announced the news and there’s various things he wants to go over first, then we will start to get the questions put to him. But I will be saving them up in the meantime.

So Kevin, what is it that you got? We’re all on tenterhooks! (The suspense is killing us!) Do you want me to get this on the screen right now?

Kevin Annett: Sure, that’d be good. It’s actually an announcement from the International Commonwealth Court of Justice. I’m an advisor to the prosecutor of the court.

And based on startling new evidence, they’re launching a criminal case against the present Pope Leo Robert Prevost. And we’ll get into that as I read that.

But I just want to say as a prelude to that, two days ago, there was an incident and this has never happened. It shows you that we have the bad guys concerned. I had just presided at a funeral of one of our people who had died. And I was standing there at the committal service in the graveyard. A limousine pulls up. Two guys get out. One of them walks over to me. This is when I was by myself after the service. And he looked vaguely familiar. I realized later he was a Knights of Columbus goon who had been in one of our church protests in Toronto. But he came to me and very quickly said,

“If you carry through with this court case, we’re going to do to you what we do to children in these ceremonies. We’re going to cut off parts of your body and you’re going to die slowly.”

He then turned around and left.

Okay, that’s never happened before face to face. And so, you know, I take it seriously enough. But as he left, I called out to him. “Don’t I know you from somewhere?” Because he definitely was one of those Knights of Columbus. These are goons that came when we were doing the church occupations in 2008 that forced out a lot of this stuff in Canada. He had been one of the people at St. Michael’s Catholic Church in downtown Toronto who had roughed up some of the people we were with.

Carrie Luster, a Mohawk woman, had gone up and seized the pulpit and began to read the crimes of the Vatican. She got punched in the stomach and dragged out. And this guy was one of the ones who did it.

Well, he was the guy who threatened me 17 years later, but I could tell it was the same guy. Unfortunately, I don’t know his name. And unfortunately, there was nobody around to record this, but it happened. And I think it’s directly related to this.

So to get into this announcement, the court has announced today that they’re beginning a criminal investigation. If you scroll down a little bit, you’ll see a picture of this young woman, Emanuela Orlandi. Scomparsa in Italian means disappeared. In 1983, she vanished. And you’ll see this in all the mainstream corporate media.

Disappeared

Her father had worked at the Vatican. She had a long association. As a matter of fact, if you go right down to the bottom of that press release, you’ll see a picture of her as a young girl standing in front of John Paul II, who in fact was somebody who had harmed her and was involved in this Ninth Circle trading in children.

A young Emanuela Orlandi in front of Pope John Paull II/Karol Wojtyla, her rapist and trafficker

The court announced today, based on new evidence, that they are launching this criminal investigation against the present Pope Robert Prevost based on a number of things. First of all, there are two eyewitnesses, one within the Ninth Circle, a former cult member, and a victim survivor who has come forward, who was involved in the cult. Her parents had introduced her into the cult, and she survived. She’s in hiding now somewhere in Europe.

But the investigators of the court interviewed both of these people. They both claim that the present Pope Leo was involved in these Ninth Circle ceremonies on two occasions. First of all, September 1978, the month he was ordained a priest. He was ordained in Rome, the same month that John Paul I died. Remember the Pope who was killed for investigating the Vatican Bank? He was found basically poisoned.

And then later in June 1983, he was present when this young woman, Emanuela, was brought in and harmed and abused by these Ninth Circle members, and then shipped off, they believe she was sent off to Germany to be used in their cult network, either sacrificed or used sexually, and in other ways.

So the court prosecutor, let me read out the statement from the court prosecutor.

“Apparently the new Pope Leo, Robert Prevost, was inducted into the Ninth Circle soon after his ordination as a priest in September 1998. The induction occurred at midnight on October 16, 1978, in a sub-basement catacomb beneath the Vatican.”

And I’m going to discuss where it happened because we have more evidence on that.

During that initiation, the newly appointed Pope John Paul II presided at the ritual killing, dismembering, and cannibalizing of a four-year-old Italian boy. Prevost was also present on June, as I mentioned, June 22nd, when Emanuela Orlandi was kidnapped, basically, and then circulated through their network.

Now this is important. Like every Roman pontiff, Robert Prevost was chosen as Pope from a select stable of Ninth Circle members who’ve been groomed by the cult for years and approved their loyalty to its carnage.

And the second part of this is that sources within the Vatican, once this stuff became known, they approached the court with a log. Apparently this is a log, a journal, of all the Ninth Circle ceremonies that have been held in the Vatican since 1870. And this log confirms that Prevost, the present Pope Leo, was present at these and other ceremonies in the Vatican.

Now a final point on that, if you go to the very bottom of the press release, you’ll see a schematic map of what’s underneath the Vatican. It’s part of what’s called the Vatican Grotto. These are chambers coming from the early Christian period and made into various chambers.

If you look there, scroll down a little bit, you’ll see Chamber U. That’s called the Tomb of Lucifer. And that’s where these, at least the recent Ninth Circle sacrificial ceremonies we’re talking about, took place. It’s interesting, it’s right beneath St. Peter’s Square, right where, according to legend, St. Peter was crucified upside down. And that’s significant spiritually, because it’s inverting the energy of early Christianity to capture it and control it, just like they do in these sacrificial ceremonies.

So that’s the basic press release. And the timeline on this is the court is convening in two weeks, Sunday, June 1st.

Three months later, September 1st, the court is issuing [will issue] summonses to Leo and his accomplices to be arraigned before the court. I won’t say where in Europe. And the charges will be read out and the prosecution’s case will begin on September 1st.

So that’s our basic news, but there’s other things connected to that which we should get into.

Shaun Attwood: Kevin, how easy or rather how difficult is it to serve legal papers to the Pope and these people, these higher-ups?

Keven Annett It’s been done before. Don’t forget, I mean, under their statutes, they can’t be prosecuted. But under international law, they can be. He can be prosecuted as flesh and blood. And the common law principle, going back to before Magna Carta, says, be you ever so high, you are not above the law. So under international law, he can be tried as a man. And they don’t have the right to refuse sheriffs from an international court who will be issuing them.

Don’t forget, when you serve something, you don’t have to be served in person. I mean, I’ve had this happen to me. All you have to do is nail the summons on the door of the Vatican or stand there with a video camera and say, we are serving the Pope here. He served, bang. And they wouldn’t want that kind of bad publicity, which is, I think, one of the reasons they want to shut this thing down before it gets to September, right?

Shaun Attwood: Indeed, yes. So does this mean that people will be arrested and there will be summonses?

Keven Annett Yep. We already have common law sheriffs from the first case and in subsequent years. We’re also going to go to Interpol and deputize them. We want to have deputized Interpol agents and even the Roman police to accompany us when we film this, when we do all this.

And yeah, they have the right. If they’re summoned, they’re usually given either 48 hours or seven days to respond, to come to the arraignment, which is when the charges are read out and they have to plead. If they don’t, they can be arrested for evading illegal summons.

And don’t forget Ratzinger stepped down when the Spanish government threatened to have him arrested when he came to Spain, when they looked at the docket of evidence we have on him.

So he’s vulnerable. I think that’s why these threats are intensifying.

I’m an advisor to the prosecutor’s office. I’m also the North American field secretary, but you know, it’s one of the reasons I’m coming to Europe in the fall to work with the court.

Shaun Attwood: So how long has this court been around and, you know, what kind of successes has it achieved in the past?

Keven Annett If folks remember, we formed the International Tribunal of Crimes of Church and State in Dublin in the summer of 2010. That’s after I got locked out of Canada when the Canadian government and churches did their cover-up and spin operation. Suddenly I was banned. I couldn’t be quoted in the press anymore.

So right at that time, I was invited over to Europe by Irish survivors of the church of Rome. And we set up this tribunal and it spread quickly to nine countries and it formed the common law court of justice that brought the first case against Queen Elizabeth and Joe Ratzinger and, you know, a.k.a. Pope Benedict that caused, you know, his resignation. He hid out in the Vatican till the day he died so he wouldn’t be arrested.

So it’s a bonafide court of record. Any citizen in the world can set up these courts. Any group of citizens can set up what are called tribunals of conscience if the courts and the government are implicated in these crimes, which we know they are.

So it gives us tremendous power and we’re hoping these things can be a springboard for people to set up in their own communities these investigations and not wait for others, you know, like me to do it. We’ve shown that this works and so that should be kind of a green light for folks.

Shaun Attwood: So the Vatican is worth so much money, there’s so much vested interest and you are kind of like rocking that boat. Aren’t you afraid? You have told us about the assassins, the intelligence, the police. They’re a law unto themselves, and any entity with that amount of money can pretty much have someone eliminated. Are you taking extra extra caution or?

Keven Annett Well, yeah, we have certain kind of protocols we follow but, you know, if they want to kill you, they’ll kill you and their their main ally is not the cop out there but the cop in your head. He’s telling you don’t do this, you know, something might happen to you.

I passed that long ago where I was self-concerned in that way because I realized because it can happen to any of us at any time, not just from a killer but fate, you know, we could drop dead from a stroke tomorrow. You have only this moment and if you stay focused on that, it’s very difficult for them to stop one person, let alone a whole group of people working together on this stuff.

The difficulty I’ve found is that people aren’t coming together on this and they’re not stepping up and taking these actions. That’s the real enemy, not these turkeys in Rome who are helpless. If we all stood together and took action, they would fall tomorrow and I have to keep that in mind all the time and I’m thinking all the time of those children right now who are being carved up and like a side of beef by these people and used and and killed.

So they want to take me and cut my nose and ears off. Well, so what? So I’m dead. The point is others have to carry this on and that’s the point we keep trying to get people to move from that fear and self-concern mode into we’re not going to be stopped. No, like a mother, the mother’s instinct or the father’s instinct to protect their children, it’s inherent in us. We need to tap into that and we’ll be unbeatable.

(Shaun Attwood reads the indictment against Robert Prevost.)

Shaun Attwood: So, we’ve probably got a lot of people on here, Kevin, who are not familiar with the Ninth Circle. I know you’ve explained it several times, but could you just explain it one more time, please?

Keven Annett: Yeah, it’s formed, we believe, by the Jesuits in the 16th century. It’s a child sacrifice cult, operates within the Catholic Church, it’s inter-generational, so there’s prominent families who are part of this, they raise their children in it, usually sacrifice their firstborn in order to, move up the hierarchy of the cult. And it operates also as a blackmailing agency. We’ve had survivors like Toos Nijenhuis and Anne Marie van Blijenburgh say that they were. Anne Marie was a lawyer who was brought to what she was told was going to be a dinner, turns out they were sacrificing and killing a child there, and, they blackmailed her and controlled her that way.

So it has political purposes and spiritual ones. You’ve talked about this kind of energy vampirism, but also it’s very lucrative. It’s part of the human trafficking network all over the planet the Catholic Church is embedded in and profits hugely from. Again, I mentioned that in my book, Dethroning Rogue Power. We’ve sold over 700 copies of this in this month alone, if you can believe it, so it’s been a huge success. So that’s kind of in a nutshell what the Ninth Circle is all about.

The date 1870, I don’t know, many people know this, but that year, the Pope in Rome declared himself infallible, which means he’s incapable of error. He kind of one-upped God, right? He said, I’m incapable of error, right? That year Garibaldi had overthrown the Vatican, basically. The Vatican didn’t exist until Mussolini reestablished it in 1929. But he got the guarantee, everyone in the church suddenly believed he was infallible.

So that obviously encouraged them to say, okay, we can go ahead with these Ninth Circle ceremonies, come out of the closet, because I can’t be touched now. And we think it’s definitely correlated. But the interesting thing, Sean, they have a log about all these ceremonies.

And we’ve apparently, it’s a very old form of Latin and still being translated, but we have already found the name of this guy, Prevost, already in here at these two ceremonies we mentioned. So, in court, this is almost irrefutable evidence, including with the eyewitnesses.

Shaun Attwood: So Angelique wants to know, is that the tomb they opened at Christmas?

Keven Annett: No, this is something else. As a matter of fact, don’t forget, anything you see in the press, it’s being swabbed. A couple of things on this, you mentioned, like in the press release, there’s a stable of safe names who can be chosen as Pope. They do this in any election with any government too. Call it a red list. Safe people are on a red list. Unacceptable candidates are on a black list and they can never be elected. But the safe people are on a red list. And those are the candidates you can choose. Whether it’s Trump, Biden, Robert Prevost, they’re all safe.

In the papacy, you’re on the red list if you participate in the Ninth Circle. And then it doesn’t matter who you elect, you’re elected in the Ninth Circle. And, so that’s one of the damning features of this, where it condemns the whole institution, not just bad apples, right? That’s the good part.

Shaun Attwood: So Annie’s wondering whether these Ninth Circle events coincide with Davos events or political get-togethers. I imagine there’s more history in the timings of the Ninth Circle than these contemporary political events, isn’t there, Kevin?

Keven Annett: Oh, yeah. Yeah, it goes back centuries. And it’s based, of course, on an ancient Roman sacrificial cult. We’ve talked about that before, where the Romans would sacrifice children for the crops, in early spring and that. So, I mean, these are old practices, but they have a whole aspect here where they’ve got a lot of political and financial power behind them, too.

We talked in the last show about China, China’s role in all this, and the importance of the Vatican Bank in shifting the world’s finances towards the east to the Chinese sphere. So that all comes into this as well.

Shaun Attwood: Now, the Pope, if he gets served, is he just likely to ignore this and just hope it goes away? Is that the strategy that these Popes have taken in the past?

Keven Annett: Well, it’s a dumb strategy, because what that does under law is you’re not contesting what’s being said about you. It’s how King Charles I in England had his head chopped off. He refused to plead. So the parliamentary court said, okay, you’re not contesting what we’re saying about you. You waged a war of tyranny against your own people.

If Prevost doesn’t contest what we’re charging him openly with, that he’s involved in these nefarious murderous activities, then it’s a tacit admission of guilt. And in a lot of court trials, criminal court trials, at that point he can be found immediately guilty as charged and sentenced. So they’re caught between a rock and a hard place. If they ignore it, they’re admitting to it. If they don’t ignore it and respond, they’re admitting to the legitimacy of our court and they have to be involved in it. So it’s a win-win for us. And that’s why we keep saying to people, take these actions and you’ll see the kind of power you have.

Shaun Attwood: A few people are asking for details of what’s in the diary of the Ninth Circle events, but we’ve got to be very careful, Kevin, with our language, what we say online. (Because of YouTube censorship.)

Keven Annett: I just want to make a point legally about that. You know, in the US Constitution, First Amendment, they talk about “prior restraint”, which means nobody can tell somebody what to say or how to phrase it in a legal context. If they try to do that, whoever is imposing these censorship rules on what happens on YouTube or whatever, they have to come into court and show just cause why they’re telling people not to use certain words. I don’t think they want that. And you can’t be shut down for using certain words. It’s called prior restraint. It’s against the law to do that. And they only do it because they think people will be intimidated and start cooperating. We can’t censor our words. That’s what people are under tyranny, that’s the first step towards tyranny, not saying things as they are.

Like in my work in Canada early on, these places, these death camps were called residential schools. Well, they weren’t schools. They were places where children were dying and being killed. So, nobody ever sued me over that. In 30 years, I’ve never been sued for using those words in Canada.

So why would it happen to you? If their lawyers and censors are listening to this right now, they know very well that it’s true, what I’m saying, and they’re not going to come down. They just rely on people’s fear to cooperate.

So I’m not telling you what to do and not to do, Shaun. I’m just, I feel the need to share that with people because it’s a fundamental issue of our right to say things as they are.

Shaun Attwood: Yeah, I agree with all of that, but I’ve lost the channel twice and it’s not people. It’s AI. So AI is watching every single word. And when certain words cross thresholds, it shuts you down. That’s the modern world we’re in.

Keven Annett: Yeah. Temporarily, they can shut you down. But at some point, whoever owns that AI would have to appear in a court of law and show why they did that.

Now, you always have to weigh what you’re going to lose in the short run with what you can lose. You know, I mean, I’ve been shut down so often, but I’m still here. And by being shut down, I became more popular and people are saying, what’s going on with this guy? You know, Shaun, you might get more followers by being shut down. But I feel the need to say that. I never tell people what to do or say, but I’m just letting you know lawfully we’re standing on solid ground.

Shaun Attwood: So who was Emanuela Orlandi?

Keven Annett: It got a lot of media exposure back in the eighties, her brother, Paolo, he’s led this campaign for many years. Her dad worked in the Vatican. She went to a music lesson somewhere in the Vatican and she just vanished June 22nd, 1983. It was solstice, summer solstice, which is not surprising. That’s a satanic high point.

And for years, the Vatican put up this thing saying, “Oh, we don’t know where she is. We’re searching for her,” a typical kind of spin and fog operation.

But the court investigators have spoken to the eyewitness who saw Robert Prevost at the ceremony, along with the Ninth Circle insider who confirmed, the second eyewitness confirmed that, yes, he was at this, where these things happened to her. And she was then sent to Germany, they believe. We’re communicating all that to her brother and to the campaign in Italy.

But it got enormous spread. It still does. If you look it up online, you’ll see, about that, about her.

Shaun Attwood: Yeah. I mean, the Marquis de Sade, he wrote about these extremely wealthy people in Europe in castles and stuff who would just snatch kids and do all kinds of horrific things to them. So, you know.

Keven Annett: I also mentioned about where this is happening in the Vatican. It’s called the Tomb of Lucifer, but where it is, I don’t know if like in Rome, you’ve got the St. Peter’s Square, this kind of circular thing, and there’s an obelisk. That obelisk is supposed to be where they crucified Peter, the disciple, who they claim was the first pope, which is nonsense, but they say that Peter was crucified upside down, right on that spot. What was interesting, that’s where I conducted the exorcism, October 11, 2009, where the tornado hit the next day, and then all this news hit the media about this, right on the same spot.

I didn’t even know I was being led there. I just stood there, and it shows you at that spot, it’s an energy vortex, and they’re using it, you can invert the inversion, you can, so it’s all kind of centered there, and what’s interesting is this U on the map, the tomb of Lucifer, right beneath where they supposedly crucified Peter.

It was only excavated in 1940 by this Pope Pius XII. Now, he’s the one who recognized the Nazi regime, and they recognized each other. This is 1940 to 49, and there’s stories about how the Nazis were always looking for these arcane relics to tap into the demonic energy related. It’s interesting, that’s when this Pius XII, the pro-Nazi pope, authorized the excavations that opened up this tomb of Lucifer, where they now conduct the Ninth Circle ceremony, so I don’t think that’s accidental.

Shaun Attwood: So what about Emanuela’s parents in this, what’s the deal there?

Keven Annett: Oh, they were bribed into silence, or bribed into going along with the official line, which is, we don’t know where she is, but the church is looking for her, and we pray for her safety, blah blah blah.

You know, I mean, I’ve had the same experience working with indigenous families who had their kids, done away with or whatever. They were told, they were approached by the church and said, you’re going to face a lot of trouble if you talk about this, and they go along with it. Even when that happened to our friends in our movement, their families all said the same thing.

So, when people are by themselves, on their own, they feel helpless, and they feel they have to go along, but what we’re doing with these court trials is to show no you’re not alone, and you can take action, and we hope it’s kind of a rallying and encouragement for people in that situation.

Shaun Attwood: So was that out of fear, or did they get paid off, or both?

Keven Annett: All of the above. Everyone has a weakness, they look for it, they press. Some people can’t be, and then they kill them. You know, whatever. It’s just, the story. I mean, we all know the world, the way it is.

I just remembered something connected to that, the Chamber of Lucifer that I mentioned, and the Nazi involvement. It’s a little known fact that Pope Benedict and Pope John Paul II in the picture there were both members in Germany and in Poland of what’s called the Knights of Darkness, which was an SS demonic cult. They would go into these concentration camps and get people and use them in their ceremonies, the SS Knights of Darkness. And it’s not accidental that these guys are very prominent in the Ninth Circle as well.

So we’ve got a lot of this categorized. It’s going to be in the prosecutor’s report. We’re going to send out summaries of this over the summer before the trial begins.

Shaun Attwood: So, physically, then, where will the trial be held? Which jurisdiction, which country?

Keven Annett: It has international jurisdiction. We don’t want to say where it’s going to be held at this point. When we first did that, there was a bad repercussion. But it has international jurisdiction. Common law has universal jurisdiction, which means you can hold it anywhere and it’s just as binding. But there will obviously be local actions happening in Italy, Brussels, where some of the legal advisors operate out of.

And we want to encourage people in any country to hold their own investigations, hold their own actions at churches to bring this out. People in those pews who are giving the money need to know these facts. So really urge people to write to us and get involved in this campaign. There’s a lot people can do on the ground to further the work of the court.

Shaun Attwood: So you started out talking about the threat to your life that you received this week. What about the other people involved in the court? Have they been through anything?

Keven Annett: Well, in the past, we’ve had investigators disappear altogether. One of the people I knew in Europe, he just vanished, never found him. Witnesses go missing or suddenly drop out or certainly start bad-mouthing us, in the typical manner you find with native people in Canada, who suddenly said, “Oh, I never gave Kevin my testimony. He’s making all that up.”

You know, the best way to stop something is to discredit it, not to start piling up bodies, because that brings attention. You want to bribe and convince people to change their stories on that, to say, “See, Kevin was just making it all up. It’s all about him and his ego.”

I mean, that’s what people are prone to believe anyway. People tend to want to look for that shady aspect. We live in a very cynical age, right? And people are prone to believe the worst about somebody. So it works most of the time.

But yeah, the fellow I was with, who is kind of my bodyguard, I don’t like having a bodyguard, but he insists. He’s ex-military, actually. He kind of follows me around. He was off at the cemetery. That’s why he wasn’t there. He would have taken these guys down. But they were watching us, obviously, and they waited till when I was alone and came over and thought, they know it’s not going to stop me, but they also know that I’m going to share the story and they hope it will intimidate people and encourage other people in the court, not to want to carry on.

But you can just do so much and then they’re powerless. And that’s why this is like planting seeds everywhere. We know the seeds will grow and they can’t stamp them all out, right?

Shaun Attwood: J.D. wants to know, why is this case being going on for so long and not had Leo in court already?

Keven Annett: Well, a couple of reasons on that. We just recently discovered that there’s this kind of red list of acceptable candidates for the papacy and that his name was on this Vatican, document from since 1870, listing all the Pope’s involvement. So once he got elected and we found this stuff, that’s when the court decided to move on this particular individual to show the bigger aspect of this, right? How it’s organized. These people are chosen 50 years in advance. There’s this young priest who is willing to take part in these things and say, OK, put him on the red list. He’s a future Pope, right?

Just to show people how the system works. But from the beginning, ever since our first court case in 2012, we said all along that it isn’t about the individuals, although in common law you have to indict individuals. It’s about a whole system, a whole history. The Vatican wouldn’t be able to get away with this unless they had billions of dollars every year. So you’re up against a formidable enemy. And we have just so many resources, right? So you can’t do everything.

You know, people are saying, “Kevin, why don’t you go arrest the guy?” Right. Who me personally? It requires that we reach kind of a critical mass of awareness and then police and others will come forward as they have done in the past.

Shaun Attwood: Right. Next question is from Kelly: “How much weight, if any, will this trial hold, and what outcome do you hope to achieve?”

Keven Annett: We hope to achieve the end of the Vatican and the disestablishment of this criminal institution. That’ll take many years. This is another nail in the coffin.

The power of the of the court is tremendous. Yet why do you think Ratzinger stepped down? Not only Ratzinger, but three other cardinals named in the indictment in 2012 all resigned, including the head of the Jesuits, Adolfo Nicolás Pachón.

So it has tremendous power, but unfortunately, by staying on the mainstream stuff, you’re always being brainwashed to think that power means you see a lot of cops go in there and take somebody down, or, like that’s not how a system, disintegrates. It’s disintegrating now as we speak, the Catholic Church, because of all of these revelations, you go to a Catholic Church in a place like Quebec, which is our Ireland or Italy, and there’s 10 people sitting in the pews on a Sunday morning. People are voting with their feet on this and it’s because of all of this work we’ve been doing and not stopping.

Shaun Attwood: So people are asking, why isn’t this already on the web? Because Kevin has decided to announce this this evening, and I’ll put the link for the announcement in the live chat, there it is, it’s in the live chat, so if people want to read that. And murderbydecree.com, International Court to investigate, it’s and I’ll put it in the description box as well.

Question from the Trackmaster Man: Why have the FBI not just shut this whole religion down? It’s painstakingly obvious what’s going on, and yet they re-elect a new pope and carry on. Surely there has to be an end.” Isn’t it out of the jurisdiction of the FBI? Because it’s a law unto itself, the Vatican, isn’t it?

Keven Annett: They like to create that impression, but no, the Vatican, like in every country in America, the Vatican is a subversive power. It operates outside the laws of America. It’s got its own law, claims its own jurisdiction.

When children are harmed, they’re told to disobey the child protection laws of their own country. That’s intruding on the sovereignty and the laws of America. Why wouldn’t that power be disestablished and stop from operating in America if they were a sovereign nation? So this is about fundamental questions of justice and the lives of children and sovereignty of nations, the rule of law, the separation of the church and state.

My question is, why do people stand by and let it happen? Why? I mean, if there’s an issue that would mobilize people, you think it’d be what happens to children, their lives, right? But no, I mean, that’s the degree to which people have been emotionally numbed and mentally numbed. And that’s one of the reasons we do these campaigns, is to spark life again in people, to say, look at this big death we’re part of, right? It kills minds and hearts and souls, not just bodies. And we’ve got to break out of that and have a future. So that’s kind of the bigger issue here.

Shaun Attwood: Was Trudeau, former PM, a professed Jesuit?

Keven Annett: He wasn’t just professed, he was raised by Jesuit teachers, as was his father, Pierre. It’s one of the reasons that we believe one of the Trudeau sons who died in a, “skiing accident,” you sacrifice one of your children in the cult, right? It’s a sign of a cultic involvement.

Continued from The Papacy And The Civil Power – Chapter XVI. Henry VIII. Part 2.

Coercive Power of the Church.—Parties and Factions.—Quarrel between Rome and Avignon.—Philip of France and Boniface VIII.—Power claimed by his Bull Unam Sanctam.—Promise of Clement V. to Condemn Boniface VIII.—John XXII. and Nicholas V.—Benedict XII. Corruption of the Fourteenth Century.—The Beginning of the Fifteenth Century.—Three Councils called by Gregory XII., Benedict XIII., and the Cardinals.—Council of Pisa.—It condemns both Popes, and deposes Them.—Alexander V. elected.—He confirms all the Decrees of the Council.— Three Popes.—Balthasar Costa becomes Pope, as John XXIII.—Council of Constance.—Tries and Condemns Gregory XII., Benedict XIII., and John XXIII.—The Latter found Guilty of Enormous and Scandalous Crimes.— He is deposed, and the Doctrine of the Pope’s Infallibility condemned.—Difficulty in maintaining the Succession of the Popes.—May be two Infallible Popes at same Time.—Corruption in the Council.—John Huss and Jerome.—Their Trial and Death.—Effect in Bohemia.—Martin V.—His Policy.—Violation of his Promise to Alphonso.—His Bull against the King of Arragon.—His Letter to his Legate. Becomes sole Pope.—His Letter to the King of Poland for exterminating the Hussites.—His Death.—Effects of his Reign.

THE interference of the popes with the domestic civil affairs of the nations was, undoubtedly, superinduced by their possession of temporal power in Rome. The fact of having acquired this power by means so totally different from any employed by the apostles, or by the Christians of the first centuries, naturally tended to destroy their Christian humility, and to implant in their minds ideas of personal and official grandeur. Under such influences many of the popes became mere politicians, and were mixed up for several centuries in controversies with kings and princes. They neglected the spiritual affairs of the Church, and seemed to think that God was sufficiently served by an enlargement of their own temporal authority.

The number of bulls, briefs, and encyclicals issued by them concerning temporal matters greatly exceeded those which involved the interest of religion. Having in this way separated themselves from the influence of the apostolic example, and finding the world, on account of its ignorance, in a condition to acquiesce in the imposture, they did not hesitate to set up the claim of divine power, sufficiently broad and comprehensive to embrace within it the right to govern the kings and princes, and, through them, the people. When they succeeded in obtaining a practical recognition of this power, as pertaining to the organization of the Church, they found it necessary to go one step farther in order to preserve it. This was the introduction of the doctrine, as a part of their religious system, that this immense power must be maintained, it necessary, by force. Hence, the persecution and extirpation of heretics; and also the doctrines now avowed by Pius IX. in his Syllabus.

Although, by these means, they were enabled to secure several centuries of success, during which the world was held in complete subjugation and darkness; yet, in the course of time, the light began to break in upon the minds of men, and to disclose the fact, in spite of the reigning ecclesiasticism, that this entire system of oppression was the offspring of usurpation and fraud. Then, like the possessors of all other ill—gotten power, the leading and most ambitious popes became adepts in all the arts and practices of political intrigue and diplomacy, and in the pursuit of whatsoever means were necessary to maintain their authority, without any regard whatever to the morality or immorality of their acts. And thus it is that they themselves created the combination of influences out of which the Reformation arose. Had they been content to employ their spiritual power for the legitimate uses of the Church, the Church would have possessed within itself sufficient power to have applied the necessary corrective to all abuses in its government. But when they went beyond this, and claimed the right to universal dominion, as derived directly from God and as a part of “the patrimony of Peter,” it became necessary to the world that this claim should not only be resisted, but, if possible, absolutely destroyed. It could not undergo any abatement merely; for, according to the papal theory, the power of the papacy is plenary (unlimited), and can be nothing less; and therefore the contest, in so far as the papacy was concerned, became a death—struggle.

And thus we have seen that, in point of fact, the Reformation in England—as the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth sufficiently demonstrate—was not so much a protestation against the faith and just authority of the Roman Church as against the abuses of the hierarchy, and the gross corruptions practiced by them under papal sanction and toleration. There were many intelligent and devout Roman Catholics who, before that time, had been sagacious enough to understand, and honest enough to declare, that the papacy had departed from the apostolic teachings and the practices of the first centuries of Christianity. Their efforts—preceding, the great Protestant Reformation—to save their ancient and time—honored Church were heroic, but unavailing. They are brilliant lights in these former centuries, and attract no less our admiration than our wonder. They convince us—if anything were necessary to do so—that there was yet enough in the true faith of the Roman Catholic Church, even in the worst days of Rome, to give consolation to the Christian mind, and to excite its liveliest Christian hopes; and that much that is essentially true and consistent with the teachings of the Saviour and his apostles has been preserved in its shifting creeds during all the years of its existence. The genuine love and veneration they felt for the Church to which their affections clung so tenaciously, stimulated them to desire and to labor for its reform, for the lopping—off the decayed branches, that the trunk of the old tree which had withstood so many storms might continue to bear good and wholesome fruit.

We cannot withhold from Anselm and Abelard, and Arnold of Brescia—all devout Roman Catholics—the concession of sincerity for their bold appeals to reason against the unjust assumptions and usurpation of authority by the popes. They were not of the number of those commonly classed with the Reformers; but when they asserted the right of free inquiry and free thought, they brought themselves under the ban of the papacy, which feared an open exposure of its enormous offenses against religion and society; and the controversy thus inaugurated necessarily incited such inquiries as could never thereafter be suppressed or silenced.

Nor can we fail to appreciate the integrity and manliness of Savonarola when he stirred up the people of Florence to intense excitement by his denunciations of papal infallibility—declaring that the constitutions issued by some popes had been annulled by others; that the opinions of some are contrary to those of others; and that the prevalent doctrines of the papacy led to “evil doings—to waste in eating and drinking, to avarice, to concubinage, to the sale of benefices, and to many lies, and to all wickedness.” (*)

It should increase our admiration of this intrepid priest to know that for the avowal of his honest convictions he lost his life. Arrested by violence, tried by authority of Pope Alexander VI. with “true Inquisitorial mercilessness,” and put to death by his persecutors, his courage, exhibited in the midst of the flames, imparted itself to his defenders, and gave fresh impulse to the work of reform. (Milman’s “Essays,” p. 66, etc.)

If the reforms sought for by these and other faithful Christians had been obtained within the Church, the Christian world would have been disinclined to rebel against the spiritual authority of the popes, being content to regard it as indicating the unity of the faith. But the authorities of the Church—including popes, prelates, and the inferior clergy—had become so corrupt that practical reform became impossible. The long residence of the popes at Avignon, in France—brought about by the political intrigues carried on between popes and princes—so demoralized those who conducted the affairs of the Church, both there and at Rome, that with them religion became a matter of secondary importance, if not of utter indifference. The Church was divided into parties and factions, each accusing and anathematizing the others as heretics and schismatics, and visiting upon them the curse of excommunication.

We have heretofore seen that Boniface IX. was pope at Rome, while Clement VII. and Benedict XIII. respectively claimed the pontificate at Avignon. This state of things manifestly grew out of the quarrel between Philip of France and Boniface VIII., which was conducted with great asperity on both sides, and reduced the election of a pope to a mere matter of temporal expediency, the real interests of the Church or of religion having little or nothing to do with it. The celebrated bull of Boniface—Unam Sactam—where in he asserted that the pope holds in his hands both the spiritual and the temporal sword, led him into such direct conflict with the temporal power, that, without resistance on the part of the nations, he would have reduced them all to the condition of entire dependency upon the papacy. Hence we find Clement V. securing the pontificate, as the successor of Boniface VIII., by taking an oath to Philip, “by the body of Jesus Christ,” that he would “blot out the memory of Pope Boniface!” and proceeding soon after his election to revoke several of the bulls of Boniface, and, especially, to declare “that the bull Unam Sanctam should do no prejudice to the king or kingdom of France, and that all things should remain in the same posture they were in before that bull;” (Du Pin, vol. xii., p. 11.) notwithstanding which, the faithful are now instructed that this same bull continues to be, even at the present day, a part of the canon law!

Hence, also, we find that, after the death of Clement V. the discord prevailing among the cardinals occasioned so much delay in the election of his successor, that the people became so disgusted as to “set fire on the conclave,” (Ibid., p. 21.) and disperse the cardinals. The terrified prelates could not be assembled again until after the death of Philip, and “the chair of Peter” remained without an occupant for two years!

John XXII. was then elected at Lyons and took up his residence at Avignon, and Nicholas V. was elected at Rome. But the Italians, though backed by the King of Bavaria, were unable to protect their pope, and he ultimately fell into the hands of John XXII., who imprisoned him till he died. (Ibid., p. 24) So prostituted had the papacy become under such influences, that heresy consisted in disobedience to the pope in the merest trifles, and punishments were inflicted on account of them, without the slightest remorse.

John XXII. caused four Gray Friars to be arrested because they would not wear their gowns in the shape prescribed by his pontifical bull Quorundam! They were condemned to be burned as heretics, and were executed! A fifth one was degraded and imprisoned for life for the same offense! (Du Pin, vol. xii., p. 25. )

Benedict XII., successor of John XXII., was himself a heretic, in this; that he maintained that “the souls of those who die in mortal sin descend actually right into hell, where they suffer the pains of the damned;” (Ibid., p. 29.) in express violation of the doctrine of purgatory, which the General Council of Florence, at its twenty-fifth session, in 1438, declared to have always been the doctrine of the Church.

Such a condition of affairs as thus existed at Avignon, aided by what occurred during the subsequent pontificates of Clement VI., Innocent VI., Urban V., Gregory XI., and Urban VI., surrounded the papacy, in the fourteenth century, with an amount of corruption which had no parallel in all the previous history of the world. The good men of the Church, of whom there were many, were made heart-sick at the spectacle. They desired reform, but were overpowered by the prevailing corruption.

The fifteenth century opened with demands for three councils: one summoned by Gregory XII.; another by the rival pope, Benedict XIII.; and the third by the cardinals. The latter, which assembled at Pisa, was the most numerously—attended, having, besides a number of cardinals, ambassadors from France and England. That this council did not believe in the doctrine of papal infallibility is perfectly certain; for, soon after it convened, it caused both popes, Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII., to be called at the gate of the Church; and neither of them appearing, proctors were appointed, in the name of the Universal Church, to consider what steps were necessary to be taken against both of them, in order to put an end to the schism and restore the peace of the Church. After they had been several times called, and had failed to appear by themselves or legates, the council unanimously adopted a sentence against them to the effect that they were both “contumacious (obstinately disobedient) of faith and of schism.”Here was an issue directly and explicitly made between the cardinals and these two contumacious popes, as to where the controlling authority of the Church was lodged; whether in a general council representing the whole Church, or, as Pius IX. and his Jesuit defenders now say, in the pope alone, as the infallible vicegerent of God.

The settlement of this great question by the Council of Pisa assures us that if Pius IX. had then been pope, he would not have been considered infallible; or if the cardinals of Pisa had been at the late Lateran Council at Rome, the decree of in fallibility would not have been enacted. It was decided that the cardinals had power to call the council, that it was lawfully assembled, and that it had power to proceed to a definitive sentence against both popes. The trial was, therefore, entered upon with all necessary solemnity. The popes remaining contumacious, although duly summoned to appear, commissioners were appointed to appear for and defend them.

After all the evidence had been heard and duly considered, the council decided, by a solemn and deliberate vote, that both Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. had violated their oaths by continuing the schism, and that all Christians were released from the obligation of obedience to them! Benedict XIII. was accused of heresy upon the authority of the universities of Paris, Angiers, Orleans, and Toulouse, and three hundred doctors of that of Bononia. And all the accusations against him and Gregory XII. being fully sustained, a decree was unanimously passed declaring that they were both “manifest schismatics, favorers of schism, heretics, guilty of perjury and of the violation of their oaths; that they give a scandal to the whole Church by their manifest obstinateness and contumacy; that they are unworthy of all honor and dignity, and particularly of the pontifical; and that they are fallen from it, deprived of it, and separate from the Church, ipso facto.” The See of Rome was declared vacant; all Christians were forbidden to obey either of the popes; and all their judgments and sentences were declared null and void! (Du Pin, vol. xiii., D. 5.)

Now, when it is considered that this council was composed of one hundred and forty cardinals, archbishops, bishops, and mitered abbots, of twenty—six doctors of divinity, of three hundred doctors of civil and canon law, and of ambassadors from France, England, Jerusalem, Sicily, Cyprus, Poland, Brabant (a province of Belgium), Austria, Bavaria, and from a number of lesser powers, including some of the princes of Italy, it must require more than a common amount of assurance to pretend, as all the Jesuit and ultramontane writers now do, that infallibility was always and everywhere the universal doctrine of the Church! For although it has suited the purposes of the papacy to deny that the Council of Pisa was an ecumenical council, and to disguise its proceedings as much as possible, yet that it did represent the real sentiments of the Church is abundantly attested by the history of those times. There could not then have been assembled in Europe any considerable concourse of Christians who would not have denounced the infallibility of the pope as impious and unchristian. And of this we shall soon see more satisfactory proof than that furnished by the Council of Pisa.

After Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. had both been deposed, the Council of Pisa proceeded to the election of a new pope; when Alexander V. was chosen, and, being present, presided over the council and approved all its sentences and decrees. After a few more sessions the council adjourned, and another general council was ordered to meet in 1412, to provide for reform in the Church. Pope Alexander V. afterward published a bull in 1410, confirming all that the Council of Pisa had done, against which bull many ultramontane maledictions have since been hurled.

In the mean time, Gregory XII. assembled his council in Aquileia, but it was attended by very few prelates. He, however, caused it to decree that his election was canonical, as had been also that of Urban VI., Boniface IX., and Innocent X.; and that the elections of Clement VII., Benedict XIII., and Alexander V. “were temerarious (reckless), unlawful, and sacrilegious, and that they were schismatics and usurpers.” He, moreover, caused it to be announced that he would resign the pontifical dignity, in order to restore harmony, if Benedict XIII. and Alexander V. would do so; for it must be remembered that there were now three popes, each claiming to be the successor of Peter!

But Alexander V. was disposed neither to surrender his dignity nor to carry on the work of reform which was expected of him by the Council of Pisa. He was under the control of Balthasar Costa, who directed the measures of his pontificate with the sole view of making himself his successor, in which he succeeded. Yet he was, says Du Pin, “acknowledged for pope by all Christendom, except Apulia and some part of Italy which had not yet abandoned Gregory, and the kingdoms of Arragon, Castile, and Scotland, and the states of Count Armagnac, who acknowledged Benedict.”

At his death, which occurred in 1410, Balthasar Costa was elected his successor, and took the name of John XXIII. He made war upon the King of Naples with a view of wresting his dominions from him, and placing the Duke of Anjou upon his throne. The king, however, finally drove him from Rome, where he was hated by the people in consequence of his having “drawn great sums of money from the richest men in the city.” He took refuge at the Court of the King of Hungary, where he went to consult about the meeting of a council. He sent his legate to France with a bull, whereby he assured the French clergy that he desired that a council should be held at the time agreed on at Pisa, to endeavor to bring about a union between the Greek and Latin churches, to make peace between France and England, and “to reform the Church both in its head and members.” He finally succeeded, by obtaining the protection of Sigismund of Hungary, in getting his views so generally acquiesced in that he at last called the Council of Constance to meet in 1414—the time fixed at Pisa. This council, although thus convened by a pope who had participated in the proceedings of the Council of Pisa, and had, by acquiescing in them, committed himself to the doctrine that a council can try, condemn, and depose a pope, and, therefore, that popes are not infallible, is regarded by all the Church as the Sixteenth Ecumenical Council. Whatever it did, therefore, carries with it the highest sanction of the Church, and has all the authority of law.

At this council the means of restoring peace to the Church by terminating the schism were much discussed by the fathers. Deputies attended from Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII., the former of whom proposed his resignation. The fathers, however, although they declared that the Council of Pisa was lawfully celebrated, were mostly of opinion that the best way to put an end to the schism was to require that all three of the popes—Gregory XII., Benedict XIII., and John XXIII.—should resign! They held that, notwithstanding John XXIII. was a lawful pope, yet the Universal Church might constrain him to resign, and that the council was the representative of the Universal Church. John endeavored to defeat this measure by sowing divisions among the members of the council; but all his exertions in that direction were without avail, the vote being unanimous.

In the mean time an Italian bishop accused John XXIII. of having committed “all sorts of crimes,” which were not immediately made public. The prelates from Germany, England, and Poland thought they ought not to be published, because it “could only serve to disgrace the Holy See, to scandalize the Church, and throw it in confusion.” John at first thought he would defy the council, and deny their power to depose him, except for heresy; but he was persuaded by his friends not to make this attempt. Before the investigation of the charges was begun, the council proposed to him his resignation, according to the plan they had previously adopted. Embarrassed as he was, he had no other method left which seemed to open the door of escape; and he accepted the plan with apparent pleasure, proposing that he would voluntarily resign if Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. would also agree to do so. This contingent proposition was not acceptable to the council, and he made another, equally unsatisfactory for the same reasons. A third one was drawn up which, through fear of the Emperor Sigismund, he agreed to accept. He then pronounced the declaration, and the next day repeated it in the presence of the council. He vowed, and swore to God, to the Church, and the Holy Council, that he would resign so soon as Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII. should do so, or should be deprived of their claims to the pontificate by death or otherwise. He offered to visit Benedict XIII. himself and procure his abdication; but the council would not consent to this, suspecting that his only object was to get away from Constance, and thus break up its sessions. This suspicion was not without foundation; for soon after, notwithstanding he had promised the emperor that he would not leave, he escaped in disguise, and took shelter in a castle several leagues distant, followed by only five or six cardinals, four of whom returned in a few days.

This absence of the pope led immediately to the consideration in the council of the question whether the pope was above the council, and, therefore, infallible, or was inferior to it, and consequently not infallible. There were only six cardinals who maintained the first of these propositions, and who insisted that the council was dissolved in consequence of the absence of the pope. But the council answered them “that the pope was not above the council, but inferior to it,” thus directly and emphatically condemning the doctrine of papal infallibility! The ill—fated John XXIII., finding his efforts to break up the council ineffectual, fled to another castle, where he summoned a notary, and made solemn protestation against all that he had promised to the council, and sworn to because, as he said, he was “forced to it by violence and fear,” so little did the popes in those days regard even their most solemn oaths, though taken in the presence of an ecumenical council.

The council, in order to counteract the influences which John XXIII. was trying to invoke in his own behalf, then proceeded to pass several important decrees. In one of these it is declared that the Council of Constance was “lawfully assembled in the name of the Holy Ghost;” that it “represented the whole Catholic Church militant; had its power immediately from Jesus Christ; and that every person, of whatsoever state or dignity, even the pope himself, is obliged to obey it in what concerns the faith, the extirpation of schism, and the general reformation of the Church in its members and its head:” (*) Other decrees were passed, declaring that those who refused to obey the council, “even the popes themselves not excepted,” should be punished; that if the pope, when required by the council to renounce the pontificate, failed or delayed to do so, he had thereby forfeited his dignity, and no obedience was due him; and that if John XXIII. did not return to Constance, “they would proceed against him as a favorer of schism, and suspected of heresy.”

John XXIII. resorted to many subterfuges to escape his impending doom. He endeavored to apologize for his secret departure from Constance by pretending that it was necessary on account of the condition of his health; and even went so far as to propose the second time to resign. But the council had no confidence in him or his promises. Having already committed perjury by the violation of a most solemn oath, the fathers could put no other estimate upon him than that he was capable of any kind of treachery—was both base and false—hearted. They therefore proceeded with his trial, and, after the most careful examination of the evidence and full deliberation, found him guilty of crimes before which the iniquities of the basest of modern criminals dwarf into insignificance. Du Pin thus enumerates them:

“Lewdness and disorders in his youth, the purchasing of benefices by simony; his advancement to the dignity of a cardinal by the same means; his tyranny while he was legate at Bononia; his incests and adulteries while he was in that city; his poisoning of Alexander V. and his own physician; (*) his contempt of the divine offices after he was pope; his neglecting to recite the canonical prayers, and to practice the fasts, abstinences, and ceremonies of the Church; his denying justice, and oppressing the poor; his selling benefices and ecclesiastical dignities—to those that bid most; his authorizing an infinite number of dreadful abuses in distributing of preferments, and committing a thousand and a thousand cheats; his selling bulls, indulgences, dispensations, and other spiritual graces; his wasting the patrimony of the Church of Rome, and mortgaging that of other Churches; his maladministration of the spiritual and temporal affairs of the Church; and lastly his breaking the oath and promise he had made to renounce the pontificate, by re tiring shamefully from Constance, to maintain and continue the schism.” (**)

Cormenin gives the decision of the council somewhat more in detail, thus:

“The General Council of Constance, after having invoked the name of Christ and examined the accusations brought against John XXIII., and established on irrefragable proof, pronounces, decrees, and declares, that Balthasar Costa [the pope] is the oppressor of the poor, the persecutor of the just, the support of knaves, the idol of simoniacs, the slave of the flesh, a sink of vices, a man destitute of every virtue, a mirror of infamy, and devil incarnate; as such it deposes him from the pontificate, prohibiting all Christians from obeying him and calling him pope. The council further reserves to itself the punishment of his crimes in accordance with the laws of secular justice; and his pursuit as an obstinate and hardened, noxious, and incorrigible sinner, whose conduct is abominable and morals infamous; as a simoniac, ravisher, incendiary, disturber of the peace and unity of the Church; as a traitor, murderer, Sodomite, poisoner, committer of incest, and corrupter of young nuns and monks!” (*)

Few men have reached so low a point of infamy and degradation as that reached by John XXIII., who is recognized by all the Church historians as having been lawfully elected pope. On account of the enormity of his crimes, he was deposed and disgraced by the council, and all persons were forbidden to recognize him thereafter as pope, or to obey him. Thus reduced, and abandoned by the few friends who had previously adhered to him, he humiliatingly announced to the council that he had no defense to offer, declared the council to be most holy and infallible, and approved of all its decrees up to his deposition at the twelfth session, thus entitling that decree which declared that a general council was superior to the pope, and, therefore, that the pope was not infallible, to take its place in the canons and to become a part of the law of the Church!

The Jesuit defenders of infallibility, with all their cunning and ingenuity, have been sorely puzzled over this part of the history of the Church. They have found it exceedingly difficult to make the links in the chain of regular apostolic succession interlock each other. In whatsoever way they attempt it, they run afoul of numerous palpable facts which, when fully understood, upset all their theories.

In the “Catholic Family Almanac for the United States,” for 1870, there appears a chronological table of the Roman pontiffs, beginning with St. Peter and ending with Pius IX. (“Catholic Almanac,” 1870, pp. 47, 48.) This is intended for the instruction of the faithful. Referring to the forty years of disputed succession which followed the close of the pontificate of Urban VI., in 1389, it carries down the Roman line of succession as follows: Boniface IX., from 1389 to 1404; Innocent VII., from 1404 to 1406; Gregory XII., from 1406 to 1417; and then follows it with Martin V., from 1417 to 1431—thus making the line unbroken. Within these same years it puts down as “rival popes,” Clement VII., Benedict XIII., Alexander V., and John XXIII.

A recent “History of the Catholic Church,” published also in the United States in 1870, and highly commended for its accuracy, contains also a chronological table of the same kind. Covering the period given above, it makes the line as follows: Boniface IX., from 1389 to 1404; Innocent VII., from 1404 to 1406; Gregory XII., from 1406 to 1409; Alexander V., 1409; John XXIII., from 1409 to 1413; and then follows Martin V., from 1413 to 1431—with the additional statement, indicated by the letters “abd” opposite their names, that Gregory XII. abdicated in 1409, and John XXIII. in 1413. (“History of the Catholic Church,” by Rev. Theodore Noethen, p. 577.)

Now, without stopping to comment upon other facts connected with the great schism of forty years, during which the right to the chair of Peter was continually and obstinately contested, to the disgrace of all the parties and the injury of the cause of Christianity, it may be well asked, how are the faithful to decide between contradictory statements like these? One places Alexander V. and John XXIII. among the “rival popes,” and the other places them in the regular line of succession! One continues the pontificate of Gregory XII. in the regular line down to 1417, and makes no mention of Alexander V. and John XXIII. in that line; while the other represents Gregory XII. as having abdicated in 1409, and continues the regular line down to Martin V., with both Alexander V. and John XXIII. One represents Martin V. as having been made pope in 1417, and the other in 1413—four years before.

But the puzzle will become more difficult of solution to an intelligent investigator when he finds out, as he would do, that neither of these tables represents the precise truth. Gregory XII. was not pope from 1406 to 1417. He was elected at Rome in 1406, while Benedict XIII. was yet pope at Avignon, where he had held his pontifical court since 1394 as the successor of Clement VII. At the time of his election he promised the cardinals at Rome to resign if Benedict would do so, but afterward equivocated to such an extent that all his cardinals except four withdrew from him, and appealed from his authority to that of the Council of Pisa. This council deposed him in 1409, as they also did Benedict XIII., and elected Alexander V., who was regarded as the legal pope. Alexander V. was not, therefore, a “rival pope;” nor was John XXIII. Gregory XII. did not abdicate in 1409; but after he was then deposed by the Council of Pisa, claimed still to be pope as against Benedict XIII., Alexander V., and John XXIII. up till the fourteenth session of the Council of Constance, in 1415, when he resigned his right to the pontificate and recognized the validity of the council. The council then approved of what he had canonically done; (Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 18.) that is, what he had done before he was deposed by the Council of Pisa. This broke his fall somewhat by recognizing him as legal pope at Rome against Benedict XIII. at Avignon, from 1406 to 1409—only three years out of the twelve which he claimed. And this was perhaps more a matter of policy and necessity than principle; for if Gregory XII. was not the lawful pope from 1406 to 1409, then Benedict XIII. was; and he is properly put down as a “rival pope” in one of the above tables, and does not appear in the other at all. And if Gregory XII. was a lawful pope after he was deposed by the Council of Pisa, then Alexander V., who was elected by that council, was not. As the Council of Constance decided that at Pisa to have been regularly and legally held, and recognized Alexander V. and John XXIII. both to be legal popes, they could not stultify themselves by approving of what Gregory XII. had done after he was deposed; for that would have been equivalent to deciding that Peter had two successors at the same time!

But, apart from this confusion in tracing out the line of regular apostolic succession, this complicated condition of affairs suggests this most pertinent inquiry: where, during all this time, was infallibility deposited? Was Gregory XII. infallible? He was deposed by the Council of Pisa, and the Council of Constance recognized the act as valid. Was Benedict XIII. infallible? He also was deposed by the same authority. Was John XXIII. infallible? He was deposed by the Council of Constance, after having been found guilty of the most outrageous offenses. Was the Council of Constance infallible? That it claimed infallibility is certainly true; that the whole Church assented to this claim is also true, and yet to affirm now that it was would be heresy, under the decree of the late Lateran Council. By it the faithful are taught that the pope is alone the possessor of infallibility, and is the source from which all others receive it. Therefore they are driven to the necessity of deciding that Gregory XII., or Benedict XIII., or John XXIII. was infallible. If they select Gregory XII., the Council of Pisa stands in the way to condemn them. If they select Benedict XIII., they meet the same difficulty. If John XXIII., the Council of Constance, and his tremendous catalog of crimes, stare them in the face. If they pass by all three of them, and lodge infallibility in the General Council of Constance, they are pronounced heretics by Pius IX. and his Jesuit and ultramontane prelates, and cut off from the Church by excommunication.

What, then, are the faithful to do in the midst of all these complications? To a common—sense mind this question would be hard to answer; but the defenders of the papacy are equal to the occasion. See how admirably this difficulty is disposed of by St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who wrote shortly after the schism. He says:

“It is possible for one to have belonged to either party in good faith and with a safe conscience, for, although it is necessary to believe that there is but one visible head of the Church, if it should nevertheless happen that two sovereign pontiffs are elected at the same time, it is not obligatory to accept either as the legitimate pope; but only to acknowledge as the true pope the one who has been canonically elected; and the people are not expected to determine which is the pope, but can follow the opinion and guidance of their pastors.” (*)

That is to say, “it is necessary to believe that there is but one” pope at a time, but “not obligatory.” Peter can have but one legitimate successor occupying the pontifical chair; but if there should be two, it is no matter, as it is “not obligatory” upon the faithful to select between them. All that is necessary is to believe that one or the other is the pope, no matter which. “The people” are too ignorant and simple—minded to “determine” anything about matters of so much intricacy. All they are required to do is to “follow the opinion and guidance of their pastors!” to avoid all thoughts of their own, all investigation of the facts, and passively submit to whatsoever commands shall be given them. Even though, as was the case in the instances referred to, one set of the faithful should be taught by their pastors to support one pope, and another class another pope, stll no matter! for notwithstanding each should denounce the other as a heretic and guilty of all sorts of crimes, still, as infallibility must be somewhere, one or the other must have it!

Until the Council of Pisa deposed Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII., the faithful were permitted to believe that either was infallible as taught by their pastors. And the only effect of the election of Alexander V. by the council was to add to the list another representative of infallibility. The necessary effect was, each was infallible to those who followed him, so that infallibility became triplicated, existing, in three places at the same time.

The Church had not so many heads as Briareus, yet it had so many that nobody then and nobody now can tell which was the true head! And yet this book, designed for the edification of American readers, after admitting that “the obstinacy of the popes” divided the Christian world, “increased the schism, and caused all the subsequent evils” to the Church; and that as “God has promised his Church that he will not forsake her in time of extreme peril,” his providence selected the cardinals as the agents for convening a council in defiance of these schismatic popes, and thus saving the Church from overthrow—after admitting all this with every appearance of candor, does not hesitate to tell us that each of these popes was infallible to his followers; that each was in the line of regular apostolic succession; that each wore the crown and held the sword of St. Peter, provided only that the pastors who paid obedience to each so commanded their several flocks to believe, as they undoubtedly did! And this is put forth with apparent sincerity in this intelligent and investigating age, as if mens’ minds were still encased in an impenetrable coat of ignorance and stupidity, and bold and unblushing dogmatism were alone possessed of impunity.

But it will not do to pass by the Council of Constance without further comment. When it is remembered that it is regarded by all the Church as ecumenical; that the pope found guilty by it of the most infamous crimes belongs to the regular line of succession from Peter; and that he was the pope at Rome; some of the impending difficulties in the way of reform in the Church may be seen and appreciated, even at this distance of time. It was claimed that the “chair of St. Peter” was at Rome, and that the Church there was, consequently, “the mother and mistress of all the Churches.”

As pagan Rome was the chief imperial city of the world, so the popes, in imitation of the emperors, had endeavored to make Christian Rome the sole representative of ecclesiastical imperialism. It was so in the person of John XXIII., an Italian, who was in possession of the Vatican, of all the holy churches of Rome, of the triple papal crown, of the fisherman’s ring, of all the relics of the saints, part of the true cross, of the thorns in the cross of Christ, and of the garments worn by the Virgin Mary, and the thousands of other things which the ignorant and superstitious are still taught to worship. And, more than all that, was he not in fallible, so that he could not err in matters of faith or morals?—though steeped in crime and villainy sufficient to contaminate the whole atmosphere of Rome. The festering and consuming sore of corruption was, therefore, more violent at the heart of the Church than at the extremities; it was viler and more filthy there than the world ever saw anywhere else, in any of the departments of society, since Sodom and Gomorrah were overwhelmed by the wrath of God. And such was the solemn and deliberate decision of an ecumenical council, pronounced without a single dissenting voice!

There were some good men in the council who desired to make it a reform council—the ostensible object for which it was convened. But the ideas which prevailed with the majority limited the work of reform to the pope alone: they desired to reform him, but not themselves. If the cardinals and higher prelates of the Church had been willing to practice such virtues as they demanded of the pope, and of the inferior clergy, results very different from those which did ensue might have been brought about. But, so far from this having been the case, a large number of them were as corrupt as the pope, and habitually practiced the very vices they condemned in him, thus influencing the lower clergy to a still greater degree of degradation. And such is the undeniable voice of all impartial history. John Huss, after the conviction and disgrace of John XXIII., thus spoke from his dreary prison at Gottlieben:

“The council has condemned its chief—its proper head—for having sold indulgences, bishoprics, in fact, everything; and yet among those who have condemned him are many bishops who are themselves guilty of the shameful traffic!…. O profligate men! why did you not first pull out the beam from your own eye?…. They have declared the seller to be accursed, and have condemned him, and yet themselves are the purchasers. They are the other party in the compact, and yet they remain unpunished.” (Life and Times of John Huss,” by Gillett, vol. i., p. 524.)

The learned Clemingis, who lived in those days, whose Christian fidelity was unquestioned, and who, together with Gerson and D’Ailly, shed luster upon the University of Paris, spoke of the members of the council as “carnal, for the most part bent on their pleasures, not to say their lusts;” and said:

“These carnal sons of the Church do not only have no care or apprehension of spiritual things, but they even persecute those who walk after the Spirit, as has been the case from the days of just Abel, and will be to the end of time. These are the men who fly together to the Church merely to seize upon temporalities; who lead in the Church a secular life, conspire, covet, plunder, rejoice in pre-eminence, not in profiting others; oppress and rob their subjects; glory in the honor of promotion; riot in pomp, pride, and luxury; who count gain godliness, sneer at such as wish to live holily, chastely, innocently, spiritually, calling them hypocrites….. Of such men the Church is full this day, and scarcely, in whole chapters or universities, can you find any others….. Are men like these the ones to exert themselves for a reformation of the Church—men who would account such a reformation the greatest calamity to themselves? (Apud Gillett, ibid.)

The Council of Constance, controlled by men of this sort, and subject to such influences as would naturally emanate from them, while its action, like that of the Council of Pisa, was a blow at the ambition of the papacy and the infallibility of the pope, did as much as lay in its power to advance the cause of ecclesiastical absolutism, and to crush out the rising and growing spirit of inquiry which had been excited by Anselm, Arnold, Savonarola, and Wycliffe, of former times, and by John Huss and Jerome of Prague, who then lived. The trial, condemnation, and execution of Huss and of Jerome will remain a reproach to it as long as history is read—will forever convict it of injustice, cruelty, intolerance, and persecution. Whatever amount of ingenuity may be expended, and however the facts may be perverted and distorted by Jesuit art and cunning, it cannot be disguised that the cruelty practiced toward them was designed as a condemnation of free thought, and an attempt on the part of the highest authority of the Roman Catholic Church to perpetuate the corruption and vices which then prevailed at the expense of all that was sanctified in the former history of the Church, and that purity of faith and practice which it had derived from the teaching and example of the apostolic Christians. No language is fertile enough in words of denunciation to express what all intelligent and thinking, minds must feel in relation to it.

Both Huss and Jerome had always led pure and Christian lives. No charge of vice or immorality was ever made against either of them. The Bohemian Christians venerated and followed them, not merely on account of their eloquence as preachers, but because no breath of suspicion ever rested upon their integrity as men or upon their fidelity as Christians. But they were accused of favoring the doctrines of Wycliffe, which pointed to reform; and that was an unpardonable sin, because they struck at the multifarious forms of vice and corruption which were then sanctioned by the example of such popes as John XXIII., and such prelates as constituted the majority of the Council of Constance. This pope and these prelates were their accusers, triers, and executioners, and it should surprise no one to know with what alacrity they hastened to their conviction, and how their hearts leaped with gladness when the torches that consumed their bodies were lighted by their emissaries.

John Huss had a “safe-conduct” from the Emperor Sigismund, under whose influence John XXIII. consented that the council should be held. He was promised full protection both in going and returning to the council, where he was summoned to answer the charge of heresy. Yet this promise of protection was violated, to the damning disgrace of all the parties concerned in the treacherous and dastardly act. Whether it was justified by the perpetrators of the wrong upon the declared ground that “faith should not be kept with heretics,” is no matter, since it is undoubtedly true that such was the doctrine which then prevailed among the popes and the leading members of the hierarchy, and which yet prevails, as there are volumes of evidence to show. Both upon this and less satisfactory grounds, innumerable contracts, agreements, and promises have been violated and disregarded without the slightest compunctions of conscience; and in all these matters the popes themselves were far ahead of all others.

Whether John XXIII. or Sigismund was most to blame for the betrayal of Huss is of no consequence now, since the pope is shown to have been capable of that or any other enormity, and the emperor was ready to do whatsoever was necessary to the protection of his imperial authority. The council was equally guilty with either or both of them, for, knowing that the “safe-conduct” had been given by the very authority under which it convened, if it had not been insensible to shame it would have scorned to maintain a jurisdiction acquired over a defenseless adversary by such base and cowardly means. Du Pin says, “The pope and the emperor invited John Huss to come thither,” and “the emperor granted him a safe—conduct.” (Du Pin, vol. xiii., p. 120. ) This invitation, if it did not expressly engage the pope to good faith, implied it so strongly that any man less infamous than John XXIII. would have protested against its violation. And if the council had entertained any respect for the pope, and had not been influenced by the loose principles of morality which then prevailed, the blood of John Huss would not yet be clinging to its skirts.

The next morning after Huss arrived at Constance, two noblemen, who had accompanied him, visited the pope to notify him of his arrival. They inquired of him whether he could safely remain without ally risk of violence. The pope replied: “Had he killed my own brother, not a hair of his head should be touched while he remained in the city.” ( “History of the Council of Constance,” by L’Enfant; apud Gillett, vol. i., p. 329 (note 1).) So that, if the pope was not a party to the “safe-conduct,” he gave his solemn promise that it should be ob served. Either would have bound an honest man, but neither would have bound John XXIII.! Even his oath, taken before the council with a solemn appeal to God, could not bind him, infallible as he was!

Infamous as John XXIII. was, he was not destitute of ability or cunning. Having reached Constance some time before the emperor, he endeavored to shape the policy of the council so as to divert attention from his own crimes. He had already distinguished his pontificate by emptying the vials of his wrath upon the head of King Ladislaus of Naples for no other offense than his having been an ally of Gregory XII., which, as we have just been taught by Noethen, quoting from St. Antoninus, was no offense against the law of the Church. Harmless as this preference of Ladislaus is now pretended to have been,yet for it alone he was declared by this infallible pope to be “a heretic, a schismatic, a man guilty of high treason against the majesty of God;” a crusade was proclaimed against him, and those who should take part in it were promised that all their sins should be forgiven, upon repentance and confession. (Gillett, vol i., p. 181.)

His success in bringing the hierarchy to adopt his views in reference to Ladislaus, and his promptness in dealing with heresy, led him to believe that if he could turn the attention of the council to inquiries of that kind, he might himself escape. Accordingly, “the foil he used was the heresy of Huss,” which he hoped would give him the opportunity of showing how faithfully he guarded the faith of the Church! To effect his purpose the more certainly, he caused his bull of convocation to be read, wherein, in order to establish the legitimacy of his own pontificate, he claimed that the Council of Constance was but a continuation of that of Pisa, and then announced, through one of his cardinals, that the council would be expected to direct its attention especially to some prevalent errors of doctrine, and “pre—eminently to those which were originated by Wycliffe,” knowing that Huss had been accused of maintaining them. He succeeded in part of his plan, that is, in inciting the persecution of Huss, but not in escaping the doom which he himself so richly merited. (Gillett,vol. i., p. 342.)

Huss, when summoned before the council, was told that he had been charged with disseminating “errors of the gravest kind” in Bohemia, but they were not specifically stated. He was only notified that they were “manifestly opposed to the Catholic Church.” To this indefinite accusation he replied, like an honest man, “If any one can convince me of any error, I will unhesitatingly abjure it.” (Ibid., p. 345.) Specific articles of accusation were, however, afterward drawn up against him, by which it was charged, 1st, that he rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation; 2d, with maintaining that a priest in mortal sin cannot administer the sacraments; 3d, that by the Church is not to be understood the pope, clergy, or members of the hierarchy; 4th, that the endowment of the Church by secular princes is unwise; 5th, that all priests are equal, and it is false that bishops alone have the right to consecrate and ordain; 6th, that the entire Church has no power of the keys, when the whole clergy is in gross sin; and, 7th, that he had contemned his excommunication by saying mass everyday on his journey to Constance. (Ibid., p. 347.)

He was immediately arrested and held in custody as a prisoner, to answer this indictment. His place of imprisonment was a nauseous and unhealthy apartment, “through which every sort of impurity was discharged into the lake”—of Constance. When the emperor, who had not yet arrived, heard of this, he sent forward ambassadors to demand the release of Huss, but he was not discharged. On account of his sickness, occasioned by the foul air he was compelled to breathe in his filthy and poisonous dungeon, he was at last removed to more healthy apartments. This is said to have been done by the pope, “lest Huss should die in prison, and the cause of orthodoxy lose the incense of a burning heretic.” ( Ibid., p. 357.) His failing health admonished him of the necessity of having an advocate to defend him, and he asked that one might be appointed. But this was refused; and he was told “that, according to the canon law, no one could be allowed to take the part or plead the cause of a man suspected of heresy;” an act of tyranny worthy only of the most heartless despotism.

Weak and feeble as he was, however, his defense of himself was a masterly exhibition of his great powers of mind, and of his unflinching courage. But it was of no avail. All sorts of evidence were admitted against him; everything he said was tortured into heresy; and, after a mock trial of a few days, he was pronounced by this great ecumenical council to be guilty not of any crime, but of daring to think! He had ventured to say that immoral priests could not administer the sacraments, and this was considered by a majority of the council as an impeachment of themselves. He had endeavored to lower the pride and diminish the authority of the pope and hierarchy, and had thus brought himself under the ban of these corrupt officials. Of course he was convicted—that had been predetermined—for no victim could be furnished so likely as Huss to satisfy the world of the orthodoxy of the council and the pope!

There was but a single mode of escape for this intrepid champion of free thought; that was, to admit the errors charged against him, and to retract them. Unconscious of error, he could not in his conscience admit it; and therefore he had nothing to retract. He appealed to reason and the enlightened judgment of the council; but that body refused him the right to address himself to any motive higher than that which grew out of its own selfish and partisan passions, and demanded unconditional submission. It would allow no debate, no inquiry; every one of its assumptions had to be accepted as infallibly true. Huss, then, when he demanded to be heard in defense of his own opinions, was the representative of the free spirit of the present age—the champion of that intellectual and moral freedom upon which the central column of Protestantism is now resting. How much fairer and nobler a place does he occupy in history than the infamous pope whose victim he became, or any of those members of the council who aided in producing his conviction! Their names are scarcely known except to the readers of history, while his is lisped by almost every schoolboy throughout Christendom.

Jerome met the same fate. He and Huss were burned at the stake—martyrs in the cause of truth and freedom. Neither of them exhibited the slightest fear of death. No quivering muscle displayed the cowardice of conscious guilt. They were heroes in the highest sense, and left behind them influences which were not long in producing fruits, not expected by their persecutors, but which laid the foundation for some of the grandest results in history.

To pretend that the Roman Catholic Church is not guilty of the death of Huss and Jerome, as the papists do, is worse than idle. The Council of Constance was its highest authority. It represented the entire Church, and in this capacity tried, convicted, and turned them over to the secular authorities for execution. After their conviction, and before they were removed from the council chamber, paper crowns were placed upon their heads. These were covered with “pictured fiends” with flames around them, to signify that they were devoted to death by burning. (Gillett, vol. ii., pp. 65, 255.)

When this was placed upon the head of Huss, his persecutors exclaimed, “We devote thy soul to the devils in hell,” which was more the language of a fiend than of a Christian. The council knew what the result of the conviction would be. The Church at that time shaped the domestic policy of the nations, in so far as it concerned the Church or dealt with heresy. Wherever there was an emperor or king who refused to enact laws against heretics consistently with the decree of persecution enacted by the Fourth Lateran Council, he was cursed and excommunicated, and his subjects were released from their allegiance. Hence the law under which Huss and Jerome were executed was the result of that obedience which the nations then paid to the Church, which the Church required of them, and for the failure or refusal to pay which it visited its severest punishments upon them. The blood, therefore, of these murdered Christians is still crying out against the hierarchy of the Church, and will not be washed away until they learn to exchange their persecuting intolerance for the mild and forbearing teachings of the Gospel.

Soon after the vengeance of the Council of Constance had spent itself in the flames which consumed the bodies of Huss and Jerome, avengers begun to spring up on every side to proclaim anew the truths uttered by them, and more especially to assert the right to challenge the oppressions and usurpations of imperialism. The contest became one between reason and authority—between the papacy, wielding all the power of the Church in maintaining its demand for absolute and uninquiring submission, and in denying to its followers free access to the Scriptures, and the right of free inquiry into the truths of religion, philosophy, and science.

In order ignobly to maintain its authority, and thus to perpetuate the existing corruptions, every artifice was employed. Bulls of excommunication and ecclesiastical interdicts— employed far more frequently in reference to secular than spiritual affairs—were the common resort of the popes, who, forgetting that God still reigned over the world, impiously claimed that they could open or close the gates of heaven and hell at their pleasure, and could withdraw the thunder and the lightning from the sky to scathe and blast the opponents of their ignominious and debasing vices. What wonder is there, then, that these avengers arose within the Church, when they remembered how much it had done to Christianize and civilize the world, and how much of apostolic purity there was yet retained in its cherished faith? They saw clearly that the struggle involved the life of Christianity and the dearest hopes of the Christian world; and the inspiriting thought that they were the champions of such a cause gave them a courage and heroism which the world will never cease to admire. The oceans of blood which papal imperialism caused to be shed throughout the beautiful plains and valleys of Europe have not been sufficient to wash from the pages of history the bright record of their virtues and their courage. The flames could consume their bodies, but other flames were enkindled which could not be extinguished; and from out of these flashed forth the light of truth.

The Bohemians were very much attached to Huss and Jerome, and their cruel murder produced intense excitement among them. The King of Bohemia observing, one day, a nobleman, named John Zisca, deeply wrapped in thought, inquired of him what he was thinking about; when he replied: “I was thinking on the affront offered to our kingdom by the death of John Huss.” The king replied: “It is out of your power or mine to revenge it, but if you know which way to do it, exert yourself.” (“Church History,” by Fry, London, 1824, p. 261.)

And he did exert himself in such a way as to bring down terrible revenge upon the heads of the persecutors. With the assistance of Nicholas de Hussinetz, he raised an army of forty thousand men, and a war immediately ensued between the emperor, as the representative of papal imperialism, and the Bohemians, which lasted for thirteen years. Inhuman cruelties were practiced on both sides, and the termination of the struggle was marked by a concession to the Bohemians which they considered of the utmost importance in maintaining their faith and mode of religious worship. This was the allowance to their laity of the use of the cup in the sacrament, which the Romanists had denied to them, because it gave too much importance to the common people. The introduction of this concession in the treaty of peace was, to some extent, the recognition of the fact that the laity were not a mere canaille (riffraff); and it resulted, ultimately, in bringing about a union between the Waldenses and the Hussites, and in giving new impetus to the cause of the Moravian Christians. And although the Hussites were banished from Moravia some time afterward, they had two hundred congregations in Bohemia and Moravia at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Martin V. was elected pope by the Council of Constance, and having finally succeeded, after much difficulty, in getting rid of his rivals, was also anxious to get rid of the council—for, like other popes, he desired to govern alone. He was afraid to break it up, and endeavored to keep in its favor by continuing to execute the Hussites, making for that purpose “a magnificent auto-da-fe (public execution)!” Unable to accomplish his wish in this way, he announced his intention of leaving Constance, but was opposed in this by the emperor, who desired to have the relations between them satisfactorily arranged. Martin, dreading the possibility of being cited to a new council, in case of disagreement with the emperor, thought to put an end to the proceedings by resort to a pontifical bull, wherein he maintained that “a pope was the absolute judge of his own actions, in all circumstances, and that he could annul the promises he had previously made!” (Cormenin, vol. ii., p. 111.) And he adopted this principle in practice.

He endeavored to establish the papal rule over the cities of Genoa, Venice, Florence, and Naples, which had freed themselves from the tyranny of the popes. He found the husband of Joanna, Queen of Naples, driven out in consequence of his cruelties; and, taking advantage of the existing disorders, he offered the crown to Louis of Anjou, on condition of his assisting him to re-acquire the papal possessions, thus claiming the divine right to dispose of crowns and kingdoms. Joanna, to defeat this, obtained assistance from Alphonso, King of Arragon; and as the pope’s army was upon the eve of being defeated, the wily pope had recourse to the cunning expedient of making another agreement with Alphonso, to the effect that if he would dethrone Joanna, he would obtain the renunciation of Louis of Anjou, and give the crown to him. Alphonso consented, and seized the government of Naples, requiring an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants. Joanna fled, and Alphonso became master of Naples. He called on the pope for the fulfillment of his promise, by deposing Joanna and conferring the title of king upon him. But as the pope, when he made the promise, had not the slightest idea of complying with it, he replied, very deliberately, that “he had never intended to fulfill the promises he had made him!” (Ibid., p. 113.) that the crown of right belonged to Louis, who had bought the investiture of it from Popes Alexander V. and John XXIII.; and that, besides, he would not aid a prince who had given shelter to a rival pope, as Alphonso had done to Benedict XIII. His solemn promise did not weigh with him the weight of a feather.

Alphonso determined to avenge the insult, and Martin V., seeing that he was likely to do it effectually, sent to him a legate to sue for peace. But Alphonso, having learned his perfidy and hypocrisy sufficiently, declined any intercourse with the legate, and published an edict forbidding the reception of any of the pope’s bulls in Spain. This was purely a temporal matter, yet the pope issued a bull against the King of Arragon declaring him an enemy of religion, a supporter of schism, and as such deprived him of his dignity and kingdom; not, it will be observed, for any sin against God and the Church, but for daring to rebuke him, an infallible pope, for his perfidy and want of truth.

The pope now gathered an army of Italian, French, German, and English soldiers, and sent them into Bohemia, under the command of one of his cardinals, to exterminate all who embraced the doctrines of Huss. The Bohemians were not easily overcome, and drove the papal troops out of their country. But the pope, although thus defeated, was gratified that he had succeeded in stirring up a civil war in Germany, from which he hoped great gains to the papal cause. Therefore he wrote to his defeated legate:

“You will immediately recruit new troops to recommence hostilities, and to wash out, in the blood of the Hussites, the opprobrium with which your name is covered. Let no consideration arrest you; spare neither money nor men. Believe that we are acting for religion, and that God has no more agreeable holocaust than the blood of his enemies! Strike with the sword, and when your arm cannot reach the guilty, employ poison, burn all the towns of Bohemia, that fire may purify this accursed land; transform the country into arid steppes, and let the dead bodies of the heretics hang from the trees in greater number than the leaves of the forest.” (Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 115, 116.)

Benedict XIII. having died, and Clement VIII. having resigned his claims to the pontificate, Martin V. became the sole possessor of the tiara, in 1429, thus ending the great Western schism, which had for more than fifty years enabled the chief actors to exhibit themselves as “ambitious, avaricious, vindictive, debauched, and cruel; solely occupied with duping men, and changing the holy water into a stream of gold.” This gave to Martin V. more leisure to prosecute his war of extermination of the Hussites; and we have still further insight into the character of this war, and the policy of this infallible pope, by the following letter, addressed by him to the King of Poland, endeavoring to procure his aid in bringing back the Bohemians to the true faith:

“Know that the interests of the Holy See, and those of your crown, make it a duty to exterminate the Hussites. Remember that these impious persons dare proclaim principles of equality; they maintain that all Christians are brethren, and that God has not given to privileged men the right of ruling the nations; they hold that Christ came on earth to abolish slavery; they call the people to liberty, that is, to the annihilation of kings and priests. While there is still time, then, turn your forces against Bohemia; burn, massacre, make deserts everywhere, for nothing could be more agreeable to God, or more useful to the cause of kings, than the extermination of the Hussites.” (Cormenin, vol. ii., pp. 116,117.)

Martin V. did not live long enough, after issuing this bloody edict, to witness its desolating effect upon the Bohemians. The gallant Hussites, invigorated by the consciousness that they were defending an inalienable right which God had given them, rallied, like true soldiers, to the defense of their principles and their homes, and cut the papal army to pieces, driving it back in dismay and disgrace. At their hands liberty won another triumph over imperialism, and the cause of free conscience was, under the protecting providence of God, still preserved. The shock which the pope sustained when this sad news reached the Vatican was too great for him. Finding himself thus defied, and with an army routed and dispirited, he was seized with a fit of apoplexy, and died, disappointed in his hopes, and despised by all except those who were united with him in the effort to keep the people in degradation and perpetuate the reign of papal and imperial absolutism. But he lived long enough to show the world that the canon of the Fourth Lateran Council, which commanded the extermination of heresy by force, was still the law of the Church, and that from it the papacy derived the leading and governing principle of its action. With a view to the enforcement of this law, he proclaimed his infallibility, that he might the more readily grasp sufficient temporal power to unsheath the swords of princes, and send forth their armies, with torch and fagot, to murder, to destroy, and to desolate some of the fairest portions of Europe. What impious blasphemy it is to say that God was on the side of the fiendish and infernal work prescribed by this pope for the defenders of papal sovereignty!

But the healing of the schism to which the pontificate of Martin V. led did not put an end to the corruptions of popes, prelates, or priests. God seems to have permitted these to continue during the remainder of the fifteenth century, and into the sixteenth, in order that the Christian world might realize how far the papacy had departed from the teachings and practices of the apostolic age, and be prepared for the ushering—in of the Protestant Reformation. Notwithstanding that torrents of blood were shed, and the fires of the terrible Inquisition were kindled, and gibbets and scaffolds were erected wherever the papacy had power, God did not design that the world should be longer ruled by depraved popes and priests; and, therefore, by the consummation of that great event, he marked out for it new roads to happiness and prosperity, and to Christianity fresh triumphs in more peaceful fields. And thousands who had before felt the crushing weight of papal oppression, and groaned under the burden, enlisted under the banner of religious freedom, which has been borne onward and upward, through terrible trials, until at last it floats in front of the Vatican at Rome, despite the curses and anathemas of Pope Pius IX., who, that it might again be trailed in the dust before him, invites another crusade, revives the canon of the Lateran Council, and gnashes his teeth in desperate rage, because there is no king upon any throne to do his bidding, and because mankind will not tamely submit to the pressure of his heel upon their necks.

By the proclamation of his sovereignty, his infallibility, and his omnipotence, he leaves no room to doubt that he desires to turn the Christian world back from its progressive advancement into the terrible condition from which the Reformation raised it, and by the substitution of terror, hatred, and intolerance, for love, charity, and toleration, to will again universal supremacy for the papacy. To do this, he would enslave all peoples who will not obey him, destroy all governments wherein the people have power, abrogate every law in conflict with papal enactments, restore the universal reign of kings, and establish a Holy Empire, with ecclesiastical supremacy, upon the ruins of all popular government.

Continued in The Papacy And The Civil Power – Chapter XVIII. Resistance to Civil Power.

By Kevin Annett

(This is a re-post from https://murderbydecree.com/2025/05/17/international-court-to-investigate-pope-leos-complicity-in-the-ritual-murder-of-children-and-the-disappearance-of-emanuela-orlandi/

Eyewitnesses saw Leo/Robert Prevost at Ninth Circle sacrificial ceremonies as early as September 1978

BREAKING NEWS: Saturday, May 17, 2025

Rome and Brussels:

The court that prosecuted Pope Benedict and forced him from office is launching a criminal lawsuit against ‘Pope’ Leo XIV/Robert Prevost, charging him with complicity in murder, criminal conspiracy, and crimes against humanity.

The case against the Bishop of Rome is based on new evidence linking him to the ritual rape and murder of children as a newly ordained priest, and to the torture and disappearance of Emanuela Orlandi on summer solstice of 1983.

Investigators with the International Common Law Court of Justice (ICLCJ) have interviewed a former participant in the Ninth Circle cult as well as a victim-survivor of its grisly rituals. Both witnesses claim that Robert Prevost participated in the killing of children as part of his induction into the cult.

The witnesses state that Prevost was also present at the rape, torture and subsequent disappearance of Emanuela Orlandi on June 22, 1983 in a chamber beneath the Vatican.

The Court has obtained corroborating Vatican archival evidence consisting of a “log” of the details of all Ninth Circle ceremonies held in Rome since 1870. This record confirms Prevost’s presence at these events in September 1978 and June 1983.

According to the Court Prosecutor,

“Apparently the new pope Leo, Robert Prevost, was inducted into the Ninth Circle soon after his ordination as a priest, in September 1978, the same month that the former Pope John Paul I was murdered in the Vatican. Prevost’s induction into the cult occurred at midnight on October 16, 1978 in a sub-basement catacomb beneath the Vatican. During that initiation, the newly appointed Pope John Paul II presided at the ritual killing, dismembering and cannibalizing of a four-year-old Italian boy.

“Prevost was also present on June 22, 1983 when Emanuela Orlandi was kidnapped by Vatican agents, raped and tortured by Ninth Circle members, and then taken to Germany to be sexually trafficked and possibly sacrificed.

“Like every Roman pontiff, Robert Prevost was chosen as pope from a select stable of Ninth Circle members who have been groomed by the cult for years and have proved their loyalty to its carnage.”

In addition, the Court will be investigating Pope Leo’s links to Catholic-run child trafficking and killing cults in Canada, America, Peru, and Argentina, including those connected to the deceased Pope Francis/Jorge Bergoglio.

The Court will convene on Monday, June 2, 2025 under the Law of Nations and with the participation of international jurists. That same week, the Court Prosecutor will present lawful Summonses to ‘Pope Leo’ and his accomplices to appear before the Court for arraignment when the trial begins on Monday, September 1, 2025.

Regular public and media briefings on the Prevost case will be issued by the Court during the summer and prior to the trial’s commencement.

The Court is offering rewards and immunity from prosecution to any persons with information or evidence that leads to the criminal conviction of Robert Prevost/‘Pope Leo XIV’ under international law.

The Court can be contacted at [email protected] . 

Issued by the Press Office of the International Common Law Court of Justice on Saturday, May 17, 2025

A young Emanuela Orlandi in front of Pope John Paull II/Karol Wojtyla, her rapist and trafficker

See: Emanuela Orlandi, new revelations by Mehmet Ali Agca: “The kidnapping was an internal fact of the Vatican”

Schematic of Vatican Grottos and the site of Ninth Circle sacrificial ceremonies involving each pope since at least 1870: The killings occur in Chamber U, “The Tomb of Lucifer’) :