The Vatican Against Europe – Edmond Paris
Part I THE EVIDENCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR
CHAPTER I THE EUROPEAN SITUATION ON THE EVE OF 1914
Contents
THE Triple Alliance. — Pope Pius X, Pope of the Austro-Germans. — Papal absolutism: the fatality of clericalism. — The rapprochement between the Vatican and Berlin. — The Catholic Zentrum supports Prussian militarism. — The Vatican’s marked hostility towards France. — President Loubet’s journey to Rome. — The Pope refuses to receive him. — The Vatican does not favour a Franco-Italian rapprochement that would weaken the Triple Alliance. — The Law of Separation of Church from State is promulgated in France. — The break with the Vatican. — France is treated as Enemy No. 1 by the Papacy. — Mgr. Cristiani, or the art of falsifying history.
these claims, men need the souls of slaves!”
J. W. DRAPER,
Professor at the University of New York
“Germany is the element upon which the Holy
Father can and must base great hopes.”
MGR. FRUHWIRTH.
“One has to fight with fists. In a duel, blows are neither
counted nor measured. . . . War is not fought with charity.”
POPE plus X.
EVER since 1882, the Triple Alliance had united Germany, Austria and Italy. Just what this union signified for each, Count Carlo Sforza, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Italy, reveals to us in his book “L’ltalie telle que je l’ai vue“:
“‘A treaty’, wrote Bismarck to Kalnoky on 10 February 1887, ‘will always have its gaps, even if it is most meticulously drafted; when necessary, there will always be a way of evading the clearest stipulations. At present, it is important for us that, should Austria-Hungary enter into war with Russia, she be assured of non-aggression by Italy. That can be obtained only through Italian neutrality’. These two sentences reveal the idea of an offensive war against Russia, something which Italy would never have accepted. . . .”
Sforza goes on to describe the secret satisfaction with which news of the assassination of Archduke Franoois-Ferdinand at Sarajevo was received not only by the Emperor, thus relieved of his dynastic problems arising from the Archduke’s morganatic marriage, but also by the camarilla of the Court of Vienna and the magnates of Hungary, who saw in this assassination the long-awaited pretext for crushing Serbia.
The proof, he asserts, is given us by the wording of the Viennese memorandum aimed at ensuring the support of Germany’s armed forces in the event of an Austro-Serbian war. Drafted before the assassination, and submitted to William II shortly after the event, it bore a post-script which pointed to this murder as proof of the irreconcilable antagonism existing between the Monarchy and Serbia.
Vienna took great care not to send the memorandum to her other ally, democratic Italy. Indeed, it was recalled therein that shortly before the Treaty of Bucarest, which, in 1913, sanctioned the Serbian annexations in Macedonia and the transfer of Salomca to Greece, the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary in Rome, Merey, announced to Marquis San Giuliano, without any psychological preparation whatsoever, the Monarchy’s decision to attack Serbia. Prime Minister Giolitti replied that, in such an eventuality, the casus foederis would not be justified, and insisted that Germany should dissuade Austria from throwing herself into this perilous venture.
“Without Giolitti’s firm and dignified reply the European war would have broken out a year earlier,” adds Sforza. It will later be seen how Emperor Francis Joseph was pushed into this aggression against Serbia by Pope Pius X. But it should first of all be seen under what conditions the latter received the tiara.
The Austro-Germans want a pro-German Pope
“It was commonly thought,” writes Rene Bazin of the Academic francaise, “that Cardinal Rampolla would be elected. … He was considered as being favourable to France. .. . When, on the morning of 2 August 1903, the cardinals were gathered in the Sistine Chapel, Cardinal Puzyna, having accepted from the old Emperor of Austria, Francis Joseph, the task of preventing the election of Cardinal Rampolla, read out a passage in Latin, asserting that his sovereign was opposed to this designation. His disregard for reality was such that he declared himself honoured by his mission. It might have been hoped that these old abuses of secular power would remain in the history we read, and not pass into that which we live. Feelings ran high. Cardinal Rampolla immediately replied: ‘I regret that, in a pontifical election, a serious blow has been -struck by a lay power at the liberty of the Church and the dignity of the College of Cardinals, and I therefore protest most energetically. . . .’
“The evening’s poll yielded 35 votes for Guiseppe Sarto (Pius X) as against 16 for the Cardinal Rampolla. The following morning, 4 August 1903, he was elected by fifty votes. . . . The Pope’s coronation took place in St. Peter’s, on the morning of 9 August. . . . Cardinal Macchi placed the tiara on the Pontiff’s head, saying:
‘Receive the tiara of the three crowns, and know that thou art the father of princes and of kings, the world’s judge. . . .’ ” In the circumstances, this stock phrase was cruelly ironical, when—apparently at least—the entire Conclave had just bowed to the will of His Apostolic Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary.
The word “apparently” is stressed, for if the fact of the Austrian intervention is confirmed by the eminent historian Adrien Dansette, Charles Ledre, the Catholic writer, does not think that the intervention was really necessary … to convince the converted. Indeed, according to him, “it is useless to introduce, by way of explanation, the veto imposed by Austria—in basic agreement with Germany— at the election of Cardinal Rampolla. . . . Among the cardinals resolved to prevent Rampolla from acceding to the pontifical throne, were included many politicians—partisans of the Triple Alliance.”
Pope Pius X clearly proved this, when upon his accession, he chose as Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, Spanish prelate and avowed Germanophile, contrary to the custom which requires that the new pope keep in this post the incumbent who occupied it under his predecessor. But, this happened to be Mgr. Rampolla. Father Brugerette says of the new Pontiff:
“He took the name of Pope Pins X and the choice of this name, which brought back memories of Plus IX, was the presage of the government which was to render the new pontificate illustrious . . . Following the example of Plus IX, Plus X will in turn prove to be a non possumus” pope, regarding as primordial . . . the principles of authority upon which he had based his government.”
Indeed, very soon this authoritarian character began to show itself, and not only in religious matters.
Papal absolutism
“‘We shall not hide from you\ declared Plus X, on 9 November 1903, ‘that We are certain to shock some people when We say that We shall of necessity interest Ourselves in politics. . . .’ After that, what limits could be fixed to the power of the Papacy? Where is a clerical poUcy thus justified in its principles, to end?”
“Pius X has published a new ‘Syllabus’ of 65 heresies”, writes Father Fremont7 . . . “Pius X has just excommunicated whosoever will not accept his encyclical ‘Pascendi’. Whosoever does not accept it in its entirety, with all its implications, is excommunicated. But ill that case the encyclical is absolutely authentic? . . . It is therefore of the nature of revealed truth? . . . Plus X wants the bishops to be absolute masters of Catholic activity in their dioceses, in the three spheres of religion, politics and social policy”.
Thus the “Syllabus” of Pius IX and the encyclical “Pascendi” of Pius X confirm the papal refusal to recognize the sovereignty of lay society and Human Rights.
Pierre Cazenave, who asks himself whether the Catholic Church can avoid having some political influence, notes that, on account of her international character, every state has to meet her not only inside its frontiers, but also in the larger world of international politics, and he adds: “If it is fighting her within its frontiers, it runs the risk of having rise up against it a neighbouring state which has been seized by the Church or has given itself to her. . . .” This indeed, as will be seen, is what happened to France in 1914 and in 1939.
Frederic HofFet”, also, has clearly shown the fatality of this intrusion of the Roman clergy in the political field: “Catholicism is clerical and political in its very essence. Catholicism and clericalism are two interchangeable terms.. .. The Roman concept of the Church treats every true believer as a soldier at the service of the ecclesiastical institution, a soldier who, like all others, does not choose his weapons. . . .
“Anticlericalism is not the diabolical invention of Voltairean minds, the enemies of religion … it simply expresses the will of free men to shake off the yoke of a Church who, proclaiming herself the sole possessor of truth, insists on their submitting themselves to her and on their governments’ accepting her authority”.
This authority was powerful in Austria-Hungary, and the Holy See was at the same time working for its establishment in Germany, through the famous Zentrum (the Catholic Party) whose activity, inspired by the Vatican, was to prove decisive in the preparation of the first, and later of the second, world war.
The relations of the Holy Eucharist with the House of Habsburg
“Before the first world war,” writes Jean Bruhat, “the Vatican’s feelings were decidedly in favour of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Austria-Hungary was the great Catholic power par excellence. . . . Francis Joseph, who had come to power during the revolution of 1848, found in the Vatican an understanding friend and an efficient ally. The Roman Catholic Church had become a remarkable force for discipline, policy and government in the Habsburg monarchy. ‘Certainly,’ Maurice Pemot insists,” ‘there was marvelous agreement between the policy of Vienna and that of Rome’.”
“Must we recall to mind the great Eucharistic Congress held in Vienna in 1912? The old Emperor Francis Joseph followed the state carriage in which the Pope’s legate was carrying the Holy Sacrament, and a Jesuit Father delivered a sermon on the theme: ‘The relations of the Holy Eucharist with the House of Habsburg’. Now, Czechs aud Slovaks were living under the domination of the Habsburgs who had separated them in an attempt to divide them. To the feudal Magyars had been left the task of oppressing the SIovaks, in which they were assisted by the Vatican and the great ecclesiastical hierarchy. The Pope accepted a situation in which they had not a single bishop of their own nationality; he acquiesced in the banning of the use of the national language in schools and colleges (even during recreation periods); and he allowed the imprisonment of country priests who had remained faithful to the Czech and Slovak national ideal as well as to their faith.
“. . . In 1886, the Centre—the German Catholic Party—was against Bismarck’s military plans. Leo XIII intervened in German home affairs in Bismarck’s favour. His Secretary of State wrote to the Nuncio of Munich: ‘In view of the forthcoming revision of religious legislation which, we have reasons to think, will be effected in a conciliatory way, the Holy Father hopes that the Centre will do all in its power to promote the bill for a military septennate’.
“. . . In point of fact,” as Marc Bonnet remarks, “it was for reasons other than religious that the Vatican turned towards the Habsburg monarchy and the Hohenzollern Empire. The central European empires represented principles of order, hierarchy and preservation that were dear to the Papacy”. “Germany,” said Mgr. Fruhwirth in 1914, “is a country upon which the Holy Father can and must base great hopes”.
This is confirmed by a Catholic author, Joseph Rovan:
“German diplomats made representations—it was already an old habit—at the Vatican in order that the Pope might bring his influence to bear upon the Zentrum [Catholic Party) in favouring the military plans. . . . The German Catholics were sure to talk of the great ‘political mission’ of Germany, which was at the same time a universal spiritual mission. ‘France was arming for war, Germany in order to maintain peace; France’s policy was that of an imperialistic power, Germany’s that of Right and of peaceful work’! These words, written after the first world war by Karl Bachem, who for thirty years was one of the Zentrum’s principal parliamentary leaders before becoming its historian, show better than lengthy commentaries just how far the German Catholics shared a viewpoint attributable to insidious nationalism. . . .”
“Under the stimulus of Lieber (Chief of the Zentrum), the Zentrum supported the Government’s military, naval and colonial policy. . . . The Zentrum was equally responsible for prolonging a reign which, from vain boasting to weakness and from aggressive speeches to naval armaments, ended in leading Germany to catastrophe.. . .
“The Zentrum allowed the Emperor (William II) to start ‘his’ war against China in 1900, as if it were a personal matter, without Parliament being called upon to vote the necessary funds, and tolerated similar abuses in 1906 during the violent ‘pacification’ of South West Africa. . . .
“On the eve of the world catastrophe, German Catholics were participating fully in the material progress of their country, but they also bore a large part of its responsibilities. . . . The 1914 war broke out with the suddenness and brutality of a natural catastrophe . . . the Zentrum entered into the war convinced that its cause was well founded and sure of the purity and moral rectitude of its country’s leaders, of the coincidence of its programme and plan with the aims of eternal justice.
“‘If ever a war was just’, writes Karl Bachem, jurist. Deputy and Zentrum historiographer, ‘it was the Great War, so far as Germany and Austria were concerned’. That was the unanimous conviction of the Zentrum.”
“Carried away by the enthusiasm that was roused by the first great German victories, some of the Zentrum’s most reputable leaders succumbed to the mirage of a ‘victorious peace’ and propagated the idea of mass annexations destined to provide an invincible foundation for German hegemony in Europe.
“On 1 November 1917 the old ‘centrist’ leader, Baron—now Count—de Hertling, is nominated Chancellor. A decorated parliamentarian, an ‘ultramontane’ leader, occupying Bismarck’s place! . . .”
The accession of a Catholic to such a high function indeed speaks volumes on the long road travelled in Germany since the famous Kulturkampf, the battle for culture . . . and against the Roman Church, which had been so roughly handled by the “iron chancellor”. In this “Prussified” empire, with its mainly Lutheran population, the Holy See had nevertheless managed to acquire a great prestige by its endless complacency in supporting and encouraging the plans of the warlike camarilla.
On the other hand, and in consequence, one may say, its attitude towards France was entirely hostile. This was particularly noticeable during President Loubet’s visit to Rome. It should be remembered that the Papacy was refusing to relent towards Italy for having, after its unification, established its capital at Rome, the former Pontifical State which, it had occupied, and this led to the excommumcation of the Italian royal family. Now Delcasse, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was seeking a rapprochement with Italy:
“After the visit of Victor Emmanuel III to Paris,”writes Adrien Dansette,”which took place from 14 to 19 October 1903, the funds for President Loubet’s visit to Rome were voted ahnost unanimously. ‘Our actions are as offenceless as our intentions’, Delcasse explained; and he pointed out ‘how very dangerous it would be to let France believe that she could live in friendly relationship with the Supreme Head of the Catholic Church only at the price of neglecting or even sacrificing French interests. . . .'”
“President Loubet arrived in the Eternal City on 24 April 1904…. He would very much have liked to be received by the Pope; but ‘an inflexible protocol’ forbade this and it was in vain that during the preceding months, several French prelates had been trying to arrange the matter with Pius X. . . . On 28 April, Cardinal Merry del Val sent an indignant note of protest to the chancelleries. . . . Even the most moderate newspapers, such as Les Debats, criticized the Vatican’s attitude, since President Loubet’s journey had been undertaken for a ‘serious political reason’.”
The warning symptoms of the first world war
Charles Ledre says on this subject:”The drama draws near to its crisis. On 4 May, I’ Osservatore Romano announced that the Holy See had protested to the French Government and that it had communicated its protest to the Catholic powers. What was the object of such a step? To prevent Loubet’s precedent from becoming a habit. . . . Could the pontifical diplomats be unaware of this decisively important rapprochement which, after President Loubet’s visit to Rome, was now becoming clearly apparent?”
This was precisely where the Holy Father’s shoe pinched. The ill-humour so violently manifested on pretext of”protocol”had in reality a far deeper cause: the Franco-Italian rapprochement, which was about to breach the Triple Alliance and so to weaken the”secular arm”of Austria-Germany.
There is, incidentally, clear proof of the Vatican’s dishonesty in this question. The Pope was unable, according to the Vatican, to receive a head of state who, by visiting the King of Italy and Rome, appeared to recognize the legitimacy of the”usurpation”of that former Pontifical State. In fact, however, there had been precedents: on two occasions a head of state—William II—had been received at Rome by the King of Italy and the Pope at the same time. . . . Mgr. Cristiani, a prelate shortly to be mentioned again, aUudes to this in his recent book:
“Upon his accession, the new Emperor William II, when visiting his ally, the King of Italy, insisted also upon paying an official visit to the Pope, on 12 October 1888, a gesture which he was to repeat in 1903.”
The same thing had happened with Edward VII, King of England, and with the Tzar.
This shows the value of the plea of”inflexible protocol”invoked by the Roman Curia.
Pope Pius X provokes France
“The French papers are in a bad temper. . . . Only the Croix continues to stigmatize the Republic”,17 wrote Yvon Lapaquellerie.
As a result of a storm of abuse from the press, the French Ambassador was dismissed; relations with the Vatican became increasingly strained; and, two years later, Parliament was voting a law of separation of the Church from the State. Thus for the Roman Church France became Enemy No. 1.
Mein Kampf
Adrien Dansette reports the following:
“On 11 February 1906, the Pope promulgated the encyclical ‘Vehementer’. It condemns the principle of separation. . . . Despite the opinion of the French cardinals, it also condemns the methods. . . . He was to joke at the beginning of 1907, in front of Camille Bellaigue (Pope Pius X’s confidant):
—Holy Father, what are you going to do in the French affair?
—Teach the French Government a lesson, of course.
This startled Bellaigue:
—Oh! Holy Father, do you really think of doing that?
—Oh, yes, it has been in my mind a long time. . . .
“Some years later he was to say: ‘Those people (the Liberals) want to be flattered and handled with velvet gloves. But one has to fight with fists. In a duel, blows are neither counted nor measured. . . . War is not fought with charity; it is a battle, a duel. . . .”
This is the duel which began in 1914, continued in 1939 and still goes on today, especially with the”stab in the back”that is being dealt by the Vatican in Algeria. The lasting character of the Church’s hatred is seen again in what a”prelate of His Holiness”—as he calls himself—dares to write today on the origin of the first world war.
Mgr. Cristiani, or the art of falsifying history
“Through a strangely blind and ill-considered policy, our country seemed to take pleasure in provoking the bellicose appetites of its redoubtable neighbour . . . indeed, the Franco-Russian alliance seemed to threaten Gennany with encirclement. . . .”
It is easy to recognize in this the everlasting slogan, dear to both William II and Hitler. Nor need we be surprised to see it issue from the pen of one of His Holiness’s prelates. Nevertheless we take the liberty of reminding this monseigneurial historian of a few dates.
The alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary had been in existence from 1879. Italy joined the two central empires in 1882, thus constituting the Triple Alliance. France, on the other hand, was alone, without an ally, in face of this bloc, and she put an end to her isolation—wrongly, according to Mgr. Cristiani, and”through a strangely blind and ill-considered policy”—by allying herself with Russia in 1894.
Such is the Vatican—not to say the German—brand of history, which is taught to the children of France in the so-called”free’ schools. It is understandable that the”sectarians”who have been so much disgraced should not be enthusiastic about it.,. Before leaving this historian and prelate—who may be French, but is certainly a Francophobe—let us glean from him a few more lines on the subject of the 1914 conflict: “There were even those who dared to put out what was called the ‘infamous rumour’, by which evilly disposed people tried to pin on to the Church and the clergy the responsibility for the terrible scourge of the war. . . .”
Infamous rumour! That sounds fine. In this vengeful expression the adjective and noun go very well together, and its euphony cannot be impeached. But can we say as much for its truth? This will be seen in the following chapter.